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Serial No. 1
Suppl Cause List
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
LPA No. 312/2025 in HCP No. 115/2025
Reserved on: 11.08.2026
Pronounced on: 01.10.2026.
Uploaded on: 01.10.2026.
Whether the operative part or
full judgment is pronounced: Full
Aabid Majeed Sheikh
S/o. Abdul Majeed Sheikh
R/o. Dadasara, Tehsil Tral, District Pulwama.
Through:
…Petitioner(s)/Appellant(s).
Mr. S. T. Hussain, Sr. Advocate with
Ms. Nida Nazir, Advocate.
Vs.
1. Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir through
Principal Secretary to Government,
Home Department, Civil Secretariat, Srinagar/Jammu.
2. District Magistrate, Pulwama.
3. Superintendent District Jail Poonch, Jammu.
...Respondent(s).
Through:
Ms. Maha Majeed, AC vice
Mr. Jehangir Ahmad Dar, GA.
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV KUMAR, JUDGE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MOHD YOUSUF WANI, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
(Per-Mohd Yousuf Wani-J)
1.
Impugned in this Letters Patent Appeal is the judgment dated
21.11.2025 passed by the learned Single Bench of this Court,
[hereinafter referred to as the “Writ Court” for short], in Habeas
Corpus Petition No. 115 of 2025 titled “Aabid Majeed Sheikh alias
Rajgade versus Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir and others”,
whereby
the
petition
impugning
the
detention
order
No.
DMP/PSA/28/2025 dated 03.05.2025 issued by the respondent No. 2,
LPA No. 312/2025 in
HCP No. 115/2025
Page No. 1
i.e., District Magistrate Pulwama, [hereinafter referred to as the
“Detaining Authority” for short], in respect of appellant, was
dismissed as meritless.
2.
The appellant came to be detained by the Detaining Authority in
exercise of its powers under Section 8 of the Jammu and Kashmir
Public Safety Act, 1978, [hereinafter referred to as the “PSA” for
short] with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner
prejudicial to the security of the state.
3.
Aggrieved
by
the
detention
order
aforementioned,
the
appellant/detenue assailed the same before this Court through HCP
No. 115/2025, which, however, came to be dismissed by the Writ
Court vide the impugned judgment, as meritless.
4.
The impugned judgment has been assailed on the ground, inter alia,
that the learned Writ Court did not appreciate the case of the
appellant/detenue as projected through the memo of the writ petition
and the arguments advanced. That the detention order is bad under
law as having been issued by the Detaining Authority on mere
apprehension, as is evident from the last paragraphs of the grounds of
detention basing the same. That the Detaining Authority acted upon
the unverified materials/dossier submitted by the police concerned
without conducting any exercise at its end for verification of the
same so as to record its satisfaction. That the appellant/detenue was
earlier arrested in 2016, 2018 and 2020, on the basis of false and
frivolous allegations in connection with the investigations in case
LPA No. 312/2025 in
HCP No. 115/2025
Page No. 2
FIR Nos. 172/2016, 50/2018 and 195/2020 of Police Station
Awantipora, in all of which cases, he was bailed out by the
competent courts on account of his prima facie non-involvement
pending trials. That the respondents did not challenge the bail orders
granted in favour of the appellant, as he did not violate the terms and
conditions of any of the bail orders. That since his release in the case
FIR No. 195/2020 of Police Station Awantipora, no specific
allegation was levelled against the appellant herein, as he used to
behave as a peaceful and law-abiding citizen. That the Detaining
Authority, while issuing the impugned detention order, wholly and
solely acted on the police dossier, which is evident from the grounds
of detention being a replica of the same. That the learned Writ Court
has not appreciated the aforementioned facts and passed the
impugned judgment, which suffers from illegality. That there was no
proximity or live-link between the last alleged incident of 2020,
resulting in registration of case FIR No. 195/2020 of Police Station
Awantipora and the passing of the impugned detention order in May
2025, after a gap of five years, which fact was also under-estimated
by the learned Writ Court.
That the learned Writ Court did not also appreciate the fact that
the respondents, instead of invoking the powers under PSA to
illegally justify the appellant's detention, could have thrown
challenge to the bail orders. That there was no whisper in the
grounds of detention that the appellant/detenue has violated any
LPA No. 312/2025 in
HCP No. 115/2025
Page No. 3
condition of bail order, which fact was to be considered by the
learned Writ Court while passing the impugned judgment. That the
Detaining Authority, while passing the impugned detention order,
observed the mandatory constitutional guarantees in breach by not
providing a copy of the detention record in full to the detenue, as also
by not informing him at an earliest that he has a right to make a
representation to the detaining authority as well as to the
government. That the representation filed by the appellant/detenu
through his father was not considered by the respondents, who
instead forwarded it to the learned Advisory Board along with its
reference and even did not inform him about the final outcome of the
same. That the grounds of detention are vague and non-existent, on
the basis of which no prudent person can make an effective
representation. That the appellant/detenu had already been taken into
custody before passing of the impugned detention order, which
material fact escaped the attention of the learned Writ Court while
passing the impugned judgment.
That the Government of Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir
does not have the competence to prescribe the period of detention
under the provisions of Article 22(7) of the Constitution of India.
That subsequent to the abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution
of India, the provisions contained in the PSA could not have been
applied/invoked.
LPA No. 312/2025 in
HCP No. 115/2025
Page No. 4
5.
We have heard the learned counsel for the parties in respect of the
matter.
6.
The learned counsel for the appellant, while reiterating his said stand
taken in the memo of LPA, contended that the impugned
order/judgment of the learned Writ Court dated 21.11.2025 suffers
from illegality, as the learned Writ Court has not appreciated the
facto legal scenario of the case.
7.
He contended that there was no justification under law for detention
of the appellant under the provisions of PSA. He further contended
that the appellant was falsely involved in three case FIRs in 2016,
2018, 2020, in which he was bailed out by the competent courts after
being satisfied that there appear no reasonable grounds of his
involvement in the said cases.
He contended that in view of the bar created under Section 43D
of the ULA(P) Act, the ld. Designated Court could not have bailed
the appellant out unless observing that there appear no reasonable
grounds of his involvement in the cases pending trial. The learned
counsel further contended that there was nothing on record available
with the ld. Detaining Authority to the effect of violation of any bail
conditions by the appellant/detenue. He contended that the bail
orders granted in favour of the appellant were not at all thrown to
challenge, in accordance with the law, by the respondents.
8.
He further contended that appellant's detention came to be ordered
only on mere apprehension of the Detaining Authority, made to
LPA No. 312/2025 in
HCP No. 115/2025
Page No. 5
believe the same by the sponsoring authority, as is evident from the
last paras of the detention order. He further contended that the
detaining authority has acted on the police dossier without recording
his satisfaction, which was sine qua non for passing of the detention
order, touching the liberty of the appellant.
He further contended that the Government of Union Territory of
Jammu and Kashmir was not competent to prescribe the period of
detention in view of the provisions contained in Article 22(7) of the
Constitution of India. He further contended that after the abrogation
of Article 370 of the Constitution of India and with the application of
the central laws to the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, the
PSA could not have been invoked.
He also contended that the copy of the detention record in full
was not provided to the appellant/detenu, who was only made to sign
on a cyclostyled receipt, thereby preventing him from making an
effective and in-time representation against his detention to the
Detaining Authority. That the representation which, however, was
filed on his behalf by his father was not considered either by the
Detaining Authority or by the Government, but was forwarded with
the reference to the learned Advisory Board and was also not
informed about the final outcome of the same.
9.
The learned counsel for the appellant in support of his contentions
placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India as also of this Court cited as:
LPA No. 312/2025 in
HCP No. 115/2025
Page No. 6
i.
Dhanya M vs State of Kerala & Ors Criminal Appeal No.
2897/2025 decided on 6th June, 2025.
ii.
Tahir Riyaz Dar vs UT of J&K and Ors in LPA No.
121/2025 decided on 06.11.2025
10. The learned counsel prayed for setting aside of the impugned
judgment as well as the impugned detention order.
11. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents contended that
the impugned judgment of the Ld. Writ Court is manifestly in
accordance with the law and does not suffer from any sort of
illegality. He contended that the activities of the appellant/detenue
upon being found prejudicial to the security of the State, his
detention order was issued by the Detaining Authority on the
recommendation of the District Police Office made through dossier.
He contended that the case against the appellant/detenue was
examined by the Detaining Authority in accordance with the law and
the detention order was issued upon proper application of the mind
by the Detaining Authority.
He contended that the grounds urged by the appellant in this LPA
are legally misconceived, untenable and without any merit and, as
such, the instant appeal deserves to be dismissed. That there was no
vagueness or staleness in the grounds of detention.
The learned counsel further contended that the object of
preventive detention is ‘preventive’ rather than ‘punitive’.
He
further contended that the preventive detention is not a parallel of the
LPA No. 312/2025 in
HCP No. 115/2025
Page No. 7
criminal proceeding as the object of the two is almost different. He
further contended that whole of the materials relied upon by the
Detaining Authority was furnished to the appellant/detenue and the
same was read over and explained to him in his local language also.
That the appellant/detenue was also informed that he can make a
representation to the Government as well as to the Detaining
Authority against his detention.
He further contended that all statutory requirements and
constitutional guarantees have been complied with by the Detaining
Authority and the impugned order was issued validly and legally.
12. The learned counsel for the respondents in support of his
contentions placed reliance on the judgments cited as “Haradhan
Saha vs. State of West Bengal (1975) 3 SCC 198”; “Borjahan Gorev
vs. State of West Bengal (1972) 2 SCC 550”; “Ashim Kumar Ray vs.
State of West Bengal (1973) 4 SCC 76”; “Abdul Aziz vs District
Magistrate, Burdwan (1973) 1 SCC 301”; “Debu Mahato vs. State
of West Bengal 1974 AIR (SC) 816”; “Secretary to Govt, Public
(Law and Order) and Anr. Vs. Nabila and another (2015) 12 SCC
127”.
13. We have perused the record of the instant intra-court appeal,
especially the impugned judgment dated 21.11.2025, the impugned
detention order dated 03.05.2025, and the grounds of detention dated
3.5.2025. The detention record made available by the respondent has
also been gone through.
LPA No. 312/2025 in
HCP No. 115/2025
Page No. 8
14. We are of the view, that there was no proximity or live-link between
the last incident of 2020, covered under the registration of case FIR
No. 195/2020 of Police Station, Awantipora, and the need for
passing the impugned detention order. The appellant, as admitted by
the Detaining Authority in the grounds of detention, has been bailed
out in all the three case FIR numbers.
15. The learned counsel for the appellant during his arguments
vehemently contended that the impugned detention order was issued
without any basis, only to take care of the mere apprehensions and
unverified inputs. He further contended during his arguments that the
appellant had already been taken into custody before passing of the
impugned detention order. The respondents have not placed on
record anything specific and concrete regarding the involvement of
the appellant subsequent to his release in the last case FIR of 2020.
16. The Ld. Writ Court has not appreciated the important legal aspect
that there was no proximity/live-link between the incident of 2020
and the need for passing of the impugned detention order in May,
2025.
17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, in “Rajinder Arora versus Union
of India and Others, AIR (2006) 4 SCC 796”, inter alia, observed:
"The conspectus of the above decisions can be summarized thus: The
question whether the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating to
pass an order of detention are proximate to the time when the order is
made or the live-link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of
detention is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each
case. No hard and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be
applicable under all circumstances and no exhaustive guidelines can be
LPA No. 312/2025 in
HCP No. 115/2025
Page No. 9
laid down in that behalf. It follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid
or mechanical test by merely counting number of months between the
offending acts and the order of detention. However, when there is undue
and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of
detention order, the court has to scrutinize whether the detaining
authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a tenable
and reasonable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned, when
called upon to answer and further the court has to investigate whether
the causal connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case.
18. In our opinion, we feel fortified with the judgment of the Hon'ble
Apex Court passed in the case titled “Rameshwar Shaw versus
District Magistrate, Burdwan and Another, AIR 1964 SC 334”, the
relevant portion whereof is reproduced as under:
"In deciding the question as to whether it is necessary to detain a
person, the authority has to be satisfied that the said person if
not detained may act in a prejudicial manner and this conclusion
can be reasonably reached by the authority generally in light of
evidence about past prejudicial activities of the said person.
When evidence is placed, the Detaining Authority has to examine
the said evidence and decide whether it is necessary to detain the
said person in order to prevent him from acting in a prejudicial
manner. Thus, it was held that the past conduct or antecedent
history of a person can be taken into account in making the
detention order and it is largely from prior events showing
tendencies or inclinations of a man that an inference could be
drawn whether he is likely even in the future to act in a manner
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Further the past
conduct or history of the person on which the authority purports
to act should ordinarily be proximate in point of time and should
have the rational connection with the conclusion that the
detention of the person is necessary, that it would be irrational to
take into account the conduct of a person which took the place
years before the date of detention".
19. We are however conscious of the law as already laid down by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in “Naresh Kumar Goyal vs. Union of India
(2005) 8 SCC 276” an0d “Haradhan Saha vs. State of W.B.
LPA No. 312/2025 in
HCP No. 115/2025
Page No. 10
(1975) 3 SCC”, to the effect that an order of detention is not a
curative or reformative or punitive action, but a preventive action,
avowed object of which being to prevent the anti-national, anti-social
and subversive elements from imperiling the welfare of the country
or the security of the nation or from disturbing the public tranquility
or from indulging in smuggling activities or from engaging in illicit
traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances etc.
“The power of preventive detention is a precautionary power
exercised in reasonable anticipation. It is not a parallel proceeding. It
does not overlap with prosecution even if it relies on certain facts for
which prosecution may be launched or may have been launched. An order
of preventive detention may be made before or during the prosecution. An
order of preventive detention may be made with or without prosecution
and in anticipation or after discharge or even acquittal. The pendency of
the prosecution is no bar to an order of preventive detention. The order of
preventive detention is also not a bar to prosecution”.
“Article 14 is inapplicable because preventive detention and
prosecution are not synonymous. The purposes are different. The
authorities are different. The nature of the proceedings is different. In a
prosecution an accused is sought to be punished for a past act. In
preventive detention, the past act is merely the material for inference
about the future course of probable conduct on the part of the detenue”.
20. We are also of the opinion that it is not the number of acts that are
determined for detention of an individual but it is the impact of the
act which is material and determinative.
As hereinbefore mentioned, the impugned detention order
appears to have been passed on vague, unverifiable and bald
allegations unsupported with any evidence or material. It is unsafe to
LPA No. 312/2025 in
HCP No. 115/2025
Page No. 11
consider such vague allegations as constituting a past act for deriving
any inference about the future course of probable conduct on the part
of detenue.
21. The grounds of detention basing the impugned detention order
apparently look as a “ditto” or “verbatim” of the police dossier,
which speaks of the non-application of mind on the part of the
Detaining Authority. No doubt, the police dossier has to be the basic
input and information to the Detaining Authority for consideration of
the powers vested in it under the provisions of the PSA. Yet, the
application of mind on the part of the Detaining Authority is a sine
qua non for the passing of the detention order. The Detaining
Authority is required under law to make some verification at its own
level too by setting into motion its own machinery for its subjective
satisfaction before proceeding to curtail one's liberty which is only
permitted in accordance with law.
All the grounds of detention framed by the detaining authority
and basing the impugned detention order are replica of police
dossier. The dossier of the police concerned submitted to the
detaining authority and the grounds of detention framed by the latter,
when both are kept and perused in juxtaposition, clearly reveal that
the detaining authority has followed the police dossier in its entirety.
Thus, there is reason to believe that the impugned detention order is
bereft of subjective satisfaction and non-application of mind on the
part of the detaining authority.
LPA No. 312/2025 in
HCP No. 115/2025
Page No. 12
22. In “Jai Singh and Others v. State of J&K, AIR 1985 SC 764,
decided on 24.01.1985”, the Hon'ble Apex Court, inter alia,
observed:
"First taking up the case of Jai Singh, the first of the petitioners
before us, a perusal of the grounds of detention shows that it is a
verbatim reproduction of the dossier submitted by the Senior
Superintendent of Police, Udhampur, to the District Magistrate
requesting that a detention order may kindly be issued. At the top
of the dossier, the name is mentioned as Sardar Jai Singh,
father's name is mentioned as Sardar Ram Singh and the address
is given as village Bharakh, Tehsil Reasi. Thereafter it is recited
"The subject is an important member of ......"
Thereafter follow various allegations against Jai Singh,
paragraph by paragraph. In the grounds of detention, all that the
District Magistrate has done is to change the first three words
"the subject is" into "you Jai Singh, S/o Ram Singh, resident of
village Bharakh, Tehsil Reasi". Thereafter word for word the
police dossier is repeated and the word "he" wherever it occurs
referring to Jai Singh in the dossier is changed into "you" in the
grounds of detention. We are afraid it is difficult to find greater
proof of non-application of mind. The liberty of a subject is a
serious matter and is not to be trifled with in this casual,
indifferent and routine manner."
23. A Division Bench of this Court, in similar facts and circumstances,
in “Showkat Ali versus Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir
and Ors, LPA No. 19 of 2024, decided on 26-07-2024”, while
deliberating upon the necessity of subjective satisfaction of the
Detaining Authority on the basis of supporting material, has, in paras
10 to 14, made the following observations:
“10. There is a plethora of judgements of the Supreme Court
and the various high Courts of the country on the aspect of
"subjective satisfaction" to be arrived at by the detaining
authority which would reflect the application of mind on its
LPA No. 312/2025 in
HCP No. 115/2025
Page No. 13
part. The main grounds for setting aside an order of preventive
detention are the non-application of mind of the detaining
authority or the denial of opportunity or material to the
detenue to enable him to make an effective representation
against his detention. That brings this court to the question as
to whether subjective satisfaction can be arrived at by the
detaining authority only based on bald allegations in the
police dossier, without there being any facts/material in
support of those allegations?
11. Before proceeding further, certain questions come to the
mind of this Court. (a) Firstly, is there any difference between
an "Allegation" and "Charge"? and (b) secondly, if there is a
difference between the two, is there a variation in their
application qua a criminal trial and in proceedings under the
preventive detention laws? And (c) thirdly, what is required in
the grounds of detention, an allegation or a charge?
12. An allegation is an imputation. It need not be verifiable.
Charge on the other hand is also an imputation, albeit
verifiable. An imputation without material in support is an
allegation and an imputation with supporting material is a
charge which prima facie reflects that what is imputed, maybe
true. Thus, allegation is the genus and charge its species. By
analogy, the concept can be understood at the stage of framing
charge in a criminal trial. The chargesheet filed by the police
may level several allegations against the accused in the
chargesheet but, the Trial Court frames charge for only those
allegations for which prima facie evidence exists in the
chargesheet. While an allegation may be generalised, nonspecific and broad based, a charge must be specific, precise
and accord a reasonable opportunity to the person so charged
to conduct his defence or proffer an explanation. Thus, a
verifiable allegation/imputation is a charge.
13. To answer the second question that this Court has posed to
itself, this Court is of the opinion that there is a marked
difference in the operation of "charge" in a criminal trial and
in proceedings under the preventive detention laws. In a
criminal trial, the one who imputes i.e., the prosecution, bears
the onus probandi of proving every single charge against the
accused which if not proved beyond reasonable doubt, may
LPA No. 312/2025 in
HCP No. 115/2025
Page No. 14
result in the acquittal of the accused. While, in proceedings
under the preventive detention laws, the onus probandi of
giving a convincing explanation to the imputations levelled by
the detaining authority, is on the detenue and if the same
satisfies the detaining authority or the advisory board, his
detention may be revoked.
14. As regards the third question as to what is required to be
stated in the grounds of detention viz., allegations or charge,
this Courtis of the view that the grounds of detention must lay
down the charge against the detenue. It must be precise,
unequivocal and unambiguous. The detenue must be in a
position to give a specific reply/rebuttal to the charge and that
is only possible where charge is specific and precise. Else, the
detenue is only able to give a bare denial by stating that the
allegation is false. However, if the charge is specific regarding
the date, time and the specific act of the detenue which
requires him to be taken into preventive detention then, the
detenue is able to give a specific response of denial rather
than a bare denial. Thus, this Court is of the view that the
grounds of detention must lay down the specific charge against
the detenue rather than unsubstantiated and unverifiable
allegations. If the grounds of detention are based on
unsubstantiated allegations, the same, along with the order of
detention can be quashed as the detenue has not been given an
opportunity to make a viable representation either to the
detaining authority or to the advisory board. The opportunity
to represent to the abovementioned authorities is not a hollow
formality. To detain a person only based on allegations
without there being any material to substantiate those
allegations would imperil the fundamental right of the
individual enshrined in article 21 of the Constitution.
24. It has been averred in the instant LPA and was also pleaded in the
learned Writ Court that the Detaining Authority did not furnish to the
appellant/detenue the copies of the detention record in full at the time
of his arrest pursuant to the impugned detention order, which
LPA No. 312/2025 in
HCP No. 115/2025
Page No. 15
prevented him from making an effective and meaningful
representation at the earliest.
25. It is the case of the appellant/detenue that the result of the
representation
made by
him through
his
father was not
communicated to him.
26. Non-supply of the entire set of documents basing and referred to
in the detention order at an earliest contravenes the provisions of
Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. The Constitutional mandate
regarding information to the petitioner/detenu that he has a
right to make representation to the detaining authority or to the
Government in respect of his preventive detention is not to be
taken as a mere formality by making mention of the words, "the
detenu was also informed that he can make a representation to
the detaining authority or to the government in respect of his
preventive
detention"
in
the
previously
cyclostyled/
computerized receipts but is meant to be followed with utmost
fairness, responsibility and accountability having regard to the
fact that detenu's fundamental right to life and personal liberty
is being curtailed on account of his apprehended conduct. The
detaining authority and the government in case of making any
representation by the detenu to them as regards his detention are
under a constitutional obligation to accord due consideration
under law to the same and to intimate the result of the
LPA No. 312/2025 in
HCP No. 115/2025
Page No. 16
consideration to the detenu through the concerned jail authority
or through his home people.
27. The relevant portion of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India in case titled "Shalini Soni Vs. Union of India (1980)
4 SCC 544", deserves a needful mention as under: "The Article 22 (5) has two facets (1) communication of the grounds on
which the order of detention has been made; (2) opportunity of making a
representation against the order of detention. Communication of the
grounds pre-supposes the formulation of the grounds and formulation of
the grounds requires and ensures the application of the mind of the
detaining authority to the facts and materials before it, that is to say to
pertinent and proximate matters in regard to each individual case and
excludes the elements of arbitrariness and automatism (if one may be
permitted to use the word to describe a mechanical reaction without a
conscious application of the mind). It is an unwritten rule of the law,
constitutional and administrative, that whenever a decision-making
function is entrusted to the subjective satisfaction of a statutory
functionary, there is an implicit obligation to apply his mind to pertinent
and proximate matters only eschewing the irrelevant and the remote.
Where there is further an express statutory obligation to communicate
not merely the decision but the grounds on which the decision is founded.
It is a necessary corollary that the grounds communicated, that is, the
grounds so made known, should be seen to pertain to pertinent and
proximate matters and should comprise all the constituent facts and
materials that went in to make up the mind of the statutory functionary
and not merely the inferential conclusions. Now, the decision to detain a
person depends on the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority.
The Constitution and the statute cast a duty on the detaining authority to
communicate the grounds of detention to the detenu. From what we have
said above, it follows that the grounds communicated to the detenu must
reveal the whole of the factual material considered by the detaining
authority and not merely the inferences of fact arrived at by the detaining
authority. The matter may also be looked at from the point of view of the
second facet of Article 22(5). An opportunity to make representation
against the order of detention necessarily implies that the detenu is
informed of all that has been taken into account against him in arriving
at the decision to detain him. It means that the detenu is to be informed
not merely, as we said, of the inferences of fact but of all the factual
material which have led to the inferences of fact. If the detenu is not to be
so informed the opportunity so solemnly guaranteed by the Constitution
becomes reduced to an exercise in futility. Whatever angle from which
the question is looked at, it is dear that "grounds" in Article 22(5) do not
LPA No. 312/2025 in
HCP No. 115/2025
Page No. 17
mean mere factual inferences but mean factual inferences plus factual
material which led to such factual inferences. The 'grounds' must selfsufficient and self-explanatory. In our view copies documents to which
reference is made in the 'grounds' may be supplied to the detenu as part
of the 'grounds'."
28. In “Rajammal v. State of Tamil Nadu and others, 1999 (1) SCC 417”, it
has been held that:
"It is a constitutional obligation of the Government to consider the
representation forwarded by the detenu without any delay. Though no
period is prescribed by Article 22 of the Constitution for the decision to
be taken on the representation, the words "as soon as may be in clause
(5) of Article 22 convey the message that the representation. should be
considered and disposed of at the earliest."
29. In "K. M. Abdulla Kunhi v. Unio of India (1991) 1 SCC 476", it has been
held as follows:
".... it is settled law that there should not be supine indifference,
slackness or callous attitude in considering the representation. Any
unexplained delay in the disposal of the representation would be breach
of the constitutional imperative and it would render the continued
detention impermissible and illegal."
30. In “A.K. Roy Vs. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 271”, it was held at para
70 of the judgment as under: "70. We have the authority of the decisions in... for saying that the
fundamental rights conferred by the different articles of Part III of the
Constitution are not mutually exclusive and that therefore, a law of
preventive detention which falls within Article 22 must also meet the
requirements of Articles 14, 19 and 21."
31. However, the contentions of the learned counsel for the
appellant/detenue to the effect that Government of Union Territory of
Jammu and Kashmir does not have the competence to prescribe the
period of detention in terms of provisions of Article 22[7] of the
Constitution of India and that subsequent to the abrogation of Article
370 of the Constitution of India, resulting in the application of Central
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laws to the Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir, the Jammu &
Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978, could not have been applied, are
without any force.
The learned writ court has addressed both the issues in accordance
with the law.
Paras 6, 7, 8, and 8 of the impugned judgment are reproduced for
the sake of convenience: “6. So far as the first contention raised by learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the petitioner is concerned, it is to be noted that the
Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act has been enacted by the
Legislative Assembly of the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir in
the year 1978. After coming into force of the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act, 2019, certain enactments legislated framed by the
erstwhile State Legislature have been repealed whereas certain other
legislations framed by the erstwhile State Legislature have been saved
for their application to the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir,
Table-4 of the Fifth Schedule of the J&K Re-organization Act gives
the list of enactments which continue to remain in force in the Union
Territory of Jammu and Kashmir and Union Territory of Ladakh even
after re-organization of the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir.
The Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978, is one of the
enactments which finds mention in the said table. Therefore, the said
Act continues to have application in the Union Territory of Jammu
and Kashmir.
7. That takes us to the issue as to whether the State Legislature has the
power to fix the period of detention, as, according to the learned
Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, clause (7) of Article 22 of
the Constitution of India vests such power only with the Parliament.
This question came up for discussion before the Constitution Bench of
the Supreme Court in the case of “Fagu Shaw vs. State of West
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Bengal, AIR 1974 SC 613”. The Supreme Court while deliberating
upon this issue observed as under:15
14. Under Entry 3 of List III of the Seventh Schedule, both
Parliament and State Legislatures have plenary power to pass
laws for preventive detention as respects the subjects
mentioned therein. As ancillary to that power, or, as an
inseparable part of it, Parliament and State Legislatures have
power to fix the period of detention also. One cannot imagine a
power to pass a law for detention unless that power carries with
it the incidental power to provide for the period of such
detention. Therefore, both Parliament and State Legislatures
have power under the entry to provide for detention of a person
for a specified period. The purpose of Article 22(4)(a) is to put
a curb on that power by providing that no law shall authorize
the detention of a person for a period exceeding three months
unless an Advisory Board has reported within the period of
three months that there is sufficient cause for detention. And,
what the proviso means is that even if the Advisory Board has
reported before the expiration of three months that there is
sufficient cause for detention, the period of detention beyond
three months shall not exceed the maximum period that might
be fixed by any law made by Parliament under Article
22(7)(b). The proviso cannot mean that even if Parliament does
not pass a law fixing the maximum period under Article
22(7)(b), the State Legislatures, for example, cannot pass a law
which provides for detention of a person beyond three months.
The period of such detention viz. detention beyond the period
of three months, would then be a matter within the plenary
power of Parliament or State Legislatures, as the case may be,
as such a power is incidental to the power to pass a law with
respect to the topics covered by Entry 3 of List III.
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15. It is therefore clear that, but for the proviso to clause
(4)(a) of Article 22, the Act, as it provides for the opinion
of the Advisory Board, can authorize detention of a person
for any period, by virtue of the plenary character of the
legislative power conferred by the Entry. Whether such a
law is liable to be struck down on the ground that it
imposes unreasonable restrictions upon the fundamental
rights under Article 19 is an altogether different question.
The proviso says in effect that if Parliament fixes the
maximum period under Article 22(7)(b), the power of
Parliament and State Legislatures to fix the period of
detention in a law passed under the Entry would be
curtailed to that extent.
8. From the analysis of aforesaid legal position, it is clear that
both Parliament and State legislatures have plenary power to pass
laws for preventive detention and ancillary to that power, the
Parliament and the State legislature have power to fix the period
of detention also. In these circumstances, the contention of the
petitioner that the State legislature did not have power to fix the
period of detention is misconceived and is, therefore, without any
merit.”
32. In the backdrop of the foregoing facto-legal scenario of the case, we
allow the instant Letters Patent Appeal and set aside the impugned
judgment dated 21.11.2025 of the learned writ court passed in HCP
No. 115/2025. Consequently, the impugned detention order bearing
No. DMP/PSA/28/2025 dated 03.05.2025 passed by the District
Magistrate, Pulwama, in respect of the appellant also stands quashed.
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33. As a result, the appellant detenu, namely, Aabid Majeed Sheikh, S/o.
Abdul Majeed Sheikh, R/o Dadasara, Tehsil Tral, District Pulwama,
is directed to be released from his preventive detention in this case, if
not already released.
SRINAGAR
01.10.2026
Shahid Manzoor
(MOHD YOUSUF WANI)
JUDGE
(SANJEEV KUMAR)
JUDGE
Whether the Judgment is Speaking
Yes
Whether approved for reporting
Yes
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