Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction
Appellate Side
Present:
The Hon’ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul)
CRR 5075 of 2024
Adarsh Parasramka & Anr.
Vs.
The State of West Bengal & Anr.
For the Petitioners
: Mr. Narayan Debnath,
Ms. Bishalaxmi Ghosh,
Ms. Swarnali Saha,
Mr. Md. Nesab Sarkar,
Ms. Anisha Haque,
Ms. Shreya Das.
For the State
: Mr. Amarta Ghosh,
Mr. Abhinav Rakshit.
Judgment reserved on
: 15.07.2026
Judgment delivered on
: 12.08.2026
SHAMPA DUTT (PAUL), J. :
1.
The revisional application has been preferred praying for
quashing of the proceedings of GR (NS) Case No.218/24
arising out of the proceedings in Bowbazar P.S. Case No.
57/24 dated 12.04.24 under Sections 120B/420/406 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860, pending before the Court of Learned
Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate-II, Calcutta.
2.
The petitioners state that Bowbazar PS Case no. 57/24 dated
12.04.2024 was registered under Sections 420/406/120B of
Page 2
Indian Penal Code, stating therein that pursuant to a
commercial agreement dated 24.09.2021, the de facto
complainant/Opposite Party no. 2 supplied, industrial oil for 8
months from 23.07.2021 to 20.02.2022. From 21.02.2022, the
Accused Persons/petitioners herein stopped the payment for
supplying the goods. Even after several persuasions through
calls and other media, no payment was made. Hence, the
complaint was registered through Court order in compliance
to Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
3.
The petitioners state that the Opposite party no. 2, in
pursuant to a commercial contract dated 24.09.2021, has
supplied industrial oil which is of inferior quality as against
the terms and conditions of the said agreement. In fact, the
Petitioners also intimated the same through notice dated
04.01.2024
through
their
Learned
Advocate,
thereby
intimating the concerned factum. Moreso, it has categorically
been mentioned that due to such inferior quality of product,
the Petitioners have incurred a huge loss of Rs. 48,79,000/-,
as owing to such substandard quality of industrial oil damage
and break down has been caused to high quality machineries.
4.
It is thus stated that the alleged dispute is entirely civil in
nature, arising out of commercial transactions. Moreover, the
Opposite Party no. 2 has supplied inferior quality of goods
Page 3
with an evil motive to gain wrongfully and after receiving a
legal notice dated 04.01.2024, this instant criminal case has
been filed through Court order in pursuant to provision of
Section 156(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 after
more than 3 months without any plausible explanation for
such inordinate delay just in order to shield his own misdeed.
5.
The petitioners further state that it is now the settled
proposition of Law as observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court
that Sections 420/406 of the Indian Penal Code cannot
co-exist simultaneously on the same sets of facts.
6.
The petitioners state that they had neither any intention to
deceive the Opposite party no. 2 nor to misuse the terms of
the commercial contract. In fact it is the Opposite Party no. 2
who has deceived the Petitioners by supplying inferior quality
of goods in deviation to the terms as settled between the
parties. In fact, after receiving of the legal notice dated
04.01.2024,
this
case
has
been
drawn
up
through
provisions of Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 on 12.04.2024 (i.e. delay of more than 3
months without any plausible explanations).
7.
The petitioners rely upon the judgment of the Supreme Court
in Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. & Ors. Versus State of
Uttar Pradesh & Anr., in Criminal Appeal No. 3114 of
Page 4
2024, decided on 23 August, 2024, wherein the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held:“41. Before we close this matter, we would like to
say something as regards the casual approach of
the courts below in cases like the one at hand.
The Indian Penal Code (IPC) was the official
Criminal Code in the Republic of India inherited
from the British India after independence.
The IPC came into force in the sub-continent during
the British rule in 1862. The IPC remained in force
for almost a period of 162 years until it was
repealed and replaced by the Bharatiya Nyaya
Sanhita (“BNS”) in December 2023 which came
into effect on 1st July 2024. It is indeed very sad to
note that even after these many years, the courts
have not been able to understand the fine
distinction between criminal breach of trust and
cheating.
42. When dealing with a private complaint, the law
enjoins upon the magistrate a duty to meticulously
examine the contents of the complaint so as to
determine whether the offence of cheating or
criminal breach of trust as the case may be is made
out from the averments made in the complaint. The
magistrate must carefully apply its mind to
ascertain whether the allegations, as stated,
genuinely constitute these specific offences. In
contrast, when a case arises from a FIR, this
responsibility is of the police – to thoroughly
ascertain whether the allegations levelled by the
informant indeed falls under the category of
cheating
or
criminal
breach
of
trust.
Unfortunately, it has become a common
practice for the police officers to routinely
and mechanically proceed to register an FIR
for both the offences i.e. criminal breach of
trust and cheating on a mere allegation of
some dishonesty or fraud, without any proper
application of mind.
43. It is high time that the police officers
across the country are imparted proper
Page 5
training in law so as to understand the fine
distinction between the offence of cheating
viz-a-viz criminal breach of trust. Both
offences are independent and distinct. The
two offences cannot coexist simultaneously in
the same set of facts. They are antithetical to
each other. The two provisions of the IPC (now
BNS, 2023) are not twins that they cannot
survive without each other.”
8.
The State has placed the Case Diary along with memo of
evidence, wherein it appears that the complainant has stated
that:“He supplied industrial oil to the accused based on
a contract dated September 24, 2021. While
supplies were made regularly, the accused
deliberately stopped making payments starting
February 21, 2022. When the complainant reached
out via calls, emails, and messages to collect the
dues, the accused delayed payments by making
excuses, such as being out of station or having
health issues. Furthermore, the accused attempted
to deflect by falsely accusing the complainant of
supplying degraded quality oil. The accused has
wrongfully withheld and misappropriated a total
sum of Rs. 33,78,512/- (Thirty-three lakh seventyeight thousand five hundred and twelve only). The
complainant alleges that these actions were done
with a mala fide (bad faith) intention to wrongfully
gain, constituting cheating and criminal breach of
trust under Sections 420 and 406 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860.”
9. In Shailesh Kumar Singh alias Shailesh R. Singh vs
State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., in Criminal Appeal No.
2963/2025 (@ petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.)
Page 6
No. 4880/2025), decided on 14 July, 2025, places
paragraph 9:“9. What we have been able to understand is that
there is an oral agreement between the parties. The
Respondent No.4 might have parted with some
money in accordance with the oral agreement and
it may be that the appellant - herein owes a
particular amount to be paid to the Respondent
No.4. However, the question is whether prima facie
any offence of cheating could be said to have been
committed by the appellant.”
10. It is thus the contention of the petitioners herein that in view
of the final observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. & Ors (Supra) at Para 41, 42,
43 the offences alleged in the present case of cheating and
criminal breach of trust cannot co-exist simultaneously
and it is stated that on this ground alone, the FIR is to be
quashed.
11. It is further brought to the notice of the Court that the
Hon’ble
Supreme
Court
has
categorically
noted
that
whenever a case arises from an F.I.R., this responsibility is
on the police to thoroughly ascertain whether the allegation
levelled against the informant falls under the category of
cheating or criminal breach of trust. The Court also directed
that the police officers across the country should be
imparted proper training to understand the fine distinction
Page 7
between the offence of cheating viz a viz. criminal breach of
trust.
12. Sections 316 and 318 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023
are the offences relating to criminal breach of trust and
cheating, and define the offences as follows:“316. Criminal breach of trust. – (1) Whoever,
being in any manner entrusted with property, or
with any dominion over property, dishonestly
misappropriates or converts to his own use that
property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that
property in violation of any direction of law
prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be
discharged, or of any legal contract, express or
implied, which he has made touching the
discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any
other person so to do, commits criminal breach of
trust.”
“318. Cheating. – (1) Whoever, by deceiving any
person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the
person so deceived to deliver any property to any
person, or to consent that any person shall retain
any property, or intentionally induces the person
so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he
would not do or omit if he were not so deceived,
and which act or omission causes or is likely to
cause damage or harm to that person in body,
mind, reputation or property, is said to cheat.”
13. The difference being that Section 316 of Bharatiya Nyaya
Sanhita is attracted when initial arrangement/transaction,
etc. is not conducted with any mens rea of criminality,
there being an entrustment. It is here that the subsequent
Page 8
occurrence of incidents, which leads to the criminal offence.
So here the initial/start is based on trust, of which there is
alleged breach, with or without mens rea.
14. On the other hand, the offence of cheating under Section 318
of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita requires criminal intent right
from the beginning, when the transaction takes place.
15. In a case of cheating, an accused enters a business
arrangement/transaction, etc. with mens rea of committing
offence. His intention right from the start has the ingredients
to constitute the offence under Section 318 of Bharatiya
Nyaya Sanhita.
16. In S.N. Vijayalakshmi & Ors – versus – State of
Karnataka & Anr., 2025 INSC 917, the Supreme Court
held that:“37. Purely from a legal lens, it is now settled that
the same person cannot be simultaneously charged
for offences punishable under Sections 406 and
420 of the IPC with regard to one particular
transaction, as per the decision rendered in Delhi
Race Club (1940) Limited (supra). In this regard,
reference may also be made to a subsequent
decision by us in V D Raveesha v State of
Karnataka, 2024 INSC 1060 (penned by
Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.), which noticed the
exposition in Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited
(supra). In V D Raveesha (supra), the distinction
between Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC was duly
taken note of, but charges under Sections 406 and
420 of the IPC against the same person were
upheld, not being part of a single transaction and
Page 9
committed against different persons. The relevant
passage from V D Raveesha (supra) reads thus:
„21.
Though,
having
regard
to
the
aforeenumerated position of law, on an overall
conspectus of the factual aspects juxtaposed with
the evidence on record, as regards fulfilment of the
ingredients of Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC, at
first sight, it may appear that the petitioner cannot
be convicted both under Sections 406 and 420 of
the IPC, but, in the present case, on a proper
consideration of the issue in its entirety, there is a
fine distinction inasmuch as, there are two different
persons against whom the petitioner has committed
the respective offences under the Sections supra:
17 first, the Company and second, Mallikarjuna
(PW4 and husband of purchaser Savithramma).
Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the present
case, evidently the petitioner is guilty of offence
committed against the Company punishable under
Section 406 of the IPC and also, of offence
committed against Mallikarjuna (PW4 and husband
of purchaser Savithramma) punishable under
Section 420 of the IPC.‟
(emphasis supplied).”
17. Thus keeping in mind the arguments made, by the parties
herein,
and
the
judgments
relied
upon,
moreso,
the
judgment in Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. & Ors (Supra)
and para 37 of S.N. Vijayalakshmi (Supra), this court is of
view that in order for the offences under Section 316 and 318
of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita to co-exist, the facts of the case
is required to be prima facie a mixture of both offences
which
involves
several
transactions,
committed
by
Page 10
different persons in a single case being a “mixed bag of
facts”.
18. The Supreme Court in S.N. Vijayalakshmi & Ors – versus
– State of Karnataka & Anr. (2025 INSC 917), also held:“42. Coming to the second question i.e., whether
civil and criminal proceedings both can be
maintained on the very same set of allegations
qua the same person(s), the answer stricto sensu,
is that there is no bar to simultaneous civil and
criminal proceedings. If the element of criminality
is there, a civil case can co-exist with a criminal
case on the same facts. The fact that a civil
remedy has already been availed of by a
complainant, ipso facto, is not sufficient ground to
quash an FIR, as pointed out, inter alia, in P
Swaroopa Rani v M Hari Narayana, (2008) 5
SCC 765 and Syed Aksari Hadi Ali Augustine
Imam v State (Delhi Admn.), (2009) 5 SCC
528. The obvious caveat being that the
allegations, even if having a civil flavour to them,
must prima facie disclose an overwhelming
element of criminality. In the absence of the
element of criminality, if both civil and criminal
cases are allowed to continue, it will definitely
amount to abuse of the process of the Court,
which the Courts have always tried to prevent by
putting a stop to any such criminal proceeding,
where civil proceedings have already been
instituted with regard to the same issue, and the
element of criminality is absent. If such element is
absent, the prosecution in question would have to
be quashed. In this connection, Paramjeet Batra
v State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 11 SCC 673
can be referred to:
„12. … Whether a complaint discloses a criminal
offence or not depends upon the nature of facts
alleged therein. Whether essential ingredients of
Page 11
criminal offence are present or not has to be
judged by the High Court. A complaint disclosing
civil transactions may also have a criminal
texture. But the High Court must see whether a
dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is
given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a
situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in
fact, adopted as has happened in this case, the
High Court should not hesitate to quash the
criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process
of the court.‟
(emphasis supplied)
43. In Usha Chakraborty v State of West
Bengal, (2023) 15 SCC 135, while quashing the
FIR therein and further proceedings based
thereon, it was observed „…the factual position
thus would reveal that the genesis as also the
purpose of criminal proceedings are nothing but
the aforesaid incident and further that the dispute
involved is essentially of civil nature.”
19. The four core elements of a crime are Actus Reus (the
guilty act), Mens Rea (the guilty mind/intent), Concurrence
(the act and intent must happen together), and Causation
(the act must cause the resulting harm). These elements,
defined by statutes, must generally be present to establish
criminal liability, proving someone committed a harmful
act with the required mental state.
20. In Naresh Kumar & Anr. Vs The State of Karnataka &
Anr., in Criminal Appeal No. ……….. of 2024 (arising out
of SLP (Crl.) No. 1570 of 2021), decided on March 12,
2024, the Supreme Court held:-
Page 12
“5. Under these circumstances, we are of the
considered view that this is a case where the
inherent powers should have been exercised by
the High Court under Section 482 of the
Criminal Procedure Code as the powers are
there to stop the abuse of the process and to
secure the ends of justice.
6. In the case of Paramjeet Batra v. State of
Uttarakhand (2013) 11 SCC 673, this Court
recognized that although the inherent powers of
a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure should be exercised
sparingly, yet the High Court must not hesitate
in quashing such criminal proceedings which
are essentially of a civil nature. This is what
was held:
“12. While exercising its jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the Code the High Court has to be
cautious. This power is to be used sparingly and
only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the
process of any court or otherwise to secure ends
of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a
criminal offence or not depends upon the nature
of facts alleged therein. Whether essential
ingredients of criminal offence are present or not
has to be judged by the High Court. A
complaint disclosing civil transactions may
also have a criminal texture. But the High
Court must see whether a dispute which is
essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak
of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a
civil remedy is available and is, in fact,
adopted as has happened in this case, the
High Court should not hesitate to quash
the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse
of process of the court.”
(emphasis supplied)
Relying upon the decision in Paramjeet Batra
(supra), this Court in Randheer Singh v. State
of U.P. (2021) 14 SCC 626, observed that
criminal proceedings cannot be taken recourse
to as a weapon of harassment. In Usha
Chakraborty & Anr. v. State of West Bengal
& Anr. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 90, relying upon
Paramjeet Batra (supra) it was again held that
Page 13
where a dispute which is essentially of a civil
nature, is given a cloak of a criminal offence,
then such disputes can be quashed, by
exercising the inherent powers under Section
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
7. Essentially, the present dispute between the
parties relates to a breach of contract. A mere
breach of contract, by one of the parties, would
not attract prosecution for criminal offence in
every case, as held by this Court in Sarabjit
Kaur v. State of Punjab and Anr. (2023) 5
SCC 360. Similarly, dealing with the distinction
between the offence of cheating and a mere
breach of contractual obligations, this Court, in
Vesa Holdings (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala,
(2015) 8 SCC 293, has held that every breach
of contract would not give rise to the offence of
cheating, and it is required to be shown that the
accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention
at the time of making the promise.”
21. In Anukul Singh vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr., in
Criminal Appeal No. 4250 of 2025 (arising out of SLP
(Crl.) No. 2682 of 2020), decided on
September 24,
2025, the Supreme Court held:“11. Before adverting to the facts of the present
case, it is necessary to recapitulate the settled
legal principles governing the exercise of
inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It is
well established that though the High Court
possesses
wide
and
plenary
inherent
jurisdiction, such power is not unbridled or
unlimited, but circumscribed by self-imposed
restraints
evolved
through
judicial
pronouncements.
11.1. This Court in State of Haryana v.
Bhajan Lal10 , at paragraph 102, laid down
illustrative categories where quashing of
proceedings is justified. These are:
“(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they
are taken at their face value and accepted in
Page 14
their entirety do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report
and
other
materials,
if
any,
accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by
police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code
except under an order of a Magistrate within the
purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made
in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not disclose
the commission of any offence and make out a
case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute
only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation
is permitted by a police officer without an order
of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section
155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding against
the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar
engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or
the Act concerned (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or, where
there is a specific provision in the Code or the
Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for
the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge.”
The categories in Bhajan Lal are illustrative
and not exhaustive, but they provide guiding
principles
to
balance
two
competing
considerations – (a)preventing abuse of process
of law, and (b)ensuring that criminal
Page 15
proceedings are not stifled at the threshold on
disputed questions of fact.
11.2. Equally, this Court has consistently
cautioned that the High Court, while exercising
jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., cannot
embark upon a “minitrial” or weigh the
sufficiency of evidence, which falls within the
domain of the trial Court. The scope of enquiry is
confined to whether, on a plain reading of the
FIR / complaint and accompanying material, the
ingredients of the alleged offence are disclosed.
[See: Rajiv Thapar v. Madal Lal Kapoor 11 ,
HMT Watches v. Abida12, and Rathish
Babu Unnikrishnan v. the State (Govt. of
NCT of Delhi) and others13].
11.3. In Md. Allauddin Khan v. State of
Bihar 14 , it was reiterated that appreciation of
contradictions or inconsistencies in witness
statements lies within the exclusive domain of
the trial Court and not in proceedings under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. Similarly, in CBI v. Aryan
Singh15 , it was emphasized that the High
Court had exceeded its jurisdiction by
examining the merits of the prosecution‟s case
and holding that charges were not proved,
which is a matter strictly for trial.
11.4. Nevertheless, an exception has been
recognized where the defence relies upon
unimpeachable, incontrovertible evidence of
sterling quality – such as documents of
undisputed authenticity – which ex facie
demonstrate that continuation of criminal
proceedings would be unjust and oppressive.
This
principle
was
recognized
in
Suryalakshmi Cotton Mills Ltd v. Rajvir
Industries Ltd16, and followed in subsequent
decisions.
11.5. Thus, the cumulative principles that
emerge are: while the jurisdiction under Section
482 Cr.P.C is extraordinary and must be
exercised sparingly, it is the duty of the High
Court to intervene where continuation of criminal
proceedings would amount to an abuse of
process of law, or where the dispute is purely of
a civil nature and criminal colour has been
artificially given to it. Conversely, where
Page 16
disputed questions of fact arise requiring
adjudication, the matter must ordinarily proceed
to trial.
17. This Court has, in a long line of decisions,
deprecated the tendency to convert civil disputes
into criminal proceedings. In Indian Oil
Corporation v. M/s. NEPC India Ltd. 17 , it
was held that criminal law cannot be used as a
tool to settle scores in commercial or contractual
matters, and that such misuse amounts to
abuse of process. The following paragraphs
from the decision are apposite:
“9. The principles, relevant to our purpose are:
(i) A complaint can be quashed where the
allegations made in the complaint, even if they
are taken at their face value and accepted in
their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out the case alleged against the
accused. For this purpose, the complaint has to
be examined as a whole, but without examining
the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed
inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material
nor an assessment of the reliability or
genuineness of the allegations in the complaint,
is warranted while examining prayer for
quashing of a complaint.
(ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is
a clear abuse of the process of the court, as
when the criminal proceeding is found to have
been initiated with malafides/malice for
wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where
the allegations are absurd and inherently
improbable.
(iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be
used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution.
The power should be used sparingly and with
abundant caution.
(iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim
reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence
alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is
laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that
a few ingredients have not been stated in detail,
the proceedings should not be quashed.
Quashing of the complaint is warranted only
where the complaint is so bereft of even the
Page 17
basic facts which are absolutely necessary for
making out the offence.
(v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely
a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or
(c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A
commercial transaction or a contractual dispute,
apart from furnishing a cause of action for
seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a
criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a
civil proceedings are different from a criminal
proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint
relates to a commercial transaction or breach of
contract, for which a civil remedy is available or
has been availed, is not by itself a ground to
quash the criminal proceedings. The test is
whether the allegations in the complaint
disclose a criminal offence or not.
10. While on this issue, it is necessary to take
notice of a growing tendency in business circles
to convert purely civil disputes into criminal
cases. This is obviously on account of a
prevalent impression that civil law remedies are
time consuming and do not adequately protect
the interests of lenders/creditors. Such a
tendency is seen in several family disputes also,
leading to irretrievable break down of
marriages/families. There is also an impression
that if a person could somehow be entangled in
a criminal prosecution, there is a likelihood of
imminent settlement. Any effort to settle civil
disputes and claims, which do not involve any
criminal offence, by applying pressure though
criminal prosecution should be deprecated and
discouraged.”
18. Similarly, in Inder Mohan Goswami and
another v. State of Uttaranchal and
others18 , it was emphasized that criminal
prosecution must not be permitted as an
instrument of harassment or private vendetta. In
Ganga Dhar Kalita v. State of Assam19 ,
this Court again reiterated that criminal
complaints in respect of property disputes of
civil nature, filed solely to harass the accused or
to exert pressure in civil litigation, constitute an
abuse of process.
Page 18
19. Most recently, in Shailesh Kumar Singh @
Shailesh R. Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh
and others 20 , this Court disapproved the
practice of using criminal proceedings as a
substitute for civil remedies, observing that
money recovery cannot be enforced through
criminal prosecution where the dispute is
essentially civil. The Court cautioned High
Courts not to direct settlements in such matters
but to apply the settled principles in Bhajan Lal.
The following paragraphs are relevant in this
context:
“9. What we have been able to understand is
that there is an oral agreement between the
parties. The Respondent No.4 might have parted
with some money in accordance with the oral
agreement and it may be that the appellant –
herein owes a particular amount to be paid to
the Respondent No.4. However, the question is
whether prima facie any offence of cheating
could be said to have been committed by the
appellant.
10. How many times the High Courts are to be
reminded that to constitute an offence of
cheating, there has to be something more than
prima facie on record to indicate that the
intention of the accused was to cheat the
complainant right from the inception. The plain
reading of the FIR does not disclose any element
of criminality.
11. The entire case is squarely covered by a
recent pronouncement of this Court in the case
of “Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited vs. State of
Uttar Pradesh” reported in (2024) 10 SCC 690.
In the said decision, the entire law as to what
constitutes cheating and criminal breach of trust
respectively has been exhaustively explained. It
appears that this very decision was relied upon
by the learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner before the High Court. However,
instead of looking into the matter on its own
merits, the High Court thought fit to direct the
petitioner to go for mediation and that too by
making payment of Rs. 25,00,000/- to the 4th
respondent as a condition precedent. We fail to
understand why the High Court should
Page 19
undertake such exercise. The High Court may
either allow the petition saying that no offence is
disclosed or may reject the petition saying that
no case for quashing is made out. Why should
the High Court make an attempt to help the
complainant to recover the amount due and
payable by the accused. It is for the Civil Court
or Commercial Court as the case may be to look
into in a suit that may be filed for recovery of
money or in any other proceedings, be it under
the Arbitration Act, 1996 or under the provisions
of the IB Code, 2016.
12. Why the High Court was not able to
understand that the entire dispute between the
parties is of a civil nature.
13. We also enquired with the learned counsel
appearing for the Respondent No.4 whether his
client has filed any civil suit or has initiated any
other proceedings for recovery of the money. It
appears that no civil suit has been filed for
recovery of money till this date. Money cannot
be recovered, more particularly, in a civil dispute
between the parties by filing a First Information
Report and seeking the help of the Police. This
amounts to abuse of the process of law.
14. We could have said many things but we
refrain from observing anything further. If the
Respondent No.4 has to recover a particular
amount, he may file a civil suit or seek any
other appropriate remedy available to him in
law. He cannot be permitted to take recourse of
criminal proceedings.
15. We are quite disturbed by the manner in
which the High Court has passed the impugned
order. The High Court first directed the appellant
to pay Rs.25,00,000/- to the Respondent No.4
and thereafter directed him to appear before the
Mediation and Conciliation Centre for the
purpose of settlement. That‟s not what is
expected of a High Court to do in a Writ Petition
filed under Article 226 of the Constitution or a
miscellaneous application filed under Section
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for
quashing of FIR or any other criminal
proceedings. What is expected of the High Court
is to look into the averments and the allegations
Page 20
levelled in the FIR along with the other material
on record, if any. The High Court seems to have
forgotten
the
wellsettled
principles
as
enunciated in the decision of this Court in the
“State of Haryana & Others vs. Bhajan Lal &
Others” Reported in 1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335.””
22. The facts in the present case appears to be a civil dispute
arising out of disagreement in a business transaction, and in
such cases, it has to be prima facie shown that there was/is
criminal intent present.
23. The materials on record, herein including the case diary do
not prima facie show presence of the ingredients required to
constitute the offences alleged against the petitioners herein
with absence of criminal intent and as such the proceeding in
this case is thus liable to be quashed in the interest of
Justice, to prevent an abuse of the process of law.
24. CRR 5075 of 2024 is thus allowed.
25. The proceeding being GR (NS) Case No.218/24 arising out of
the proceedings in Bowbazar P.S. Case No. 57/24 dated
12.04.24 under Sections 120B/420/406 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860, pending before the Court of Learned Additional
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate-II, Calcutta, is hereby quashed
in respect of the petitioners namely Adarsh Parasramka
and Seema Trading Company.
26. All connected Applications, if any, stand disposed of.
27. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
Page 21
28. Copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Trial Court for
necessary compliance.
29. Urgent certified website copy of this judgment, if applied for,
be supplied expeditiously after complying with all, necessary
legal formalities.
[Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.]
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review