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2025:MLHC:1099-DB
Serial No. 01
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
Crl.A. No. 46 of 2024
Date of Decision: 17.11.2025
Shri. Aloi Suiam
S/o (L) Shri. Lowis Sayoo
R/o Mookyndeng Village,
West Jaintia Hills District,
Meghalaya.
…....Appellant
Vs.
The State of Meghalaya through the
Commissioner & Secretary to the Government of
Meghalaya, Department of Home (Police),
Civil Secretariat, Shillong, Meghalaya.
..…..Respondent
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Hon’ble Mr. Justice B. Bhattacharjee, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s)
:
Ms. A.D. Syiem, Adv.
Mr. G. Syngkrem, Adv. vice
Mr. K.S. Kynjing, Sr. Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
:
Mr. N.D. Chullai, AAG with
Mr. E.R. Chyne, GA.
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
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JUDGMENT AND ORDER
Per W. Diengdoh, J:
1.
On 06.09.2005, the Officer In-Charge, Jowai Police Station,
West Jaintia Hills received an FIR filed by one Shri. Linus Sumer informing
him that on 02.09.2005, his son Rishanki Biam was murdered by Aloi Suiam
during the night at Saphai (Kympreng) village. The act was witnessed by one
Ling Langstang. It was also stated that the said incident was reported to the
In-Charge, Garampani O.P. on 04.09.2005.
2.
On receipt of the said information, Jowai P.S Case No. 121 (9)
2005 under Section 302 IPC was registered and investigation was launched.
From the records, it appears that the main suspect, named in the FIR
surrendered before the police on 06.10.2005 and on prayer made, was
remanded to seven days’ police custody and thereafter, on expiry of the
same, to judicial custody.
3.
On completion of the investigation, the Investigating Officer has
filed the chargesheet with an opinion that a well-established prima facie case
is made out against the accused person who is then made to stand trial for
having committed an offence punishable under Section 302 IPC.
4.
Thereafter, the matter being taken up by the learned Sessions
Judge, a charge under Section 302 IPC was framed against the accused
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person on 02.04.2015, who pleaded not guilty and demanded to be tried.
5.
The learned Trial Court then examined 7(seven) witnesses from
the prosecution’s side and as many as 6(six) documents were exhibited. After
the prosecution’s witnesses have been examined, the statement of the
accused person under Section 313 was recorded and then he was asked
whether he wishes to adduce evidence from his side, he declined. The final
argument of the parties was heard by the court and finally, the learned
Sessions Judge passed the impugned judgment and sentence, finding the
accused person guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and
he was accordingly sentence to undergo life imprisonment.
6.
Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said impugned
judgment and sentence, the appellant/convict has now approached this Court
with this instant appeal.
7.
Heard Ms. A.D. Syiem, learned counsel for the appellant, who
has argued that the learned Trial Judge has failed to appreciate and consider
the evidence tendered by the alleged eye-witness, Morning Langstang when
in the impugned judgment it was held that “…PW-2 the sole eye witness
stated that he saw the accused attacked the deceased. PW-2 tried to
intervene, but he was threatened by the accused, as such, he fled away. PW2 reported the matter to the family of the deceased…”, whereas from the
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entirety of the evidence of PW-2, it can be said that his evidence is wholly
un-reliable.
8.
The learned counsel has then led this Court to the evidence of
PW-2 and has submitted that PW-2 has stated that he met the deceased victim
on the day of the incident, who asked a biri from him. Then at that point of
time, the accused/appellant came and assaulted the deceased victim and
when PW-2 tried to intervene, he was himself threaten and so he fled away
from the scene. He then told the police about the incident when the police
came to the place of occurrence. PW-2 has also stated that he met the
deceased on the village road near his house, but the body of the deceased
was found lying at Saphai jungle, hence the statement of the PW-2 in this
respect is false, submits the learned counsel.
9.
PW-2 has again stated that as it was dark, he could not see from
where the accused/appellant had assaulted the deceased as such, it can also
be said that he did not see who had assaulted the deceased, submits the
learned counsel.
10.
Proceeding further with the evidence of PW-2, the learned
counsel has submitted that his testimony is full of falsehood as he has
asserted that he knows the accused person as they were from the same
village, but from the records, it is seen that they are not from the same village.
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Further, PW-2 has also stated that when he met the deceased, he was smelling
of alcohol, but from the post mortem report, nothing has been indicated as
such. He has also stated that when he reached the house of his wife’s
grandmother, he informed about the incident, but there are no witness or
witnesses to prove that he has actually informed someone or even the family
members of the deceased.
11.
On the manner of the death of the deceased, the learned counsel
has submitted that from the seizure list, what can be seen is that the alleged
murder weapon was said to be a wooden firewood about 34 inches in length,
which was also exhibited in court as Material Ext-1. However, from the post
mortem report, details of which was brought before the court by PW-5, Dr.
Paitbha Syngkon, the finding of the Doctor who had conducted the said post
mortem and who is now deceased, is that the cause of death was due to
violence axphysial dead and the alleged weapon used is broad ligature.
Therefore, it cannot be said that the death was as a result of assault by the
said wooden firewood. Here too, there is a contradiction in the evidence of
the prosecution witnesses, asserted the learned counsel.
12.
Another point of argument raised by the learned counsel is that
PW-6 who was the Magistrate who had recorded the statement of the
accused/appellant under Section 164 Cr.P.C. has stated that he has complied
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with the provision of Section 164, when during the process of recording of
the statement, he has given three hours’ time for reflection and that the
accused has confessed that he has committed the crime. This, according to
the learned counsel is not correct as generally, what has been accepted is that,
if the accused is to make a confession admitting to his guilt, at least 24 hours’
time of reflection must be given. In this regard, the accused/appellant in
answer to question No. 12 in his statement made under Section 313, has
stated that it was out of compulsion from the police that he has made the
confession before the Magistrate. Therefore, any statement made by the
accused/appellant is void ab initio, submits the learned counsel This
contention is fortified by the following authorities:
i)
Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957
SC 637, para 10;
ii)
Devraj Goyal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2013 CRI.L.J. 4394,
para 18, 19
13.
It is also the submission of the learned counsel that the fact that
the material exhibit seized has not been proved to be the weapon used for the
commission of the alleged crime, since PW-7, Shri Babu Singh has clearly
stated that he did not notice any bloodstain on Material Exhibit-I, nor was
any finger print lifted from the same, which only proved that the
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accused/appellant is innocent of the offence alleged.
14.
The observations of the learned Trial Judge in the impugned
judgment that the multiple injuries and the fact that there is evidence of broad
ligature being used for causing death of the victim has to be explained by the
accused/appellant, is contrary to the provision of Section 106 of the Evidence
Act as the prosecution must succeed or fail by the evidence it can bring up,
and until a prima facie case is established by such evidence, the onus does
not shift to the accused as was held in the case of Surendra Kumar v. State
of U.P. reported in AIR 2021 SC 2342, para 28, submits the learned counsel.
15.
Finally, the learned counsel has submitted that, unless there is
some connecting link between the movement of the deceased and the
accused/appellant, any kind of suspicion however great, cannot be a ground
for the accused/appellant to be convicted of such offence charged. The
impugned judgment and sentence is not based on legally sound principles
and grounds, as such, the same has to be set aside and quashed.
16.
On the other hand, Mr. N.D. Chullai, learned AAG along with
Mr. E.R. Chyne, learned GA appearing for the State respondent, has
strenuously supported the rationale of the learned Trial Judge, who has
passed the impugned judgment, and has submitted that the findings of the
learned Sessions Judge were based on evidence on record.
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17.
The learned AAG has submitted that the pivot on which the
balance of the prosecution’s case hinges, was mostly on the basis of the
evidence rendered by the PW-2, who was the star witness and which
evidence has not been shaken in the cross-examination.
18.
The findings of the learned Trial Judge at para 9 (series) of the
impugned judgment was read out by the learned AAG, who has then
submitted that such findings has accurately brought out the facts of the
prosecution’s case, wherein it was evident that PW-2 has clearly narrated the
sequence of events from the time he met the deceased victim who had asked
for a biri from him to the moment the accused/appellant came and started
assaulting the victim. This piece of evidence was not contradicted by the
accused/appellant in the cross-examination as no suggestion was ever put to
PW-2 that the accused/appellant has not assaulted the victim. This witness
has therefore proved to be a sterling witness and as such, on his testimony
alone, the case of the prosecution stands proved, submits the learned AAG.
To buttress this contention, the case of Shri Edwin Sungoh v. State of
Meghalaya, Crl. A. No. 19 of 2021, para 28, 29, 32 & 36 was cited.
19.
On the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that
motive has not been proved as regard the cause of the alleged murder, the
learned AAG has submitted that here too, the evidence of PW-2, who was
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the eye-witness who has seen the accused/appellant assaulted the deceased
victim, has to be accepted as a fact, as such, lack or absence of motive
becomes inconsequential in the face of direct evidence as in this case. Para
37 of the case of Shri Edwin Sungoh was also cited in this connection.
20.
Again, on the contention of the appellant that because, there was
no sufficient time given to the accused for reflection before his statement
before the Magistrate made under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was recorded and this,
has caused prejudice to his case, thus has vitiated the trial, the learned AAG
has submitted that there is no hard and fast rule which specify the length of
time to be given for reflection. The case of Mulo Rakait & Ors v. State of
Meghalaya, Crl. A. No 7 & 8 of 2023, para 18 was referred to in this regard
wherein this Court has held that there is no hard and fast rule that accused
must be given 24 hours of time.
21.
Contrary to what the learned counsel for the appellant has
contended that the accused/appellant was forced to make a confession
admitting to his guilt in the commission of the said offence, the learned AAG
has submitted that apart from sufficient time being given to the accused for
reflection, his confessional statement made under Section 164 was also
recorded in the proper form, and according to the recording Magistrate, who
has examined himself as PW-6, the confession of the accused that he has
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committed the offence appears to have been done so voluntarily.
22.
On the nature and manner of death of the victim, the learned
AAG has referred to the Postmortem report dated 5th September, 2005,
wherein under the heading “More detailed description of injury or disease”
it was noted as “Compression to the neck (strangulation) leading to asphyxia
is fatal and ante-mortem in nature” and that the opinion of the Doctor is that
“…the cause of death was due to violent asphyxia death weapon/manual a
broad ligature.” According to the evidence of the witnesses, the murder
weapon was said to be a wooden firewood and it was by this weapon, which
was seized on the leading of the accused, that the victim was strangulated,
when the victim must have fell down. Submits the learned AAG.
23.
The learned AAG has then reiterated that in view of the clear
evidence on record, wherein the finger of guilt is pointed at the
accused/appellant, who has assaulted and murdered the deceased victim, the
findings of the learned Trial Judge warrant no interference.
24.
We have duly considered the submission and contentions raised
by the learned counsels for the respective parties in support of the impugned
judgment and sentence as well as those seeking to assert that there has been
a miscarriage of justice while convicting the accused/appellant which is
required to be set right by this appellate court.
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25.
As has been observed hereinabove, the outcome of the case of the
prosecution rests mainly on the testimony of the sole eye-witness, PW-2,
whose evidence has been relied upon by the learned Trial Judge to convict
the accused/appellant.
26.
We will now firstly, have a re-look at the evidence of the said
sole eye-witness, Shri Morning Langstang, who has entered the witness box
as PW-2. This witness in his deposition before the court has narrated the
sequence of events which took place on the day of the incident, though he
could not remember the date, month and year as the incident happened a long
time ago, he did say that at that particular time, he was on his way to his
wife’s grandmother house coming out from his wife’s house, the distance
being only about 15 minutes’ walk. On the way, he met the deceased victim
who asked a biri from him. At that point of time, he saw the accused came
up to the victim and started assaulting him. When he asked the
accused/appellant why he assaulted the victim, the accused threaten him
causing him to flee to his wife’s grandmother house.
27.
If the testimony of PW-2 that he witnessed the victim being
assaulted by the accused is to be tested, then, the result of such an assault has
to be proved. In his deposition before the court, this witness has clearly stated
that he saw the accused/appellant assaulted the deceased victim as he was
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present at the scene at that particular moment. This statement was never
challenged, in fact, in the cross-examination, PW-2 has reiterated the fact
that the accused has assaulted the deceased victim. No counter evidence was
ever produced by the defence to prove that the accused was never at the place
of occurrence at that point of time.
28.
To further confirm this fact, the details found in the postmortem
report, would indicate that upon examination of the dead body, multiple
small abrasion on the head, face and whole body was found. Further, there
was also seen small abrasion (multiple) on the frontal and left parietal region
of the scalp, size ½ x ½ scalp deep. Now, what are abrasions, they are, but,
superficial skin injuries which usually causes damage to the epidermis. It is
very unlikely that death can be caused by such abrasions.
29.
However, in this case, it turned out that the victim has since died
and his dead body was found by his father, Linus Sumer, who has revealed
this fact in his deposition before the court as PW-1, when he said that on the
day of the incident, when he came home and could not find his son, he and
his friends went to search for him and they found the dead body in the garden.
30.
Proceeding further, PW-7, Shri Babu Singh in his statement
before the court has stated that in the year 2004, he was the In-charge of
Garampani (police) Outpost. On 06.09.2005, he was endorsed to investigate
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into the said case by the O/C Jowai P.S. Thereafter, he went to the place of
occurrence (PO), and has drawn up the sketch map. He has also conducted
the inquest over the dead body. He then sent the body for postmortem
examination. This witness, although he has stated in his deposition that he
has conducted the inquest over the dead body of the victim, the inquest report
was never brought on record by way of an exhibit, as such, nothing much
can be read from the statement of this witness in this regard.
31.
PW-5, Dr. Paitbha Syngkon has produced the postmortem report
before the court on behalf of Dr. G. Passah, who has conducted the said
postmortem on the body of the deceased Risanki Biam and who has since
expired. However, from the postmortem report, what has emerged is that,
there is a finding of injuries, being multiple small abrasions found on the
head, face and whole body. There was also compression to the neck
(Strangulation leading to axphysia) which is fatal and ante-mortem in nature
and is said to be the cause of death. As has been observed above, from the
postmortem report, it can be deduced that the deceased did not die as a result
of the multiple injuries found in his head, face and body, even if one assumes
that he died because of the said abrasions on his scalp due to excessive loss
of blood, this fact has not been indicated in the said postmortem report.
32.
According to the Doctor, the cause of death was due to
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strangulation leading to asphysia and the broad ligature, would suggest that
there was force applied on the neck. To prove this finding, the prosecution
has brought in PW-7, the Investigating Officer of the case who has stated
that in course of investigation, the accused has led him to the discovery of a
wooden firewood about 34 inches, which according to the prosecution is the
murder weapon. However, PW-7 never said that in his findings, the said
wooden firewood was used by the accused to kill the victim. He also said
that he has seized the same and has brought it before the court as material
Exhibit 1. He has also admitted that he did not lift any fingerprints from the
said piece of wood and also that he could find no blood stains on such
firewood.
33.
In such a scenario, what can be deduced is that, firstly, PW-2 the
eye-witness has never mention anything about seeing the accused carrying a
wooden firewood, secondly, he has also not said that he saw the accused
strangulate the victim with such firewood. Therefore, there is nothing to
connect the firewood as the murder weapon and that it was the seized
material which was used by the accused to commit the crime.
34.
Under such circumstances, we are constrained to observe that
though, PW-2 has seen the accused assaulted the victim, it cannot be said
that such assault has led to the death of the victim, since in the intervening
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period from the time PW-2 fled from the scene when the victim was then
alive, to the time the victim was found dead by his father and party, there is
no record as to when the dead body was found. PW-1, the father of the
victim, who in his deposition, has stated that upon finding the dead body of
his son, he reported the matter to the police, and the police who has registered
such FIR, has noted that the same was filed only on 06.09.2005, 4(four) days
after the victim was assaulted, though PW-1 did say that on 04.09.2005 has
informed the Officer In-Charge, Garampani Outpost about the matter.
Therefore, there has arisen a doubt as to when the deceased victim actually
died, since the probable time of death is very important to be considered, the
postmortem report also not having such precise information in this regard.
Therefore, it cannot be said as to whether it was the accused/appellant who
is responsible for the death of the deceased victim.
35.
We have also noticed that the learned Trial Judge in the
impugned judgment, has relied mainly on the evidence tendered by PW-2 to
the extent that he is the eye-witness to the crime. However, even if we admit
that this witness is a rustic villager who may not be able to give a detailed
account of what he has witnessed, the fact remains that there is no mention
of the wooden firewood which is said to be the murder weapon supposedly
being used by the accused/appellant in the commission of the crime, to the
extent that it was responsible for the death of the victim. This is too glaring
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a fact to be ignored for which it was incumbent upon PW-2 to have
mentioned the same in his testimony.
36.
It is reiterated that we are convinced that the accused/appellant
has indeed assaulted the victim, however, as has been mentioned, there is no
clear evidence that such assault has resulted in the death of the victim, this,
read with the findings in the postmortem report. In such a situation where
there are two hypothetical views present as to whether it was the accused
who has murdered the victim or it was not him, it is well settled that the view
favouring the accused has to be adopted by the court. In this regard, in the
case of Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808, the
Supreme Court at para 25 of the same has observed as follows:
“25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the
administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are
possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the
guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view
which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This
principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the
accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence.
Rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence
adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the
guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence,
the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the
accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court
entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the
accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt
regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not
the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is
incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is
hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences.
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The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does not warrant
acquittal of the accused by report to surmises, conjectures or
fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case
of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, (1974) 3 SCC 227, a criminal
trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to
one's imagination and phantasy. It concerns itself with the
question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty
of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real
life and is the product of interplay of different human emotions.
In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused
charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge
the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic worth
and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis
would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit
of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the
Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex
facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature
of conjectures.”
37.
From the impugned judgment, we also find that the learned Trial
Judge while forming his opinion on the question as to whether the
accused/appellant has made a voluntary confession implicating himself as to
the commission of the offence had discussed the evidence of PW-6, the
Magistrate who has recorded the statement of the accused/appellant under
Section 164 Cr.P.C wherein he is said to have voluntarily confessed to have
committed the crime, the conclusion reached is that the accused/appellant
had indeed committed the offence as charged though there is infirmity in the
recording of such statement. The observation in this regard runs as “… The
evidence of PW-2, sole eye-witness gets fortified with the confessional
statement, inspite of the infirmity in the confessional statement…” This
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according to us, is a contradiction of sorts which reflects the uncertainty in
the mind of the court.
38.
Without going into the basics as to what entails a recording of a
statement under 164 Cr.P.C. as far as confession of an accused to the
commission of an offence is concerned, in this case, what is evident is that
the accused/appellant is a labourer by profession and nothing is said about
his educational qualifications or that he is well versed in the English
language. It would be incumbent upon the learned Magistrate to have
ascertain the fact that he understands the English language, if not, then an
interpreter to be appointed to make him understand the questions put to him.
Nothing is found to give us the indication that this exercise was carried out
by the learned Magistrate. The assumption that he may not understand the
English language (since nothing is on record to prove that he was questioned
in his native language) cannot be ruled out. Under such a situation, there is
doubt as to the veracity of his alleged confession.
39.
Secondly, in his said confession, he said that he confessed to have
committed the crime. But this is too vague an answer as apparently, he has
not given the details of how he has committed the crime and the learned
Magistrate ought to have taken note of this and should have made further
queries in this regard, which was not done so.
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40.
Thirdly, the accused/appellant was put a question, being No. 12
while his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded, such question
being that he had admitted to have committed the crime before the learned
Magistrate who has recorded his statement under Section 164, what he has
to say to this. His answer to this is that he has done so out of compulsion
from the police. Though this portion would not have any substantive
evidentiary value, however if we look into it in the light of the evidence of
PW-6 who, in his cross-examination, he has stated that “…During the
reflection time the accused person was asked to be in the custody of Police
for 3 hours…” , what has emerged is that the accused was brought before the
learned Magistrate for recording of his statement under Section 164 straight
from police custody, albeit, after being given three hours reflection time.
Now, what reflection can there be if he is kept under such an intimidating
situation. His capacity to think rationally and with a free mind is suspect.
Thus, confession under such circumstances cannot be considered any
effective confession at all. In this regard, the case of Sarwan Singh Rattan
Singh v. State of Punjab (supra) cited by the learned counsel for the appellant
is relevant, when from an extract of para 10, it is seen that the Supreme Court
has observed as follows:
“10. … Besides, in neither Court below has any attention been
paid to the fact that Sarwan Singh appeared to have been kept in
police custody without any justification between 26th November
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and 30th November. We have carefully considered all the relevant
facts bearing on this question and we see no escape from the
conclusion that the failure of the learned Judges of the High Court
to take into account these material facts has introduced a serious
legal infirmity in their conclusion that the confession made by
Sarwan Singh is voluntary. That is why we think we must reverse
this conclusion…”
41.
Going further on this issue, the Supreme Court in the same case
of Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh (supra) at para 11 has also observed that “…
There is, besides, another fact which is equally fatal to the prosecution case.
Even if the confession is held to be voluntary, it must also be established that
the confession is true and for the purpose of dealing with this question it
would be necessary to examine the confession and compare it with the rest
of the prosecution evidence and the probabilities in the case…” In the case
of the accused/appellant herein, as has been observed and found out, duly
recorded hereinabove, the evidence of PW-2 does not inspire confidence that
he has actually witnessed the accused/appellant killing the victim by any
broad weapon such as a wooden firewood and besides the evidence of PW2 which was heavily relied upon by the prosecution to secure conviction of
the accused/appellant, there is no other credible evidence to this effect to
implicate the accused/appellant as far as the act of murder is concerned.
Therefore, such voluntary confession even if accepted to be true (which is
not), cannot be the reason to convict the accused/appellant.
42.
However, we would venture to say that from the body of evidence
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presented and as has been observed hereinabove, we find that the
accused/appellant is guilty of the offence of criminal force as per Section 350
IPC, which is reproduced hereinbelow as:
“350. Criminal force. – Whoever intentionally uses force to any
person, without that person’s consent, in order to the committing
of any offence, or intending by the use of such force to cause, or
knowing it to be likely that by the use of such force he will cause
injury, fear or annoyance to the person to whom the force is used,
is said to use criminal force to that other.”
43.
What has been established is that the accused/appellant had used
intentional force without the consent of the victim and such force has resulted
in injuries sustained by the victim. Therefore, in this manner, the accused,
for having committed such an offence, he is liable for punishment under
section 352 IPC, which provides for imprisonment of upto three months or
fine which may extend upto ₹ 500/- (Rupees five hundred) only or both.
44.
Under such circumstances, this Court hereby alters the charge
against the accused/appellant for an offence punishable under Section 302
IPC to that for the offence punishable under Section 352 IPC and sentence
to undergo punishment for imprisonment for three months.
45.
Since it appears from the records that the accused/appellant has
been in custody for a period of more than three months, the period of
imprisonment hereby imposed would be considered as term served.
46.
Having duly noted the many authorities cited by the respective
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parties as well as the contentions on other aspects of the case, in the overall
analysis of the evidence and materials on record, we are convinced that the
prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused/appellant beyond
reasonable doubt as far as the offence of murder is concerned.
47.
Accordingly, we find that the accused/appellant is entitled to
benefit of doubt in so far as the charge under Section 302 IPC is concerned.
The impugned judgment and the corresponding sentence of imprisonment in
this regard is required to be set aside and quashed, which is done so herein.
48.
In the event, this appeal partly succeeds, the conviction and
sentence of the accused/appellant as regard Section 302 IPC is hereby
overturned. He is now entitled to be immediately release, provided he is not
wanted in any other case.
49.
Trial Court records are hereby sent back.
50.
Appeal disposed of. No costs.
(B. Bhattacharjee)
Judge
DARIKORDOR NARY
Date: 2025.11.17 19:55:33 IST
(W. Diengdoh)
Judge
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