Contempt of Court: Civil contempt – It is well settled that contempt action ought to proceed only in respect of established wilful disobedience of the order of the Court – In the instant case, the limited direction given by the High Court and not disturbed by this Court was to permit the petitioners to work on the concerned posts and to pay them regular salary as and when the same accrues to them – Grievance of the petitioners in the first set of contempt petitions was that the respondents have appointed them afresh instead of reinstatement with continuity of service along with arrears of wages and thus have wilfully violated the direction of this Court – The expression used is only “to permit the petitioners to work on the posts” which were held by them at the time of their termination and “to pay them regular salary month by month” and “as and when the same accrues to them” – It is not a case of wilful disobedience of the orders of the Court.
Contempt of Court: Civil contempt – The second set of contempt petitions, emanate from termination order issued by the respondents – These petitions essentially proceed on the allegation that the respondents committed wilful disobedience of the order of this Court in not affording prior opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and similarly placed persons despite express direction contained in the said order – High Court had set aside the termination order issued by the respondents, solely on the ground that it was in violation of principles of natural justice – At the same time, liberty was given to the respondents to pass a fresh order in accordance with law including by undertaking exercise of segregating the tainted from the untainted candidates – Had the respondents concluded that it was possible to segregate tainted from untainted candidates, they would have been obliged to comply with the directions given by the High Court and restated by this Court to afford prior opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and similarly placed persons before passing fresh, reasoned order – However, from the subject termination order which is a speaking order, it is crystal clear that after due enquiry and taking into consideration all aspects of the matter, in particular the enquiry reports and the opinion of the experts including final report of SIT, the respondents were of the considered opinion that it was not possible to segregate tainted from the untainted candidates for reasons recorded in that order – In light of the conclusion reached by the respondents that it was not possible to segregate the tainted from the untainted candidates, in law, it must follow that the respondents could annul the entire selection process and pass the impugned order without giving individual notices to the petitioners and similarly placed persons – Thus, there was nothing wrong in respondents issuing the said termination order without affording prior opportunity to the petitioners and similarly placed persons.
Constitution of India: Arts 32 and 226 – If the termination order is assailed on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice or fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution, such a grievance can be brought before the constitutional Court including by way of writ petition under Art.32 of the Constitution of India – It is a different matter that this Court may be loath in entertaining the grievance directly under Art.32 and instead relegate the petitioner(s) before the High Court to first exhaust the remedy under Art.226 of the Constitution of India – In the present case, there are other proceedings pending in the form of contempt petitions and a transfer petition wherein the termination order is the subject matter – Thus, the arguments in these cases will be overlapping – In that, the self-same order has been impugned in the writ petition filed before this Court – The fact that other affected similarly placed persons have filed writ petitions directly before the High Court and which are stated to be pending, can be no impediment for this Court in entertaining and deciding the writ petition – For, the issue regarding the purport of orders passed by this Court needs to be answered appropriately in contempt petitions only by this Court – It is not open to the High Court to interpret or explain the order passed by this Court in previous proceedings between the parties – High Court can only follow the dictum of this Court which is binding on it – Accordingly, the preliminary objection taken by the respondents regarding the maintainability of writ petition under Art.32 of the Constitution by similarly placed persons directly filed before this Court to assail the impugned order which is also subject matter of second set of contempt petitions is not sustainable – Contempt of court.
Disposing the petitions, the Court
HELD: 1. It is well-established position that if the termination order is assailed on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice or fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution, such a grievance can be brought before the constitutional Court including by way of writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. It is a different matter that this Court may be loath in entertaining the grievance directly under Article 32 and instead relegate the petitioner(s) before the High Court to first exhaust the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. That is also because this Court will then have the advantage of the judgment of the High Court on relevant aspects. In other words, it is not a question of maintainability of writ petition, but one of exercise of discretion with circumspection in entertaining writ petition under Article
32 in such matters. Further, in the present case, there are other proceedings pending in the form of contempt petitions and a transfer petition wherein the termination order dated 02.03.2020 is the subject matter. Thus, the arguments in these cases will be overlapping. In that, the self-same order has been impugned in the writ petition filed before this Court. The fact that other affected similarly placed persons have filed writ petitions directly before the High Court and which are stated to be pending, can be no impediment for this Court in entertaining and deciding the writ petition. For, the issue regarding the purport of orders passed by this Court needs to be answered appropriately in contempt petitions only by this Court. It is not open to the High Court to interpret or explain the order passed by this Court in previous proceedings between the parties. The High Court can only follow the dictum of this Court which is binding on it. Accordingly, the preliminary objection taken by the respondents regarding the maintainability of writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution by similarly placed persons directly filed before this Court to assail the impugned order dated 2.3.2020, which is also subject matter of second set of contempt petitions is not sustainable. [Para 56][340-C-H]
2.1 The grievance of the petitioners is that the unambiguous direction given by the High Court and upheld by this Court was to reinstate the petitioners on the same position with full back wages. The respondents were, therefore, obliged to issue order of reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages. The argument is attractive at the first blush, but on deeper scrutiny of the orders passed by the High Court and finally by this Court, it is noticed that the direction is limited to permit the petitioners to work on the posts of Assistant Engineer (Civil), Assistant Engineer (Electric/Mechanical) and Assistant Engineer (iHighComputer Science and Electronics and Communication/Electrical and Electronics) and to pay them regular salary month by month as and when it becomes due and payable to them. On similar lines, the High Court disposed of another writ petition challenging the termination order passed by the respondents. In these orders, the expression used by the High Court is “to permit the petitioners to work on the concerned posts and to pay them regular salary as and when the same accrues to them”. Perusal of order passed in review petition also does not indicate that the High Court expressly directed reinstatement of petitioners with continuity of service and back wages, as such. Even in the decision of this Court dismissing the appeals filed by respondents, no such direction has been issued. The limited direction is that the respondents must first act upon the decision of the High Court dated 28.11.2017 and only thereafter proceed in the matter in accordance with law by passing a fresh, reasoned order. [Para 58][341-C-G; 342-C-E]
2.2 After cogitating over the orders passed by the High Court and this Court, it becomes amply clear that the High Court had quashed and set aside the first termination order solely on the ground that it was passed in violation of principles of natural justice and further observed that the selection as a whole was not liable to be cancelled without undertaking an exercise to separate the tainted candidates from the untainted. While so observing, it was made clear that the respondents were free to pass a fresh, reasoned order in accordance with law. [Para 59] [342-E-F]
2.3 The explanation offered by the respondents is accepted that going by the text of the orders passed by the High Court and this Court, it was open to the respondents to issue order to reengage the petitioners on the same posts from the date of order and to pay them regular salary month by month thereafter or as and when it would accrue to them. The orders passed by the High Court and this Court, do not contain explicit direction to reinstate the petitioners with continuity of service and back wages as such. Instead, the expression used is only “to permit the petitioners to work on the posts” which were held by them at the time of their termination and “to pay them regular salary month by month” and “as and when the same accrues to them”. Thus understood, it is not a case of wilful disobedience of the orders of the Court. Arguendo, the interpretation as propagated by the petitioners of the stated orders dated 28.11.2017 passed by the High Court and 16.3.2018 of this Court, is a possible view. Being another possible view, the benefit must then be given to the respondents. For, it would certainly not be a case of wilful disobedience. It is well settled that contempt action ought to proceed only in respect of established wilful disobedience of the order of the Court The limited direction given by the High Court and not disturbed by this Court was to permit the petitioners to work on the concerned posts and to pay them regular salary as and when the same accrues to them, the plea under consideration needs to be recorded only to be rejected. The case at hand does not qualify the test of contumacious, much less wilful disobedience of the order of the Court by the officers of the respondents as such. [Paras 60, 61, 62, 63, 64][342-G-H; 343-B-D; 345-B-C] Sushila Raje Holkar v. Anil Kak (Retired) (2008) 14 SCC 392 : [2008] 7 SCR 278; State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari AIR 1961 SC 221 : [1961] SCR 728; Maruti Udyog Limited v. Mahinder C. Mehta & Ors. (2007) 13 SCC 220 : [2007] 10 SCR 933; Ram Kishan v. Tarun Bajaj & Ors. (2014)16 SCC 204 : [2014] 1 SCR 538; Director of Education, Uttaranchal & Ors. v. Ved Prakash Joshi & Ors. (2005) 6 SCC 98 : [2005]
1 Suppl. SCR 620; K.G. Derasari & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.(2001) 10 SCC 496; Deepali Gundu
Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D. Ed.) & Ors. (2013) 10 SCC 324 : [2013] 9 SCR 1; P. Karupaiah (Dead) through Legal Representatives v. General Manager, Thruuvalluvar Transport Corporation Limited (2018) 12 SCC 663 : [2017] 10 SCR 557 – relied on.
3.1 The second set of contempt petitions, emanate from termination order issued by the respondents. These petitions essentially proceed on the allegation that the respondents committed wilful disobedience of the order of this Court in not affording prior opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and similarly placed persons despite express direction contained in the said order. The Court had set aside the termination order issued by the respondents, solely on the ground that it was in violation of principles of natural justice. At the same time, liberty was given to the respondents to pass a fresh order in accordance with law including by undertaking exercise of segregating the tainted from the untainted candidates. Indeed, the Court expected that before taking any precipitative action against the petitioners, the respondents must afford opportunity of hearing to them. This observation is contextual. It would come into play dependent upon the opinion eventually formed by respondents after due consideration of the material collated by them to distinguish the tainted and untainted candidates, was possible or otherwise. Had the respondents concluded that it was possible to segregate tainted from untainted candidates, they would have been obliged to comply with the directions given by the High Court and restated by this Court in order dated 15.11.2018, to afford prior opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and similarly placed persons before passing fresh, reasoned order. However, from the subject termination order dated 2.3.2020, which is a speaking order, it is crystal clear that after due enquiry and taking into consideration all aspects of the matter, in particular the enquiry reports and the opinion of the experts including final report of SIT, the respondents were of the considered opinion that it was not possible to segregate tainted from the untainted candidates for reasons recorded in that order. It is subject matter of challenge in writ petitions pending before the High Court filed not only by Assistant Engineers, but also by Junior Engineers, Routine Grade Clerks and others. In light of the conclusion reached by the respondents that it was not possible to segregate the tainted from the untainted candidates, in law, it must follow that the respondents could annul the entire selection process and pass the impugned order without giving individual notices to the petitioners and similarly placed persons. [Paras 65, 66, 67][345-D-E; 346-C-G, H; 347-A-B]
Union of India & Ors. v. O. Chakradhar (2002) 3 SCC
146 : [2002] 1 SCR 1091; Veerendra Kumar Gautam & Ors. v. Karuna Nidhan Upadhyay & Ors. (2016) 14 SCC 18 : [2016] 7 SCR 223; Vikas Pratap Singh & Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors. (2013) 14 SCC
494 : [2013] 10 SCR 1114 – relied on.
3.2 Since the respondents have concluded that it was not possible to segregate tainted from the untainted candidates because of the reasons noted in the termination order dated 2.3.2020, in law, there was nothing wrong in respondents issuing the said termination order without affording prior opportunity to the petitioners and similarly placed persons. Had it been a case of even tittle of possibility in segregating the tainted from the untainted candidates, which exercise the respondents were permitted to engage in, in terms of the decision of this Court dated 15.11.2018, it would have been a different matter. In that case alone, the petitioners and similarly placed persons could complain of wilful disobedience of the order passed by this Court dated 15.11.2018. Even the second set of contempt petitions in reference to the subject termination order dated 2.3.2020 being in violation of direction given by this Court to afford opportunity to the petitioners vide order dated 15.11.2018, must fail. [Paras
68 and 69][347-C-F]
3.3 While discharging the show-cause notices issued in the concerned contempt petitions and disposing of all the contempt petitions, it is deemed appropriate to relegate the petitioners in the transfer petition and the writ petition filed in this Court, before the High Court to pursue their remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution to assail the order dated 2.3.2020 with further direction that all petitions involving overlapping issues and referred to in Annexure R-29 of the Supplementary Affidavit or any other writ petition pending or to be filed, list whereof be furnished by the parties to the High Court, for being heard analogously. The High Court is requested to expeditiously dispose of the writ petitions, leaving all contentions other than decided in this judgment, open to the respective parties to be raised before the High Court. The same be decided on its own merits as per law. Show-cause notices issued in the respective contempt petitions stand discharged. Contempt petitions are dismissed; The transfer petition stands rejected, as a result of which the writ petitions referred to therein will now proceed before the High Court in terms of this judgment; The writ petition is disposed of with liberty to the petitioners therein including applicants in intervention/impleadment applications to pursue their remedy before the High Court by way of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, if so advised. That writ petition be decided on its own merits in accordance with law keeping in mind the observations made in this judgment along with other pending or fresh writ petitions involving similar issues; and the High Court is requested to take up all writ petitions involving overlapping issues together for analogous hearing expeditiously. [Paras 71, 72][348-D-H; 349-A-C]
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433 : [2007] 2 SCR 60; U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. & Anr. v. Uday Narain Pandey (2006) 1 SCC 479 : [2005] 5 Suppl. SCR 609; Haryana Financial
Corporation & Anr. v. Jagdamba Oil Mills & Anr. (2002)
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557 : [2010] 7 SCR 346; Union of India & Ors. v. S.K. Kapoor (2011) 4 SCC 589 : [2011] 3 SCR 906; Nisha Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. (2014) 16 SCC 392 : [2014] 3 SCR 483; Indian Institute of Information Technology, Deoghat Jhalwa, Allahabad & Anr. v. Dr. Anurika Vaish & Ors. (2017) 5 SCC 660 : [2017] 3 SCR 691; P.N. Kumar & Anr. v. Muncipal Corporation of Delhi (1987) 4 SCC 609 : [1988] 1 SCR 732; Kanubhai Brahmbhatt v. State of Gujarat 1989 Supp (2) SCC 310 : [1987] 2 SCR 314; Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors. (2010) 4 SCC
513 : [2010] 3 SCR 787; Confederation of All Nagaland State Services Employees’Assn.& Ors. v. State of Nagaland (2006) 1 SCC 496; Amrit Lal Berry v. Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi & Ors. (1975)
4 SCC 714 : [1975] 2 SCR 960; Dharampal Satyapal Limited v. Dy. Commissioner of Central Excise, Gauhati & Ors. (2015) 8 SCC 519 : [2015] 6 SCR 437; Union of India & Ors. v. Rajesh P.U. Puthuvalnikathu & Anr. (2003)7 SCC 285 : [2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 883; Rajesh Kumar & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors. (2013) 4 SCC
690 : [2013] 4 SCR 753; K. Channegowda & Ors. v. Karnataka Public Service Commission & Ors. (2005)
12 SCC 688 : [2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 126; Modern
Dental College and Research Centre & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors (2016) 7 SCC 353 : [2016] 3 SCR 579; Inderpreet Singh Kahlon & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors. (2006) 11 SCC 356 : [2006] 1 Suppl. SCR 772; Girjesh Shrivastava & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (2010) 10 SCC 707 : [2010] 12 SCR 839; Joginder Pal & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors. (2014) 6 SCC 644 : [2014] 6 SCR 383; Purnendu Mukhopadhyay & Ors. v. V.K. Kapoor & Anr. (2008)
14 SCC 403 : [2007] 11 SCR 462 – referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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