Abid-Ul-Islam vs Inder Sain Dua

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: s.14(1)(e) – Bona fide requirement by landlord – U/s.14(1)(e) landlord makes an application seeking possession of the tenanted premise for his bona fide requirement when there is no other reasonably suitable accommodation – There has to be satisfaction on two grounds, namely, (i) the requirement being bona fide and (ii) the nonavailability of a reasonably suitable residential accommodation – Such reasonableness along with suitability is to be seen from the perspective of the landlord and not the tenant. Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: s.14(1)(e) vis-a-vis s.25B(5) – Scope of – For availing leave to defend u/s.25B(5), a mere assertion per se would not suffice as s.14(1)(e) creates a presumption subject to the satisfaction of the Rent Controller qua bona fide need in favour of the landlord – Before a presumption is drawn, landlord is duty bound to place prima facie material supported by the adequate averments – It is only thereafter, the presumption gets attracted and the onus shifts on the tenant – Further, s.19 of the Act gives a right to the dispossessed tenant for repossession if there is a noncompliance on the part of the landlord albeit after eviction – Such a right is available only to a tenant who stood dispossessed on the application filed by the landlord invoking s.14(1)(e) being allowed.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. Section 14(1)(e) carves out an exception to the regular mode of eviction. Thus, in a case where a landlord makes an application seeking possession of the tenanted premises for his bona fide requirement, the Rent Controller may dispense with the protection prescribed under the Act and then grant an order of eviction. Requirement is the existence of bona fide need, when there is no other “reasonably suitable accommodation”. When the Rent Controller comes to the conclusion that there exists a bona fide need coupled with the satisfaction that there is no reasonably suitable residential accommodation, the twin conditions mandated under Section 14(1)(e) stand satisfied. [Para 12][1025-D-F]

2. For availing the leave to defend as envisaged under Section 25B(5), a mere assertion per se would not suffice as Section 14(1)(e) creates a presumption subject to the satisfaction of the Rent Controller qua bona fide need in favour of the landlord which is obviously rebuttable with some material of substance to the extent of raising a triable issue. The satisfaction of the Rent Controller in deciding on an application seeking leave to defend is obviously subjective. The degree of probability is one of preponderance forming the subjective satisfaction of the Rent Controller. Thus, the quality of adjudication is between a mere moonshine and adequate material and evidence meant for the rejection of a normal application for eviction. [Para 15][1029-A-C]

3. Before a presumption is drawn, the landlord is duty bound to place prima facie material supported by the adequate averments. It is only thereafter, the presumption gets attracted and the onus shifts on the tenant. The object ofSection 14(1)(e) vis a vis Section 25B has to be seen in the light of yet another provision contained under Section 19. Section 19 gives a right to the dispossessed tenant for repossession if there is a noncompliance on the part of the landlord albeit after eviction, to put the premises to use for the intendedpurpose. Such a right is available only to a tenant who stood dispossessed on the application filed by the landlord invoking Section 14(1)(e) being allowed. Thus, Section 19 inter alia throws more light on the legislative objective facilitating a speedy possession. The object is also reflected in the proviso to Section 25B(8), denying a right of appeal. [Para 16][1029-C-E]

4. The proviso to Section 25B(8) creates a distinct and unequivocal embargo by not providing an appeal against the order passed by the Rent Controller over an application filed under sub-section (5). The intendment of the legislature is very clear, which is to remove the appellate remedy and thereafter, a further second appeal. It is a clear omission that is done by the legislature consciously through a covenant removing the right of two stages of appeals. Proviso to Section 25B(8) gives the High Court exclusive power of revision against an order of the Rent Controller, being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the decision making process, inclusive of procedural compliance. Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its views with that of the trial Court by exercising the appellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the record, which would only mean that in the absence of any adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act, totally forbidden by the legislature. [Paras 19, 20][1032-D-H]

5. The High Court proceeded to allow the revision by treating it like an appeal. It did not even reverse the findings of the learned Rent Controller, but proceeded to hold that the denials of the appellant in his reply to the application seeking leave to defend are vague, qua the plea of alternative accommodation, notwithstanding the rejection of the contention of the respondent that he cannot question the title. [Para 24][1038-H; 1039-A-B]

Anil Bajaj and Anr. v. Vinod Ahuja (2014) 15 SCC 610; Baldev Singh Bajwa v. Monish Saini, (2005) 12 SCC

778 : [2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 26; Ram Krishan Grover v. Union of India, (2020) 12 SCC 506; Inderjeet Kaur v. Nirpal Singh, (2001) 1 SCC 706 : [2000] 5 Suppl. SCR 707; Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119 : [1998] 2 Suppl. SCR 390; Mohd. Inam v. Sanjay Kumar Singhal, (2020) 7 SCC

327 – relied on.

Balwant Singh alias Bant Singh and Anr. v. Sudarshan Kumar and Anr. 2021 SCC OnLine SC 114 10; M.M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma and Ors. (1981) 3 SCC

36 : [1981] 3 SCR 367; P.V. Papanna and Ors. v. K. Padmanabhaiah (1994) 2 SCC 316 : [1994] 1 SCR 642; Amarjit Singh v. Khatoon Quamarain (1986) 4 SCC 736 : [1987] 1 SCR 275; D. Satyanarayana v. P. Jagadish (1987) 4 SCC424 : [1988] 1 SCR 145;

Precision Steel and Engineering Works v. Prem Deva (1982) 3 SCC 270 : [1983] 1 SCR 498; Liaq Ahmed and Ors. v. Habeeb-Ur-Rehman (2000) 5 SCC 708 : [2000] 3 SCR 800; India Umbrella Manufacturing Co. and Ors. v. Bhagabandei Agarwalla (Dead) by LRs and Ors. (2004) 3 SCC 178 : [2004] 1 SCR 10; Gram Panchayat v. Ujagar Singh and Ors. (2000) 7 SCC 543 : [2000] 3 Suppl. SCR 457 – referred to.