Amazon.Com Nv Investment Holdings Llc vs Future Retail Limited & Ors.

s. 37 – Appealable orders – Order passed u/s. 17(2) in enforcement of the award of an Emergency Arbitrator by Single Judge of the High Court – Appeal thereagainst u/s. 37 – Held: No appeal lies u/s. 37 against an order of enforcement of an Emergency Arbitrator’s order made u/s. 17(2) of the Act. Arbitration Rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre: r. 1.3 – Term Emergency arbitration – Explanation of – Held: Reading of the SIAC Rules indicates that even before an arbitral tribunal is constituted under the Rules, urgent interim reliefs can be granted by an “Emergency Arbitrator” –An Emergency Arbitrator as defined by r. 1.3 means an arbitrator in accordance with paragraph 3 of Schedule 1 – Emergency Arbitrator has all the powers vested in the arbitral tribunal pursuant to SIAC Rules, including the authority to rule on his own jurisdiction – Emergency Arbitrator has the power to order such interim relief that he deems necessary, and is to give summary reasons for his decision in writing – Once the arbitral tribunal is constituted under paragraph 10, the tribunal may reconsider, modify, or vacate any such interim order – Such interim order or award issued by the Emergency Arbitrator would continue to bind the parties unless it is modified or vacated by the arbitral tribunal, once it is constituted, until the tribunal makes a final award or until the claim is withdrawn. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Ord XLIII, r. 1(r) – Appeals from orders – Maintainbility of appeal under Ord. XLIII, r. 1(r), when enforcement order of the award of an Emergency Arbitrator made under Arbitration Act – Explained.

Disposing of the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1.1 A reading of sections 2(6), 2(8), 19(2) and 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 would show that an arbitration proceeding can be administered by a permanent arbitral institution. Importantly, Section 2(6) makes it clear that parties are free to authorise any person including an institution to determine issues that arise between the parties. Also, under Section 2(8), party autonomy goes to the extent of an agreement which includes being governed by arbitration rules referred to in the aforesaid agreements. Likewise, under Section 19(2), parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by an arbitral tribunal in conducting its proceedings. Section 21 provides that arbitral proceedings in respect of a particular dispute commence on the date on which a request for that dispute to be referred to arbitration is received by the respondent. This Section is expressly subject to agreement by the parties. [Paras 11, 12] [801-E-H]

1.2 By agreeing to the application of the Arbitration Rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC Rules), the arbitral proceedings in the instant case can be said to have commenced from the date of receipt of a complete notice of arbitration by the Registrar of the SIAC, which would indicate that arbitral proceedings under the SIAC Rules commence much before the constitution of an arbitral tribunal under the said Rules. This being the case, when Section 17(1) uses the expression “during the arbitral proceedings”, the said expression would be elastic enough, when read with the provisions of Section 21 of the Act, to include emergency arbitration proceedings, which only commence after receipt of notice of arbitration by the Registrar under Rule 3.3 of the SIAC Rules. A conjoint reading of these provisions coupled with there being no interdict, either express or by necessary implication, against an Emergency Arbitrator would show that an Emergency Arbitrator’s orders, if provided for under institutional rules, would be covered by the Arbitration Act. [Paras 12, 13][802-C-F]

Antrix Corporation Ltd. v. Devas Multimedia Pvt. Ltd. (2014) 11 SCC 560 : [2013] 6 SCR 453; Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. (2016) 4 SCC 126 : [2016] 1 SCR 364; PASL Wind Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v. GE Power Conversion India Pvt. Ltd. 2021 SCC OnLine SC 331; National Highways Authority of India v. M. Hakeem 2021 SCC OnLine SC 473 – referred to.

1.3 The parties to the contract, in the instant case, by agreeing to the SIAC Rules and the award of the Emergency Arbitrator, have not bypassed any mandatory provision of the Arbitration Act. There is nothing in the Arbitration Act that prohibits contracting parties from agreeing to a provision providing for an award being made by an Emergency Arbitrator. On the contrary, when properly read, various Sections of the Act which speak of party autonomy in choosing to be governed by institutional rules would make it clear that the said rules would apply to govern the rights between the parties, a position which, far from being prohibited by the Arbitration Act, is specifically endorsed by it. [Para 17][807-G-H; 808-A-B]

Centrotrade Minerals & Metal Inc. v. Hindustan Copper Ltd. (2017) 2 SCC 228:[2016] 9 SCR 83 distinguished.

1.4 There can be no doubt that the “arbitral tribunal” as defined in Section 2(1)(d) speaks only of an arbitral tribunal that is constituted between the parties and which can give interim and final relief, “given the scheme of the Act”, as contained in the aforementioned Sections. However, like every other definition section, the definition contained in Section 2(1)(d) only applies “unless the context otherwise requires”. Given that the definition of “arbitration” in Section 2(1)(a) means any arbitration, whether or not administered by a permanent arbitral institution, when read with Sections 2(6) and 2(8), would make it clear that even interim orders that are passed by Emergency Arbitrators under the rules of a permanent arbitral institution would, on a proper reading of Section 17(1), be included within its ambit. It is significant to note that the words “arbitral proceedings” are not limited by any definition and thus encompass proceedings before an Emergency Arbitrator with reference to Section 21 of the Act read with the SIAC Rules. [Para 19][808-F-H; 809-A]

1.5 The heart of Section 17(1) is the application by a party for interim reliefs. There is nothing in Section 17(1), when read with the other provisions of the Act, to interdict the application of rules of arbitral institutions that the parties may have agreed to. This being the position, at least insofar as Section 17(1) is concerned, the “arbitral tribunal” would, when institutional rules apply, include an Emergency Arbitrator, the context of Section

17 “otherwise requiring”-the context being interim measures that are ordered by arbitrators. The same object and context would apply even to Section 9(3) which makes it clear that the court shall not entertain an application for interim relief once an arbitral tribunal is constituted unless the court finds that circumstances exist which may not render the remedy provided under Section 17 efficacious. Since Section 9(3) and Section 17 form part of one scheme, it is clear that an “arbitral tribunal” as defined under Section 2(1)(d) would not apply and the arbitral tribunal spoken of in Section 9(3) would be like the “arbitral tribunal” spoken of in Section 17(1) which would include an Emergency Arbitrator appointed under institutional rules. [Para 20][809-B-E]

Firm Ashok Traders v. Gurumukh Das Saluja (2004) 3 SCC 155:[2004] 1 SCR 404 – referred to.

1.6 Even if section 25.2 of the FCPL Shareholders’ Agreement (pari materia with section 15.2 of the FRL Shareholders’ Agreement) makes the SIAC Rules subject to the Arbitration Act, the said Act, properly construed, would include an Emergency Arbitrator’s awards/orders, there being nothing inconsistent in the SIAC Rules when read with the Act. Rule 1.3 of the SIAC Rules indicates that an award of an Emergency Arbitrator is included within the ambit of these Rules, and that an Emergency Arbitrator, as defined, means an arbitrator appointed in accordance with paragraph 3 of Schedule 1. This makes it clear beyond doubt that “arbitration” mentioned in section 25.2 of the FCPL Shareholders’ Agreement would include an arbitrator appointed in accordance with the SIAC Rules which, in turn, would include an Emergency Arbitrator. The SIAC Rules deal with the concept of an Emergency Arbitrator. [Paras 22-24][811-C-F]

1.7 A reading of the SIAC Rules indicates that even before an arbitral Tribunal is constituted under the Rules, urgent interim reliefs can be granted by what is termed as an “Emergency Arbitrator”. An “Emergency Arbitrator” is defined by Rule 1.3 of these Rules as meaning an arbitrator in accordance with paragraph 3 of Schedule 1. Under paragraph 7 of Schedule 1, the Emergency Arbitrator has all the powers vested in the arbitral tribunal pursuant to SIAC Rules, including the authority to rule on his own jurisdiction. Importantly, under paragraph 8 of Schedule

1 to the SIAC Rules, the Emergency Arbitrator shall have the power to order such interim relief that he deems necessary, and is to give summary reasons for his decision in writing. Under paragraph 9, the interim order is to be made within 14 days of his appointment, unless time is extended. Importantly, once the arbitral tribunal is constituted under paragraph 10, the tribunal may reconsider, modify, or vacate any such interim order. Such interim order or award issued by the Emergency Arbitrator will continue to bind the parties unless it is modified or vacated by the arbitral tribunal, once it is constituted, until the tribunal makes a final award or until the claim is withdrawn. Paragraph 10 of Schedule 1 also provides that any interim order or award made by the Emergency Arbitrator shall cease to be binding only if the tribunal is not constituted within 90 days of such order or award. Under paragraph 12, the parties agree that such orders shall be binding on the parties from the date it is made and undertake to carry out the interim order immediately and without delay. [Para 25][814-C-G]

1.8 The 246th Law Commission Report did provide for the insertion of an Emergency Arbitrator’s orders into Section 2(1)(d) of the Arbitration Act. It is pertinent to note that the High-Level Committee constituted by the Government of India under the chairmanship of Justice B.N. Srikrishna (Retd.) to review the institutionalisation of arbitration mechanism in India and look into the provisions of the Arbitration Act after the 2015 Amendment Act, submitted a report on 30th July, 2017- “Srikrishna Committee Report”. What is of significance is that the said Report laid down that it is possible to interpret Section 17(2) of the Act to enforce emergency awards for arbitrations seated in India, and recommended that the Act be amended only so that it comes in line with international practice in favour of recognising and enforcing an emergency award. [Paras 26, 28, 29][814-G-H; 818-B-C; 819-D]

Avitel Post Studioz Ltd. & Ors. v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Ltd. (2021) 4 SCC 713 – referred to.

Raffles Design International India Pvt. Ltd. v. Educomp Professional Education Ltd. 2016 SCC OnLine Del 5521 : [2016] 234 DLT 349 – approved.

1.9 In essence, what is provided by the SIAC Rules and the other institutional rules, is reflected in Sections 9(2) and 9(3) so far as interim orders passed by courts are concerned. The introduction of Sections 9(2) and 9(3) would show that the objective was to avoid courts being flooded with Section 9 petitions when an arbitral tribunal is constituted for two good reasons-(i) that the clogged court system ought to be decongested, and (ii) that an arbitral tribunal, once constituted, would be able to grant interim relief in a timely and efficacious manner. Section 17 was then amended by the very same 2015 Amendment Act (which brought in sub-sections (2) and (3) to Section 9) to substitute Section 17 so that Section 17(1) would be a mirror image of Section 9(1), making it clear that an arbitral tribunal is fully clothed with the same power as a court to provide for interim relief. Also, Section 17(2) was added so as to provide for enforceability of such orders, again, as if they were orders passed by a court, thereby bringing Section 17 on par with Section 9. [Paras 32, 34][820-G-H; 821-G-H]

1.10 An Emergency Arbitrator’s “award”, i.e., order, would undoubtedly be an order which furthers these very objectives, i.e., to decongest the court system and to give the parties urgent interim relief in cases which deserve such relief. Given the fact that party autonomy is respected by the Act and that there is otherwise no interdict against an Emergency Arbitrator being appointed, it is clear that an Emergency Arbitrator’s order, which is exactly like an order of an arbitral tribunal once properly constituted, in that parties have to be heard and reasons are to be given, would fall within the institutional rules to which the parties have agreed, and would consequently be covered by Section 17(1), when read with the other provisions of the Act. [Para 35][822-A-C]

1.11 A party cannot be heard to say, after it participates in an Emergency Award proceeding, having agreed to institutional rules made in that regard, that thereafter it will not be bound by an Emergency Arbitrator’s ruling. Having agreed to paragraph

12 of Schedule 1 to the SIAC Rules, the party cannot ignore an Emergency Arbitrator’s award by stating that it is a nullity when such party expressly agrees to the binding nature of such award from the date it is made and further undertakes to carry out the said interim order immediately and without delay. [Para 36] [822-C-E]

1.12 Rule 3 merely states that the President may appoint an Emergency Arbitrator if he determines that the SIAC should accept the application for emergency interim relief. Once the Emergency Arbitrator enters upon the reference, he is given all the powers of an arbitral tribunal under Rule 7 and is to decide completely independently of any other administrative authority under the SIAC Rules. Equally, Rule 9 does not, in any manner, impinge upon the independence of the Emergency Arbitrator as it only lays down the timeframe within which an interim order or award is to be made, which time is extendable by the Registrar. The interim order or award that is finally made by the Emergency Arbitrator has only to be approved by the Registrar as to its “form” and not on merits. Further, Rule 10 also does not, in any manner, interfere with the independence of the decision of the Emergency Arbitrator. The submission that an Emergency Arbitrator under the SIAC Rules is not an independent judicial body like an arbitral tribunal constituted under the very Rules, and referred to and relied upon Rules 3, 9, and 10 is, therefore, rejected. The submission that arbitration, conceptually, is an ouster of the civil court’s jurisdiction and that, therefore, only what is expressly provided in the ouster provisions can be followed – there is no room for any implication here, may have found favour with a court if it were dealing with Arbitration Act, 1940. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is a complete break with the past and is no longer to be viewed as an ouster statute but as a statute which favours the remedy of arbitration so as to de-clog civil courts which are, in today’s milieu, extremely burdened. As a matter of fact, Section 5 of the Arbitration Act puts paid to the submission when it overrides all other laws for the time being in force and goes on to state that in matters governed by Part I of the Act, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in that Part. The Arbitration Act, therefore, turns the principle of ouster on its head when it comes to arbitration as a favoured means of resolving civil disputes. [Paras 37, 38][822-F-H; 823-B-D]

Krishnadevi Malchand Kamathia v. Bombay

Environmental Action Group (2011) 3 SCC 363 : [2011]

3 SCR 291; Anita International v. Tungabadra Sugar Works Mazdoor Sangh (2016) 9 SCC 44 : [2016] 6 SCR 635; Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla v. Hind Rubber Industries (P) Ltd. (1997) 3 SCC 443 : [1997] 2 SCR

152 – referred to.

In Re Franklin and Swathling’s Arbitration, [1929] 1 Ch.

238 – referred to.

Justice R.S. Bachawat’s Law of Arbitration and Conciliation (Sixth Ed., LexisNexis) – referred to.

1.13 No party, after agreeing to be governed by institutional rules, can participate in a proceeding before an Emergency Arbitrator and, after losing, turn around and say that the award is a nullity or coram non judice when there is nothing in the Arbitration Act which interdicts an Emergency Arbitrator’s order from being made. Section 17, as construed in the light of the other provisions of the Act, clearly leads to the position that such emergency award is made under the provisions of Section 17(1) and can be enforced under the provisions of Section 17(2). [Para 40][827-D-F]

Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan [1955] 1 SCR 117; CIT v. Pearl Mechanical Engineering & Foundry Works (P) Ltd. (2004) 4 SCC 597 : [2004] 1 Suppl. SCR 339 – distinguished.

1.14 Full party autonomy is given by the Arbitration Act to have a dispute decided in accordance with institutional rules which can include Emergency Arbitrators delivering interim orders, described as “awards”. Such orders are an important step in aid of decongesting the civil courts and affording expeditious interim relief to the parties. Such orders are referable to and are made under Section 17(1) of the Arbitration Act. [Para 41][827-F-G]

2.1 A reading of Order XXXIX, Rule 2(3) and 2(4) as it originally stood, and Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A as it stands after the 1976 Amendment Act is to “prescribe” under Section 94 of the Code of Civil Procedure as to what is the consequence when a temporary injunction order and/or an order appointing a receiver of property is flouted. The consequences are mentioned in Sections 94(c) and (d) itself and fleshed out by Order XXXIX. [Para 48][834-G-H; 835-A]

Adhunik Steels Ltd. v. Orissa Manganese and Minerals (P) Ltd. (2007) 7 SCC 125 : [2007] 8 SCR 213; Food Corporation of India v. Sukh Deo Prasad (2009) 5 SCC

665 : [2009] SCR 1107; U.C. Surendranath v.

Mambally’s Bakery (2019) 20 SCC 666 – referred to.

2.2 Orders passed under Section 17(2) of the Arbitration Act, using the power contained in Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A are, therefore, properly referable only to the Arbitration Act. [Para 50][836-D]

2.3 It is well settled that the expression “in relation to”, which occurs in both Section 9(1) and Section 17(1), is an expression which is comprehensive in nature, having both a direct as well as an indirect significance. Coupled with this, the expression “any proceedings”, occurring in Section 9(1) and Section 17(1), would also be an expression comprehensive enough to take in enforcement proceedings. [Paras 51, 53] [836-E; 839-G]

Bandekar Brothers Pvt. Ltd. v. Prasad Vassudev Keni 2020 SCC OnLine SC 707; Thyssen Stahlunion Gmbh v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. (1999) 9 SCC 334 : [1999] 3 Suppl. SCR 461; BCCI v. Kochi Cricket (P) Ltd. (2018) 6 SCC 287 : [2018] 2 SCR 829; Shri Balaganesan Metals v. M.N. Shanmugham Chetty (1987) 2 SCC 707 : [1987] 2 SCR 1173; Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta (1994) 1 SCC

243 : [1993] 3 Suppl. SCR 615; Union of India v. A.B. Shah (1996) 8 SCC 540 : [1996] 2 Suppl. SCR 620 – referred to.

2.4 Properly so read, the expressions “in relation to” and “any proceedings” would include the power to enforce orders that are made under Section 9(1), and are not limited to incidental powers to make interim orders. Thus, if an order under Section 9(1) is flouted by any party, proceedings for enforcement of the same are available to the court making such orders under Section 9(1). These powers are, therefore, traceable directly to Section 9(1) of the Act-which then takes to the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, an order made under Order XXXIX Rule 2-A, in enforcement of an order made under Section 9, would also be referable to Section 9(1) of the Arbitration Act. [Para 54] [842-C-E]

2.5 Given the fact that the 2015 Amendment Act has provided in Section 17(1) the same powers to an arbitral tribunal as are given to a court, it would be anomalous to hold that if an interim order was passed by the tribunal and then enforced by the court with reference to Order XXXIX Rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, such order would not be referable to Section

17. Section 17(2) was necessitated because the earlier law on enforcement of an arbitral tribunal’s interim orders was found to be too cumbersome. [Para 55][842-E-G]

Alka Chandewar v. Shamshul Ishrar Khan (2017) 16 SCC 119 : [2017] 6 SCR 533 – referred to.

2.6 It was to remedy this situation that Section 17(2) was introduced. There is no doubt that the arbitral tribunal cannot itself enforce its orders, which can only be done by a court with reference to the Code of Civil Procedure. But the court, when it acts under Section 17(2), acts in the same manner as it acts to enforce a court order made under Section 9(1). If this is so, then what is clear is that the arbitral tribunal’s order gets enforced under Section 17(2) read with the Code of Civil Procedure.There is no doubt that Section 17(2) creates a legal fiction. This fiction is created only for the purpose of enforceability of interim orders made by the arbitral tribunal. To extend it to appeals being filed under the Code of Civil Procedure would be a big leap not envisaged by the legislature at all in enacting the said fiction. [Paras 56, 57][844-G-H; 845-A-B]

Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd. (2006) 13 SCC 322; Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation v. Diamond & Gem

Development Corporation Ltd. (2013) 5 SCC 470 : [2013] 4 SCR 331; East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council 1952 AC 109 : [1951] 2 All ER 587 (HL) – referred to.

2.7 There can be no doubt that the legal fiction created under Section 17(2) for enforcement of interim orders is created only for the limited purpose of enforcement as a decree of the court. To extend this fiction to encompass appeals from such orders is to go beyond the clear intention of the legislature. The submission in stressing the words “under the Code of Civil Procedure” in Section 17(2), thus holds no water as a limited fiction for the purpose of enforcement cannot be elevated to the level of a genie which has been released from a statutory provision and which would encompass matters never in the contemplation of the legislature. [Para 59][847-F-H; 848-A]

2.8 The fiction created by Section 49 of the Arbitration Act is limited to enforcement of a foreign award, with the important corollary that an application to enforce an award is an application under the Arbitration Act and not an application under Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure (in which case, such application would have been governed by Article 136 of the Limitation Act as an execution application under Order XXI, and not an application under the residuary Article 137 of the Limitation Act). [Para 60][850-F-G]

Union of India v. Vedanta Ltd. (2020) 10 SCC 1 – relied on.

2.9 On a proper interpretation of the said Act, an award/order by an Emergency Arbitrator would be covered by Section

17 of the Arbitration Act, when properly read with other provisions of the Act. [Para 62][851-D-E]

2.10 The interpretation of Section 36 is not before this Court-the interpretation of Section 17 read with Section 9 is. As far as Section 17 is concerned, the scheme qua interim orders passed by an arbitral tribunal mirrors the scheme qua interim orders passed by civil courts under Section 9. This vital difference between the provisions of Section 17 read with Section 9 and as contrasted with Section 36 puts paid to this argument. [Para 64][852-A-B]

Daelim Industrial Co. Ltd. v. Numaligarh Refinery Ltd. 2009 SCC OnLine Del 511 : [2009] 159 DLT 579; Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. Abdul Samad (2018) 3 SCC

622 : [2018] 10 SCR 451; Gemini Bay Transcription Pvt. Ltd. v. Integrated Sales Service Ltd. 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 216 : AIR 2018 Bom 89 (FB); Jet Airways (India) Ltd. v. Subrata Roy Sahara 2011 SCC OnLine Bom 1379 : [2012] (2) AIR Bom 855; Kakade

Construction Co. Ltd. v. Vistra ITCL 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 1521 : (2019) 6 Bom CR 805; Global Asia Venture Co. v. Arup Parimal Deb 2018 SCC OnLine Bom

13061; Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. v. Atwal Rice & General Mills (2017) 8 SCC 116 : [2017]

8 SCR 198 – referred to.

3.1 There can be no doubt that Section 37 is a complete code so far as appeals from orders and awards made under the Arbitration Act are concerned. This has further been strengthened by the addition of the non-obstante clause by the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019. [Para 69][854-C-D]

Kandla Export Corporation v. OCI Corporation (2018)

14 SCC 715 : [2018] 1 SCR 915; Deep Industries Ltd. v. ONGC (2020) 15 SCC 706; BGS SGS SOMA JV v. NHPC (2020) 4 SCC 234 – referred to.

3.2 Section 37 did not remain untouched by the 2015 Amendment Act. As a matter of fact, a new category of appeals was infused into the said provision by adding a new sub-section (1)(a).Despite Section 17 being amended by the same Amendment Act, by making Section 17(1) the mirror image of Section 9(1) as to the interim measures that can be made, and by adding Section 17(2) as a consequence thereof, significantly, no change was made in Section 37(b)(2) to bring it in line with Order XLIII, Rule 1(r). The said Section continued to provide appeals only from an order granting or refusing to grant any interim measure under Section

17. There can be no doubt that granting or refusing to grant any interim measure under Section 17 would only refer to the grant or non-grant of interim measures under Section 17(1)(i) and 17(1) (ii). In fact, the opening words of Section 17(2), namely, “subject to any orders passed in appeal under Section 37…” also demonstrates the legislature’s understanding that orders that are passed in an appeal under Section 37 are relatable only to Section 17(1). For example, an appeal against an order refusing an injunction may be allowed, in which case sub- section (2) of Section

17 then kicks in to enforce the order passed in appeal. Also, the legislature made no amendment to the granting or refusing to grant any measure under Section 9 to bring it in line with Order XLIII, Rule 1(r), under Section 37(1)(b). What is clear from this is that enforcement proceedings are not covered by the appeal provision. [Paras 73, 74][858-F-G; 859-A-E]

Chintels (India) Ltd. v. Bhayana Builders (P) Ltd. (2021)

4 SCC 602 - distinguished.

3.3 No appeal lies under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act against an order of enforcement of an Emergency Arbitrator’s order made under Section 17(2) of the Act. As a result, all interim orders of this Court stand vacated. The impugned judgments of the Division Bench are set aside. [Para 76][861-B] South Delhi Municipal Corporation v. Tech Mahindra (2019) SCC Online Delhi 11863 – referred to.