Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
WP(C) 233 of 2023
Abhijit Dhar
S/o Sri Tapan Kr. Dhar,
R/o- Indranagar, Satsangha Chowmuhani,
PO: Kunjaban, Agartala, West Tripura, Agartala, Age-39 years.
---Petitioner(s)
Versus
1. The State of Tripura
To be represented by the Secretary, Department of Law Govt. of
Tripura, New Secretariat Complex, Khejurbagan, PS: New Capital
Complex, Agartala, District West Tripura, PIN: 799010
2. The Registrar General, Hon’ble High Court of Tripura, Lichu
Bagan, Agartala, West Tripura,
3. The Registrar Vigilance, Hon’ble High Court of Tripura, Lichu
Bagan, Agartala, West Tripura,
4. The District & Sessions Judge, Gomati District, Udaipur, Gomati
Tripura, PO-R.K. Pur, Gomati Tripura,
5. The District & Sessions Judge, Unakoti Tripura Kailashahar
(formerly North Tripura), PS: Kailashahar, Unakoti Tripura.
---Respondent(s)
For Petitioner(s)
For Respondent(s)
Date of hearing
Date of pronouncement
Whether fit for reporting
: Mr. P Roy Barman, Sr. Advocate.
Mr. S. Bhattacharjee, Advocate.
Mr. K. Nath, Advocate.
: Mr. D. Bhattacharjee, GA.
Mr. BN Majumder, Sr. Advocate.
Mr. P. Gautam, Advocate.
: 29.08.2023
: 30.08.2023
: Yes
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE T. AMARNATH GOUD
Judgment & Order
This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India for seeking the following reliefs:
(i)
Issue Rule upon the respondents to show cause as to why a writ in the
nature of Mandamus and/or order/orders and/or direction/directions of
like nature shall not be issued whereby quashing and cancelling the
impugned communication dated 09.01.2023 issued by the District &
Sessions Judge, Udaipur, Gomati Tripura.
(ii)
Issue Rule upon the respondents to show cause as to why a writ in the
nature of Mandamus and/or order/orders and/or direction/directions of
like nature shall not be issued whereby quashing and cancelling the
impugned letter, dated 23.03.2023 issued by the Registrar Vigilance,
High Court of Tripura.
(iii)
Issue Rule upon the respondents to show cause as to why a writ in the
nature of Mandamus and/or order/orders and/or direction/directions of
like nature shall not be issued whereby directing the respondents to
reinstate the petitioner with all back wages after regularizing his
period of absence w.e.f. 05.01.2022 to 09.01.2023, i.e. till the date of
impugned communication, in the post of LDC, Court of CJM-cum-Civil
Judge (Sr. Div) Gomati Judicial District, Udaipur.
(iv)
Make the rules absolute.
(v)
Call for records
Pass any further order/orders as this Hon’ble High Court considered fit
and proper.
[2]
It is the case of the petitioner while serving as LDC,
Court of CJM cum Civil Judge (Sr.Div.) Gomati Judicial District
Udaipur served with an impugned communication, terminating his
service on the ground of alleged unauthorised absence from duty
w.e.f. 05.01.2022 to 09.01.2023 by deemed resignation, in terms
of Rule 12(1) (a) of TSCS leave Rules, 1986. It is contended by the
petitioner that he was unwell & under medication of different
doctors, during the said period. The petitioner submitted medical
documents before the respondents but without considering the
same he has been removed from his service by violating the
principles of natural justice. The petitioner was not given any
opportunity
to
represent
himself.
The
impugned
order/communication dated 09.01.2023 issued by the District &
Sessions Judge, Gomati District is a stigmatic order, not an order
simpliciter. No departmental proceedings were initiated before such
removal. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the said order
dated 09.01.2023 before the Ld. Registrar, Hon’ble High Court of
Tripura, which was rejected vide letter dated 23.03.2023 without
assigning any reason. Aggrieved by the said action of the
respondents, the petitioner has approached this court by way of
filing this writ petition.
[3]
It is contended by Mr. P Roy Barman, learned senior
counsel assisted by Mr. S. Bhattachrjee, for the petitioner that vide
earlier order dated 07.12.2021, the petitioner was placed under
suspension on being unauthorised absent during several occasions.
Later all got closed and petitioner’s suspension got revoked. Now
again the said removal order dated 09.01.2023 is passed contrary
to law relied upon Rule 12(1) as inserted by Tripura State Civil
Services (Leave), 11th Amendment Rule, 2013 in Tripura State Civil
Services (Leave) Rules, 1986. Learned counsel for the petitioner
further relied on the judgments of apex court in (i) Jai Shankar vs
State of Rajasthan reported in AIR 1966 SC 492, (ii) Mafatlal
Narandas
Barot
vs.
JD.
Rathod
Divisional
Controller,
State
Transport Mehsana and Another reported in AIR 1966 of SC 1364,
(iii) V.C. Banaras Hindu University and Others vs. Shrikant reported
in (2006) 11 SCC 42, (iv) Deokinandan Prasad vs. The State of
Bihar and Others reported in 1971 (2) SCC 330, and prayed to set
aside the impugned order dated 09.01.2023.
[4]
In Jai Shankar vs State of Rajasthan reported in AIR
1966 SC 492, the apex court, according to counsel for the
petitioner, has dealt with an issue of similar nature. The relevant
portion of which have been extracted herein under:
4. The short question in this appeal is whether Jai Shanker was
entitled to an opportunity to show cause against the proposed
punishment as required Cl.(2) of Art. 311. It is admitted that no
charge was framed against him. Nor was he given any opportunity
of showing cause. The case for the State Government is that
Government did not terminate Jai Shanker’s service, and that it
was Jai Shanker who gave up the employment by remaining
absent. It is submitted that such a case is not covered by Art.
311. In support of this contention certain Regulations of the
Jodhpur Service Regulations are relied upon and we shall now
refer to them. Regulation 7 lays down that leave cannot be
claimed as a right and that Government has discretion to refuse or
revoke leave of any description. Regulation 11 lays down that an
individual who has been granted leave on medical grounds for a
period of one month or more may not return to duty without
producing a certificate of fitness signed by an officer authorized by
a general or special order to grant such certificate. Regulation 12
lays down that an individual who absents himself without
permission or remains absent at the end of his leave is entitled to
no salary for the period of such absence and that period will be
debited against his leave account unless the leave is sanctioned
or extended under the ordinary rules by competent authority.
Regulation 13 is important because it forms the basis of the
contention that Art. 311 does not apply to this case. That
Regulation may be reproduced here :
“13. An individual who absents himself without permission or who
remains absent without permission for one month or longer after
the end of his leave should be considered to have sacrificed his
appointment and may only be reinstated with the sanction of the
competent authority.
Note.- The submission of an application for extension or leave
already granted does not entitle an individual to absent himself
without permission”.
(5) It is contended that this Regulation operated automatically and
no question of removal from service could arise because Jai
Shanker must be considered to have sacrificed his appointment.
Under the Regulation he could only be reinstated with the sanction
of the competent authority. We have, therefore, to determine
whether this Regulation is sufficient to enable the Government to
remove a person from service without giving him an opportunity of
showing cause against that punishment, if any.
(6) It is admitted on behalf of the State Government that
discharge from service of an incumbent by way of punishment
amounts to removal from service. It is, however, contended that
under the Regulations all that Government does, is not to allow
the person to be reinstated. Government does not order his
removal because the incumbent himself gives up the employment.
We do not think that the constitutional protection can be taken
away in this manner by a side wind. While, on the one hand, there
is no compulsion on the part of the Government to retain a
person in service if he is unfit and deserves dismissal or removal,
on the other a person is entitled to continue in service if he wants
until his service
is terminated in accordance with law. One
circumstance deserving removal may be over-staying one’s leave.
This is a fault which may entitle Government in a suitable case to
consider a man as unfit to continue in service. But even if a
regulation is made, it is necessary that Government should give
the person an opportunity of showing cause why he should not be
removed. During the hearing of this case we questioned the
Advocate General
what would happen if a person owing to
reasons wholly beyond his control or for which he was in no way
responsible or blamable, was unable to return to duty for over a
month, and if later on he wished to join as soon as the said
reasons disappeared? Would in such a case Government remove
him without any hearing, relying on the regulation? The learned
Advocate General said that the question would not be one of
removal but of reinstatement and Government might reinstate
him. We cannot accept this as a sufficient answer. Te Regulation,
no doubt, speaks of reinstatement but it really comes to this that a
person would not be reinstated if he is ordered to be discharged or
removed from service. The question of reinstatement can only be
considered if it is first considered whether the person should be
removed or discharged from service. Whichever way one looks at
the matter, the order of the Government involves a termination of
the service when the incumbent is willing to serve. The Regulation
involves a punishment for overstaying one’s leave and the burden
is thrown on the incumbent to secure reinstatement by showing
cause. It is true that the Government may visit the punishment of
discharge or removal from service on a person who has absented
himself by overstaying his leave, but we do not think that
Government can order a person to be discharged from service
without at least telling him that the propose to remove him and
giving him an opportunity of showing cause why he should not be
removed. If this is done the incumbent will be entitled to move
against the punishment for, if his plea succeeds, he will not be
removed and no question of reinstatement will arise. It may be
convenient to describe him as seeking reinstatement but this is not
tantamount to saying that because the person will only be
reinstated by an appropriate authority, that the removal is
automatic and outside the protection of Art. 311. A removal is
removal and if it is punishment for overstaying one’s leave an
opportunity must be given to the person against whom such an
order is proposed. No matter how the Regulation describes it. To
give no opportunity is to go against Art. 311 and this is what has
happened here.
(7) In our judgment, Jai Shanker was entitled to an opportunity to
show cause against the proposed removal from service on his
overstaying his leave and as no such opportunity was given to him
his removal from service was illegal. He is entitled to this
declaration. The order of the High Court must, therefore, be set
aside and that of the District Judge, Jodhpur, restored. The
question of what back salary is due to Jai Shanker must now be
determined by the trial Judge in accordance with the rules
applicable, for which purpose three shall a remit of this case to the
civil judge, Jodhpur.
[5]
Another
Narandas
Barot
judgment
vs.
JD.
of
Rathod
the
apex
Divisional
court
in
Mafatlal
Controller,
State
Transport Mehsana and Another reported in AIR 1966 of SC 1364,
where the apex court has dealt in the following manner:
It is true that the respondent may visit the punishment of
discharge or removal from service on a person who has absented
himself without leave and without reasonable cause, but this
cannot entail automatic removal from service without giving such
person reasonable opportunity to show cause why he be not
removed. The appellant is entitled to a reasonable opportunity to
show cause which includes an opportunity to deny his guilt and
establish his innocence which he can do, only when he knows what
the charges levelled against him are and the allegations on which
such charges are based.In our judgment the appellant was entitled
to an opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be
taken against him.
[6]
Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed his
reliance on another judgment of the apex court in Deokinandan
Prasad vs. The State of Bihar and Others reported in 1971 (2) SCC
330, the relevant portion of which have been extracted herein
under:
21. From the narration of the above facts, it will be clear that from
October 5, 1961, the date of temporary injunction granted by the
Munsif, till April 3, 1962, when the order of temporary injunction
was vacated by the Subordinate Judge, the Department did not
allow the petitioner to join duty in the senior post, which he was
entitled to occupy by virtue of the order of injunction. We have
already referred to the fact that the petitioner sent letters dated
October 5, 1961, October 13, 1961, October 20, 1961 and
November 1, 1961 expressing his readiness and willingness to
work in the senior post. The respondents did not permit him to
join duty. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner was
absent from duty during this period. Again on April 11, 1963, the
Munsif granted a decree in favour of the petitioner in the suit. The
respondents did not obtain any stay order from the Appellate
Court. So the decree of the trial court was in full force till it was
set aside on appeal on June 24, 1964. During the period April 11,
1963, June 24, 1964, the petitioner wrote several letters and to
which we have made a reference earlier, requesting the
respondents to permit him to join duty in the senior grade. The
respondents did not permit him to join duty in the senior grade;
but, on the other hand, insisted on the petitioner's joining duty in
the lower grade on threat of disciplinary action being taken. This
attitude of the respondents, we have already pointed out, was in
flagrant violation of the order of the Munsif. Therefore, during the
period April 11, 1963 to June 24, 1963, it cannot be said that the
petitioner was absent from duty. Hence it will be seen that the
claim made by the respondents in the counter- affidavit that the
petitioner, since March 11, 1960 till August 5, 1966 was
continuously not in service for over five years is fallacious. There is
no question of the petitioner not being in continuous service for
over five years during the period referred to above. On the other
hand, the period during which it could be said ',,hat the petitioner
was absent was from March 11, 1960, the date on which he claims
to have gone on leave till October 5, 1961 when the order of
temporary injunction was passed by the Munsif. From October 5,
1961 to April 3, 1962, we have already pointed out, the petitioner
cannot be considered to have been absent from duty. Therefore,
the continuity of absence is broken during this period. The
petitioner can again be considered to have been absent from duty
from April 3, 1962, the date on which the order of temporary
injunction was vacated by the Subordinate Judge, till April 11,
1963, the date on which a decree was granted by the Munsif in
favour of the petitioner. During this period he was absent. But
again the continuity of absence is broken during the period April
11, 1963 the date of the decree of the Munsif, till June 24, 1964,
the date when the Subordinate Judge reversed the decree of the
trial court. We have already referred to the various letters written
during this period by the petitioner as well as the reply sent by the
Director of Public Instruction on November 27, 1963. During this
period he cannot be considered to be absent from duty. The third
period from which he can be again considered to be absent from
duty is June 24, 1964, the date of the decree of the Subordinate
Judge till August 5, 1966, the date on which the order was passed
purporting to be under r. 76 of the Service Code. The above
circumstances clearly show that the petitioner cannot be
considered to have been continuously absent from duty for over
five years during the period March 11, 1960 to August 5, 1966. if
that is so, the essential condition for the application of r. 76 of the
Service Code is lacking and, therefore, it follows that the order
dated August 5, 1966 is not supported by r. 76 of the Service
Code. Therefore that order is illegal and has to be quashed.
22. A contention has been taken by the petitioner that the order
dated August 5, 1966 is an order removing him from service and it
has been passed in violation of Art. 311 of the Constitution.
According to the respondents there is no violation of Art. 311. On
the other hand, there is an automatic termination of the
petitioner's employment under r. 76 of the Service Code. It may
not be necessary to investigate this aspect further because on
facts we have found that r. 76 of the Service Code has no
application. Even if it is a question of automatic termination of
service for being continuously absent for over a' period of five
years, Art. 311 applies to such cases as is laid down by this Court
in Jai Shanker v. State of Rajasthan (1). In that decision this Court
had to consider Regulation No. 13 of the Jodhpur Service
Regulations, which is as follows:
"13. An individual who absents himself without permission
or who remains absent without permission for one month
or longer after the end of his leave should be considered to
have sacrificed his appointment and may only be
reinstated with the sanction of the competent authority."
23. It was contended on behalf of the State of Rajasthan that the
above regulation operated automatically and there was no
question of removal from service because the officer ceased to be
in the service after the period mentioned in the regulation. This
Court rejected the said contention and held that an opportunity
must be given to a person against whom such an order was
proposed to be passed, no matter how the regulation described it.
It was further held "to give no opportunity is to go against Art. 311
and this is what has happened here".
[7]
The apex court in V.C. Banaras Hindu University and
Others vs. Shrikant reported in (2006) 11 SCC 42, the relevant
portion of which have been extracted herein under:
43. We may notice a similar provision being clause 76 of the Bihar
Services Code, which reads as under:
"76. Unless the State Government, in view of the special
circumstances of the case, shall otherwise determine, a
government servant, after five years' continuous absence from
duty, elsewhere than on foreign service in India, whether with or
without leave ceases t be in Government employ."
[8]
Mr. P. Gautam, learned counsel for the respondent No.
5 has submitted before this court that the petitioner was given
enough opportunity to submit his reply but he did not submit. A
letter vide No.F.2(625)-DJ/G/2017-22/1685, dated 03.03.2022
issued to the petitioner for furnishing leave application for the
period w.e.f. 08.11.2021 to 26.11.2021 and again a reminder
letter dated 29.09.2022 was issued through speed post whereby a
last chance to submit the leave application by 12.10.2022 was
given to him. But the petitioner did not submit any petition/leave
application in this regard. It is also mentioned that a notice was
issued to the petitioner through speed post to rejoin duties
immediately & regularize unauthorized absence from duty vide
communication No.F.2(625)-DJ/G/2017-22/4858 dated 29.09.2022.
[9]
Mr. BN Majumder, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent No.2 and 3 has submitted before this court that the
petitioner has preferred an appeal under Rule 23 and 25 of CCS
(CCA) Rules, 1965 before the respondent No.2 against the order
dated 09.01.2023 of the District & Sessions Judge, Gomati.
However, the said appeal is not maintainable as the petitioner
ceases to continue in service under Rule 12(1) of the Tripura State
Civil Services (Leave) (11th Amendment) Rules, 2013 and the same
cannot be challenged by an appeal under Rule 23 and 25 of
CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965. Since the same was not maintainable it was
placed before High Court and the same was rejected. Therefore, it
is denied that the impugned communication is against the mandate
of Article 311 of the Constitution of India.
[10]
He further contended that the respondent No.2 is not
the appellate authority in this matter in terms of Rule 23 of
CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965. The order of discharge of the petitioner was
passed by the District & Sessions Judge, Gomati (Respondent No.4)
under the provision of Rule 12(1)(a) of the Tripura State Civil
Services (Leave) Rules, 1986 but the appeal was preferred under
Rule 23 read with 25 of the CCS(CCA) Rule, 1965 and therefore the
same was not maintainable.
[11]
Heard both sides.
[12]
To appreciate the facts of the case on legal position, it
is relevant to extract the Rule 12 of the Tripura State Civil Services
(Leave) Rule, 1986 and Rule 22, 23, 25 of the CCS CCA Rules,
1965 which are extracted herein under:
Rule 12 Maximum amount of continuous leave
Unless the Governor, in view of the exceptional circumstances of the case
otherwise determines, no Government servant shall be granted leave of
any kind of a continuous period exceeding five years.
[(1) : A government servant shall be deemed to have resigned from the
service if he(a) is absent without authorization for a period of one year; or
(b) remains absent from duty for a continuous period of five years,
with or without leave; or
(c) continues on foreign service beyond the period approved by the
Government;
Provided that a reasonable opportunity to explain the reason for such
absence or continuation on foreign service shall be given to the servant
before the provisions of this rules are invoked.]
Rule 22.
Orders against which no appeal lies
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Part, no appeal shall lie
against(i)
any order made by the President;
(ii)
any order of an interlocutory nature or of the nature of a step-inaid of the final disposal of a disciplinary
proceeding, other
than an order of suspension;
(iii)
any order passed by an inquiring authority in the course
of
an inquiry under Rule 14.
Rule 23.
Orders against which appeal lies
Subject to the provisions of rule 22, a Government servant may
prefer an appeal against all or any of the following orders,
namely:(i) an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made
under rule 10;
(ii) an order imposing any of the penalties specified in rule 11,
whether made
by the disciplinary authority or by any
appellate or revising authority;
(iii) an order enhancing any penalty, imposed under rule 11;
(iv) an order which(a) denies or varies to his disadvantage his pay,
allowances, pension
or other conditions of service as
regulated by rules or by agreement; or
(b) interprets to his disadvantage the provisions of any
such rule or
agreement;
(v) an order(a) stopping him at the efficiency bar in the time-scale of
pay on the
ground of his unfitness to cross the bar;
(b) reverting him while officiating in a higher service, grade
or post, to a
lower service, grade or post, otherwise
than as a penalty;
(c) reducing or withholding the pension or denying the
maximum pension admissible to him under the rules;
(d) determining the subsistence and other allowances to be
paid to
him for the period of suspension or for the
period during which he is
deemed
to
be
under
suspension or for any portion thereof;
(e) determining his pay and allowances(i)
for the period of suspension, or
(ii)
for the period from the date of his dismissal,
removal or compulsory retirement from service,
or from the date of his reduction to a lower
service, grade, post, time-scale or stage in a
time-scale of pay, to the date of his
reinstatement or restoration to his service, grade
or post; or
(f) determining whether or not the period from the date of
his suspension or from the date of his dismissal,
removal, compulsory retirement or reduction to a lower
service, grade, post, time-scale of pay or stage in a
time-scale of pay to the date of his reinstatement or
restoration to his service, grade or post shall be treated
as a period spent on duty for any purpose.
Rule 25.
[13]
Period of Limitation of appeals
No appeal preferred under this part shall be entertained
unless such appeal is preferred within a period of forty-five
days from the date on which a copy of the order appealed
against is delivered to the appellant :
Provided that the appellate authority may entertain the
appeal after the expiry of the said period, if it is satisfied
that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the
appeal in time.
A bare reading of the Rule 12 Tripura State Civil
Services (Leave) Rules, 1986 categorically provides to give an
opportunity to the petitioner before his services are discharged.
Under Rules 23 and 25 of CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965 there is no
provision for filing appeal before Registrar General and accordingly
the appeal preferred by the petitioner under the said Rules needs
no consideration and the communication made by the Registrar
General be treated as an intimation in this regard.
[14]
It is relevant to extract the operative portion of the
impugned proceeding dated 09.01.2023:
“Now, THEREFORE, in terms of Rule 12(1)(a) of “The
Tripura State Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 1986, the
undersigned in the capacity of Head of Department &
appointing authority is hereby pleaded to accept that Shri
Abhijit Dhar, LDC, Court of the Chief Judicial MagistrateCum-Civil Judge (Sr.Div) Gomati Judicial District, Udaipur
has deemed to have resigned from the Government Service
w.e.f. 09th day of January, 2023 (Afternoon) & discharged
from services with immediate effect.”
[15]
Before appreciating the same a perusal of the record
shows that the petitioner has unauthorisedly absent on several
occasions and also he has admitted that he is guilty.
[16]
In view of the above, this court is of the opinion that
admittedly, the petitioner has not approached this court with clean
hands. He has not placed on record and also before the concerned
judicial officer any evidence or any request or representation from
05.01.2022 till 09.01.2023 till the impugned order is passed.
Nothing prevented the petitioner from keeping informed the judicial
officer concerned or the Registry of High Court of Tripura about the
reasons for his unauthorised absence. It cannot be said that the
burden of doctrine of Audi Alteram Partem falls only on the authority
who has passed the order dated 09.01.2023 but it is the duty of the
petitioner to act with responsibility in performing his job. It is
evident from the records the petitioner was having in his hands all
days from 05.01.2022 till 09.01.2023 to put forth his reasons for
his unauthorised absence but the petitioner failed to do so. The one
year as per Rule 12 of the Tripura State Civil Services (Leave) Rule,
1986 is from 05.01.2022 to 04.01.2022. The conduct of the
petitioner also cannot be viewed in a casual manner and is not a
case of any sympathy.
[17]
one
Admittedly, the proceedings dated 09.01.2023 is the
which
is
issued
without
giving
show
cause
notice
as
contemplated under Rule 12 the Tripura State Civil Services (Leave)
Rule, 1986.
Thus, the impugned order dated 09.01.2023 is
modified as a show cause notice and since the petitioner is aware of
entire litigation. The petitioner is directed to submit his explanation
before the District & Sessions Judge, Gomati Judicial District,
Udaipur within a period of fifteen days from today and on receipt of
such explanation, the concerned District judge shall pass a
reasoned order with open mind without being influenced by
observation made by this court.
[18]
Moreover, the judgments of the Hon’ble apex court as
relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner relate to the different
set of facts where the employee therein was not on unauthorised
absentee but was on an extended leave without permission or prior
intimation.
[19]
With the observation made above, this petition stands
disposed of. As a sequel, stay, if any, stands vacated. Pending
application(s), if any also stands closed.
JUDGE
Dipak
DIPAK
DAS
DIPAK DAS
Date: 2023.09.02
16:20:55 +05'30'
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review