All India Council for Technical Education vs Shri Prince Shivaji Maratha Boarding House’s College of Architecture & Ors.

– Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.8443 of 2011 is dismissed – Further, in the appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.20460 of 2011, decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court issuing directions contained in the judgment under appeal in absence of CoA being impleaded is erroneous – However, no independent directions issued as these appeals were heard together as batch matters and the grievances of CoA have been addressed in the judgment – Civil Appeals arising out of SLP(C) Nos.17005 and 17006 of 2016 are disposed of in terms of the decision in the main appeal – In appeal arising out of SLP(C)No.28121 of 2018, the decision of the Kerala High Court is set aside – Institution involved is entitled to operate with recognition obtained under the 1972 Act – Interim orders passed in these appeals, dissolved – Architects Act, 1972 – ss.2(d), 3, 14-21, 25, 35, 43-45 – All India Council of Technical Education Act, 1987 – ss. 2(g), 3, 10, 11, 22, 23, 25– All India Council for Technical Education (Grant of approval for starting new technical institutions, introduction of courses or programmes and approval of intake capacity of seats for the courses or programmes) Regulations, 1994 – All India Council for Technical Education (Norms and Guidelines for Fees and guidelines for admission in Professional Colleges) Regulations, 1994 – Council of Architecture Regulations, 1982 – Part VIII- Clauses 29, 30 – Minimum Standards of Architectural Education Regulations 1983 – Clauses 5, 8; Appendix B, C – Minimum Standards of Architectural Education Regulation, 2015 – Constitution of India – Art.77 – Interpretation of Statutes.

Interpretation of Statutes – Former and later Acts – Clashing provisions – Overlapping provisions in the 1972 Act (under which the Council of Architecture (CoA) is constituted) and the 1987 Act (under which the All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE) is constituted) on the question of grant of approval and subsequent monitoring of architectural education – Plea on behalf of AICTE that the 1987 Act being later statute, covering common field, the provisions of the 1972 Act, to the extent the same deals with architectural education, shall be deemed to have been repealed by implication – Held: It is not an absolute proposition of law that a later Act would always prevail over the former in the event there are clashing provisions even if there is no express provision of repeal – Architects Act, 1972 – All India Council of Technical Education Act, 1987.

Interpretation of Statutes – Special law vis-a-vis general law – Council of Architecture (CoA) constituted under the 1972 Act and the All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE) constituted under the 1987 Act – Overlapping powers on the aspect of setting norms for architectural education and for monitoring the institutions engaged in imparting such education – Held: A special law implies a statute covering a particular subject specifically – Subject of conflict in the present proceedings is architectural education – 1972 Act however does not solely deal with architectural education – Further, the 1987 Act has certain features of a special law being devoted to setting up, supervision and monitoring of institutions imparting technical education, but it does not cover technical education imparted by all types of institutions – Having regard to the scheme and provisions of these two statutes, ex-facie it is difficult to label either of them as special law or general law – Architects Act, 1972 – All India Council of Technical Education Act, 1987.

Interpretation of Statutes – Principle of implied repeal – Application of – Overlapping of powers between the Council of Architecture (CoA) constituted under the 1972 Act and the All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE) constituted under the 1987 Act, on the aspect of setting norms for architectural education and monitoring the institutions engaged in imparting such education – Dominant purpose of the two legislations – Held: Principle of implied repeal cannot apply so far as the provisions relating to architecture education is concerned, on the basis of the 1987 Act having become operational – One of the dominant purposes of the 1972 Act is recognition of qualifications on architecture – Registration of an architect is dependent upon acquisition of such recognised qualification – Said Act cannot be held to have been repealed by implication for the sole reason of inclusion of the word “architecture” in the definition of technical education– AICTE failed to discharge onus to establish that the provisions of the 1972 Act was repealed by implication – Architects Act, 1972 – All India Council of Technical Education Act, 1987 – s.2(g).

Architects Act, 1972 – s.17 – Non-obstante clause – Implication of – Discussed.

All India Council of Technical Education Act, 1987 – s.2(g) – Subject of conflict in the instant cases is architectural education BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE. OF ARCH.

as under the 1972 Act and the 1987 Act there are overlapping areas under which the respective Councils i.e. Council of Architecture (CoA) and the All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE) could make Regulations – Plea that the context of regulating architecture education requires exclusion of the expression “architecture” from the definition of technical education – Held: So far as these appeals are concerned, to altogether exclude architecture from the purview of AICTE, that expression, i.e. architecture would have to be dropped from the definition of technical education – If the issue is examined in the external context, which in this case would be the provisions of 1972 Act, such a course would be inevitable – A meaning different to what is ascribed in the definition clause can be given to a word in different parts of a statute if the context so demands – Subjectdispute involved in these appeals requires omission of the word architecture from the definition of technical education – Such course is also a permissible tool of construction to prevent absurd or unworkable results flowing from a statute – In respect of the provisions of s.2 (g), the definition of “technical education” would have to be given such a construction and the word “architecture” should be treated to have been inapplicable in cases where the AICTE imports its regulatory framework for institutions undertaking technical education – There would however be no substitution because the context would not demand it – Architects Act, 1972 – Interpretation of Statutes.

Disposing of the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1.1 Both the regulatory authorities under the respective statutes have power to frame regulations for giving effect to the provisions of the respective Acts. Both the statutes have provisions for approval and monitoring of architecture courses run by institutions. So far as the Architects Act, 1972 is concerned, the expression employed is recognition of qualification and the ultimate authority for granting or withdrawing recognition to degree or diploma courses in architectural education by different academic institutions is the Central Government. The CoA under the statutory scheme however has significant role in such decision making process. AICTE has also been empowered under the All India Council of Technical Education Act, 1987 to lay down standards and norms for courses on architecture along with other subjects coming within the term “technical education”. Under Section 3(3)(b), of the 1972 Act, the CoA is required to have two persons nominated by the AICTE. On the other hand, Section 3 (4) (m) of the 1987 Act stipulates that AICTE is to consist of representatives of various bodies, including a member to be appointed by the Central Government to represent the CoA. Section 10(k) of the 1987 Act requires AICTE to grant approval in consultation with the agencies concerned. [Paras 19, 25] [492B-E]

1.2 Section 20 of the 1972 Act deals with withdrawal of recognition of an authority listed in the Schedule to the Act. Section 21 of the 1972 Act also empowers the Council to prescribe minimum standards of architectural education required for granting recognized qualifications by colleges or institutions in India. The power of the CoA to examine infrastructural facilities at the time of considering the application for recognition or monitoring the quality of an institution recognized by the Council stems from Sections 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the 1972 Act. Further, none of the Regulations produced however specify the actual norms but refer to standards and norms to be laid down for approval of technical institutions, which include institutions imparting architectural education. [Paras 27, 32] [493-F-H; 494A-B; 499-B] Ajoy Kumar Banerjee and Others v. Union of India and Others (1984) 3 SCC 127 : [1984] 3 SCR 252 ; State of Tamil Nadu and Others v. Adhiyaman Educational Research Institute and Others (1995) 4 SCC 104 : [1995] 2 SCR 1075 ; Orissa Lift Irrigation

Corporation Limited v. Rabi Sankar Patro and Others (2018) 1 SCC 468 : [2017] 13 SCR 921 ; Parshvnath Charitable Trust and Others v. All India Council for Technical Education and Others (2013) 3 SCC 385 : [2012] 11 SCR 1057 – distinguished.

Varun Saini & Ors. v. Guru Govind Singh Indraprastha University (2014) 16 SCC 330 – referred to.

2. AICTE has referred to a communication emanating from the Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE. OF ARCH.

India, bearing No.F.17 11/2003 TS.IV. No case has been made out that the memorandum to which reference has been made, has been published in the official gazette. This memorandum does not meet the requirement of valid exercise of power under the aforesaid two provisions by the Central Government so as to make it binding. This memorandum, at best, can be treated to be an advisory of the Ministry not having enforceable effect. Moreover, the aforesaid memorandum has been issued beyond the timeframe laid down under the provisions of the statutes reproduced in the said two sections of the respective Acts. The memorandum also cannot be treated to be an executive order under Article 77 of the Constitution of India. [Paras 37, 39] [502B; 503-F-H]

3. As a proposition of law, AICTE’s stand is accepted that there need not be complete identity in the subject-matters of the two rival statutes being tested in the yardstick of point of time of their commencement of operation. It is not an absolute proposition of law that a later Act would always prevail over the former in the event there are clashing provisions even if there is no express provision of repeal. Further, a special law implies a statute covering a particular subject specifically. The subject of conflict in the present proceedings is architectural education. The 1972 Act however does not solely deal with architectural education. The Act intends to control or regulate the profession of architects. It has two main features, one part dealing with regulating the profession of architect and the other part regulating architectural education. Significant portion of the statute deals with formation of the CoA but the function of that body is essentially to regulate and monitor the other two areas of this statue. The 1987 Act deals with technical education and in particular the methodology for approval technical institutions and their monitoring. The provisions of 1987 Act have not been immunised by a non-obstante clause like the one employed in Section 17 of the 1972 Act. Having regard to the scheme and provisions of these two statutes, ex-facie it is difficult to label either of them as special law or general law. The 1987 Act has certain features of a special law being devoted to setting up, supervision and monitoring of institutions imparting technical education. But the said statute does not cover technical education imparted by all types of institutions. The exceptions have been clearly mentioned in Section 2(h) of the act and explained in the cases of Bharathidasan University and Association of Management of private colleges. So far as the 1972 Act is concerned, its application is not confined to architecture education alone. This enactment contemplates establishing the Council of Architecture, recognizing degrees and diplomas in architecture and regulating the profession of architects. But there is inter-link between architecture education and registration of architects. Further, the three regulations under the 1987 Act do not directly lay down any specific norm or standard which ought to be followed. Such norms appear to have been set by the AICTE in pursuance of the aforesaid regulations. The two Regulations of 1994 do not lay down specifically such norms. The 2016 regulations has provision for Approval Process Hand Book which may be published from time to time laying down the manner in which approval shall be given. [Paras 47-51] [511-E-F; 512-B-D-F; 513-A-C, F-G] Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks (1998)

8 SCC 1 : [1998] 2 Suppl. SCR 359 ; K.V. Muthu v. Angamuthu Ammal (1997) 2 SCC 53 [1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 188 ; Printers (Mysore) Ltd. v. Asstt. CTO (1994)

2 SCC 434 ; [1994] 1 SCR 682 ; Pushpa Devi v. Milkhi Ram (1990) 2 SCC 134 : [1990] 1 SCR 278 – relied on.

M/s. Mathra Parshad and Sons v. State of Punjab and Others [1962] Supp 1 SCR 913 ; A.B. Abdulkadir v. State of Kerala.1962 Supp (2) SCR 741 ; Assn. of Registration Plates v. Union of India (2005) 1 SCC 679 : [2004] 6 Suppl. SCR 496 ; Tika Ramji v. State of U.P. [1956] 1 SCR 393 ; R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka (1992) 1 SCC 335 : [1991] 1 Suppl. SCR

387 ; U.P. State Electricity Board v. Hari Shankar Jain (1978) 4 SCC 16 : [1979] 2 SCR 355 ; J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. [1961] 3 SCR 185 ; Association of Management of Private Colleges v. All India Council of Technical Education and Others (2013) 8 SCC 271 : [2013] 6 SCR 1054 – referred to.

BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE. OF ARCH.

4. For the sole reason of there being overlapping subjects, Courts straightaway may not get into an exercise to find out if one statute intends to eclipse the other. The duty of the regulatory bodies in a situation of this nature would be to come out with a unified regime, which this Court expected in the case of Municipal Council, Palia. The two regulatory bodies in the field of architectural education however have not taken this approach and on the other hand have engaged themselves in a dispute over turf-control. In such a situation, under normal circumstances attempt should be made first at reconciliation of the competing statutory instruments. If that exercise fails, then the aim would be to find out what is the dominant purpose or principal subject-matter of a particular statute and then construe the conflicting provisions of the respective Regulations to match the dominant statutory purpose. The process of recognition and effect thereof are more expansive under the 1972 Act. All “authorities” require recognition by the Central Government to conduct any degree or diploma course in architecture education to qualify for being recognised qualification. The CoA under the said Act plays a key role in the process of recognition. There is no exclusion or exemption of any institution from undergoing such recognition process except the subsisting ones at the time the Act became operational. The CoA has also wide monitoring power under Section 18 and 19 of the Act of every authority which grants recognized qualification under the said Act. Moreover, Section 17 of the said Act is armed with a nonobstante clause. The implication of the said clause in Section 17 of the 1972 Act is that to be on the register of architects in India, recognized qualification would be sufficient. There is no provision under the 1972 Act or in any Rule thereunder which would entitle a person trained from an AICTE approved technical institution in architecture to describe himself as an architect or get himself registered as such without recognised qualification under the 1972 Act. The scheme of the Act thus demonstrates that lack of recognized qualification under the 1972 Act would in substance disentitle a person from being registered as an architect. He would not be able to legally represent himself as an architect in India. This being the statutory mandate, CoA’s role in the process of recognition of qualification of an architect cannot be said to have been obliterated by the 1987 Act. It is a fact that 1987 Act is primarily concerned with setting-up and running of a technical institution and not with regulating the professions of individuals qualifying from such institutions. But under the 1972 Act, conducting a course on architectural education and regulating the profession of architect are statutorily interwoven. Recognition of degrees or diplomas in architecture cannot be amputated from the said Act and held to have been replaced by the 1987 Act. That would render the 1972 enactment unworkable. The third distinguishing element of the 1972 Act is that the CoA is not the ultimate decision-making authority but it is the Central Government in relation to process of recognition of degree or diploma in architectural education or withdrawal thereof. Such decision is required to be taken after consultation with the CoA. But since CoA has been conferred with power to make regulations in relation to, interalia, recognition norms and monitoring of institutions imparting architectural education, CoA’s role in such process is critical. The approval power of AICTE is direct. But in the event AICTE’s norms come into conflict with that of CoA, any report or representation the CoA may make to the Central Government would be dependent upon the decision of the Central Government. The Central Government’s decision, taken under the provisions of the 1972 Act in such a case would obviously prevail, the latter being an authority superior to both the Councils constituted under the two statutes. [Paras 54, 5759] [515-F-H; 516-A; 517-B-E-H; 518-A-E] Municipal Council Palai v. T.J. Joseph [1964] 2 SCR

87 ; LIC v. D.J. Bahadur (1981) 1 SCC 315 : [1981]

1 SCR 1083 – relied on.

“Principles of Statutory Interpretation” by Justice G.P. Singh (14th Edition)– referred to.

5.1 AICTE is exercising its power to regulate institutions imparting architectural education on the strength of definition of technical education, which has been defined to mean programmes of education, research and training in architecture. The duty of the AICTE to regulate “technical education” is BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE. OF ARCH.

derived from the provisions of Section 10 of the 1987 Act. So far as these appeals are concerned, to altogether exclude architecture from the purview of AICTE, that expression, i.e. architecture would have to be dropped from the definition of technical education. If the issue is examined in the external context, which in this case would be the provisions of 1972 Act, such a course would be inevitable. In the event AICTE’s stand is to be accepted and CoA’s role is eliminated from the recognition process of architectural qualification, then a person having a degree or diploma from an AICTE approved institution only would in effect not be entitled to enrollment in the register of architects and would not be able to represent himself as an architect. Secondly, in view of the decisions of this Court in the cases of Bharatidasan University and Association of Management of Private Colleges, there would be two parallel authorities regulating architectural education. CoA would regulate universities and affiliated colleges imparting such education while AICTE would supervise rest of the institutions. Moreover, the authority of Central Government to recognize qualifications in architecture education would stand obliterated by a body, AICTE and that too in respect of certain categories of technical institutions only. The subject-dispute involved in these appeals requires omission of the word architecture from the definition of technical education. Such a course is also a permissible tool of construction to prevent absurd or unworkable results flowing from a statute. [Paras 60-62] [518-F-G; 519-D-H; 520-A]

“Bennion on Statutory Interpretation” by F A R Bennion, Fifth Edition published by Lexis Nexis (at page 972) – referred to.

5.2 In respect of the provisions of Section 2 (g) of the 1987 Act, the definition of “technical education” would have to be given such a construction and the word “architecture” should be treated to have been inapplicable in cases where the AICTE imports its regulatory framework for institutions undertaking technical education. There would however be no substitution because the context would not demand it. This construction of the definition clause is necessary as the external context requires it to prevent an unworkable outcome in implementation of the 1987 Act. The principle of implied repeal cannot apply so far as the provisions relating to architecture education is concerned, on the basis of the 1987 Act having become operational. One of the dominant purposes of the 1972 Act is recognition of qualifications on architecture. The registration of an architect is dependent upon acquisition of such recognised qualification. The said Act cannot be held to have been repealed by implication for the sole reason of inclusion of the word “architecture” in the definition of technical education. AICTE has failed to discharge its onus to establish the said provisions of the 1972 Act was repealed by implication. [Para 63] [520-CF]

6. So far as recognition of degrees and diplomas of architecture education is concerned, the 1972 Act shall prevail. AICTE will not be entitled to impose any regulatory measure in connection with the degrees and diplomas in the subject of architecture. Norms and Regulations set by CoA and other specified authorities under the 1972 Act would have to be followed by an institution imparting education for degrees and diplomas in architecture. Individual appeals – (a) The judgment of the Bombay High Court forming subject-matter of Appeal No.364 of 2005 is sustained. The appeal of the All India Council of Technical Education is dismissed. (b) Three appeals arose from the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior Bench delivered on 2nd February, 2011 in W.P. No. 315 of 2011. Rajeev Gandhi Proudyogiki Vishwavidyalyalay is the appellant in the Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 5400/2011. The appellant in the second Civil Appeal (arising out of SLP(C)No.8443/2011) is the institution, Bharatiya Vidya Mandir Shiksha Samiti. For the reasons explained earlier in this judgment, the appeal of Bharatiya Vidya Mandir Shiksha Samiti is dismissed. The High Court has directed in the judgment under appeal compliance of the conditions communicated by the CoA. The academic session involved is 2010-2011. Supreme Court at the notice stage in the university’s appeal [SLP(C)No.5400 of 2011] granted interim stay of the order of the High Court. Subsequently, there were admissions from time to time with interim directions of this Court. This appeal of the Rajeev Gandhi Proudyogiki Vishwavidyalaya is accordingly disposed of with direction that the process of recognition contained in the 1972 Act ought to be implemented in respect of the subject institution BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE. OF ARCH.

before any further admission takes place. But so far as admissions already undertaken in terms of interim orders of this Court, it is directed that such admissions ought not be disturbed. It is directed so, as it is found the High Court itself had directed compliance of CoA norms in the judgment under appeal and compliance of building requirements set by CoA was to be effected within one year. Thus, CoA norms were substantially directed to be complied with. It is also made clear that the AICTE would not have any regulatory control over the concerned institution so far as architecture education is concerned. In the appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.20460 of 2011 that CoA ought to have been impleaded as a party respondent in the said writ petition. Decision of the High Court to issue the directions contained in the judgment under appeal in absence of CoA being added in the array of respondents was erroneous. But any independent direction is not issued as these appeals were heard together as batch matters and the grievances of the CoA have been addressed to in the judgment. (c) The Civil Appeals arising out of SLP(C) No. 17005 of 2016 and SLP(C)No.17006 of 2016 have been instituted by the AICTE against a common judgment of the Karnataka High Court in Writ Appeal No.110 of 2013 and Writ Appeal No. 112 of 2013. The observation of the Karnataka High Court in a common judgment has been that the controversies would be subject to the outcome of the appeal arising out of the Bench decision of the Bombay High Court. That is the first appeal we have dealt with in this judgment. These two appeals are accordingly disposed of in terms of the decision contained in the preceding sub-paragraph (a). AICTE would not have any power to impose its regulatory measures on the concerned institution so far as architecture education is concerned. (d) The decision of the Kerala High Court in the Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C)No. 28121 of 2018 is set aside. The appeal is allowed. The institution involved in this appeal shall be entitled to operate with recognition obtained under the 1972 Act. All interim orders passed in these appeals shall stand dissolved. All connected applications shall stand disposed of. [Paras 64-66] [520-F-H; 521-A-H; 522-A-H; 523A-B]

Bharathidasan University and Another v. All India Council for Technical Education & Others (2001) 8 SCC 676 : [2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 253 ; Khayti Girish Purnima Kulkarni v. College of Architecture & Ors. (2012) 4 AIR BOM R 371; Thejus College of

Architecture v. State of Kerala & Ors. Decision dated. 6th August 2018 of High Court of Kerala in W.P.(C) No. 23858 of 2018 – referred to.