Judicial Service – Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010 – rr.45 and 46 – Entitlement to protection u/Art.311 of the Constitution – Bail order dated 27.04.2015 passed by Appellant-judicial officer in favour an accused in a case under Prevention of Corruption Act became genesis of action taken against him – Departmental enquiry instituted against him u/r.16 of Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 for acts amounting to misconduct and violation of rr.3 and 4 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Conduct Rules), 1971 – Allegation leveled that appellant passed the bail order with ulterior or oblique motives and for extraneous considerations – Appellant submitted preliminary objections to the allegations, which came to be rejected by the Enquiry Judge – Meanwhile, Higher Judicial Committee, constituted for deciding confirmation and discharge of Judicial Officers, upon inspection of appellant’s records, decided not to recommend the appellant for confirmation – Subsequently, a Full Court meeting was convened wherein, based on recommendation submitted by the Higher Judicial Committee, it was decided to discharge the appellant – Appellant was thus discharged despite pendency of enquiry proceedings against him – Discharge order was passed against the appellant on ground that the Full Court found the appellant’s services to be unsatisfactory during probation – Subsequently, enquiry as well as disciplinary proceedings initiated against the appellant were closed – Writ petition filed by appellant dismissed by High Court – On appeal, held: There was no material to showcase unsatisfactory performance of appellant in terms of requirement u/rr.45 and 46 of the RJS Rules, 2010 – Moreover, appellant’s discharge was not simpliciter, as claimed by the respondent – Noncommunication of ACRs to the appellant was proved to be arbitrary and since respondent choose to hold enquiry into appellant’s alleged misconduct, the termination of his service was by way of punishment because it put a stigma on his competence and thus affected his future career – In such a case, the appellant would be entitled to protection of Art.311(2) of the Constitution – Moreover, adverse comments in ACR for the year 2015 could not have been the basis on which appellant was discharged from service – Appellant was never granted opportunity to improve and there was no intimation to him about his performance being unsatisfactory – Importantly, no verifiable complaint was filed against the appellant that could form the basis of disciplinary proceedings against him – Appellant was competent to pass the bail order dated 27.04.2015 and Respondent was not able to prove presence of any extraneous consideration or ulterior motive on the part of the appellant – Also neither the bail order dated 27.04.2015 was ever challenged by the State before any Court of law, nor was any complaint received against the appellant regarding the said bail order – This is not the case where there were strong grounds to suspect the appellant’s bona fides – Even if appellant’s act was considered to be negligent, it cannot be treated as “misconduct” – The discharge order is accordingly quashed – Keeping in view that the appellant had not worked as judicial officer after he was discharged, he be reinstated with all consequential benefits including continuity of service and seniority, but with only 50% backwages – Constitution of India, 1950 – Art. 311.
Service Law – Judicial Service – Every judicial officer is likely to commit mistake of some kind or the other in passing orders in the initial stage of his service, which a mature judicial officer would not do – However, if the orders are passed without there being any corrupt motive, the same should be over-looked by the High Court and proper guidance should be provided to him. Service Law – Judicial Service – Merely because a wrong order has been passed by the appellant-judicial officer or the action taken by him could have been different, this does not warrant initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the judicial officer. Service Law – Judicial service – Negligence vis-a-vis misconduct – On facts, appellant-judicial officer, while passing the bail order, may have been guilty of negligence in the sense that he did not carefully go through the case file and did not take notice of the order of the High Court which was on his file – This negligence cannot be treated to be misconduct.
Service Law – Misconduct – Mere suspicion cannot constitute “misconduct” – Any ‘probability’ of misconduct needs to be supported with oral or documentary material.
Service Law – Judicial service – Relief-oriented judicial approaches cannot by themselves be grounds to cast aspersions on the honesty and integrity of an officer.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The submission of the respondent that the discharge of the appellant was a discharge simpliciter and not violative of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India is not worthy of acceptance. The High Court erred in holding that the discharge order of the appellant was a simpliciter order and not punitive in nature. In spite of observing that the order of discharge had been passed on account of inquiry initiated against the appellant, the High Court failed to provide any reasoning as to how the allegation of misconduct pertaining to the bail order was not the foundation of the order of discharge. [Para 41][719-E-F]
2. The material placed before the Higher Judicial Committee [consisting of five Judges and constituted for deciding the confirmation and discharge of Judicial Officers] which recommended the discharge of the appellant, clearly shows that no adverse remarks were made against the appellant except in relation to the grant of bail on 27.04.2015. [Para 43][719-H]
3. To argue that the comments and observations in the 2015 ACR of the appellant were the basis on which he was discharged, is misplaced and erroneous. Firstly, a bare perusal of the ACR reveals that the top of this ACR itself carried a comment that read “Discharged from Service”. Secondly, the Higher Judicial Committee had, even prior to the submission of the 2015 ACR, already recommended the discharge of the appellant. Notably, the ACR for the year 2015 was filled and submitted by the appellant on 20.01.2016, while the Higher Judicial Committee had already recommended the discharge of the appellant on 24.11.2015 itself and the impugned order of discharge was passed on 27.01.2016, admittedly, in pursuance of a Full Court meeting on 20.01.2016. Additionally, although the respondent had submitted that the Integrity Certificate of the Appellant was withheld by the Inspecting Judge, he failed to highlight that the reason for the certificate being withheld was that the appellant had been served with a chargesheet and not because of the appellant’s service record. [Para 46][720-G-H; 721-A-C]
4. Moreover, the ACRs were not communicated to the appellant within reasonable time. The non-communication of the ACRs to the appellant in the present case is arbitrary and such arbitrariness violated Article 14 of the Constitution of India. [Para 47][721-C, G-H]
5. Since the Government had, on enquiry, come to the conclusion, rightly or wrongly, that the appellant was unsuitable for the post he held on probation, this was clearly by way of punishment and, hence, the appellant would be entitled to the protection of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Moreover, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the substance of the termination order reveals that the discharge was by way of punishment. Hence, the question that whether the action of nonconfirmation of the appellant is in accordance with Rules 45 and
46 of the RJS Rules is answered in the Negative. There was no material on record to showcase unsatisfactory performance of the appellant in terms of requirement under Rule 45 and 46 of the Rajasthan Judicial Services Rules, 2010. [Paras 50 & 51][726C-D, G]
6. The appellant was never granted an opportunity to improve and there was no intimation to him about his performance being unsatisfactory. This requirement of affording an opportunity of improvement has been stressed upon by the Supreme Court on multiple occasions and has also been envisaged under Rule 46(1) of the RJS Rules, 2010. [Para 53][727-B-C]
7. Every judicial officer is likely to commit mistake of some kind or the other in passing orders in the initial stage of his service, which a mature judicial officer would not do. However, if the orders are passed without there being any corrupt motive, the same should be over-looked by the High Court and proper guidance should be provided to him. In the present case, admittedly there was no intimation to appellant about his performance being unsatisfactory and hence he was deprived of his opportunity to improve as a judicial officer. [Para 54][728-H; 729-A-B]
8. The three complaints filed against the appellant were never communicated to the petitioner during his service tenure and had been subsequently closed. The record clearly showcases that no verifiable complaint was filed against the appellant that could form the basis of the disciplinary proceeding against him. [Para 55][729-B-C]
9. With respect to the grant of bail order dated 27.04.2015, the record reveals that when the bail application of the accused K.K. Jalia was listed before the Court of the appellant, no reply was filed by the State and the prosecution, despite being given the opportunity to file their reply, neither argued nor brought on record the fact about the bail of the accused being denied by the High Court. Additionally, it is evident from the record that the Investigating Officer produced two letters dated 24.04.2015 and 27.04.2015 by the competent authority that clearly stated that the file was submitted to the State Government for decision regarding sanction. No time was specified regarding when the decision was likely to be taken. Letter dated 27.04.2015 filed by the Investigating Officer clearly stated that the meeting was held with competent authority on 23.03.2015 and that the file was sent to the State Government for their decision. Therefore, it is evident that the competent authority could not decide the matter and had sent it to the State Government with no timeline in sight. Moreover, the counsel of the accused informed the appellant that the co-accused Alimuddin and Irfan had already been granted bail by the High Court and this was a relevant consideration to appellant’s mind. The fact of Alimuddin being granted bail was even more relevant for the appellant because he was aware of Alimuddin’s role in the case and also the fact that despite prosecution sanction having been granted against Alimuddin, he was granted bail by the High Court. [Para 56][730-A-E]
10. The appellant could not be said to be at fault in granting bail to K.K. Jalia since the bail order dated 27.04.2015 was based on the non-grant of prosecution sanction and no progress in relation to the same being brought on record. The appellant even recorded that the State should act swiftly in relation to the grant of prosecution sanctions in such matters. Also, it is settled law that the appellant, under section 439 CrPC, could have granted bail to the accused even subsequent to the rejection of the bail by the High Court. [Para 57][730-E-F]
11. In essence, the appellant honestly admitted in his comment that he had come across the reference of the dismissal of the first bail application whilst dictating the bail order but exercised his discretion in granting bail to the accused given the uncertainty and delay in prosecution sanction and the intervening grant of bail to the two other co-accused by the High Court, even when the prosecution sanction had been granted for one of the co-accused. [Para 59][731-F]
12. Importantly, the order of grant of bail dated 27.04.2015 was never challenged by the State before the High Court. Moreover, no complaint was ever filed against the appellant with respect to the grant of bail. [Para 61][733-A-B]
13. Charges filed against the appellant are vague in nature and absolutely no details have been provided regarding the allegation of passing the bail order for extraneous considerations/ulterior motive. In this context, there is no detail provided as to what was the said extraneous consideration or ulterior motive, but merely an inference has been drawn on the basis of suspicion. Further, the record reveals that no complaint or other material exists which could form the basis of the said allegations. [Para 62][733-B-C]
14. The accused K.K. Jalia had the right to file bail application at any stage when undergoing imprisonment as an under-trial prisoner. The fact that the two other co-accused had already been enlarged on bail was a valid reason for granting bail to accused K.K. Jalia. If the High Court was to initiate disciplinary proceedings based on a judicial order, there should have been strong grounds to suspect appellant’s bona fides and the order itself should have been actuated by malice, bias or illegality. This is clearly not the case in the present matter. The appellant was competent and well within his right to grant bail to the accused in discharge of his judicial functions. [Para 64][735-F-H]
15. Merely because a wrong order has been passed by the appellant or the action taken by him could have been different, this does not warrant initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the judicial officer. [Para 66][736-G]
16. The appellant may have been guilty of negligence in the sense that he did not carefully go through the case file and did not take notice of the order of the High Court which was on his file. This negligence cannot be treated to be misconduct. Moreover, the enquiry officer virtually sat as a court of appeal picking holes in the order granting bail, even when he could not find any extraneous reason for the grant of the bail order. The present case revolves only around a single bail order, and that too was passed with competent jurisdiction. Mere suspicion cannot constitute “misconduct”. Any ‘probability’ of misconduct needs to be supported with oral or documentary material, and this requirement has not been fulfilled in the present case. There was no allegation of illegal gratification against the present appellant. Relief-oriented judicial approaches cannot by themselves be grounds to cast aspersions on the honesty and integrity of an officer. [Para 69][740-G-H; 741-A-C]
17. There was no material to showcase unsatisfactory performance of the appellant in terms of requirement under Rule
45 and 46 of the RJS Rules, 2010. Moreover, the appellant’s discharge was not simpliciter, as claimed by the respondent. The non-communication of the ACRs to the appellant has been proved to be arbitrary and since the respondent choose to hold an enquiry into appellant’s alleged misconduct, the termination of his service is by way of punishment because it puts a stigma on his competence and thus affects his future career. In such a case, the appellant would be entitled to the protection of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Moreover, the adverse comments in the ACR for the year 2015 could not have been the basis on which the appellant was discharged from service. The appellant was never granted an opportunity to improve and there was no intimation to him about his performance being unsatisfactory. Importantly, no verifiable complaint was filed against the appellant that could form the basis of the disciplinary proceeding against him. After perusing all the relevant record, it is clear that the appellant was competent to pass the bail order dated 27.04.2015 and the Respondent has not been able to prove the presence of any extraneous consideration or ulterior motive on the part of the appellant. Also neither the bail order dated 27.04.2015 was ever challenged by the State before any Court of law, nor was any complaint received against the appellant regarding the said bail order. This is not the case where there are strong grounds to suspect the appellant’s bona fides. Even if appellant’s act is considered to be negligent, it cannot be treated as “misconduct”. [Para 71][741-F-H; 742-A-C]
18. The discharge order is quashed. Keeping in view that the appellant has not worked as judicial officer after he was discharged, it is directed that while the appellant be reinstated with all consequential benefits including continuity of service and seniority, but will be entitled to be paid only 50% backwages. [Para 72][742-D-E]
Director, Aryabhatta Research Institute of Observational Sciences vs Devendra Joshi (2018) 15 SCC 73;
Rajasthan High Court vs. Ved Priya (Judgment dated 18-03-2020 of Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 8933-34/2017) and Bimla Devi vs State of Bihar (1994)
2 SCC 8 – distinguished.
Sukhdev Singh vs Union of India (2013) 9 SCC 566: [2013] 5 SCR 1004; Maneka Gandhi vs Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248: [1978] 2 SCR 621; Shamsher Singh vs State of Punjab (1974) 2 SCC 831: [1975] 1 SCR 814; State of Bihar vs. Gopi Kishore Prasad AIR 1960 SC 689; Ishwar Chand Jain vs High Court of Punjab and Haryana (1988) 3 SCC 370: [1988] 1 Suppl. SCR 396; Ramesh Chander Singh vs High Court of
Allahabad (2007) 4 SCC 247: [2007] 3 SCR 198; P.C. Joshi vs State of U.P. (2001) 6 SCC 491: [2001] 1 Suppl. SCR 369; Krishna Prasad Verma vs State of Bihar (2019) 10 SCC 640: [2019] 12 SCR 861 and Sadhna Chaudhary vs State of U.P. (2020) 11 SCC 760 – relied on.
Pradip Kumar vs Union of India (2012) 13 SCC 182: [2012] 9 SCR 1141; Radhey Shyam Gupta vs. U.P. State Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. (1999) 2 SCC 21: [1998] 3 Suppl. SCR 558 and Pavanendra Narayan Verma vs. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences (2002) 1 SCC 520: [2001] 5 Suppl. SCR 41 – referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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