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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon’ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul)
CRR 5367 of 2024
Anamitra Acharya
Vs
The State of West Bengal & Anr.
For the Petitioner
:
Mr. Ayan Bhattacharjee, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Shounak Mondal.
For the State
:
Mr. Pritam Roy,
Mr. Avishek Bhandari.
For the Opposite Party No.2 :
Mr. Dipanjan Dutt,
Mr. Surojit Saha.
Judgment reserved on
:
23.09.2026
Judgment delivered on
:
01.10.2026
Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.:
1.
The criminal revisional application has been preferred praying for
quashing of the proceedings of G. R. (S) No. 230 of 2024 arising out of
Hare Street Police Station Case No. 70 of 2024 dated February 28,
2024 under Sections 420/406/467/468/471/120B of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 pending before the Court of the Learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Calcutta.
2.
The husband of the instant petitioner, namely Tapan Kumar Acharya
(since deceased), happened to operate a construction business in the
form of sole proprietorship under the name and style of "T.K.
Construction". The instant petitioner had no role to play whatsoever in
the business of her deceased husband, and also was not involved in or
took any interest in the said business in any manner whatsoever.
3.
On March 10, 2023, the husband of the instant petitioner expired on
account of brain death. Immediately after the demise, the instant
petitioner took the noble decision of donating the pair of kidneys of her
deceased husband, and stood by such decision to materialize the same.
4.
It was only during the condolence gathering of her deceased husband,
that the instant petitioner got acquainted with the opposite party no.2
for the first time. It was during such condolence gathering that the
opposite party no.2 introduced himself to the instant petitioner, and
made disclosures regarding the purported inter se transactions
between the opposite party no.2 and the deceased husband of the
instant petitioner. The opposite party no.2 further went on to project
that the deceased husband of the petitioner happened to owe a portion
of a purported amount which was extended as credit by the opposite
party no.2 to the deceased husband of the petitioner during his
lifetime. The opposite party no.2 also disclosed his intention to buy
one of the residential properties of the deceased husband of the
petitioner with the balance amount.
5.
The allegations made in the application under Section 156(3), Cr. P.C.
which led to the registration of the present police case are as follows:-
“That the complainant was allegedly introduced to the
petitioner and her husband through a common friend in
the year 2013-14 and the complainant had a friendly
relationship with the husband of the petitioner. It is the
case of the complainant that the petitioner and her
deceased husband had introduced the complainant to the
accused no.2 also who is the brother of the petitioner and
the brother of the deceased husband of the petitioner”.
6.
The specific allegations are as follows:“That
sometime
in
April,
the
deceased
had
approached the complainant at his work place and
informed him that he was in dire need of financial
assistance for certain personal requirements. At the outset,
when the deceased came up with such a request to the
complainant, the complainant was hesitant but later on the
accused no.1 along with her husband, had approached the
complainant
and
made
numerous
false
assurances
regarding repayment of the monetary assistance sought by
them. The accused persons as also the deceased had
promised the complainant that not only the principal
amount would be repaid back to him but also a certain
compensatory amount would be paid additionally to him
as an interest to the principal amount. The accused
persons further represented that they were prepared to
hand over a Deed of their flat which is situated at FD-294,
Sector III, Salt Lake, Kolkata. 700106. The accused no. 1
went to the extent of considering the complainant as her
elder brother and requested him to help her in their
difficult times.”
7.
On the very next day the accused persons had paid a visit to the
complainant along with the Deed of the aforesaid flat. The accused
persons had canvassed that they considered the complainant as their
own and as such, they were not willing to go to any bank. On
scrutinizing the Deed, the complainant was apprised of the fact that
the said Deed was not registered in the name of the deceased or in the
name of the accused persons. On questioning regarding such anomaly,
the accused no. 1 had stated that the said Deed shall be registered in
no time and soon after the registration is completed, they would hand
over the same to the complainant.
8.
The complainant in good faith and with intention of helping the
accused persons as also the deceased, had decided to part away with a
sum of Rs. 60,00,000/-.The deceased had requested the complainant
to remit the said amount to the bank account of his proprietary
concern as also to his personal bank account. The accused persons
had promised to repay the said amount within March, 2023 along with
a compensatory amount which would be payable on a monthly basis.
9.
That sometime in the end of November, 2021 the deceased had visited
the office of the complainant and handed him over a photocopy of the
Deed of the aforesaid property along with a building plan and a letter
issued by the Land Manager, Bidhannagar dated 26.10.2021. Apart
from the said documents, photostat copies of PAN and Aadhar Card of
accused no. 1, Certificate of Enlistment and E-Receipt, License
Department, Kolkata Municipal Corporation and a photocopy of a
Registration Certificate (Form GST REG – 06) were also handed over.
10.
After handing over such documents the deceased had once again
sought for a financial assistance of Rs. 5 lakhs from the complainant
and he gave an Account No. being maintained with HDFC Bank, Salt
Lake branch bearing no. 00181000223524.
11.
In spite of several requests the accused persons did not pay a single
farthing to the complainant and on each and every occasion, had
sought for further time to make the payments to the complainant.
Sometimes in April, 2022 the accused persons had provided with two
Photostat copies of letters issued by the Joint Municipal Commissioner,
Bidhannagar Municipal Corporation dated 31.03.2022.
12.
It has been further stated by the complainant that since October, 2022
when the husband of the petitioner expired and after the death of her
husband the complainant allegedly approached the petitioner for
repayment when the petitioner allegedly assured that once her property
was sold, he would return the money. It is further stated that prior
to filing of the complaint, the complainant came to know that the
petitioner sold her property at Salt Lake and after getting the
news, he was totally shocked and proceeded to file the complaint.
13.
The State has placed the case diary wherefrom it appears from the case
diary that the investigation revealed that the account 251969001953
belonged to T. K. Construction wherein the FIR named accused
Anamitra Acharya is the nominee and wherein the complainant of the
case has deposited Rs.27 lakhs, and on multiple cash withdrawals, the
account was closed at present. It is evident that the accused has
withdrawn the entire money present in the said account mainly by
withdrawing the cash money through ATM and transferring to multiple
places. The withdrawal count of the said account is 336 and the
deposit count is 38. The total withdrawal amount is ₹ 1,43,24,061/and the deposit amount is the same.
14.
The account in question i.e., 00181000223524 that belongs to the FIR
named accused Anamitra Acharya has deposits from another account
of Indian Bank belonging to TK Constructions and also from her
husband and the said account also shows multiple withdrawal by the
FIR named accused person.
15.
The account of deceased Tapan Kumar Acharya also shows multiple
case withdrawals through ATM and transferring to multiple places. The
withdrawal count of the said account is 74 and the deposit count is 37.
The total withdrawal mount is Rs.31,88,723/- and the deposit amount
is the same.
16.
It appears from the materials on record including the petition of
complaint under Section 156(3) that prima facie the complainant had
allegedly paid a sum of Rs.60 lakhs allegedly to the husband of the
petitioner.
17.
From the statements made in the petition of complaint it appears that
prima facie the complainant was interested in purchasing the
property at Salt Lake which belonged to the petitioner and her
husband. The petition of complaint has been made after the death
of the petitioner’s husband when the complainant got the
information that the property at Salt Lake had been sold. Though
the complainant has shown bank transaction for transfer of the said
amount, there are no documents like agreement receipts or any
memorandum of understanding etc. to show prima facie as to why the
said amount had been handed over to the petitioner and her husband.
The reasons for such loan is not clear and the Court can only presume
considering the documents referred to, that there was something to do
with the transfer of the property at Salt Lake.
It is when the said
property was sold to a third party, that the complainant being
aggrieved has filed the criminal case.
18.
On perusal of the report submitted by the Officer-in-charge, Hare
Street Police Station, it appears that the money transactions referred to
by the Investigating Officer relate to the partnership business which
the petitioner’s husband admittedly had. The petitioner herein was
not a partner in the said business but was a nominee of her
husband and it is in accordance with law that the amount that
stood in the account was transferred in her name after the death
of her husband. There is no prima facie illegality in such transfer.
19.
The transfer of money, as stated by the Investigating Agency in respect
of the business of the petitioner’s husband, is in no way connected with
the amount allegedly come to the petitioner’s husband from the
complainant, as to why the said amount was given. There is nothing
in writing and it is only the statement of the complainant on the basis
of which such a criminal case has been registered. The complainant’s
relief thus lies before the Civil Court and in the present case this Court
finds no criminality involved in the conduct of the petitioner herein.
20.
In Naresh Kumar & Anr. Vs The State of Karnataka & Anr., in
Criminal Appeal No. ……….. of 2024 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.
1570 of 2021), decided on March 12, 2024, the Supreme Court
held:“5. Under these circumstances, we are of the considered
view that this is a case where the inherent powers
should have been exercised by the High Court under
Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code as the
powers are there to stop the abuse of the process and to
secure the ends of justice.
6. In the case of Paramjeet Batra v. State of
Uttarakhand (2013) 11 SCC 673, this Court
recognized that although the inherent powers of a High
Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure should be exercised sparingly, yet the High
Court must not hesitate in quashing such criminal
proceedings which are essentially of a civil nature. This
is what was held:
“12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482
of the Code the High Court has to be cautious. This
power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose
of preventing abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint
discloses a criminal offence or not depends upon the
nature of facts alleged therein. Whether essential
ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to
be judged by the High Court. A complaint disclosing
civil transactions may also have a criminal
texture. But the High Court must see whether a
dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is
given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a
situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in
fact, adopted as has happened in this case, the
High Court should not hesitate to quash the
criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process
of the court.”
(emphasis supplied)
Relying upon the decision in Paramjeet Batra (supra),
this Court in Randheer Singh v. State of U.P. (2021)
14 SCC 626, observed that criminal proceedings cannot
be taken recourse to as a weapon of harassment. In
Usha Chakraborty & Anr. v. State of West Bengal
& Anr. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 90, relying upon
Paramjeet Batra (supra) it was again held that where
a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature, is given a
cloak of a criminal offence, then such disputes can be
quashed, by exercising the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
7. Essentially, the present dispute between the parties
relates to a breach of contract. A mere breach of
contract, by one of the parties, would not attract
prosecution for criminal offence in every case, as held by
this Court in Sarabjit Kaur v. State of Punjab and
Anr. (2023) 5 SCC 360. Similarly, dealing with the
distinction between the offence of cheating and a mere
breach of contractual obligations, this Court, in Vesa
Holdings (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2015) 8 SCC
293, has held that every breach of contract would not
give rise to the offence of cheating, and it is required to
be shown that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest
intention at the time of making the promise.”
21.
In Anukul Singh vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr., in Criminal
Appeal No. 4250 of 2025 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2682 of
2020), decided on September 24, 2025, the Supreme Court held:“11. Before adverting to the facts of the present case, it
is necessary to recapitulate the settled legal principles
governing the exercise of inherent powers under Section
482 Cr.P.C. It is well established that though the High
Court possesses wide and plenary inherent jurisdiction,
such power is not unbridled or unlimited, but
circumscribed by self-imposed restraints evolved
through judicial pronouncements.
11.1. This Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan
Lal10 , at paragraph 102, laid down illustrative
categories where quashing of proceedings is justified.
These are:
“(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a case against
the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do
not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of
the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within
the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of
the same do not disclose the commission of any offence
and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever reach a just
conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under
which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or,
where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act
concerned, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to
spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
The categories in Bhajan Lal are illustrative and not
exhaustive, but they provide guiding principles to
balance two competing considerations – (a)preventing
abuse of process of law, and (b)ensuring that criminal
proceedings are not stifled at the threshold on disputed
questions of fact.
11.2. Equally, this Court has consistently cautioned that
the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under
Section 482 Cr.P.C., cannot embark upon a “minitrial” or
weigh the sufficiency of evidence, which falls within the
domain of the trial Court. The scope of enquiry is
confined to whether, on a plain reading of the FIR /
complaint and accompanying material, the ingredients
of the alleged offence are disclosed. [See: Rajiv Thapar
v. Madal Lal Kapoor 11 , HMT Watches v. Abida12,
and Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan v. the State (Govt.
of NCT of Delhi) and others13].
11.3. In Md. Allauddin Khan v. State of Bihar 14 ,
it was reiterated that appreciation of contradictions or
inconsistencies in witness statements lies within the
exclusive domain of the trial Court and not in
proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Similarly, in CBI
v. Aryan Singh15 , it was emphasized that the High
Court had exceeded its jurisdiction by examining the
merits of the prosecution’s case and holding that
charges were not proved, which is a matter strictly for
trial.
11.4. Nevertheless, an exception has been recognized
where the defence relies upon unimpeachable,
incontrovertible evidence of sterling quality – such as
documents of undisputed authenticity – which ex facie
demonstrate that continuation of criminal proceedings
would be unjust and oppressive. This principle was
recognized in Suryalakshmi Cotton Mills Ltd v.
Rajvir Industries Ltd16, and followed in subsequent
decisions.
11.5. Thus, the cumulative principles that emerge are:
while the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C is
extraordinary and must be exercised sparingly, it is the
duty of the High Court to intervene where continuation
of criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of
process of law, or where the dispute is purely of a civil
nature and criminal colour has been artificially given to
it. Conversely, where disputed questions of fact arise
requiring adjudication, the matter must ordinarily
proceed to trial.
17. This Court has, in a long line of decisions,
deprecated the tendency to convert civil disputes into
criminal proceedings. In Indian Oil Corporation v.
M/s. NEPC India Ltd. 17 , it was held that criminal
law cannot be used as a tool to settle scores in
commercial or contractual matters, and that such
misuse amounts to abuse of process. The following
paragraphs from the decision are apposite:
“9. The principles, relevant to our purpose are:
(i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations
made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged
against the accused. For this purpose, the complaint has
to be examined as a whole, but without examining the
merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a
meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment
of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the
complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for
quashing of a complaint.
(ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear
abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal
proceeding is found to have been initiated with
malafides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause
harm, or where the allegations are absurd and
inherently improbable.
(iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to
stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power
should be used sparingly and with abundant caution.
(iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce
the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the
necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint,
merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not
been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be
quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only
where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts
which are absolutely necessary for making out the
offence.
(v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil
wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil
wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial
transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from
furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil
law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature
and scope of a civil proceedings are different from a
criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint
relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract,
for which a civil remedy is available or has been
availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal
proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the
complaint disclose a criminal offence or not.
10. While on this issue, it is necessary to take notice of
a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely
civil disputes into criminal cases. This is obviously on
account of a prevalent impression that civil law
remedies are time consuming and do not adequately
protect the interests of lenders/creditors. Such a
tendency is seen in several family disputes also, leading
to irretrievable break down of marriages/families. There
is also an impression that if a person could somehow be
entangled in a criminal prosecution, there is a likelihood
of imminent settlement. Any effort to settle civil disputes
and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence,
by applying pressure though criminal prosecution
should be deprecated and discouraged.”
18. Similarly, in Inder Mohan Goswami and another
v. State of Uttaranchal and others18 , it was
emphasized that criminal prosecution must not be
permitted as an instrument of harassment or private
vendetta. In Ganga Dhar Kalita v. State of Assam19
, this Court again reiterated that criminal complaints in
respect of property disputes of civil nature, filed solely to
harass the accused or to exert pressure in civil litigation,
constitute an abuse of process.
19. Most recently, in Shailesh Kumar Singh @
Shailesh R. Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and
others 20 , this Court disapproved the practice of using
criminal proceedings as a substitute for civil remedies,
observing that money recovery cannot be enforced
through criminal prosecution where the dispute is
essentially civil. The Court cautioned High Courts not to
direct settlements in such matters but to apply the
settled principles in Bhajan Lal. The following
paragraphs are relevant in this context:
“9. What we have been able to understand is that there
is an oral agreement between the parties. The
Respondent No.4 might have parted with some money in
accordance with the oral agreement and it may be that
the appellant – herein owes a particular amount to be
paid to the Respondent No.4. However, the question is
whether prima facie any offence of cheating could be
said to have been committed by the appellant.
10. How many times the High Courts are to be reminded
that to constitute an offence of cheating, there has to be
something more than prima facie on record to indicate
that the intention of the accused was to cheat the
complainant right from the inception. The plain reading
of the FIR does not disclose any element of criminality.
11. The entire case is squarely covered by a recent
pronouncement of this Court in the case of “Delhi Race
Club (1940) Limited vs. State of Uttar Pradesh” reported
in (2024) 10 SCC 690. In the said decision, the entire
law as to what constitutes cheating and criminal breach
of trust respectively has been exhaustively explained. It
appears that this very decision was relied upon by the
learned counsel appearing for the petitioner before the
High Court. However, instead of looking into the matter
on its own merits, the High Court thought fit to direct the
petitioner to go for mediation and that too by making
payment of Rs. 25,00,000/- to the 4th respondent as a
condition precedent. We fail to understand why the High
Court should undertake such exercise. The High Court
may either allow the petition saying that no offence is
disclosed or may reject the petition saying that no case
for quashing is made out. Why should the High Court
make an attempt to help the complainant to recover the
amount due and payable by the accused. It is for the
Civil Court or Commercial Court as the case may be to
look into in a suit that may be filed for recovery of
money or in any other proceedings, be it under the
Arbitration Act, 1996 or under the provisions of the IB
Code, 2016.
12. Why the High Court was not able to understand that
the entire dispute between the parties is of a civil
nature.
13. We also enquired with the learned counsel
appearing for the Respondent No.4 whether his client
has filed any civil suit or has initiated any other
proceedings for recovery of the money. It appears that
no civil suit has been filed for recovery of money till this
date. Money cannot be recovered, more particularly, in a
civil dispute between the parties by filing a First
Information Report and seeking the help of the Police.
This amounts to abuse of the process of law.
14. We could have said many things but we refrain from
observing anything further. If the Respondent No.4 has
to recover a particular amount, he may file a civil suit or
seek any other appropriate remedy available to him in
law. He cannot be permitted to take recourse of criminal
proceedings.
15. We are quite disturbed by the manner in which the
High Court has passed the impugned order. The High
Court first directed the appellant to pay Rs.25,00,000/to the Respondent No.4 and thereafter directed him to
appear before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre for
the purpose of settlement. That’s not what is expected of
a High Court to do in a Writ Petition filed under Article
226 of the Constitution or a miscellaneous application
filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 for quashing of FIR or any other
criminal proceedings. What is expected of the High Court
is to look into the averments and the allegations levelled
in the FIR along with the other material on record, if
any. The High Court seems to have forgotten the
wellsettled principles as enunciated in the decision of
this Court in the “State of Haryana & Others vs. Bhajan
Lal & Others” Reported in 1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335.””
22.
In Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited and Ors. vs State of Uttar Pradesb
& Anr., (2024) 10 SCC 690, wherein the Supreme Court held:“38. In our view, the plain reading of the complaint fails to
spell out any of the aforesaid ingredients noted above. We
may only say, with a view to clear a serious misconception
of law in the mind of the police as well as the courts below,
that if it is a case of the complainant that offence of criminal
breach of trust as defined under Section 405IPC, punishable
under Section 406IPC, is committed by the accused, then in
the same breath it cannot be said that the accused has also
committed the offence of cheating as defined and explained
in Section 415IPC, punishable under Section 420IPC.”
23.
From the materials on record including the case diary it appears
that the dispute in the present case is clearly a private civil
dispute and in such cases of alleged breach of agreement, it has to be
prima facie shown that there was/is criminal intent present.
Admittedly
there
was
a
business
arrangement
between
the
complainant and the husband of the petitioner herein.
24.
The materials on record, herein including the case diary, do not prima
facie show presence of the ingredients required to constitute the
offences alleged against the petitioner herein, with also absence of
criminal intent and as such the proceeding in this case is liable to be
quashed in the interest of Justice, to prevent an abuse of the process
of law.
25.
CRR 5367 of 2024 is thus allowed.
26.
The proceedings of G. R. (S) No. 230 of 2024 arising out of Hare Street
Police Station Case No. 70 of 2024 dated February 28, 2024 under
Sections 420/406/467/468/471/120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
pending before the Court of the Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Calcutta, is hereby quashed in respect of the petitioner namely
Anamitra Acharya.
27.
All connected Applications, if any, stand disposed of.
28.
Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
29.
Copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Trial Court for necessary
compliance.
30.
Urgent certified website copy of this judgment, if applied for, be
supplied expeditiously after complying with all, necessary legal
formalities.
(Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.)
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