The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
18. In this case, even though the defendant disputed execution of Ext.A1 agreement offering sale of the plaint schedule property, which belonged to the defendant and her mother jointly, the defendant admitted borrowing of Rs.50,000/- by her husband for the purpose of constructing a residential building. However, the plaintiff himself got examined as PW1 to prove execution of Ext.A1 and payment of advance amount to the tune of Rs.65,000/[Rs.50,000 + Rs.15,000]. That apart, PW2, the scribe and PW3, the document writer were also examined to prove execution of Ext.A1. Since the evidence tendered by PWs 1 to 3 were not shaken during the cross-examination, the finding of the trial court that the plaintiff succeeded in proving Ext.A1 agreement is only to be confirmed. While calculating the sale consideration at the rate of Rs.55,000/per cent for the plaint schedule property having an extent 2025:KER:28540 R.F.A. No. 82 of 2017 of 7 ¼ cents, the amount would come to Rs.3,98,750/-, but the advance amount paid by the plaintiff is only Rs.65,000/-.
19. In this matter, even though the suit is found to be hit by Order II Rule 2 of CPC, the trial court granted the alternative relief to return the advance amount on the principle of unlawful enrichment. Once the suit is found to be barred under Order II Rule 2 of CPC, no relief can be granted in the suit, other than to dismiss the suit. It is fairly conceded by the learned counsel for the defendant that, as far as return of advance money is concerned, the defendant has no objection. In view of the above, the decree and judgment under challenge are only to be confirmed. Therefore, there is no reason to interfere with the verdict of the trial court. Holding so, the trial court verdict does not require any interference.
20. In the result, the appeal stands dismissed and the verdict under challenge stands confirmed. Having considered the facts of the case, the parties shall suffer their respective costs. R.F.A. No. 82 of 2017 2025:KER:28540 All interlocutory applications pending in this regular first appeal stand dismissed. Sd/-
Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
2025:KER:28540
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A. BADHARUDEEN
MONDAY, THE 7TH DAY OF APRIL 2025 / 17TH CHAITHRA, 1947
RFA NO. 82 OF 2017
AGAINST THE DECREE AND JUDGMENT DATED 19.11.2016 IN O.S. NO.159 OF 2011
OF SUB COURT, MUVATTUPUZHA
APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF:
A.R.PETER
S/O. RAPPEL, AGED 59 YEARS, AATTUPURAM HOUSE, THANKALAM
KARA, THRIKKARIYOOR VILLAGE, KOTHAMANGALAM TALUK.
BY ADVS.
SRI.P.M.JOSHI
SRI.T.S.NAZIMUDDIN
SMT.SIJI K.PAUL
RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT:
SARADA NARAYANAN
W/O. NARAYANAN, D/O. LATE RAMAN, AGED 51 YEARS, PERUMBAMKUDI
HOUSE, THANKALAM KARA, THRIKKARIYOORVILLAGE, KOTHAMANGALAM
TALUK.
BY ADV SRI.N.K.MOHANLAL
THIS REGULAR FIRST APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 27.03.2025,
THE COURT ON 07.04.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
2025:KER:28540
R.F.A. No. 82 of 2017
“C.R”
JUDGMENT
Dated this the 7th day of April, 2025
This regular first appeal has been filed under
Section 96 read with Order XLI Rule 1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 [hereinafter referred as ‘CPC’ for short],
challenging the decree and judgment dated 19.11.2016 in
O.S.
No.159/2011
Muvattupuzha,
on
the
files
of
the
disallowing
the
relief
Sub
of
Court,
specific
performance of Ext.A1 agreement, while granting the
alternative relief
of return of
advance amount. The
appellant herein is the plaintiff and the respondent is the
defendant.
2.
Heard the learned counsel for appellant and the
learned counsel appearing for the respondent. Perused the
verdict under challenge, the records of the trial court and the
decisions placed by both sides.
3.
Parties in this appeal shall be referred with
reference to their status before the trial court, hereafter.
4.
The plaintiff approached the trial court seeking
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R.F.A. No. 82 of 2017
performance of Ext.A1 sale agreement dated 26.08.2010,
whereby it is alleged that the defendant has agreed to
execute sale deed in respect of the plaint schedule
property, having an extent of
7 ¼ cents, at the rate
Rs.55,000/- per cent. According to the plaintiff, at the time
of execution of the agreement, Rs.50,000/- was paid to the
defendant as advance and thereafter on 06.10.2010,
Rs.15,000/-
was
also
given
being
part
of
the
sale
consideration. Even though, the plaintiff has been ready
and willing to perform his part of the contract in the matter
of execution of the sale deed by paying the balance
consideration, the defendant failed to execute the sale
deed.
Accordingly,
the
plaintiff
sought
the
relief
of
execution of the agreement or in the alternative, to get
back the advance amount.
5.
Defendant filed written statement and resisted the
suit, disputing execution Ext.A1 agreeing to sell the plaint
schedule property. According to the defendant, her husband
had borrowed Rs.50,000/- from the plaintiff on 26.08.2010
for the construction of residential building and as demanded
by the plaintiff Ext.A1 agreement was executed as a security
R.F.A. No. 82 of 2017
2025:KER:28540
document. The defendant also raised contention that the suit
is barred under Order II Rule 2 of CPC, in view of filing of
earlier suit vide O.S. No.340/2011 by the plaintiff, seeking
the relief of injunction and filing of the present suit, after
withdrawing the same, without seeking permission of court
to file a fresh suit for specific performance.
6.
The trial court raised necessary issues and tried
the matter. PWs 1 to 3 were examined and Exts.A1 to A5
were marked on the side of the plaintiff. DW1 was
examined and Exts.B1 to B3 were marked on the side of the
defendant.
7.
Finally, in paragraph No.11 of the judgment, the
trial court found that the second suit filed by the plaintiff
seeking the relief of specific performance, based on Ext.A1
agreement is clearly hit by Order II Rule 2 of CPC. Thereafter,
on finding proof of execution of Ext.A1, the trial court
granted the alternative relief of return of advance amount,
with 12% interest from the date of the suit till realization.
8.
While assailing the verdict of the trial court, the
learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that, the finding
of the trial court, holding the view that the present suit is
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R.F.A. No. 82 of 2017
hit under Order II Rule 2 of CPC is wrong. He submitted
further that, as per the evidence tendered by the plaintiff
as PW1, supported by the evidence of PW2, the scribe and
PW3, the document writer, the execution of
Ext.A1
agreement is proved. That apart, readiness and willingness
on the part of the plaintiff also is proved. Therefore, the
relief of specific performance ought to be granted by the
trial court. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has placed
decision
of
the
[MANU/SC/0979/2014
Apex
:
Court
(2015)
reported
in
SCC
12]
Inbasegaran v. S. Natarajan, to contend that, since the
cause of action for filing the first suit seeking the relief of
injunction is not the cause of action for filing the second
suit for specific performance, the present suit is not hit
under Order II Rule 2 of CPC.
9.
Whereas, the learned counsel for the defendant
strongly supported the finding of the trial court holding the
view that, the suit is barred by Order II Rule 2 of CPC, while
conceding that even now also the defendant is ready to pay
the advance amount ordered to be returned by the trial
court. The learned counsel for the defendant has placed
2025:KER:28540
R.F.A. No. 82 of 2017
decision of the Apex Court reported in [2019 ICO 3246 :
AIR 2020 SC 395 : (2020) 14 SCC 110] Vurimi
Pullarao
v.
Vemari
Vyankata
Radharani
Dhankoteshwarrao, wherein an identical situation has
been dealt by the Apex Court and held that the second suit
is barred under Order II Rule 2 of CPC, finding that there
was identity of cause of action in the earlier suit and the
subsequent suit.
10. Addressing the rival submissions, the points to be
determined are:
1. Whether the trial court went wrong in
holding that the present suit is hit by Order II Rule
2 of CPC?
2. What are the essentials to find out bar
under Order II Rule 2 of CPC?
3. Whether the trial court went wrong in not
granting
the
discretionary
relief
of
specific
performance instead of granting the alternative
relief of return of advance amount?
4. Whether the decree and judgment of the
trial court would require interference?
5. Reliefs and costs.
11. Here, while holding that the present suit is hit
under Order II Rule 2 of CPC, the trial court relied on the
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R.F.A. No. 82 of 2017
decision of the Apex Court reported in [2012 KHC 4492 :
2013 (1) SCC 625 : ILR 2012 (4) Ker. 464] Virgo
Industries (Eng.) P. Ltd. (M/s.) v. M/s. Venturetech
Solutions P. Ltd., wherein the facts of the case are
discussed in paragraph Nos. 3 and 4. The same read as
under:
3. The brief facts that would be required
to be noticed for the purpose of the present
adjudication may now be recapitulated. The
respondent in the two appeals, as the
plaintiff, instituted C.S No. 831 of 2005 and
C.S. No. 833 of 2005 before the Madras High
Court
seeking
injunction
a
decree
restraining
of
permanent
the
appellant
(defendant) from alienating, encumbering or
dealing with the plaint schedule properties to
any other third party other than the plaintiff.
The aforesaid relief was claimed on the basis
of two agreements of sale entered into by the
plaintiffs
and
the
defendant
both
on
27.7.2005 in respect of two different parcels
of immovable property consisting of land and
superstructures built on plot No. 65 (old
No.43) and plot No. 66 (old No.42), Second
Main
Road,
Ambattur
Industrial
Estate,
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R.F.A. No. 82 of 2017
Chennai. In each of the aforesaid suits the
plaintiff
had
stated
that
under
the
agreements of sale different amounts were
paid to the defendants, yet, on the pretext
that restrictions on the alienation of the suit
land were likely to be issued by the Central
Excise Department on account of pending
revenue
demands,
the
defendants
were
attempting to frustrate the agreements in
question. In the suits filed by the plaintiff it
was also stated that as the period of six
months fixed for execution of the sale deeds
under the agreements in question was not
yet over, the plaintiff is not claiming specific
performance of the agreements. The plaintiff,
accordingly, sought leave of the court to omit
to claim the relief of specific performance
with liberty to sue for the said relief at a later
point of time, if necessary. The two suits in
question, i.e., C.S. Nos. 831 and 833 of 2005
were filed by the plaintiff on 28.8.2005 and
9.9.2005 respectively.
4. Thereafter on 29.5.2007, O.S. Nos.
202 and 203 were filed by the plaintiff in the
Court of the District Judge, Tiruvallur seeking
a decree against the defendant for execution
and registration of the sale deeds in respect
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R.F.A. No. 82 of 2017
of the same property and for delivery of
possession thereof to the plaintiff. In the
aforesaid latter suits it was mentioned by the
plaintiff that in respect of the same suit
property it had earlier filed suit Nos. C.S. 831
and 833 of 2005 seeking the relief of
permanent
injunction.
As
the
time
for
performance of the agreements of sale had
not elapsed when C.S. No.831 and 833 of
2005 were instituted and the plaintiff was
'under
the
bona
fide
belief
that
the
defendants would perform the agreement'
the relief of specific performance was not
claimed in the aforesaid suits. However, as
inspite of a legal notice issued to the
defendants on 24.2.2006, the sale deeds had
not been executed by the defendant the
latter suits i.e. O. S. Nos. 202 and 203 were
instituted.
12. Thereafter, the Apex Court held in paragraph
No.11 that, the cardinal requirement for application of the
provisions contained in Order II R.2(2) and (3), therefore, is
that the cause of action in the latter suit must be the same
as in the first suit. It will be wholly unnecessary to enter
into any discourse on the true meaning of the said
2025:KER:28540
R.F.A. No. 82 of 2017
expression, i.e. cause of action, particularly, in view of the
clear enunciation in a recent judgment of this Court in the
Church
of
Christ
Charitable
Charitable
Society,
represented
Ponniamman
Educational
Trust
and
by
its
Trust
Educational
Chairman
represented
by
v.
its
Chairperson/ Managing Trustee, JT 2012 (6) SC 149. The
huge number of opinions rendered on the issue including
the
judicial
pronouncements
available
does
not
fundamentally detract from what is stated in Halsbury's
Law of England, (4th Edition). The following reference from
the above work would, therefore, be apt for being extracted
hereinbelow: 'Cause of Action' has been defined as
meaning simply a factual situation existence of which
entitles one person to obtain from the Court a remedy
against another person. The phrase has been held from
earliest time to include every fact which is material to be
proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed, and every fact
which a defendant would have a right to traverse. 'Cause of
action' has also been taken to mean that particular action
the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause
of complaint, or the subject matter of grievance founding
2025:KER:28540
R.F.A. No. 82 of 2017
the action, not merely the technical cause of action.
13. In fact, in the decision placed by the learned
counsel for the plaintiff in Inbasegaran’s case (supra), the
Apex Court referred the decision in Virgo Industries’s
case (supra) and also the decision of the Constitution
Bench of the Apex Court, discussing the scope and
applicability
of
Order
II
Rule
of
CPC
in
[MANU/SC/0241/1964 : AIR 1964 SC 1810] Gurbux
Singh v. Bhooralal and extracted paragraph No.6 therein.
The same reads as under:
6. In order that a plea of a Bar under Order
2 Rule 2(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure should
succeed the Defendant who raises the plea must
make out; (i) that the second suit was in respect
of the same cause of action as that on which the
previous suit was based; (2) that in respect of
that cause of action the Plaintiff was entitled to
more than one relief; (3) that being thus entitled
to more than one relief the Plaintiff, without
leave obtained from the Court omitted to sue for
the relief for which the second suit had been
filed. From this analysis it would be seen that the
Defendant would have to establish primarily and
to start with, the precise cause of action upon
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R.F.A. No. 82 of 2017
which the previous suit was filed, for unless there
is identity between the cause of action on which
the earlier suit was filed and that on which the
claim in the latter suit is based there would be no
scope for the application of the bar. No doubt, a
relief which is sought in a plaint could ordinarily
be traceable to a particular cause of action but
this might, by no means, be the universal rule.
As the plea is a technical bar it has to be
established
presumed
satisfactorily
merely
on
and
basis
cannot
of
be
inferential
reasoning. It is for this reason that we consider
that a plea of a bar under Order 2 Rule 2 of the
Code of Civil Procedure can be established only if
the Defendant files in evidence the pleadings in
the previous suit and thereby proves to the Court
the identity of the cause of action in the two
suits. It is common ground that the pleadings in
CS 28 of 1950 were not filed by the Appellant in
the present suit as evidence in support of his
plea under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The learned trial Judge, however,
without these pleadings being on the record
inferred what the cause of action should have
been from the reference to the previous suit
contained in the plaint as a matter of deduction.
At the stage of the appeal the learned District
2025:KER:28540
R.F.A. No. 82 of 2017
Judge noticed this lacuna in the Appellant's case
and pointed out, in our opinion, rightly that
without the plaint in the previous suit being on
the record, a plea of a bar under Order 2 Rule 2
of
the
Code
of
Civil
Procedure
was
not
maintainable.
xxxxx
It was his submission that from this passage
we
should
infer
that
the
parties
had,
by
agreement, consented to make the pleadings in
the earlier suit part of the record in the present
suit.
We
are
interpretation
unable
of
these
to
agree
with
this
observations.
The
statement of the learned Judge. "The two courts
have, however, freely cited from the record of
the earlier suit" is obviously inaccurate as the
learned District Judge specifically pointed out
that the pleadings in the earlier suit were not
part of the record and on that very ground had
rejected the plea of the bar under Order 2 Rule 2
of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor can we find
any basis for the suggestion that the learned
Judge had admitted these documents at the
second appeal stage under Order 41 Rule 27 of
the Code of Civil Procedure by consent of parties.
There is nothing on the record to suggest such an
agreement or such an order, assuming that
2025:KER:28540
R.F.A. No. 82 of 2017
additional
evidence
could
legitimately
be
admitted in a second appeal under Order 41 Rule
27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We can
therefore proceed only on the basis that the
pleadings in the earlier suit were not part of the
record in the present suit.
14. In Vurimi Pullarao’s case (supra), the Apex
Court considered the earlier decisions and followed the
ratio in Virgo Industries’s case (supra) and also referred
the Constitution Bench decision in Gurbux Singh’s case
(supra), in a case where initially the plaintiff therein filed a
suit
for
injunction
restraining
the
defendant
from
obstructing the possession of the plaintiff and a subsequent
suit filed for specific performance of the contract, wherein
the Apex Court held that the cause of action in both suits is
identical, while upholding the bar under Order II Rule 2 of
CPC.
15. The learned counsel for the plaintiff placed
decision of this Court in Mathew and Others v. Elikutty
and Others reported in [2018 ICO 2908 : 2019 (2) KLJ
323 : 2019 (2) KHC 160], where this Court held that
R.F.A. No. 82 of 2017
2025:KER:28540
when the plaintiff had consciously abandoned the relief of
specific performance despite accrual of a cause of action
for such a suit in his favour and the plaintiff had abandoned
the first suit without seeking leave under Order XXIII Rule 1
of CPC, the second suit is barred under Order II Rule 2 of
CPC.
16. While analyzing the legal position, it is apposite
to extract Order II Rule 2 of CPC. The same provides as
under:
“2. Suit to include the whole claim.(1) Every suit shall include the whole of the
claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in
respect of the cause of action; but a plaintiff
may relinquish any portion of his claim in
order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of
any Court.
(2) Relinquishment of part of claim.Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or
intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his
claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of
the portion so omitted or relinquished.
(3) Omission to sue for one of several
reliefs.- A person entitled to more than one
relief in respect of the same cause of action
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R.F.A. No. 82 of 2017
may sue for all or any of such reliefs; but if he
omits, except with the leave of the Court, to
sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards
sue for any relief so omitted.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this
rule an obligation and a collateral security for
its performance and successive claims arising
under the same obligation shall be deemed
respectively to constitute but one cause of
action.
Sub-rule (1) of Order II Rule 2 of the Code
deals with the frame of suit and it enables a
plaintiff to abandon or relinquish a part of his
claim
before
instituting
the
suit.
The
provisions in Order II Rule 2 indicate that if the
plaintiff is entitled to several reliefs against
the defendant in respect of the same cause of
action, he cannot split up the claim so as to
omit one part of the claim and sue for the
other. If the cause of action is the same, the
plaintiff has to place all his claims before the
court in one suit. This provision is based on
the cardinal principle that the defendant
should not be vexed twice for the same cause.
One of the objects of Order II Rule 2 of the
Code is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings.
Statement of law in Sub-rule (2) to Order II
R.F.A. No. 82 of 2017
2025:KER:28540
Rule 2 of the Code is clear; where the plaintiff
omits to sue in respect of or intentionally
relinquishes any portion of his claim, he shall
not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so
omitted or relinquished. This is an absolute
bar.
Sub-rule (3) of the above provision gives
no room for any doubt regarding its extent
and operation. A person entitled to more than
one relief in respect of the same cause of
action may sue for all or any such reliefs. But,
if he omits, he shall not afterwards sue for any
relief so omitted, unless he had omitted to sue
with the leave of the court. In other words, if a
plaintiff omits, without obtaining a leave of the
court to sue in respect of all reliefs arising out
of the cause of action available to him at the
time of filing the suit, he shall not afterwards
sue for any relief so omitted. As mentioned
above, the principles enunciated in Order II
Rule 2 of the Code are based on a public
policy and with a salutary object that no
person shall be vexed twice for the same
cause. It is therefore clear that the bar should
be determined having regard to the facts and
circumstances in each case.
R.F.A. No. 82 of 2017
2025:KER:28540
17. Reading the statutory text along with the binding
precedents discussed, the legal position is no more
res-integra on the point that, if two suits have been filed by
the plaintiff and the relief claimed therein are based on the
same cause of action, then the subsequent suit would be
barred under Order II Rule 2 of CPC. But, if the cause of
action is different in the earlier suit, then the subsequent
suit based on a distinct and different cause of action will
not be barred under Order II Rule 2 of CPC. In order to find
as to whether both suits have been filed on the same cause
of action, the test to be applied is whether the relief sought
for in the second suit can also be claimed in the first suit
itself. Otherwise, the first suit has to be withdrawn with
leave of the Court to proceed with the second suit. To put it
otherwise, in cases involving contract for sale, once a
person files a suit for injunction restraining alienation of the
property alone, the cause of action for the suit is the
contract of sale and its non performance. So, the cause of
action to sue for specific performance is very much
available at the time of filing the first suit itself. If so, the
second suit seeking specific performance of the contract,
R.F.A. No. 82 of 2017
2025:KER:28540
based on the same contract of sale emerges from the same
cause of action is barred under Order II Rule 2 of CPC.
17. Following the above legal position, the finding of
the trial court that the suit is barred under Order II Rule 2 of
CPC is only to be confirmed.
18. In this case, even though the defendant disputed
execution of Ext.A1 agreement offering sale of the plaint
schedule property, which belonged to the defendant and
her mother jointly, the defendant admitted borrowing of
Rs.50,000/- by her husband for the purpose of constructing
a residential building. However, the plaintiff himself got
examined as PW1 to prove execution of Ext.A1 and
payment of advance amount to the tune of Rs.65,000/[Rs.50,000 + Rs.15,000]. That apart, PW2, the scribe and
PW3, the document writer were also examined to prove
execution of Ext.A1. Since the evidence tendered by PWs 1
to 3 were not shaken during the cross-examination, the
finding of the trial court that the plaintiff succeeded in
proving Ext.A1 agreement is only to be confirmed. While
calculating the sale consideration at the rate of Rs.55,000/per cent for the plaint schedule property having an extent
2025:KER:28540
R.F.A. No. 82 of 2017
of 7 ¼ cents, the amount would come to Rs.3,98,750/-, but
the
advance
amount
paid
by
the
plaintiff
is
only
Rs.65,000/-.
19. In this matter, even though the suit is found to be
hit by Order II Rule 2 of CPC, the trial court granted the
alternative relief to return the advance amount on the
principle of unlawful enrichment. Once the suit is found to
be barred under Order II Rule 2 of CPC, no relief can be
granted in the suit, other than to dismiss the suit. It is fairly
conceded by the learned counsel for the defendant that, as
far as return of advance money is concerned, the defendant
has no objection. In view of the above, the decree and
judgment under challenge are only to be confirmed.
Therefore, there is no reason to interfere with the verdict of
the trial court. Holding so, the trial court verdict does not
require any interference.
20. In the result, the appeal stands dismissed and
the verdict under challenge stands confirmed. Having
considered the facts of the case, the parties shall suffer
their respective costs.
R.F.A. No. 82 of 2017
2025:KER:28540
All interlocutory applications pending in this regular
first appeal stand dismissed.
Sd/-
A. BADHARUDEEN
SK
JUDGE
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