Service Law: Armed forces – Discharge from service – Appellant was discharged from service on the basis of four Red-Ink entries received by him during his period of service – Writ petition filed by him challenging order of discharge – Single judge relied upon the judgment in Balwant Singh wherein similar issue was involved regarding discharge from Assam Rifles on securing four Red-Ink entries – In that case, it was held that the authority vested with the power to discharge must examine the response of the concerned person and weigh the same vis-a-vis the severity of the misconduct which led to incurring of the Red-Ink entries in the service rolls; and that the order of discharge and the procedure preceding such discharge being of summary nature, it is necessary that the order of discharge is a speaking order – Relying on the said judgment, Single Judge set aside the order of discharge and remitted matter to competent authority for fresh decision – However, Division Bench set aside the order passed by Single Judge on the ground that neither the Assam Rifles Act, 1941 nor the Assam Rifles Act, 2006 requires the authority to record any reasons or satisfaction in the order of discharge itself – On appeal, held: Where there are no reasonable grounds for formation of the authority’s opinion, judicial review in such a case is permissible – There is nothing on record to indicate that the nature of the misconduct leading to the award of four Red Ink entries was so unacceptable that the competent authority had no option but to direct his discharge to prevent indiscipline in the force – Therefore, to do substantial justice, order of discharge is set aside and appellant is treated to have been in service till the time, he could be said to have completed the qualifying service for grant of pension – Assam Rifles Act, 1941 – Assam Rifles Act, 2006 – Assam Rifles Regulation, 2016 – Regns.107 and 108.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. Where an Act or the statutory rules framed thereunder left an action dependent upon the opinion of the authority concerned, by some such expression as ‘is satisfied’ or ‘is of the opinion’ or ‘if it has reason to believe’ or ‘if it considered necessary’, the opinion of the authority is conclusive, (a) if the procedure prescribed by the Act or rules for formation of the opinion was duly followed, (b) if the authority acted bona fide, (c) if the authority itself formed the opinion and did not borrow the opinion of somebody else and (d) if the authority did not proceed on a fundamental misconception of the law and the matter in regard to which the opinion had to be formed. The action based on the subjective opinion or satisfaction, can judicially be reviewed first to find out the existence of the facts or circumstances on the basis of which the authority is alleged to have formed the opinion. It is true that ordinarily the court should not inquire into the correctness or otherwise of the facts found except in a case where it is alleged that the facts which have been found existing were not supported by any evidence at all or that the finding in regard to circumstances or material is so perverse that no reasonable man would say that the facts and circumstances exist. The courts will not readily defer to the conclusiveness of the authority’s opinion as to the existence of matter of law or fact upon which the validity of the exercise of the power is predicated. The doctrine of reasonableness thus may be invoked. Where there are no reasonable grounds for the formation of the authority’s opinion, judicial review in such a case is permissible. [Para 28-30][239-EH; 240-A-C]
2. When this Court say that where the circumstances or material or state of affairs does not at all exist to form an opinion and the action based on such opinion can be quashed by the courts, this Court means that in effect there is no evidence whatsoever to form or support the opinion. The distinction between insufficiency or inadequacy of evidence and no evidence must of course be borne in mind. A finding based on no evidence as opposed to a finding which is merely against the weight of the evidence is an abuse of the power which courts naturally are loath to tolerate. Whether or not there is evidence to support a particular decision has always been considered as a question of law. Secondly, the court can inquire whether the facts and circumstances so found to exist have a reasonable nexus with the purpose for which the power is to be exercised. In other words, if an inference from facts does not logically accord with and flow from them, the Courts can interfere treating them as an error of law. Thus, this Court can see whether on the basis of the facts and circumstances found, any reasonable man can say that an opinion as is formed can be formed by a reasonable man. That would be a question of law to be determined by the Court. Thirdly, this Court can interfere if the constitutional or statutory term essential for the exercise of the power has either been misapplied or misinterpreted. The Courts have always equated the jurisdictional review with the review for error of law and have shown their readiness to quash an order if the meaning of the constitutional or statutory term has been misconstrued or misapplied. Fourthly, it is permissible to interfere in a case where the power is exercised for improper purpose. If a power granted for one purpose is exercised for a different purpose, then it will be deemed that the power has not been validly exercised. If the power in this case is found to have not been exercised genuinely for the purpose of taking immediate action but has been used only to avoid embarrassment or wreck personal vengeance, then the power will be deemed to have been exercised improperly. Fifthly, the grounds which are relevant for the purpose for which the power can be exercised have not been considered or grounds which are not relevant and yet are considered and an order is based on such grounds, then the order can be attacked as invalid and illegal. [Para 31, 34-37][240-D-E, H; 241-A-B, D-G]
3. Having regard to the nature of the misconduct alleged against the appellant in the ends of justice, the order of discharge is set aside and the appellant is treated to have been in service till the time, he could be said to have completed the qualifying service for grant of pension. Such an order is passed with a view to do substantial justice as there is nothing on record to indicate that the nature of the misconduct leading to the award of four Red Ink entries was so unacceptable that the competent authority had no option but to direct his discharge to prevent indiscipline in the force. [Para 39][244-F]
Ram Manohar v. State of Bihar AIR 1966 SC 740 : [1966] 1 SCR 709; Dwarka Das v. State of J. and K. AIR 1957 SC 164; Motilall v. State of Bihar AIR 1968 SC 1509 : [1968] 3 SCR 587; Virendra Kumar Dubey v. Chief of Army Staff & Ors. (2016) 2 SCC 627 : [2015]
10 SCR 1013; Vijay Shankar Mishra v. Union of India and Ors. (2017) 1 SCC 795 : [2016] 12 SCR 200; Rasbihari v. State of Orissa AIR 1969 SC 1081 : [1969]
3 SCR 374; Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. S.D. Agarwal and Another AIR 1969 SC 707 : [1969] 3 SCR 108; Barium Chemicals Ltd. and Another v. Company Law Board and Others AIR 1967 SC 295 : [1966] Suppl. SCR 311 – relied on.
Union of India v. Balwant Singh (2015) 14 SCC 389 – referred to.
Satgur Singh v. UOI & Ors. (2019) 9 SCC 205 : [2019]
11 SCR 1023 - held inapplicable.
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Head (1959) AC 83; Reg. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Armah, Ex Parte (1966) 3 WLR 828; Bean v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries (1944) 2 All ER 279; Farmer v. Cotton’s Trustees, 1915 AC 922; Iveagh (Earl of) v. Minister of Housing and Local Govt. (1962) 2 QB 147; Iveagh (Earl of) v. Minister of Housing and Local Govt. (1964)
1 AB 395 - referred to.
Muthu Gounder v. Government of Madras (1969) 82 Mad LW 1; Natesa Asari v. State of Madras AIR 1954 Mad 481 – referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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