Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – s.105 – Registration Act, 1908 – s.47 – An advertisement was published on 12.10.2011 by the respondent-Corporation inviting applications for grant of dealership of petrol pumps – Appellant applied on 11.11.2011 – After evaluation, the appellant was placed in the first position – A complaint was made – Pursuant thereto, the respondent took the view that the lease dated 08.11.2011 which was the foundation for the offer made by the appellant would commence from the date of approval of the petrol outlet – This meant that the possession over the premises did not amount to a lease and on the date of the execution of the lease deed the lease had not come into force – Appellant made several representations, which were rejected by the Corporation – Writ petition filed before the High Court was also dismissed – On appeal, held: In the instant case, here is a lease deed which contemplated the period of the lease commencing at a point of time in the future – What is more it would commence only with effect from the date of approval of the petrol pump – The parties in fact contemplated in clause 7 that in case the petrol pump was not approved then the second party (the appellant) must handover the land transferred on rent to the first party – Further, a perusal of clause 5 would reveal that lease period is explained as after ‘the expiry of 30 years’ and it speaks about the renewal of the lease period – The completion of the lease period which is after the expiry of the 30 years again would have to be reckoned only with effect from the date of approval of the petrol pump – Therefore, it is clear that the lease which the appellant laid store by contemplated the period of the lease commencing not on the date of the lease but at a point of time in the future – The lease did not take effect on the date of the lease namely 08.11.2011 or on date of application 11.11.2011 AND ORS.
– As a result, the appellant cannot be possibly entitled to the benefit of 35 marks which is vouchsafed only for those applicants who inter alia had a long-term lease as on the date of the application – As far as s.47 of the registration Act is concerned, on facts, it would not have the effect of preponing the period of the lease as commencing from the date of the execution of the lease – The lease would operate on its terms and the period of the lease would commence only upon approval being granted despite it being registered – Thus, there is no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment passed by the High Court.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. A lease of immovable property is a transfer of immovable property. The transfer consists of the transfer of a right to enjoy immovable property. It creates an interest in the property. One of the essential elements of the lease is the period of time for which the demise holds good. A lease may be for certain time which may be express or implied. It may also be in perpetuity. Therefore, when one thinks of a lease of an immovable property one of the essential terms would be the period for which the lease operates. In this case, the lease or the period of the lease is 30 years. The question would immediately arise as to when the lease bears life. The expression ‘certain time’ is premised on there being a beginning in point of time and the end again with reference to time. ‘Certain time’ would in other words be a period of time. The answer is given by the lease itself, namely that the period begins with effect from the date of approval of the petrol pump. In other words, here is a lease deed which contemplated the period of the lease commencing at a point of time in the future. What is more it would commence only with effect from the date of approval of the petrol pump. The parties in fact contemplated in clause 7 that in case the petrol pump was not approved then the second party (the ‘appellant’) must handover the land transferred on rent to the first party. [Para 13][211-C-G]
2. A perusal of clause 5 would reveal that lease period is explained as after ‘the expiry of 30 years’ and it speaks about the renewal of the lease period. The completion of the lease period which is after the expiry of the 30 years again would have to be reckoned only with effect from the date of approval of the petrol pump. Therefore, it is clear that the lease which the appellant laid store by contemplated the period of the lease commencing not on the date of the lease but at a point of time in the future. In fact, the point of time or the event upon which the period of lease was to begin with itself uncertain. Maybe it is true that it could come into effect upon future events taking shape on the principle that in equity on the future event happening relating to the subject matter of the lease, the lease could have affected the property in the future. But we need not explore the matter on those lines any further as it is clear that the lease did not take effect on the date of the lease namely 8.11.2011. If that be so there was also no lease in place as on the date of the application namely 11.11.2011. [Para 14][212-A-D]
3. The appellant attempted to derive support from Section
47 of the Registration Act, 1908. Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908 is only intended to give effect to the lease deed which is registered at a later point of time than when it is executed. It is intended to provide that the document which is registered will have efficacy on its own terms with effect from the time when it was supposed to have come into effect under the document. In other words, the fact that it is registered at a later point of time could not detract from the document commencing to operate when it would have commenced but for it not having been registered. In fact, if one applies Section 47 of the Registration Act, to the facts of this case it would not have the effect of preponing the period of the lease as commencing from the date of the execution of the lease. The lease would operate on its terms and the period of the lease would commence only upon approval being granted despite it being registered. [Para 15][212D-F] Jugalkishore Saraf v. M/s. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd., AIR 1955 SC 376 – relied on.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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