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signed by
YOGESH TIWARI
YOGESH Digitally
2026.10.14
TIWARI Date:
18:27:20 +0530
CGHC010215452023
2026:CGHC:44352
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Order Reserved on : 06.08.2026
Order Delivered on : 14.10.2026
WPS No. 4254 of 2023
1 - Kameshwar Kumar Yadav Son Of Munjanlal Yadav Aged About 31
Years Village Koparo Post Rampur Block Salewara, District :
Khairagarh-Chhuikhadan-Gandai, Chhattisgarh
2 - Yogendramani Verma Son Of Shri Kailash Verma Aged About 28
Years Resident Of Village Jaghrakhand, District : Gaurela-PendraMarwahi, Chhattisgarh
3 - Sandeep Kumar Kumbhkar Son Of Shri Jogi Ram Kumbhkar Aged
About 31 Years Resident Of Village Khaprikala Block Lormi, District :
Mungeli, Chhattisgarh
4 - Jitendra Kumar Son Of Shri Panna Lal Aged About 32 Years
Resident Of Village Bagehwar Ward 5 Arang, District : Raipur,
Chhattisgarh
5 - Omprakash Chelak S/o Sudhuram Chelak Aged About 33 Years
Satnamipara Khuteri Block Arang, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
--- Petitioner(s)
Versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department Of School
Education, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya Atal Nagar, New Raipur,
District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
2 - Director, Directorate Of Chhattisgarh Public Instruction Indrawati
Bhawan, Naya Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
--- Respondent(s)
WPS No. 125 of 2024
1 - Yogendra Kumar Sharma S/o Vinod Kumar Sharma Aged About 23
Years Roll No. 13023411 R/o Village- Ghuthia, Post- Baitalpur, TahsilPathariya,, District : Mungeli, Chhattisgarh
2 - Sudeep Kumar S/o Bodhram Aged About 25 Years Roll No.
18153125, R/o Ward No. 12, Sundar Gali, Lewai Khisora,, District :
Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh
3 - Ghanshyam S/o Awadh Ram Aged About 33 Years Roll No.
16173061 R/o Sahupara, Bargaon, Bemetara,, District : Bemetara,
Chhattisgarh
4 - Sanat Kumar Miri S/o Chedi Lal Aged About 25 Years Roll No.
18103240 R/o Post- Hardi,, District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh
5 - Chandra Prakash S/o Rikhiram Aged About 29 Years Roll No.
13393070 R/o Vill- Padariya, Post- Takhatpur,, District : Bilaspur,
Chhattisgarh
6 - Bhupendra S/o Tikam Das Aged About 24 Years Roll No. 26073392
R/o Gadhula,, District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh
7 - Anuradha Tamrakar D/o Sohan Lal Tamrakar Aged About 32 Years
Roll No. 16123064 R/o Shiv Mandir Titurdih, District : Durg,
Chhattisgarh
8 - Lokesh Kumar Janghel S/o Omprakash Janghel Aged About 31
Years Roll No. 26133290, R/o H.No. 10, Padmawatipur,, District :
Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh
9 - Daneshwar S/o Bhupendra Aged About 29 Years Roll No. 25073508
R/o Maraud, Dhamtari, District : Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh
10 - Pooja Mande D/o Ratan Lal Mande Aged About 30 Years Roll No.
25103113 R/o Abhanpur,, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
11 - Shalini Gavel D/o Hazari Lal Gavel Aged About 26 Years Roll No.
22113064, R/o Pathripara, Korba, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh
12 - Farukh Ahmad Khan S/o Kalim Ahmad Khan Aged About 32 Years
Roll No. 13153445 R/o Taiba Chowk, Talapara,, District : Bilaspur,
Chhattisgarh
13 - Kanchan Tripathi W/o Sanjeev Kumar Tripathi Aged About 29
Years Roll No. 24203026 R/o Ambika Sadan, Gharghoda,, District :
Raigarh, Chhattisgarh
14 - Adarsh Agrahari S/o Gouri Shankar Agrahari Aged About 25 Years
Roll No. 13123103 R/o Mangla, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh
15 - Shriram Pal S/o Aado Pal Aged About 27 Years Roll No. 26173039
R/o Dapka, District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh
16 - Ajay Lahare S/o Teturam Lahare Aged About 28 Years Roll No.
13343267 R/o Pamgarh,, District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh
17 - Suman Patel D/o Govind Ram Patel Aged About 31 Years Roll No.
24303003 R/o Chandrapur,, District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh
18 - Sagar Chandrakar S/o Pokhan Lal Chandrakar Aged About 32
Years Roll No. 23103153 R/o Village- Kharora,, District : Mahasamund,
Chhattisgarh
19 - Shaukat Quraishi S/o Akbar Ali Quraishi Aged About 32 Years Roll
No. 13243234 Roll Vill- Sahaspur, Block- Lormi, District : Mungeli,
Chhattisgarh
20 - Deepak Dongre S/o Devchand Dongre Aged About 30 Years Roll
No. 16043195 R/o Gandhi Nagar, Diprapara, Ward No. 39, District :
Durg, Chhattisgarh
21 - Indra Kumar Sahu S/o Tuldas Sahu Aged About 31 Years Roll No.
26163147 R/o Lakholi Naka,, District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh
22 - Bhawna Sahu D/o Jyotikant Sahu Aged About 31 Years Roll No.
25253251 R/o Nagri,, District : Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh
23 - Reshma Sahu D/o Rajendra Sahu Aged About 30 Years Roll No.
25223232 R/o Neonara,, District : Bemetara, Chhattisgarh
24 - Mithlesh Verma S/o Geetalal Verma Aged About 27 Years Roll No.
16013001 R/o Maroda, Junvani, District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh
25 - Mamata D/o Uttam Kumar Aged About 27 Years Roll No. Borsi,,
District : Gariyabandh, Chhattisgarh
26 - Tanuja D/o Jagdish Prasad Aged About 27 Years Roll No.
40083170 R/o Lawsara,, District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh
27 - Himanshu Sahu D/o Bihari Lal Sahu Aged About 26 Years Roll No.
30093030 R/o Kaitha,, District : Balodabazar-Bhathapara, Chhattisgarh
28 - Ankit Yadav S/o Ballu Yadav Aged About 26 Years Roll No.
16053202 R/o Kasaridih, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh
29 - Murli Manohar Jaltare S/o Santosh Kumar Aged About 29 Years
Roll No. 18093330, R/o Karnaud Bamhani Bazar,, District : JanjgirChampa, Chhattisgarh
30 - Suryaprakash S/o Kamleshwar Aged About 24 Years Roll No.
25053202 R/o Ajad Para Mohara, District : Balod, Chhattisgarh
31 - Vinod Kumar Sahu S/o Chesh Kumar Sahu Aged About 27 Years
Roll No. 26073472, R/o Ranitarai,, District : Balod, Chhattisgarh
32 - Mahendra S/o Horilal Aged About 29 Years Roll No. 29063110 R/o
Tarra, Rajim,, District : Gariyabandh, Chhattisgarh
33 - Khushboo D/o Jaikumar Aged About 28 Years Roll No. 16233487
R/o Gautam Nagar, Khurshipar, Bhilai,, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh
34 - Lakesh Kumar S/o Ashok Kumar Aged About 27 Years Roll No.
25113218,
R/o
Pendra,
Fingeshwar,
District
:
Gariyabandh,
Chhattisgarh
35 - Ashish Kumar Rathore S/o Balaji Rathore Aged About 34 Years
Roll No. 18183017 R/o Barpali Chowk, Champa,, District : JanjgirChampa, Chhattisgarh
36 - Suman D/o Chandrabhan Aged About 31 Years Roll No. 15043260
R/o Jagnnathpur, District : Balod, Chhattisgarh
37 - Human Lal S/o Keja Ram Aged About 33 Years Roll No. 26193065
R/o Harduwa Ghumka,, District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh
38 - Vinod Bandhekar S/o Shivshay Bandhekar Aged About 26 Years
Roll No. 22083315 R/o Balco Nagar,, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh
39 - Seema D/o Gop Singh Aged About 29 Years Roll No. 16023174
R/o Chaurel, District : Balod, Chhattisgarh
40 - Sukanya Gupta D/o Pradeep Gupta Aged About 32 Years Roll No.
12013537 R/o School Para Main Road, Baikunthpur, District : Koriya
(Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh
41 - Wahaab Ahmad S/o Abdul Wahid Aged About 29 Years Roll No.
16183310 R/o Bhilai Nagar,, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh
42 - Rishikesh Ratre S/o Bharatlal Ratre Aged About 26 Years Roll No.
23023097 R/o Balsi,, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh
43 - Fanendra Mouryawanshi S/o Murli Mouryawanshi Aged About 29
Years Roll No. 25253027 R/o Semra Bahkhara,, District : Dhamtari,
Chhattisgarh
44 - Laxmi D/o Kriparam Aged About 26 Years Roll No. 16193084 R/o
Umar Poti, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh
45 - Shivam Panda S/o Sanatan Panda Aged About 27 Years Roll No.
24153049 R/o Tarkela, Raigarh, District : Raigarh, Chhattisgarh
46 - Bhupesh Tiwari S/o Rajendra Tiwari Aged About 28 Years Roll No.
16073115 R/o Ajad Chowk, Bhilai3,, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh
47 - Parmanand Ray S/o Paritosh Ray Aged About 31 Years Roll No.
28033109 R/o Vill- Gondahur,, District : Kanker, Chhattisgarh
48 - Kishan Kumar Sahu S/o Indreshwar Sahu Aged About 24 Years
Roll No. 16163126 R/o Jeora, Distt- Durg, Cg
49 - Ashish Patel S/o Toshram Patel Aged About 24 Years Roll No.
13253095, R/o Hirapur, Lailunga,, District : Raigarh, Chhattisgarh
50 - Narad S/o Bishahu Ram Aged About 31 Years Roll No. 13443380
R/o Rajpur, District : Mungeli, Chhattisgarh
51 - Shivaji Rao Madhukar S/o Geetaprasad Madhukar Aged About 30
Years Roll No. 18093497 R/o Indra Nagar,, District : Raigarh,
Chhattisgarh
52 - Dinesh Kumar Sahu S/o Poshan Das Sahu Aged About 26 Years
Roll No. 26033279 R/o Jarwahi, District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh
53 - Rashmi Hota W/o Nitesh Hota Aged About 30 Years Roll No.
13233374 R/o Ashma Deluxe Home, Bilaspur,, District : Bilaspur,
Chhattisgarh
54 - Gaind Lal Sahu S/o Purooshottam Sahu Aged About 27 Years Roll
No. 23133182 R/o Bagbahara,, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh
55 - Prateek Shrivas S/o Jairam Prasad Shrivas Aged About 32 Years
Roll No. 25123428 R/o Khamtarai,, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
56 - Hitesh Kumar S/o Bijelal Aged About 27 Years Roll No. 26043374,
R/o Ward No. 2, Naya Dhaba,, District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh
57 - Pankaj Vema S/o Ravindra Verma Aged About 32 Years Roll No.
25183204 R/o Ward No. 5, Budgahan, Raipur,, District : Raipur,
Chhattisgarh
58 - Krishna Kumar Saytode S/o Deval Das Saytode Aged About 29
Years Roll No. 25013097 R/o Village- Mungi, Post- Chandkhuri, BlockArang,, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
59 - Balkrishna Sahu S/o Khelendra Sahu Aged About 29 Years Roll
No. 25323088 R/o Village- Bailaspur, Post- Manpasar,, District :
Balodabazar-Bhathapara, Chhattisgarh
60 - Santosh S/o Sohan Lal Aged About 24 Years Roll No. 26173118
R/o Village- Kallutola, Jithratola,, District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh
61 - Gopi Kumar S/o Ramhu Ram Aged About 31 Years Roll No.
21043311 R/o Bisatoal,, District : Kawardha (Kabirdham), Chhattisgarh
62 - Lokeshwari Dewangan D/o Kanhaiya Lal Dewangan Aged About
25 Years Roll No. 2503007, R/o Sorid,, District : Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh
63 - Suryapratap S/o Nakul Singh Aged About 25 Years Roll No.
31013229 R/o Ward No. 15, Bhimkanhar,, District : Balod, Chhattisgarh
64 - Mayank Dewangan S/o I.P. Dewangan Aged About 29 Years Roll
No. 13353070 R/o Kumharpara,, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh
65 - Deepak Kushwaha S/o Shri Jaiprakash Kushwaha Aged About 29
Years Roll No. 13173375 R/o Village- Amhar, Post- Patna, TahsilBaikunthpur, Distt- Koriya, Cg
66 - Kisan Kumar S/o Uttam Kumar Aged About 23 Years Roll No.
29013149 R/o Borsi,, District : Gariyabandh, Chhattisgarh
67 - Vaibhav Rao Jadhav S/o Narendra Rao Jadhav Aged About 25
Years Roll No. 15023219 R/o Bansapara, Ward No. 30,, District :
Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh
68 - Hemshankar Sahu S/o Fulas Kumar Sahu Aged About 23 Years
Roll No. 16273485 R/o Ward No. 11, Hasda,, District : Balod,
Chhattisgarh
69 - Sandeep Kumar S/o Chhedu Ram Aged About 31 Years Roll No.
13193541 R/o Village- Kumhari, District : Sarangarh-Bilaigarh,
Chhattisgarh
70 - Hansraj Jalchhatri S/o Byas Narayan Jalchhatri Aged About 34
Years Roll No. 23051034, R/o Arang, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
---Petitioner(s)
Versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department Of School
Education, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Atal Nagar, New Raipur,,
District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
2 - Director Directorate Of Chhattisgarh Public Instruction Indravati
Bhawan, Naya Raipur,, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
3 - Professional Examination Board Through its Controller Vyapam
Bhawan, Sector- 19, North Block- Atal Nagar, Raipur, CG
--- Respondent(s)
WPS No. 300 of 2024
1 - Parimal Kumar Bhoi S/o Vijay Bhoi Aged About 38 Years R/o 06,
Balanda, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh.
2 - Hupendra Kumar Devangan S/o Shri Omprakash Devangan Aged
About 34 Years R/o H.N. 88 Mohlai Trimurit Chowk Durg District Durg
Chhattisgarh.
3 - Harishankar S/o Shri Dulichand Dewangan, Aged About 30 Years
R/o 157, Ward No. 05, Bilaigarh, Bangla Bhata District Baloda Bazar
Chhattisgarh.
---Petitioner(s)
Versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department Of Education,
Mahanadi Bhawan, Manatralaya, Atal Nagar, New Raipur, District :
Raipur, Chhattisgarh
2 - Director Directorate Of Chhattisgarh Public Instruction Indravati
Bhawan, Raipur Chhattisgarh.
3 - Joint Director, Directorate Of Chhattisgarh Public Instruction
Indravati Bhawan, Raipur Chhattisgarh.
4 - National Council Of Teacher Education Sector -10 Dwarka Near
Metro Station New Delhi.
--- Respondent(s)
WPS No. 5884 of 2023
1 - Mehat Kumar S/o Badrika Prasad Aged About 28 Years R/o Village
Andola Tahsil Sarangarh District Sarangarh Bilaigarh Chhattisgarh.
2 - Dheluram Yadav S/o Bhagwat Ram Yadav Aged About 30 Years R/o
Village Pathartal Tahsil Lormi District Mungeli Chhattisgarh.
3 - Shyam Sundar Sahu S/o Shri Ram, Aged About 33 Years R/o
Village Hasuwa Tahsil Tundra District Baloda Bazar Chhattisgarh.
4 - Rupesh Kumar Tarak S/o Shri Pati Ram Tarak, Aged About 30 Years
Adress Jawaibardha District Raipur Chhattisgarh.
5 - Manoj Kumar Sahu S/o Shri Manharan Lal Sahu Aged About 28
Years Dhardei, Via, Kharod District Janjgri Champa Chhattisgarh.
6 - Dilsay S/o Shri Antu Ram Aged About 34 Years Ward No. 2 13.
School Para Sonadula Parsadih, Bilaigarh, Baloda Bazar Chhattisgarh.
7 - Vishwanath Chandra S/o Shri Rajkumar Chandra, Aged About 29
Years Addree. Word No. 12 Deoraha, Deoraha Dhangaon Baloda
Bazar Bilaigarh Chhattisgarh.
8 - Prem Lal S/o Shri Bhagwat Ram Sahu, Aged About 29 Years
Address 03 Sadhakpara 08 Samariya Baloda Bazar Chhattisgarh.
---Petitioner(s)
Versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department Of School
Education, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya Atal Nagar, New Raipur,
District Raipur Chhattisgarh.
2 - Director, Directorate Of Chhattisgarh Public Instruction Indravati
Bhawan, Naya Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh.
3 - Professional Examination Board Through Its Controller Vyapam
Bhawan Sector 19 North Block Atal Nagar, Raipur Chhattisgarh.
--- Respondents
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Respective
:
Petitioners
Ms. Naushina Afrin Ali, Senior Advocate
assisted by Ms. Ankita Gouraha, Mr.
Shailendra Kumar Bajpai, Mr. Ajay
Shrivastava and Mr. Tapan Kumar
Chandra, Advocates
Mr. Yogendramani Verma, in person in
WPS No.4254/2023
For Respondents-State :
Mr. Anand Dadariya, Deputy Advocate
General
For Respective
Respondents
:
Ms. Akanksha Singh, Advocate on
behalf of Mr. Avinash Singh, Mr. Arpit
Parakh, Mr. Animesh Tiwari and Mr.
Rupendra
Kumar
Dewangan,
Advocates
Hon'ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge
CAV Order
1.
Heard Ms. Naushina Afrin Ali, learned Senior Advocate, assisted
by Ms. Ankita Gouraha, Mr. Shailendra Kumar Bajpai, Mr. Ajay
Shrivastava and Mr. Tapan Kumar Chandra, learned counsel
appearing for the respective petitioners; Mr. Yogendramani
Verma, petitioner appearing in person in WPS No.4254/2023; Mr.
Anand Dadariya, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for
the respondents-State; and Ms. Akanksha Singh, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of Mr. Avinash Singh, Mr. Arpit Parakh, Mr.
Animesh Tiwari and Mr. Rupendra Kumar Dewangan, learned
counsel for the respective respondents.
2.
Since a common question of law and facts arises for consideration
in all these writ petitions, they were, therefore, heard analogously
and are being disposed of by this common order, so as to avoid
repetition of facts and pleadings and to ensure consistency in
adjudication. Though the petitioners have sought certain reliefs
which may vary in their form and formulation, the principal and
foundational challenge raised in all the writ petitions is directed
against the legality and validity of the advertisement dated
04.05.2023 issued by the respondent authorities for recruitment to
the posts of Assistant Teacher, Teacher and Lecturer, particularly
Teachers (E-Cadre) and Teachers (T-Cadre), insofar as the
reservation provided therein is alleged to be contrary to the
applicable reservation policy, reservation roster and the law laid
down by this Court as well as the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
3.
For the sake of convenience, WPS No.300 of 2024 is treated as
the lead case, and the facts, pleadings, documents and reliefs
contained therein are being referred to for the purpose of
adjudication of all the connected matters, except where any
distinction is specifically required to be noticed.
4.
The
petitioners'
common
grievance
arises
out
of
the
advertisement dated 04.05.2023 issued by the respondent
authorities through CGVYAPAM for recruitment to the posts of
Assistant Teachers, Teachers and Lecturers, including Teachers
(E-Cadre) and Teachers (T-Cadre). The petitioners, possessing
the requisite qualifications under the Chhattisgarh School
Education (Teaching Cadre) Service Rules, 2019, participated in
the selection process; the written examination was conducted on
10.06.2023 and the result was declared on 02.07.2023. The
principal challenge is to the category-wise distribution of
vacancies, particularly the alleged excessive reservation in favour
of the Scheduled Tribe category. It is pleaded that out of 1113
posts of Teachers (E-Cadre), 698 posts were reserved for
Scheduled Tribe candidates, constituting approximately 62.71%,
while out of 4659 posts of Teachers (T-Cadre), 3105 posts were
reserved
for
the
Scheduled
Tribe
category,
constituting
approximately 66.64%. According to the petitioners, such
distribution substantially exceeds the permissible reservation and
correspondingly reduces the vacancies available to unreserved
and other categories.
5.
The petitioners further contend that the aforesaid reservation
cannot be justified by treating the vacancies as backlog
vacancies. According to them, out of the total 12489 vacancies,
approximately 3746 were backlog vacancies and 8743 were fresh
vacancies, and even after excluding the backlog vacancies, the
proportion of unreserved posts remained substantially below what
was permissible under the applicable reservation regime. The
petitioners rely upon the Chhattisgarh Lok Seva (Reservation for
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward
Classes) Act, 1994 and the subsequent notification dated
29.11.2012, whereby reservation was enhanced from 50% to
58%, comprising 12% for Scheduled Castes, 32% for Scheduled
Tribes and 14% for Other Backward Classes. The said
enhancement was challenged before this Court in WPC No.591 of
2012 and connected matters and was quashed by the Division
Bench vide order dated 19.09.2022. The said judgment was
challenged before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLP (C)
Nos.18816-18817 of 2022, wherein, by order dated 01.05.2023,
the State was permitted to complete recruitment and promotion
processes which were already pending, subject to the final
outcome of the proceedings. According to the petitioners, the said
order did not authorise issuance of any fresh advertisement on
the basis of the quashed reservation notification.
6.
It is, therefore, the specific case of the petitioners that the
impugned advertisement dated 04.05.2023, issued after the
judgment of this Court and immediately after the order of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court, could not have continued or extended
the quashed 58% reservation regime, much less provided
reservation to the Scheduled Tribe category beyond the
prescribed percentage. The petitioners also rely upon the order
dated 12.05.2022 whereby the circular dated 17.01.2012
concerning eligibility of local residents for appointments in the
Surguja and Bastar Divisions was quashed. They contend that,
despite their representation dated 24.08.2023 pointing out the
alleged errors in the reservation roster, the recruitment and online
counselling
process
was
proceeded
with.
The
impugned
advertisement is, therefore, assailed as being contrary to the
statutory reservation scheme, the judgment of this Court dated
19.09.2022, the order dated 01.05.2023 of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court and Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, with a
consequential prayer for quashing of the advertisement insofar as
it relates to the posts of Teachers and for consideration of the
petitioners for document verification, counselling and appointment
in accordance with law.
7.
In the lead petition, i.e. WPS No.300/2024, the petitioners have
accordingly sought, inter alia, the following reliefs:“10.1 That the Hon'ble Court may kindly be
pleased
to
call
for
the
entire
records
pertaining to the case of the petitioner.
10.2 That, Hon'ble Court may kindly be
pleased
to
issue
an
appropriate
writ/order/direction and quash the impugned
advertisement dated 04.05.2023 as far as the
post of Teachers are concerned.
10.3 That, Hon'ble Court may kindly be
pleased
to
issue
an
appropriate
writ/order/direction and direct the respondent
authorities
to
send
call
letters
to
the
petitioners for document verification.
10.4 That, Hon'ble Court may kindly be
pleased
to
issue
an
appropriate
writ/order/direction and direct the appropriate
authorities to issue respondent appointment
orders in favour of the petitioners after the
counseling process.
10.5 Any other relief/reliefs which the Hon'ble
Court may deem fit and proper in the facts
and circumstances of the case may also
kindly be granted.”
8.
The present batch of writ petitions arises out of a common
recruitment process initiated by the respondent authorities
pursuant
to
advertisement
dated
04.05.2023,
whereby
applications were invited for filling up vacant posts of Assistant
Teachers, Teachers and Lecturers under the Chhattisgarh School
Education (Teaching Cadre) Service Rules, 2019 and the
amendments made thereto. The recruitment process was to be
conducted through the Chhattisgarh Professional Examination
Board (CGVYAPAM). The impugned advertisement pertains, inter
alia, to the posts of Teachers in E-Cadre and T-Cadre in the
Surguja and Bastar Divisions. The petitioners in the respective
writ petitions are candidates possessing the requisite educational
and other qualifications prescribed for the posts in question and
had participated in the recruitment process pursuant to the
aforesaid advertisement. After submission of their applications,
the eligible candidates were issued admit cards and the written
examination was conducted by CGVYAPAM on 10.06.2023. The
result of the examination was thereafter declared on 02.07.2023
and the petitioners claim to have been declared successful therein
and to have acquired a legitimate expectation of being considered
further in the recruitment process in accordance with law.
9.
The principal grievance raised by the petitioners is with regard to
the manner in which the vacancies were distributed amongst the
various social categories in the impugned advertisement.
According to the petitioners, the reservation roster adopted by the
respondent authorities has resulted in an excessive allocation of
vacancies to the Scheduled Tribe category, substantially beyond
the percentage prescribed under the applicable reservation
framework. It has been pleaded that, out of 1113 posts advertised
for Teachers (E-Cadre), 698 posts were earmarked for candidates
belonging
to
the
Scheduled
Tribe
category,
constituting
approximately 62.71% of the total vacancies, whereas 105 posts
were earmarked for the Scheduled Caste category. Likewise, out
of 4659 posts advertised for Teachers (T-Cadre), 3105 posts were
reserved
for
the
Scheduled
Tribe
category,
constituting
approximately 66.64% of the vacancies. The petitioners contend
that such distribution has resulted in a corresponding reduction in
the number of posts available to candidates belonging to the
unreserved and Scheduled Caste categories and is contrary to
the reservation roster as well as the constitutional guarantee of
equality of opportunity in public employment under Articles 14 and
16 of the Constitution of India.
10. The challenge to the impugned reservation roster has its genesis
in the earlier reservation regime prevailing in the State of
Chhattisgarh. According to the petitioners, under the Chhattisgarh
Lok Seva (Anusuchit Jatiyo, Anusuchit Janjatiyo aur Anya Pichhda
Vargon Ke Liye Arakshan) Adhiniyam, 1994, the reservation for
direct recruitment was originally prescribed at 16% for Scheduled
Castes, 20% for Scheduled Tribes and 14% for Other Backward
Classes,
aggregating
amendment/notification
to
dated
50%.
Subsequently,
29.11.2012,
the
by
reservation
structure was altered and the reservation for Scheduled Tribes
was enhanced to 32%, while the reservation for Scheduled
Castes was fixed at 12% and that for Other Backward Classes at
14%, thereby taking the aggregate reservation to 58%. The said
enhancement, including the model roster applicable to the
Surguja Division, was challenged before this Court in WPC
No.591 of 2012 and connected matters. By judgment/order dated
19.09.2022, the Division Bench of this Court quashed the
notification dated 29.11.2012, inter alia, on the ground that the
enhanced reservation exceeded the permissible ceiling of 50%,
and also dealt with the special reservation arrangement applicable
to the Surguja Division. The petitioners contend that, in view of
the aforesaid judgment, the respondent authorities could not have
proceeded to frame a fresh recruitment roster by relying upon the
very reservation structure which had already been judicially
invalidated.
11.
The aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench was assailed before
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLP (C) Nos.18816-18817 of 2022.
During pendency of the proceedings before the Hon'ble Supreme
Court, the State brought to the notice of the Court that, prior to the
judgment of this Court, various recruitment and promotion
processes had already been initiated under the reservation
regime contemplated by the notification dated 29.11.2012 and that
several such processes were at different stages of completion. In
the said backdrop, by order dated 01.05.2023, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court permitted the State to proceed with and complete
the selection processes which were already pending and to make
appointments and promotions pursuant thereto, subject to the
final outcome of the proceedings pending before it. According to
the petitioners, however, the said order was confined to protecting
or permitting completion of recruitment and promotion processes
which had already been initiated and did not authorise the State to
commence a fresh recruitment process by issuing a new
advertisement based upon the reservation regime contained in
the notification dated 29.11.2012. It is the specific case of the
petitioners that the advertisement dated 04.05.2023 was a fresh
advertisement issued after the judgment of this Court dated
19.09.2022 and, therefore, could not derive protection from the
order dated 01.05.2023 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
12. The petitioners further contend that the reservation in the present
recruitment cannot be justified merely by describing a substantial
portion of the vacancies as backlog vacancies. According to the
material relied upon by them, a considerable number of vacancies
advertised in the recruitment process were fresh vacancies, and
even after excluding the backlog vacancies, the distribution of the
remaining vacancies did not conform to the permissible
reservation structure. The petitioners have referred to the
particulars disclosed by the State in connected writ proceedings,
including the number of backlog and fresh vacancies, and
contend that the proportion of unreserved posts in relation to the
fresh vacancies was substantially reduced on account of the
excessive reservation provided to the Scheduled Tribe category. It
is their further case that the State itself, in its pleadings in
connected matters, disclosed the existence of a substantial
number of backlog vacancies, but the same could not be utilised
as a device to justify reservation in fresh vacancies beyond the
prescribed percentage. The petitioners accordingly assert that the
impugned advertisement effectively continues the quashed 58%
reservation regime and, in respect of certain categories, even
provides reservation to the Scheduled Tribe category substantially
beyond 58%.
13. During the course of the recruitment process, the petitioners also
approached the competent authorities and raised objections
regarding the alleged error in preparation and implementation of
the reservation roster. Representations were submitted before the
concerned authorities, including the Director, Public Instruction,
pointing out the alleged disparity in the category-wise allocation of
vacancies and seeking correction of the roster. It is further stated
that the recruitment process proceeded through online counselling
and that candidates were called upon to participate in the
counselling process despite the objections raised by the
petitioners. The petitioners have also relied upon the proceedings
in other connected writ petitions, including WPS No.4254/2023
and WPS No.3179/2023, and the pleadings filed therein by the
State, in support of their contention regarding the number of
backlog vacancies, fresh vacancies and the manner in which the
reservation roster was prepared. The petitioners submit that,
despite the pendency of litigation concerning the reservation
policy and despite the judgment of this Court quashing the
notification dated 29.11.2012, the respondents proceeded with the
recruitment on a reservation pattern which, according to them, is
inconsistent with the applicable law.
14. It is in the aforesaid factual and legal backdrop that the present
batch of writ petitions has been instituted. Though the individual
petitioners have sought consequential reliefs in relation to their
respective candidature, document verification, counselling and
appointment, the core issue raised in all the matters is
substantially common, namely, whether the respondent authorities
could have issued the advertisement dated 04.05.2023 and
undertaken the recruitment process by adopting a reservation
roster which, according to the petitioners, earmarks vacancies in
excess of the permissible percentage for the Scheduled Tribe
category and thereby reduces the vacancies available to the
unreserved and other reserved categories. The petitioners
contend that such action is contrary to the statutory reservation
scheme, the judgment dated 19.09.2022 passed by the Division
Bench of this Court, the order dated 01.05.2023 passed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court, and the constitutional mandate contained
in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The respondentState, on the other hand, has sought to justify the recruitment
process and the reservation roster on the basis of the applicable
reservation policy, the nature of the vacancies and the protection
granted in the pending proceedings before the Hon'ble Supreme
Court.
15. Ms. Naushina Afrin Ali, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Ms.
Ankita Gouraha, learned counsel for the petitioners would submit
that the controversy involved in the present batch of writ petitions
is not directed against the constitutional concept of reservation or
the affirmative action contemplated under Article 16(4) of the
Constitution of India, but is confined to the legality of the
recruitment process initiated pursuant to the advertisement dated
04.05.2023. It is submitted that the respondents have initiated a
fresh recruitment process for the posts of Teacher (E-Cadre) and
Teacher (T-Cadre) by applying the reservation notification dated
29.11.2012 and the consequential reservation roster, despite the
fact that the said notification had already been quashed by the
Division Bench of this Court vide judgment dated 19.09.2022.
According to learned Senior Counsel, once the parent notification
itself stood quashed, the consequential reservation roster framed
thereunder could not have continued to operate as an
independent source of power for making fresh appointments. The
petitioners, being qualified candidates who participated in the
selection
process
and
successfully
cleared
the
written
examination, are directly prejudiced by the unlawful distribution of
vacancies and, therefore, have a substantive legal right to
challenge the recruitment process.
16. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that prior to the
notification dated 29.11.2012, the reservation structure in the
State provided for 16% reservation for Scheduled Castes, 20% for
Scheduled Tribes and 14% for Other Backward Classes,
aggregating
to
50%.
Subsequently,
by
notification
dated
29.11.2012, the reservation was enhanced to 58%, comprising
12% for Scheduled Castes, 32% for Scheduled Tribes and 14%
for Other Backward Classes, and consequential reservation
rosters were prepared for different divisions, including Bastar and
Surguja. The validity of the said notification and the consequential
rosters was challenged before this Court in WPC No.591 of 2012
and connected matters, and this Court, after examining the issue,
quashed the notification dated 29.11.2012 vide judgment dated
19.09.2022. It is submitted that the legal consequence of such
quashing is that the notification ceased to have operative force
and could not thereafter constitute the foundation for any fresh
recruitment. The respondents, therefore, could not have treated
the said notification as continuing to remain in force merely
because the judgment was subsequently challenged before the
Hon'ble Supreme Court.
17. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the subsequent order dated
01.05.2023 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
proceedings arising out of the judgment dated 19.09.2022 does
not assist the respondents. According to learned Senior Counsel,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while taking note of the fact that
certain recruitment and promotion processes had already
commenced under the earlier reservation regime, permitted the
State to complete such pending processes, subject to the final
outcome of the proceedings pending before it. The said order
neither stayed the judgment dated 19.09.2022 nor revived the
notification dated 29.11.2012, nor did it grant liberty to the State to
initiate
a
fresh
recruitment
process
by
issuing
a
new
advertisement on the basis of the quashed notification. It is
emphatically submitted that the impugned advertisement dated
04.05.2023 was issued after the judgment of this Court and after
the order dated 01.05.2023 of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and,
therefore, cannot be treated as a continuation of any recruitment
process which was already pending. The distinction between
completion of an existing selection process and initiation of a
fresh recruitment process, according to learned Senior Counsel, is
fundamental and goes to the root of the controversy.
18. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the figures contained
in the impugned advertisement themselves demonstrate the
extent of the illegality. Out of 1113 posts advertised for Teacher
(E-Cadre), 698 posts have been earmarked for candidates
belonging
to
the
Scheduled
Tribe
category,
constituting
approximately 62.71% of the total vacancies, while out of 4659
posts advertised for Teacher (T-Cadre), 3105 posts have been
earmarked for the Scheduled Tribe category, constituting
approximately 66.64% of the total vacancies. It is submitted that
even under the very notification dated 29.11.2012, upon which the
respondents seek to rely, the reservation for Scheduled Tribe
candidates was only 32%, and, therefore, allocation of more than
60% of the vacancies to a single reserved category cannot be
justified merely by referring to the said notification or the
reservation roster framed thereunder. Learned Senior Counsel
submits that the respondents have failed to disclose any lawful
statutory or constitutional basis for such extraordinary allocation of
vacancies and that the impugned distribution materially affects the
rights of candidates belonging to the unreserved as well as other
reserved categories and consequently infringes the guarantee of
equality of opportunity under Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution.
19. It is further submitted by learned Senior Counsel that the
respondents
cannot
overcome
the
aforesaid
illegality
by
describing a part of the vacancies as backlog vacancies.
According to learned Senior Counsel, backlog vacancies and
fresh vacancies stand on a distinct legal footing and the existence
of backlog vacancies has to be established by production of the
relevant roster, category-wise vacancy position, recruitment year,
statutory provision governing carry-forward and the methodology
by which such vacancies have been adjusted against the present
recruitment. In the present case, the respondents have not
furnished the foundational material necessary to demonstrate that
the
excessive
reservation
reflected
in
the
impugned
advertisement is attributable exclusively to validly carried-forward
backlog vacancies. It is submitted that even assuming the
existence of backlog vacancies, such vacancies cannot revive a
reservation notification which has already been quashed by a
constitutional court, nor can they confer jurisdiction upon the
respondents to commence a fresh recruitment process under an
invalidated reservation regime. The respondents must first
establish the existence of a valid source of power before seeking
to justify the manner in which the vacancies have been
distributed.
20. Learned Senior Counsel also submits that the respondents, being
executive authorities, are constitutionally bound to obey and
implement the judgments of this Court unless the same are
stayed, modified or set aside by a competent superior court. Mere
pendency of an appeal or Special Leave Petition does not efface
the binding effect of the judgment under challenge. In the present
case, there was no order staying the operation of the judgment
dated 19.09.2022, nor was there any order expressly restoring the
notification dated 29.11.2012. Therefore, the respondents could
not have proceeded as though the quashed notification continued
to possess legal force. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the
reservation roster, being merely a mechanism for implementation
of the parent reservation policy, could not survive independently
once the parent notification had been quashed. Reliance is placed
on the settled principles governing the distinction between
quashing and stay of an order and the binding nature of
judgments rendered by constitutional Courts.
21. Lastly, learned Senior Counsel submits that the impugned
advertisement and the recruitment process undertaken pursuant
thereto are consequently vitiated by lack of lawful authority,
disregard of the binding judgment dated 19.09.2022 passed by
this Court, an erroneous interpretation of the limited protection
granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide order dated
01.05.2023, and arbitrary implementation of the reservation roster.
It is submitted that the State cannot, under the guise of filling
backlog vacancies or by relying upon a consequential roster,
circumvent a judgment of this Court and continue a reservation
regime which has already been judicially invalidated. According to
learned Senior Counsel, permitting such action would not only
prejudice the petitioners and similarly situated candidates but
would also undermine the rule of law and the constitutional
discipline
governing
executive
action.
The
impugned
advertisement, insofar as it proceeds on the basis of the quashed
notification and provides reservation substantially in excess of the
permissible limit, is therefore liable to be quashed, with
consequential directions for consideration of the petitioners'
candidature in accordance with the reservation regime legally
prevailing on the date of the fresh recruitment.
22. Learned Senior Counsel, in support of her submissions, has
placed reliance upon a catena of decisions of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court as well as this Court. She has first relied upon the
judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217,
particularly the principles governing the extent of reservation
permissible under Article 16(4) of the Constitution of India. It is
submitted
that
the
Constitution
Bench,
while
recognising
reservation as an instrument of substantive equality, has
cautioned that reservation cannot be permitted to obliterate the
general rule of equality of opportunity and has evolved the general
rule that reservation should not ordinarily exceed 50%, save in
exceptional circumstances. Learned Senior Counsel submits that
the aforesaid constitutional principle assumes significance in the
present case, where the impugned advertisement allocates more
than 60% of the vacancies in certain cadres to the Scheduled
Tribe category.
23. Learned Senior Counsel has further placed reliance upon the
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in R.K. Sabharwal v.
State of Punjab, (1995) 2 SCC 745, to contend that a reservation
roster is only a mechanism for giving effect to a valid reservation
policy and cannot itself constitute an independent source of
reservation.
According
to
learned
Senior
Counsel,
the
respondents' reliance upon the division-wise reservation roster for
Bastar and Surguja cannot be sustained once the parent
notification dated 29.11.2012, pursuant to which the said roster
was prepared, had already been quashed by this Court. It is
submitted that the roster merely operationalises the reservation
policy and, therefore, its validity necessarily depends upon the
continued existence of the statutory or executive instrument from
which it derives its authority. Once the foundational notification
stood quashed, the consequential roster could not have been
utilised for initiating a fresh recruitment process.
24. Reliance has also been placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of
South India Trust Association, (1992) 3 SCC 1, in support of
the proposition that there is a fundamental distinction between an
order being quashed and its operation being stayed. Learned
Senior Counsel submits that when an order or notification is
quashed by a competent constitutional court, it is rendered nonexistent in the eyes of law, whereas a stay merely suspends its
operation. Applying the said principle, it is contended that after the
judgment dated 19.09.2022 passed by the Division Bench of this
Court quashing the notification dated 29.11.2012, the respondents
could not have treated the said notification as continuing to
remain operative merely because the State had preferred Special
Leave Petitions before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Unless the
judgment itself was stayed or the quashed notification was
specifically revived by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the executive
authorities were bound to act in accordance with the judgment of
this Court.
25. Learned Senior Counsel has also relied upon the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in East India Commercial Co. Ltd. v.
Collector of Customs, AIR 1962 SC 1893, to emphasise the
binding nature of judgments of the High Court upon executive
authorities and subordinate forums functioning within its territorial
jurisdiction. It is submitted that the executive cannot disregard a
judgment rendered by a constitutional court merely because an
appeal or Special Leave Petition has been preferred against such
judgment. According to learned Senior Counsel, the doctrine of
judicial discipline obliges the executive authorities to faithfully
implement the law declared by the competent constitutional court
unless and until the judgment is stayed, modified or set aside by a
superior court. In the present case, the respondents were,
therefore, bound to give effect to the judgment dated 19.09.2022
and could not have proceeded upon the assumption that the
quashed notification dated 29.11.2012 continued to confer
authority upon them.
26. Reliance has further been placed upon the judgment of the
Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M. Nagaraj
v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212, to submit that reservation,
though constitutionally permissible, remains subject to the
limitations and requirements flowing from the equality code
contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Learned
Senior Counsel submits that the power of the State to make
reservation is an enabling power and cannot be exercised in an
arbitrary
or
unstructured
manner
so
as
to
destroy
the
constitutional guarantee of equality of opportunity. According to
her, the present case is not a challenge to reservation as an
affirmative action measure, but to the manner in which the State
has exercised that power by relying upon a notification which had
already been quashed and by providing reservation to the
Scheduled Tribe category at a level substantially higher than the
percentage prescribed even under the said notification.
27. Learned Senior Counsel has also referred to the judgment of the
Constitution Bench in Jarnail Singh v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta,
(2018) 10 SCC 396, for the proposition that the exercise of
reservation powers by the State remains subject to constitutional
scrutiny and cannot be permitted to operate outside the
parameters prescribed by the Constitution. It is submitted that the
fact that reservation is intended to advance substantive equality
does not confer an unfettered discretion upon the executive to
determine the extent or manner of reservation contrary to the
constitutional framework. The impugned action, according to
learned Senior Counsel, must therefore be examined on the
touchstone of Articles 14 and 16 and cannot be sustained merely
by invoking the object of providing adequate representation to
Scheduled Tribe candidates.
28. Reliance has also been placed upon the Constitution Bench
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jaishri Laxmanrao
Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 8 SCC 1, wherein the
constitutional
significance
of
the
50%
ceiling
governing
reservation was reiterated. Learned Senior Counsel submits that,
although the constitutional scheme recognises the possibility of
exceptional circumstances, any departure from the general rule
cannot be presumed or founded upon administrative convenience
and must be supported by constitutionally relevant material.
According to her, in the present case no such exceptional
constitutional basis has been disclosed by the respondents for
earmarking more than 60% of the vacancies in favour of the
Scheduled Tribe category.
29. Learned Senior Counsel has further placed reliance upon the
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chebrolu Leela
Prasad Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2021) 11 SCC 401, to
contend that even where the State seeks to advance the interests
of a particular Scheduled Tribe population or a geographically
distinct area, the exercise of reservation power remains subject to
the constitutional limitations embodied in Articles 14 and 16. It is
submitted that the geographical or demographic composition of a
particular division cannot, by itself, furnish an unrestricted basis
for granting reservation in a manner which substantially excludes
candidates belonging to other categories from equal consideration
for public employment.
30. Learned Senior Counsel has also relied upon the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Assistant Collector of Central
Excise v. Dunlop India Ltd., (1985) 1 SCC 260, in support of the
principle of judicial discipline and the binding nature of orders
passed by superior courts. According to learned Senior Counsel,
once a constitutional court has adjudicated upon the validity of an
executive policy or notification, the executive authorities cannot
circumvent or indirectly nullify the effect of such judgment by
adopting
the
same
policy
through
another
administrative
instrument. The respondents, therefore, could not have achieved
indirectly, through the impugned advertisement and consequential
reservation roster, what stood prohibited by the judgment dated
19.09.2022 of this Court. She also placed reliance upon the
judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vikas
Kishanrao Gawali v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 6 SCC 73 as
well as recent judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of
Punjab v. Davinder Singh, (2025) 1 SCC 1.
31. Learned Senior Counsel has lastly placed specific reliance upon
the judgment dated 19.09.2022 passed by the Division Bench of
this Court in WPC No.591 of 2012 and connected writ
petitions, whereby the notification dated 29.11.2012 enhancing
the reservation to 58% and the consequential reservation
arrangement applicable to the concerned divisions were quashed.
It is submitted that the said judgment constitutes the immediate
and foundational judicial pronouncement governing the present
controversy. According to learned Senior Counsel, once the
aforesaid notification was quashed, the respondents could not
have invoked the same reservation structure for a recruitment
process
initiated
thereafter.
The
subsequent
order
dated
01.05.2023 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
proceedings arising from the said judgment, according to learned
Senior Counsel, merely permitted completion of recruitment and
promotion processes which had already commenced and did not
revive the quashed notification or authorise the State to issue a
fresh advertisement on its basis. The present recruitment, having
admittedly commenced only with the advertisement dated
04.05.2023, is therefore not covered by the protection granted by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court and is liable to be tested
independently on the basis of the law prevailing on the date of
issuance of the impugned advertisement.
32. Mr. Ajay Shrivastava, learned counsel for the petitioners adopting
the submissions advanced by learned Senior Counsel, submits
that the impugned advertisement dated 04.05.2023 is liable to be
set aside, as the reservation roster adopted therein is founded
upon the very notifications and model rosters which had already
been declared ultra vires and quashed by this Court. It is
submitted that the recruitment relates to 1,113 posts of Teacher
(E-Cadre), 4,659 posts of Teacher (T-Cadre), 793 posts of
Assistant Teacher (E-Cadre) and 5,492 posts of Assistant Teacher
(T-Cadre), wherein an excessive percentage of vacancies has
been earmarked for the Scheduled Tribe category, ranging from
approximately 56.62% to 68.42%. According to learned counsel,
such reservation is traceable to the notification dated 29.11.2012
and the consequential district/divisional model roster, both of
which have ceased to have legal efficacy pursuant to the
judgment of this Court. It is further submitted that the petitioners
have themselves participated in the selection process for the
posts of Assistant Teacher and Teacher and their candidature is
directly affected by the unlawful distribution of vacancies.
33. Learned counsel further submits that reliance placed by the State
upon the order dated 01.05.2023 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the pending proceedings arising out of WPC No.591 of
2012 is wholly misplaced. The permission granted by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court was confined to recruitment and promotion
processes which had already been initiated prior to the judgment
of the Division Bench and was subject to the final outcome of the
proceedings pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It did not
authorise the State to issue a fresh advertisement dated
04.05.2023 by relying upon a notification and model roster which
had already been quashed by this Court. Learned counsel
submits that once the Division Bench had, by judgment dated
19.09.2022, struck down the notification dated 29.11.2012 and the
consequential model roster providing excessive reservation at the
district and divisional levels, there was no subsisting statutory or
executive instrument authorising the respondents to prescribe
such enhanced reservation for district-level posts of Assistant
Teacher and divisional-level posts of Teacher. Consequently, in
the absence of a valid notification or reservation roster, the
respondents could not have proceeded to earmark an excessive
percentage of vacancies in favour of the Scheduled Tribe
category. It is, therefore, submitted that the impugned recruitment
deserves to be reconsidered by applying a legally valid
reservation framework and by excluding the benefit of the
quashed notifications and rosters.
34. Learned counsel has placed specific reliance upon the judgment
dated 19.09.2022 passed by the Division Bench of this Court in
WPC No.591 of 2012 and connected matters, particularly
paragraph 85 thereof, whereby the notification dated 29.11.2012,
including the provisions relating to enhancement of reservation
and the district/divisional model roster providing excessive
reservation, was held ultra vires and quashed. It is submitted that
the very model roster which has been relied upon by the State in
its affidavit to justify the impugned distribution of vacancies was
the subject-matter of challenge and stands specifically invalidated
by the aforesaid judgment. Learned counsel has further relied
upon W. P. No.1081/2020, wherein this Court quashed the
provision providing preference/eligibility on the basis of local
residency for recruitment in the Bastar and Surguja Divisions.
According to learned counsel, after the said judgment, the
respondents could not indirectly achieve the same result by
adopting a special reservation roster for the said divisions so as to
substantially enhance reservation in favour of the Scheduled Tribe
category. Learned counsel has also referred to the order dated
01.05.2023 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
proceedings arising from WPC No.591 of 2012, to submit that the
protection granted therein was confined to recruitment processes
which were already underway and did not confer authority to
commence a fresh recruitment under the quashed reservation
framework. Thus, according to learned counsel, neither the
notification
dated
district/divisional
29.11.2012
model
roster
nor
could
the
consequential
constitute
the
legal
foundation for Advertisement dated 04.05.2023.
35. Mr. Tapan Kumar Chandra, learned counsel for the petitioners
submits that the impugned Advertisement dated 04.05.2023 is
based
upon
the
notification
dated
29.11.2012
and
the
consequential district/divisional model roster, despite the same
having already been quashed by this Court in WPC No.591 of
2012 and connected matters, particularly paragraph 85 thereof,
whereby the enhancement of reservation and the excessive
reservation provided for the Scheduled Tribe category were held
ultra vires; he submits that, notwithstanding the aforesaid
judgment, out of 1,113 posts of Teacher (E-Cadre), 698 posts
(62.71%) have been reserved for Scheduled Tribes, out of 4,659
posts of Teacher (T-Cadre), 3,005 posts (64.49%) have been
reserved for Scheduled Tribes, out of 793 posts of Assistant
Teacher (E-Cadre), 449 posts (56.62%) have been reserved for
Scheduled Tribes and out of 5,492 posts of Assistant Teacher (TCadre), 3,758 posts (68.42%) have been reserved for Scheduled
Tribes, which clearly demonstrates excessive reservation contrary
to the applicable reservation framework; he further submits that
although
this
Court,
vide
orders
dated
10.07.2023
and
27.07.2023, directed the State to explain the basis and procedure
adopted for providing such reservation, the State, in its affidavit
dated 14.09.2023, sought to justify the same by relying upon the
Surguja and Bastar model rosters, which themselves had already
been quashed; learned counsel also places reliance upon the
judgment in WP No.1081/2020, whereby the provision granting
reservation/ preference on the basis of local residency in Bastar
and Surguja Divisions was quashed, and submits that the
respondents cannot, by adopting a divisional or district-wise
roster, indirectly confer special and excessive reservation upon
the Scheduled Tribe category in the said divisions; accordingly, it
is submitted that the impugned recruitment, being founded upon
the very notifications and rosters which have ceased to have legal
efficacy, is contrary to the binding judgments of this Court and
liable to be interfered with.
36. Mr.
Yogendramani
Verma,
petitioner-in-person
in
WPS
No.4254/2023, submits that the impugned Advertisement dated
04.05.2023 suffers from serious constitutional infirmity inasmuch
as, out of the total 5,772 posts advertised, 2,050 posts were
subsequently disclosed by the State to be backlog vacancies and,
out of the remaining 3,722 fresh vacancies, as many as 2,277
posts were earmarked for the Scheduled Tribe category,
constituting approximately 61.17% of the fresh vacancies, apart
from the reservation provided to the Scheduled Caste and Other
Backward Classes categories. He submits that the excessive
reservation is also evident from the cadre-wise distribution,
wherein 698 out of 1,113 Teacher (E-Cadre) posts (62.71%),
3,005 out of 4,659 Teacher (T-Cadre) posts (64.49%), 449 out of
793 Assistant Teacher (E-Cadre) posts (56.62%) and 3,758 out of
5,492 Assistant Teacher (T-Cadre) posts (68.42%) have been
reserved for the Scheduled Tribe category. Learned petitioner-inperson submits that the State seeks to justify the aforesaid
distribution by relying upon the 100 Point Model Roster and the
divisional/district-wise model rosters; however, the validity of the
very reservation arrangement was considered by this Court in
WPC No.591 of 2012 and connected matters, decided on
19.09.2022, wherein, particularly in paragraph 85, the notification
dated 29.11.2012 and the Schedule-II Model Roster insofar as it
related
to
the
districts
of
Surguja,
Surajpur,
Balrampur-
Ramanujganj, Jashpur, Koria and Surguja Division were declared
unconstitutional. He further submits that the said judgment has
admittedly not been stayed, which position was also noticed by
the Three-Judge Committee of this Court in Annexure P-10, and
therefore the respondents could not have relied upon the quashed
model roster for a fresh recruitment initiated on 04.05.2023.
37. He further submits that the constitutional limitation upon excessive
reservation is firmly settled by the judgments of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, AIR 1963 SC
649; Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217;
M. Nagaraj v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212; Ashoka
Kumar Thakur v. Union of India, (2008) 6 SCC 1; Chebrolu
Leela Prasad Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2021) 11 SCC
401; Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v. Chief Minister, Maharashtra,
(2021) 8 SCC 1; R.K. Sabharwal v. State of Punjab, (1995) 2
SCC 745; and Jarnail Singh v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta, (2018)
10 SCC 396, which collectively emphasise that reservation must
operate within constitutional parameters and that a roster is
merely a mechanism for implementing a valid reservation policy
and cannot itself create or enlarge a reservation quota. He
submits that the State has failed to satisfactorily explain the legal
authority for applying the old model roster after the judgment
dated 19.09.2022 and the subsequent clarification regarding the
applicable reservation regime. He further points out that the
petition
was
instituted
on
06.07.2023,
immediately
after
declaration of the combined examination result on 02.07.2023 and
before the first selection list dated 12.08.2023, and therefore the
plea that the petitioners approached the Court only after their nonselection is factually incorrect. He submits that this Court, vide
orders dated 10.07.2023 and 27.07.2023, had already required
the State to explain the basis and procedure adopted for providing
such excessive reservation, and the subsequent affidavits relying
upon the Bastar and Surguja model rosters do not cure the
fundamental illegality arising from reliance upon a roster which
had been declared unconstitutional.
38. Per contra, Mr. Anand Dadariya, learned Deputy Advocate
General appearing for the State, opposes the submissions
advanced on behalf of the respective petitioners and submits that
the impugned recruitment process has been undertaken strictly in
accordance with the reservation policy and the applicable
reservation roster of the State Government. He submits that the
petitioners have proceeded on an erroneous assumption that the
percentage
of
reservation
reflected
in
the
advertisement
represents fresh or excessive reservation in favour of the
Scheduled Tribe category, whereas the vacancies advertised
comprise both newly sanctioned posts and backlog vacancies
pertaining to earlier recruitment processes, particularly the
vacancies which remained unfilled pursuant to the recruitment
conducted in the year 2019. He submits that the State
Government,
by
its
policy
decision,
had
provided
for
division/district-wise reservation for the Bastar and Surguja
Divisions, having regard to the special circumstances prevailing in
those areas, and the competent authorities, while issuing the
advertisement
dated
04.05.2023,
merely
implemented
the
reservation roster already prescribed by the Government.
According to learned Deputy Advocate General, the reservation
figures appearing against the Scheduled Tribe category cannot be
considered in isolation by comparing them with the State-level
percentage, since the posts of Assistant Teacher are district-level
posts and the posts of Teacher are division-level posts, for which
the applicable district/division-wise roster was required to be
followed.
39. Learned Deputy Advocate General further submits that the State
has already placed on record, by way of affidavit filed in WPS
No.4254 of 2023, the complete particulars of the vacancies,
including the newly sanctioned vacancies as well as the backlog
vacancies of the year 2019, and the manner in which the same
were incorporated in the impugned recruitment. He submits that
out of the total posts, 9,299 posts were sanctioned as fresh
vacancies, while 3,190 posts represented backlog vacancies, and
the reservation roster was applied accordingly. Therefore, the
mere fact that the resultant number of Scheduled Tribe vacancies
appears to be higher than the ordinary percentage of reservation
does not, by itself, establish any violation of the constitutional or
statutory reservation scheme. He would further submit that the
reliance placed by the petitioners upon the judgment dated
19.09.2022 passed in WPC No.591 of 2012 and connected
matters is misplaced. According to him, the said judgment is the
subject matter of challenge before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
SLP(C) No.19668 of 2022 and connected matters, and the interim
order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court has permitted
continuation/completion of recruitment processes in the manner
protected therein. It is submitted that the State authorities, while
issuing the impugned advertisement, acted upon the existing
Government
policy
and
reservation
roster
and
did
not
independently create or enhance reservation in favour of the
Scheduled Tribe category.
40. Lastly, learned Deputy Advocate General submits that the
petitioners
have
constitutional
failed
prejudice
to
demonstrate
warranting
any
individual
interference
with
or
the
recruitment process. The advertisement was issued pursuant to a
conscious policy decision of the State Government, the
reservation roster was applied uniformly to the concerned districts
and divisions, and the inclusion of backlog vacancies is supported
by the record placed before this Court. He, therefore, submits that
the challenge to the advertisement is founded upon an incorrect
computation of reservation and deserves to be rejected, there
being neither any arbitrariness nor violation of Articles 14 and 16
of the Constitution of India.
41. Ms. Akanksha Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Mr.
Avinash Singh, Mr. Arpit Parakh, Mr. Animesh Tiwari and Mr.
Rupendra Kumar Dewangan, learned counsel for the respective
respondents, adopts the submissions advanced by Mr. Anand
Dadariya, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the
State, and submits that the impugned recruitment process has
been undertaken strictly in accordance with the applicable
reservation policy and the district/division-wise reservation roster
prescribed by the competent authority. She submits that the
petitioners have incorrectly treated the percentage of Scheduled
Tribe
vacancies
reflected
in
the
advertisement
as
fresh
reservation, without taking into account the nature of the posts,
the applicable district/division-wise roster and the backlog
vacancies carried forward from the earlier recruitment process.
They further submit that the vacancies advertised pursuant to the
advertisement
dated
04.05.2023
comprised
both
newly
sanctioned posts and backlog vacancies which had remained
unfilled from the recruitment process of the year 2019. The
inclusion of such backlog vacancies necessarily resulted in a
higher numerical representation of the Scheduled Tribe category
in the total advertised vacancies and cannot, by itself, be
construed as an enhancement of the prescribed reservation.
According to learned counsel, the State has already placed the
relevant particulars and the methodology adopted for preparation
of the vacancy position on record and, therefore, there is no
factual or legal basis to contend that the respondents have acted
arbitrarily or contrary to the reservation policy.
42. Learned counsel further submit that the reliance placed by the
petitioners upon the judgment dated 19.09.2022 passed in WPC
No.591 of 2012 and connected matters does not render the
impugned recruitment illegal, particularly when the said judgment
is under challenge before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the
State authorities have acted in accordance with the prevailing
policy and the orders passed in the pending proceedings. She
accordingly adopts the submissions advanced on behalf of the
State in their entirety and submits that the petitioners have failed
to establish any violation of Articles 14 or 16 of the Constitution of
India. The writ petitions, therefore, deserve to be dismissed.
43. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the respective parties
and perused the documents annexed with the batch of writ
petitions.
44. The principal grievance of the petitioners is that the percentage of
vacancies earmarked for Scheduled Tribe candidates in the
impugned recruitment is substantially higher than 50% and that
such reservation has been worked out on the basis of the
reservation framework and model rosters which were considered
by the Division Bench in WPC No.591 of 2012 and connected
matters. The State, on the other hand, has explained that the
figures appearing in the advertisement cannot be examined
merely by comparing the total number of advertised vacancies
with the percentage of reservation ordinarily prescribed at the
State level, since the posts in question are district-level and
division-level posts, different rosters operate for such posts, and,
significantly, the advertised vacancies include a substantial
number of backlog vacancies pertaining to earlier recruitment
cycles.
45. Before examining the rival submissions, this Court considers it
necessary to determine the precise legal effect of the judgment
dated 19.09.2022 passed by the Division Bench of this Court in
WPC No.591 of 2012 and connected matters and, more
particularly, the effect of the subsequent order dated 01.05.2023
passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the proceedings arising
therefrom. The controversy cannot be decided merely by noticing
that the judgment dated 19.09.2022 is presently under challenge
before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The legal consequence of a
judgment
declaring
a
statutory
provision,
notification
or
reservation arrangement unconstitutional is materially different
from a mere stay of its operation. Unless the judgment is stayed,
modified or set aside, the executive authorities are bound to
respect the law declared by the competent constitutional Court.
46. The judgment dated 19.09.2022 rendered in WPC No.591 of 2012
and connected matters was not confined to an abstract
examination of the reservation policy. The Division Bench
specifically considered the enhancement of reservation brought
about by the notification dated 29.11.2012 and the consequential
model rosters prepared for different districts and divisions. Upon
examining the constitutional scheme contained in Articles 14, 15
and 16 of the Constitution of India, the Division Bench found that
the reservation arrangement, insofar as it exceeded the
constitutionally permissible limits without a legally sustainable
justification, could not be permitted to continue. In paragraph 85 of
the said judgment, the relevant provisions and the reservation
arrangement reflected in Schedule-II Model Roster in respect of
the specified districts and Surguja Division were declared
unconstitutional and quashed.
47. The consequence of such declaration cannot be diluted merely
because the State preferred a Special Leave Petition before the
Hon'ble Supreme Court. It is well settled that there is a
fundamental distinction between an order which is quashed and
an order whose operation is merely stayed. Mere filing or
pendency of an appeal or Special Leave Petition does not, by
itself, obliterate the binding effect of the judgment under
challenge. The executive authorities cannot proceed on the
assumption that a quashed notification continues to have
independent legal efficacy unless the superior Court, in exercise
of its jurisdiction, quash judgment or grants an appropriate final
order.
48. In the present bunch of cases, the respondents have admittedly
relied upon the very notification dated 29.11.2012 and the
consequential district/division-wise model rosters which were the
subject matter of consideration in WPC No.591 of 2012 and
connected matters. The material placed before this Court further
demonstrates that the percentage of vacancies earmarked for
Scheduled Tribe candidates under the impugned advertisement is
exceptionally high. Out of 1,113 posts of Teacher (E-Cadre), 698
posts, constituting approximately 62.71%, were earmarked for
Scheduled Tribe candidates; out of 4,659 posts of Teacher (TCadre), 3,005 posts, constituting approximately 64.49%, were
earmarked for Scheduled Tribe candidates; out of 793 posts of
Assistant
Teacher
(E-Cadre),
posts,
constituting
approximately 56.62%, were earmarked for Scheduled Tribe
candidates; and out of 5,492 posts of Assistant Teacher (TCadre), 3,758 posts, constituting approximately 68.42%, were
earmarked for Scheduled Tribe candidates. The aforesaid figures
are not merely a mathematical aberration which can be ignored by
referring generally to the existence of a roster. They call for a strict
constitutional examination because the resultant reservation is
substantially in excess of the ordinary constitutional ceiling.
49. The respondents have attempted to justify the aforesaid
distribution by referring to backlog vacancies and by contending
that the posts of Assistant Teacher and Teacher constitute
different territorial cadres. This submission, however, does not
answer the foundational question involved in the present cases. A
roster is only an instrument for implementing a legally valid
reservation policy. It cannot itself become a source of power to
create or perpetuate a reservation arrangement which has already
been declared unconstitutional. Once the foundational notification
and the consequential model roster stood quashed by the
judgment dated 19.09.2022, the respondents were required to
identify a subsisting and legally valid source authorising the
reservation pattern adopted in the impugned advertisement. The
State has not been able to demonstrate the existence of any
subsequent statutory provision, notification or validly operative
reservation policy which independently authorises the very extent
of reservation reflected in the impugned advertisement. The mere
description of certain vacancies as backlog vacancies cannot
revive a reservation framework which has ceased to possess
legal efficacy. Backlog vacancies may be carried forward only in
accordance with law; the concept of backlog cannot be utilised as
a mechanism for reviving an invalid reservation regime or for
introducing, through an administrative exercise, a reservation
arrangement which otherwise lacks a lawful foundation.
50. The distinction between backlog vacancies and fresh vacancies,
undoubtedly, has significance in the constitutional scheme. Article
16(4B) itself recognises that unfilled vacancies of a year reserved
for a particular category may, subject to the constitutional and
statutory framework, be treated as a separate class of vacancies
in succeeding years. However, Article 16(4B) does not confer an
independent power upon the executive to create reservation. It
operates within the framework of an otherwise valid reservation
policy. Therefore, before the respondents can rely upon backlog
vacancies, it must first be demonstrated that the reservation to
which those vacancies originally related was founded upon a
legally valid and subsisting reservation provision. In the present
cases, the respondents seek to trace the excessive reservation to
the district/division-wise model rosters which themselves were
part of the reservation arrangement declared unconstitutional by
this Court. Consequently, the label of "backlog vacancy" cannot,
by itself, validate the source from which the vacancy is claimed to
have arisen.
51. The constitutional position governing reservation is no longer res
integra. In Indra Sawhney (supra), the Constitution Bench held
that reservations contemplated under Article 16(4) should
ordinarily not exceed 50% and that, though exceptional
circumstances may justify departure, extreme caution is required
and a special case must be made out. The principle was
thereafter reiterated in subsequent Constitution Bench decisions.
The constitutional ceiling is not a matter of administrative
convenience but forms part of the balancing mechanism between
Articles 14 and 16(1), on the one hand, and Articles 15(4) and
16(4), on the other.
52. In Dr. Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil (supra), the Constitution Bench
reiterated that reservation under Article 16(4) should not exceed
50%, and that exceeding the ceiling requires extraordinary
circumstances of the nature contemplated in Indra Sawhney. The
Court further emphasised that the 50% ceiling is intended to
preserve equality of opportunity and that any departure from it
must satisfy the stringent constitutional requirements. The
principle is of direct relevance to the present case because the
reservation figures reflected in the impugned advertisement are
not marginally above the ordinary ceiling but, in certain cadres,
substantially exceed it. When the State adopts such a reservation
arrangement, the constitutional burden is correspondingly greater
to
demonstrate
constitutionally
the
source
permissible
of
power,
circumstances
the
existence
and
the
of
legal
methodology by which the reservation has been computed.
53. The decision in M. Nagaraj (supra), also emphasises that
reservation provisions remain subject to constitutional limitations
and that the ceiling of 50% constitutes an important quantitative
limitation within the equality scheme. Similarly, Jarnail Singh
(supra), and Chebrolu Leela Prasad Rao (supra), reiterate that
affirmative action, however desirable its objective, cannot be
implemented in a manner which destroys the constitutional
guarantee of equality of opportunity. The Court is conscious that
the State possesses enabling powers under Articles 15 and 16 to
adopt measures for advancement of backward classes and for
ensuring adequate representation. However, such power is
constitutionally structured and cannot be exercised in an
uncanalised or arbitrary manner.
54. Equally significant is the principle laid down in R.K. Sabharwal
(supra) that a reservation roster is only a mechanism for giving
effect
to
a
valid
reservation
policy.
The
roster
cannot
independently create reservation. Once the prescribed reservation
has been achieved, the roster must operate consistently with the
cadre strength and the governing reservation policy. Therefore, in
the present case, the respondents cannot derive independent
authority merely from the existence of a district/division-wise
roster when the very reservation arrangement underlying such
roster has already been declared unconstitutional by this Court.
55. The judgment in WPC No.591 of 2012 also requires to be read in
its entirety. The Division Bench, while declaring the impugned
provisions
and
the
specified
reservation
arrangement
unconstitutional, was conscious of the consequences which would
follow if all appointments and admissions already made under the
impugned framework were unsettled. Paragraphs 87 and 88 of
the judgment demonstrate that the Court moulded the relief so as
to prevent administrative chaos and hardship to persons who had
already been selected or appointed. The Court specifically
observed that the power under Article 226 could be exercised to
mould relief and that setting aside selections and appointments
made under the impugned framework would cause great hardship
and
administrative
complications.
Consequently,
while
the
relevant provisions were declared unconstitutional, the existing
admissions and appointments were not disturbed. The Divisional
Bench of this Court while passing the order dated 19.09.2022 in
WPC No.591 of 2022, has observed as follows :“43. Articles 15 and 16 read as follows:
15.
Prohibition
of
discrimination
on
grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or
place of birth. - (1) The State shall not
discriminate against any citizen on grounds
only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth
or any of them.
(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of
religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any
of them, be subject to any disability, liability,
restriction or conditions with regard to (a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels
and places of public entertainment; or
(b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats,
roads and places of public resort maintained
wholly or partly out of State funds or
dedicated to the use of general public.
(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the
State from making any special provision for
women and children.
(4) Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of
article 29 shall prevent the State from making
any special provision for the advancement of
any socially and educationally backward
classes of citizens or for the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
(5) Nothing in this article or in sub-clause (g)
of clause (1) of article 19 shall prevent the
State from making any special provision, by
law, for the advancement of any socially and
educationally backward classes of citizens or
for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled
Tribes in so far as such special provisions
relate to their admission to educational
institutions
including
private
educational
institutions, whether aided or unaided by the
State, other than the minority educational
institutions referred to in clause (1) of Article
30.
(6) Nothing in this article or sub-clause (g) of
clause (1) of article 19 or clause (2) of article
29 shall prevent the State from making (a) any special provision for the advancement
of any economically weaker sections of
citizens other than the classes mentioned in
clauses (4) and (5); and
(b) any special provision for the advancement
of any economically weaker sections of
citizens other than the classes mentioned in
clauses (4) and (5) in so far as such special
provisions
relate
to
their
admission
to
educational
institutions
including
private
educational institutions, whether aided or
unaided by the State, other than the minority
educational institutions referred to in clause
(1) of article 30, which in the case of
reservation would be in addition to the
existing
reservations
and
subject
to
a
maximum of ten per cent of the total seats in
each category.
Explanation. - For the purpose of this article
and
article
16,
“economically
weaker
sections” shall be such as may be notified by
the State from time to time on the basis of
family
income
and
other
indicators
of
economic disadvantage.
16. Equality of opportunity in matters of
public employment . - (1) There shall be
equality of opportunity for all citizens in
matters
relating
to
employment
or
appointment to any office under the State;
(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of
religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of
birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible
for, or discriminated against in respect of, any
employment or office under the State.
(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent
Parliament from making any law prescribing,
in regard to a class or classes of employment
or appointment to an office under the
Government of, or any local or other authority
within, a State or Union Territory, any
requirement as to residence within that State
or Union Territory prior to such employment or
appointment.
(4) Nothing in this article shall prevent the
State from making any provision for the
reservation of appointments or posts in favour
of any backward class of citizens which, in
the opinion of the State, is not adequately
represented in the services under the State.
(4A) Nothing in this article shall prevent the
State
from
making
any
provision
for
reservation in matters of promotion, with
consequential seniority, to any class or
classes of posts in the services under the
State in favour of the Scheduled Castes and
the Scheduled Tribes which, in the opinion of
the State, are not adequately represented in
the services under the State.
(4B) Nothing in this article shall prevent the
State from considering any unfilled vacancies
of a year which are reserved for being filled
up in that year in accordance with any
provision for reservation made under clause
(4) or clause (4A) as a separate class of
vacancies to be filled up in any succeeding
year or years and such class of vacancies
shall not be considered together with the
vacancies of the year in which they are being
filled up for determining the ceiling of fifty per
cent reservation on total number of vacancies
of that year.
(5) Nothing in this article shall affect the
operation of any law which provides that the
incumbent of an office in connection with the
affairs of any religious or denominational
institution or any member of the governing
body thereof shall be a person professing a
particular religion or belonging to a particular
denomination.
(6) Nothing in this article shall prevent the
State from making any provision for the
reservation of appointments or posts in favour
of any economically weaker sections of
citizens other than the classes mentioned in
clause
(4),
in
addition
to
the
existing
reservation and subject to a maximum of ten
per cent of the posts in each category.
44.
Article 15(4) provides that nothing in this
Article or Article 29(2) shall prevent the State
from making any special provision for the
advancement
of
any
socially
and
educationally Backward Classes of citizens or
for the SCs and the Sts.
45.
Article
15(4)
was
added
by
the
Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1951. The
object of this amendment was to bring Articles
15 and 29 in line with Article 16(4) as a result
of the decision rendered by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of The State of
Madras
v.
Srimathi
Champakam
Dorairajan & Another, reported in AIR 1951
SC 226. In the aforesaid case, the validity of
an order issued by the Madras Government
fixing certain proportions in which students
seeking for admissions to the Engineering
and Medical Colleges in the State should be
admitted,
was
challenged.
The
said
government order being on the face of it a
communal order fixing the admissions in the
stated
proportion
by
reference
to
the
communities of the candidates, was struck
down by the Madras High Court and the
decision of the Madras High Court was
confirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
appeal, on the ground that the fundamental
rights guaranteed by Articles 15(1) and 29(2)
were not controlled by any exception, and
that since there was no provision under
Article 15 corresponding to Article 16(4), the
impugned order could not be sustained. Thus,
there is no doubt that Article 15(4) has to be
read as a proviso or an exception to Articles
15(1) and 29(2). In other words, if the
impugned order is justified by the provisions
of Article
15(4),
its
validity
cannot
be
impeached on the ground that it violates
Article 15(1) or Article 29(2). The fundamental
rights guaranteed by the said two provisions
do not affect the validity of the special
provision which it is permissible to make
under Article. 15(4).
46. Article 15(4) authorises the State to make
a special provision for the advancement of
any socially and educationally backward
classes of citizens, as distinguished from the
SCs and STs. No doubt, special provision can
be made for both categories of citizens, but in
specifying the categories, the first category is
distinguished from the second. Sub-clauses
(24) and (25) of Article 366 define SCs and
STs respectively, but there is no clause
defining socially and educationally backward
classes of citizens, and so, in determining the
question as to whether a particular provision
has been validly made under Article 15 (4) or
not, the first question which falls to be
determined is whether the State has validly
determined who should be included in these
Backward Classes. It seems fairly clear that
the backward classes of citizens for whom
special provision is authorised to be made
are, by Article 15(4) itself, treated as being
similar to the SCs and STs. SCs and STs
which have been defined were known to be
backward and the Constitution-makers felt no
doubt that special provision had to be made
for their advancement. It was realised that in
the Indian society there were other classes of
citizens who were equally, or may be
somewhat less, backward than the SCs and
STs and it was thought that some special
provision ought to be made even for them.
Article 341 provides for the issue of public
notification specifying the castes, races or
tribes which shall, for the purposes of the
Constitution, be deemed to be SCs either in
the State or the Union territory as the case
may be. Similarly, Article 342 makes a
provision for the issue of public notification in
respect of STs. Under Article 338 (3), it is
provided that references to the SCs and STs
shall be construed as including references to
such
other
Backward
Classes
as
the
President may, on receipt of the report of a
Commission appointed under Article 340(1),
by order, specify and also to the Anglo Indian
community. It would thus be seen that this
provision contemplates that some Backward
Classes may by the Presidential order be
included in scheduled castes and tribes. That
helps to bring out the point that the Backward
Classes for whose improvement special
provision is contemplated by Article 15 (4) are
in
the
matter
of
their
backwardness
comparable to SCs and Sts.
47.
In M. R. Balaji (supra), the validity of an
order dated 31.07.1962 passed by the State
of
Mysore
under
Article
15(4)
of
the
Constitution of India superseding all previous
orders for reservation of seats in favour of the
SCs, STs as well as OBCs was questioned.
The OBCs were divided into two categories,
namely,
Backward
Classes
and
More
Backward Classes. 50% was fixed as the
quota for the reservation of seats for OBCs;
28% out of this was reserved for Backward
Classes
so
called
and
22%
for
More
Backward Classes. 15% seats was reserved
for the SCs and 3% for the STs. The result of
the order was that 68% of the seats available
for admission to the Engineering and Medical
Colleges and to other Technical Institutions
specified in the aforesaid order, is reserved
and only 32% was available to the merit pool.
48. On consideration of the materials on
record as well as Nagan Gowda Committee
recommendations,
the
Hon’ble
Supreme
Court held that the classification of the
socially backward classes of citizens made by
the
State
proceeded
on
the
only
consideration of their castes without regard to
the other factors which are relevant and
therefore, the social backwardness of the
communities to whom the order applied had
been determined in a manner which is not
permissible under Article 15(4) and that itself
would introduce an infirmity which is fatal to
the validity of the said classification. It was
held that the sub-classification made by the
order between Backward Classes and More
Backward Classes is not justified under
Article
15(4)
which
authorises
special
provision being made for the really backward
classes. By introducing two categories, the
order purported to devise measures for the
benefit of all the classes of citizens who are
less
advanced
compared
to
the
most
advanced classes in the State which is not
within the scope of Article 15(4).
49. It was observed that in considering the
scope and extent of the expression 'backward
classes' under Art. 15(4), it is necessary to
remember that the concept of backwardness
is not intended to be relative in the sense that
any classes who are backward in relation to
the most advanced classes of the society
should be included in it. If such relative tests
were to be applied by reason of the most
advanced classes, there would be several
layers or strata of backward classes and each
one of them may claim to be included under
Article 15(4). The backwardness under Article
15(4) must be social and educational. It is not
either social or educational but it is both
social and educational.
50. While considering the question of social
backwardness observed that the problem of
determining as to who are socially backward
classes is very complex and for determination
of which an elaborate investigation and
collection of data and examining the said data
in a rational and scientific way will be
required. It was observed that the castes
cannot be the sole or the dominant test to
consider in determining social backwardness
of groups or classes of citizens
as social
backwardness is on the ultimate analysis the
result of poverty, to a very large extent. It is in
that context it was held that both caste and
poverty
have
relevance
in
determining
backwardness of citizens.
51.
While
considering
the
question
of
educational backwardness of the classes of
citizens, it was noticed by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court that the impugned order
proceeded to deal with the question on the
basis of the average of the student population
in the last three High School classes in the
State in relation to a thousand citizens of that
community and on the basis of the figures
supplied, the Nagan Gowda Committee came
to the conclusion that the State average of
student population in the last three High
School classes of all High Schools in the
State was 6.9 per thousand. Accordingly, all
castes whose average was less than 6.9 per
thousand be added as backward community
and had further held that if the average of any
community was less than 50% of the State
average, it should be recorded as constituting
the more backward classes. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that assuming that the
test applied is rational and permissible under
Article 15(4), then also, if the State average is
6.9
per
thousand,
a
community
which
satisfied the said test or is just below the said
test cannot be regarded as educationally
backward classes of citizens and that classes
of
citizens
whose
average
of
student
population works below 50% of the State
average,
are
obviously
educationally
backward classes of citizens.
52. Coming to the question about the extent
of the special provision which it would be
competent for the State to make under Article
15(4), in M.R.Balaji (supra), it was observed
that unless the educational and economic
interests of the weaker sections of the people
are promoted quickly and liberally, the ideal of
establishing social and economic equality will
not be attained and so, there can be no doubt
that Article 15(4) authorises the State to take
adequate steps to achieve the object which it
has in view. The Hon’ble Supreme Court
emphasised that consideration of national
interest and the interests of the community or
society as a whole cannot be ignored in
determining the question as to whether the
special provision contemplated by Article
15(4) can be special provision which excludes
the rest of the society altogether. It was
observed that if admission to professional and
technical colleges is unduly liberalised, it will
be idle to contend that the quality of our
graduates would not suffer. While advocating
reservation, it was observed that reservation
should and must be adopted to advance the
prospects of the weaker sections of the
society. It was also emphasised that while
providing for special measures in that behalf,
care
should
be
taken
not
to
exclude
admission to higher educational centres to
the deserving and qualified candidates of
other
communities.
Special
provision
contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation
of posts and appointments contemplated by
Article 16(4) must be within reasonable limits.
While expressing no opinion categorically and
definitely as to what would be a proper
provision to make, it was observed that
speaking generally and in a broad way, a
special provision should be less than 50%;
how much less than 50% would depend upon
the relevant prevailing circumstances in each
case. Resultantly, the impugned order was
held to be a fraud on the Constitutional power
conferred on the State by Article 15(4).
53. In the majority judgment in
Indra
Sawhney (supra), at paragraph 681, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court noted eight questions
which were framed by the learned counsel for
the parties for consideration and the same
read as follows:
“(I) Whether Article 16(4) is an exception to
Article 16(1) and would be exhaustive of the
right to reservation to posts in services under
the State?
(II) What would be the content of the phrase
Backward Class in Article 16(4) of the
Constitution and whether caste by itself could
constitute a class and whether economic
criterion by itself could identify a class for
Article 16(4) and whether backward Classes
in Article 16(4) would include the Article 46 as
well?
(III) If economic criterion by itself could not
constitute a Backward Classes under Article
16(4) whether reservation of posts in services
under
the
State
based
exclusively
on
economic criteria would be covered by Article
16(1) of the Constitution?
(IV) Can the extent of reservation to posts in
the services under the State under Article
16(4) or, if permitted under Articles 16(1) and
16(4) together, exceed 50% of the posts in a
cadre or Service under the State or exceed
50% of the appointment in a cadre or Service
in any particular year and can such extent of
reservation
be
determined
without
determining the inadequacy of representation
of each class in the different categories and
grades of Services under the State?
(V) Does Article 16(4) permit the classification
of 'Backward Classes' into Backward Classes
and Most Backward Classes or permit
classification
among
them
based
on
economic or other considerations?
(VI) Would making "any provision" under
Article 16(4) for reservation "by the State"
necessarily have to be by law made by the
Legislatures of the State or by law made by
Parliament? Or could such provisions be
made by an executive order?
(VII) Will the extent of judicial review be
limited
or
restricted
in
regard
to
the
identification of Backward Classes and the
percentage of reservations made for such
classes,
to
a
demonstrably
perverse
identification or a demonstrably unreasonable
percentage?
(VIII) Would reservation of appointments or
posts "in favour of any Backward Class" be
restricted to the initial appointment to the post
or would it extend to promotions as well?
54.
At paragraph 682, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court re-framed the questions as follows:
“1(a) Whether the 'provision' contemplated by
Article 16(4) must necessarily be made by the
legislative wing of the State?
(b) If the answer to Clause (a) is in the
negative, whether an executive order making
such a provision is enforceable without
incorporating it into a rule made under the
proviso to Article 309?
2(a) Whether Clause (4) of Article 16 is an
exception to Clause (1) of Article 16?
(b) Whether Clause (4) of Article 16 is
exhaustive of the special provisions that can
be made in favour of 'backward class of
citizens'? Whether it is exhaustive of the
special provisions that can be made in favour
of all sections, classes or groups?
(c) Whether reservations can be made under
Clause (1) of
permits
only
Article 16 or whether it
extending
of
preferences/
concessions?
3(a) What does the expression 'backward
class of citizens' in Article 16(4) mean?
(b)
Whether
backward
classes
can
be
identified on the basis and with reference to
caste alone?
(c) Whether a class, to be designated as a
backward class, should be situated similarly
to the Scs/Sts?
(d) Whether the 'means' test can be applied in
the course of identification of backward
classes? And if the answer is yes, whether
providing such a test is obligatory?
4(a). Whether the backward classes can be
identified only and exclusively with reference
to economic criteria?
(b) Whether a criteria like occupation-cumincome without reference to caste altogether,
can be evolved for identifying the backward
classes?
5. Whether the backward classes can be
further categorised into backward and more
backward categories?
6. To what extent can the reservation be
made?
(a) Whether the 50% rule enunciated in Balaji
a binding rule or only a rule of caution or rule
of prudence?
(b) Whether the 50% rule, if any, is confined
to reservations made under Clause (4) of
Article 16 or whether it takes in all types of
reservations that can be provided under
Article 16?
(c) Further while applying 50% rule, if any,
whether an year should be taken as a unit or
whether the total strength of the cadre should
be looked to?
(d)
Whether
Devadasan
was
correctly
decided?
7. Whether Article 16 permits reservations
being provided in the matter of promotions?
8. Whether reservations are anti-meritian? To
what extent are Articles 335, 38(2) and 46 of
the Constitution relevant in the matter of
construing Article 16?
9. Whether the extent of judicial review is
restricted with regard to the identification of
Backward Classes and the percentage of
reservations made for such classes to a
demonstrably perverse identification or a
demonstrably unreasonable percentage?
10. Whether the distinction made in the
second
Memorandum
between
'poorer
sections' of the backward classes and others
permissible under Article 16?
11. Whether the reservation of 10% of the
posts
in
favour
of
'other
economically
backward sections of the people who are not
covered by any of the existing schemes of the
reservations'
made
by
the
Office
Memorandum dated September 25, 1991
permissible under Article 16?”
55. In paragraphs 809 and 810, it is stated as
follows:
“809.
From
the
above
discussion,
the
irresistible conclusion that follows is that the
reservations contemplated in clause (4) of
Article 16 should not exceed 50%.
810. While 50% shall be the rule, it is
necessary not to put out of consideration
certain extraordinary situations inherent in the
great diversity of this country and the people.
It might happen that in farflung and remote
areas the population inhabiting those areas
might, on account of their being out of the
mainstream of national life and in view of
conditions peculiar to and characteristical to
them, need to be treated in a different way,
some relaxation in this strict rule may become
imperative. In doing so, extreme caution is to
be exercised and a special case made out.”
56.
At paragraph 860, the answers to the
questions as framed by the counsel for the
parties and as set out in paragraph 681 were
recorded as follows:
“(1) Article 16(4) is not an exception to Article
16(1). It is an instance of classification
inherent in Article 16(1). Article 16(4) is
exhaustive of the subject of reservation in
favour of backward classes, though it may not
be
exhaustive
of
the
very
concept
of
reservation. Reservations for other classes
can be provided under Clause (1) of Article
16.
(2) The expression 'backward class' in Article
16(4) takes in 'Other Backward Classes',
SCs, STs and may be some other backward
classes as well. The accent in Article 16(4) is
upon
social
backwardness
backwardness.
leads
to
Social
educational
backwardness and economic backwardness.
They are mutually contributory to each other
and are intertwined with low occupations in
the Indian society. A caste can be and quite
often is a social class in India. Economic
criterion cannot be the sole basis for
determining the backward class of citizens
contemplated by Article 16(4). The weaker
sections referred to in Article 46 do include
SEBCs referred to in Article 340 and covered
by Article 16(4).
(3) Even under Article 16(1), reservations
cannot be made on the basis of economic
criteria alone.
(4) The reservations contemplated in Clause
(4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.
While 50% shall be the rule, it is necessary
not to put out of consideration certain
extraordinary situations inherent in the great
diversity of this country and the people. It
might happen that in far-flung and remote
areas the population inhabiting those areas
might, on account of their being out of the
mainstream of national life and in view of the
conditions peculiar to and characteristic of
them need to be treated in a different way,
some relaxation in this strict rule may become
imperative. In doing so, extreme caution is to
be exercised and a special case made out.
For applying this rule, the reservations should
not exceed 50% of the appointments in a
grade, cadre or service in any given year.
Reservation can be made in a service or
category only when the State is satisfied that
representation of backward class of citizens
therein is not adequate.
To the extent, Devadasan is inconsistent
herewith, it is over-ruled.
(5)
There
is
no
constitutional
bar
to
classification of backward classes into more
backward and backward classes for the
purposes of Article 16(4). The distinction
should be on the basis of degrees of social
backwardness. In case of such classification,
however,
it
would
be
advisable-
nay,
necessary- to ensure equitable distribution
amongst the various backward classes to
avoid lumping so that one or two such
classes do not eat away the entire quota
leaving the other backward classes high and
dry.
For excluding 'creamy layer', an economic
criterion can be adopted as an indicium or
measure of social advancement.
(6) A 'provision' under Article 16(4) can be
made by an executive order. It is not
necessary
that
it
should
be
made
by
Parliament/ Legislature.
(7) No special standard of judicial scrutiny
can be predicated in matters arising under
Article 16(4). It is not possible or necessary to
say more than this under this question.
(8) Reservation of appointments or posts
under Article 16(4) is confined to initial
appointment only and cannot extend to
providing
reservation
in
the
matter
of
promotion. We direct that our decision on this
question shall operate only prospectively and
shall not affect promotions already made,
whether on temporary, officiating or regular/
permanent basis. It is further directed that
wherever reservations are already provided in
the matter of promotion - be it Central
Services or State Services, or for that matter
services under any Corporation, authority or
body falling under the definition of 'State' in
Article 12 - such reservations may continue in
operation for a period of five years from this
day. Within this period, it would be open to the
appropriate authorities to revise, modify or reissue the relevant rules to ensure the
achievement of the objective of Article 16(4).
If any authority thinks that for ensuring
adequate representation of 'backward class of
citizens' in any service, class or category, it is
necessary to provide for direct recruitment
therein, it shall be open to it to do so.”
57.
In R.K.Sabharwal (supra), it was laid
down that Article 16(4) of the Constitution of
India permits the State Government to make
any
provision
for
the
reservation
of
appointments or posts in favour of any
backward class of citizen which, in the
opinion of the State is not adequately
represented in the services under the State. It
is,
therefore,
incumbent
on
the
State
Government to reach a conclusion that the
backward
class/classes
for
which
reservation
is
not
adequately
made
is
the
represented in the State Services. While
doing so the State Government may take the
total population of a particular backward class
and its representation in the State services.
When the State Government after doing the
necessary exercise makes the reservation
and provides the extent of percentage of
posts to be reserved for the said backward
class then the percentage has to be followed
strictly. The prescribed percentage cannot be
varied or changed simply because some of
the members of the backward class have
already been appointed/promoted against the
general seats. The roster point which is
reserved for a backward class has to be filled
by way of appointment/promotion of the
member of the said class. No general
category candidate can be appointed against
a slot in the roster which is reserved for the
backward class. The fact that considerable
number of members of a backward class
have
been
appointed/promoted
against
general seats in the State services may be a
relevant factor for the State Government to
review the question of continuing reservation
for the said class but so long as the
instructions/rules
providing
certain
percentage of reservations for the backward
classes are operative the same have to be
followed.
58. In M. Nagaraj (supra), the petitioner had
prayed for quashing of the Constitution
(Eighty-Fifth
Amendment)
Act,
inserting Article 16(4A) of the Constitution
retrospectively
from
17.6.1995
providing
reservation in promotion with consequential
seniority
as
being
violative
of
the
unconstitutional
basic
structure.
and
Article
16(4A) is inspired by the observations in
Indra Sawhney (supra) vide paragraphs 802
and 803 in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court
had observed that in order to avoid lumping of
OBC, SC and ST which would make OBC
take away all the vacancies leaving SC and
ST high and dry, the State concerned was
entitled to categorise and sub- classify SCs
and STs on one hand vis-a-vis OBC on the
other hand. In paragraphs 121, 122, 123, it
was observed as follows:
“121.
The
impugned
constitutional
amendments by which Articles 16(4A) and
16(4B) have been inserted flow from Article
16(4). They do not alter the structure of Article
16(4). They retain the controlling factors or
the
compelling
backwardness
reasons,
and
namely,
inadequacy
of
representation which enables the States to
provide for reservation keeping in mind the
overall efficiency of the State administration
under
Article
335.
These
impugned
amendments are confined only to SCs and
STs. They do not obliterate any of the
constitutional requirements, namely, ceiling
limit of 50% (quantitative limitation), the
concept
of
creamy
layer
(qualitative
exclusion), the sub-classification between
OBCs on one hand and SCs and STs on the
other hand as held in Indra Sawhney, the
concept of post-based roster with inbuilt
concept of replacement as held in R.K.
Sabharwal.
122. We reiterate that the ceiling limit of 50%,
the
concept
of
creamy
layer
and
the
compelling reasons, namely, backwardness,
inadequacy of representation and overall
administrative efficiency are all constitutional
requirements without which the structure of
equality of opportunity in Article 16 would
collapse.
123. However, in this case, as stated above,
the main issue concerns the "extent of
reservation".
In
this
regard
the
State
concerned will have to show in each case the
existence of the compelling reasons, namely,
backwardness, inadequacy of representation
and overall administrative efficiency before
making provision for reservation. As stated
above, the impugned provision is an enabling
provision. The State is not bound to make
reservation
for
SCs/STs
in
matter
of
promotions. However if they wish to exercise
their discretion and make such provision, the
State has to collect quantifiable data showing
backwardness of the class and inadequacy of
representation
of
that
class
in
public
employment in addition to compliance of
Article 335. It is made clear that even if the
State has compelling reasons, as stated
above, the State will have to see that its
reservation
provision
does
not
lead
to
excessiveness so as to breach the ceiling
limit of 50% or obliterate the creamy layer or
extend the reservation indefinitely.”
59. In Ashoka Kumar Thakur (supra),
insertion of Article 15(5) by the Constitution
(Ninety-third Amendment) Act, 2005, which
reads as under, was challenged:
“15. (5) Nothing in this article or in sub-clause
(g) of Clause (1) of Article 19 shall prevent the
State from making any special provision, by
law, for the advancement of any socially and
educationally backward classes of citizens or
for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled
Tribes insofar as such special provisions
relate to their admission to the educational
institutions
including
private
educational
institutions, whether aided or unaided by the
State, other than the minority educational
institutions referred to in Clause (1) of Article
30”.
60. After the above Constitution (Ninety-third
Amendment
passed
Act),
Central
2005,
the
Parliament
Educational
Institutions
(Reservation in Admission) Act 2006 (Act 5 of
2007)
wherein
Section
provided
for
reservation of 15% seats for Scheduled
Castes, 7 ½ % of seats for Scheduled Tribes
and 27% for Other Backward Classes in the
State aided institutions which were defined as
“Central Educational Institutions”. The order
of the Court in Ashoka Kumar Thakur
(supra) was as follows:
“668.
The
Constitution
(Ninety-third
Amendment) Act, 2005, is valid and does not
violate the “basic structure” of the Constitution
so far as it relates to the State-maintained
institutions and aided educational institutions.
Question whether the Constitution (Ninetythird Amendment) Act,
would
be
constitutionally valid or not so far as “private
unaided”
educational
institutions
are
concerned, is not considered and left open to
be decided in an appropriate case. Bhandari
J, in his opinion, has, however, considered
the issue and has held that the Constitution
(Ninety-third Amendment) Act, 2005 is not
constitutionally valid so far as private unaided
educational institutions are concerned.
669. Act 5 of 2007 is constitutionally valid
subject to the definition of “Other Backward
Classes” in Section 2(g) of Act 5 of 2007
being clarified as follows: If the determination
of “Other Backward Classes” by the Central
Government is with reference to a caste, it
shall exclude the “creamy layer” among such
caste.
670. Quantum of reservation of 27% of seats
to Other Backward Classes in the educational
institutions provided in the Act is not illegal.
671. Act 5 of 2007 is not invalid for the reason
that there is no time-limit prescribed for its
operation but majority of Judges are of the
view that the review should be made as to the
need for continuance of reservation at the
end of 5 years.
672. The writ petitions are disposed of in the
light of majority judgment. However, in
Contempt Petition No. 112 of 2007 in WPC
No. 265 of 2006, no orders are required.”
61.
In Union of India v. Ramesh Ram &
Others, reported in (2010) 7 SCC 234, a
Constitution
Bench
reiterated
that
the
aggregate reservation should not exceed
50% of all the available vacancies, in
accordance
with
the
decision
in
Indra
Sawhney (supra).
62.
the
In Jarnail Singh & Others-I (supra),
controversy
centered
around
interpretation of Articles 16(4-A) and 16(4-B),
335, 341 and 342 of the Constitution of India.
Arguments
were
advanced
for
reconsideration of the judgment rendered in
Nagaraj (supra), which is a later judgment, on
the ground that it was in conflict with
E.V.Chinnaiah v. State of A.P., reported in
(2005) 1 SCC 394 as well as on some other
grounds. It was observed by the Hon’ble
Supreme
Court
that
in
E.V.Chennaiah
(supra), the Supreme Court was dealing with
a completely different problem, apart from
dealing with a State statute and not a
constitutional amendment, as was dealt in
Nagaraj (supra). However, it was held that
the observations in Nagaraj (supra) that the
State has to collect quantifiable data showing
backwardness of the SCs and STs was
contrary to the decision in Indra Sawhney
(supra) and therefore had to be declared as
bad on that ground. It was observed that the
whole object of reservation is to see that the
backward classes of citizens move forward so
that they may march hand in hand with other
citizens on an equal basis. This will not be
possible if only the creamy layer within that
class bag all the coveted jobs in the public
sector and perpetuate themselves, leaving
the rest of the class as backward as they
always were. This being the case, it is clear
that when a court applies the creamy layer
principle to SCs and STs, it does not in any
manner tinker with the Presidential List under
Article 341 and 342 of the Constitution of
India. The caste or group or sub-group
named in the said List continues exactly as
before. It is only those persons within that
group or sub-group who have come out of
untouchability or backwardness by virtue of
belonging to the creamy layer, who are
excluded from the benefit of reservation.
Even these persons who are contained within
the group or sub-group in the Presidential
Lists continue to be within those Lists. It is
only when it comes to the application of the
reservation principle under Articles 14 and 16
that the creamy layer within that sub-group is
not given the benefit of such reservation. In
view of the above, the Hon’be Supreme Court
held that when in Nagaraj (supra), when the
creamy layer test to SCs and STs was applied
in exercise of application of the basic
structure test to uphold the constitutional
amendments leading to Articles 16(4-A) and
16(4-B), it did not in any manner interfere with
Parliament’s power under Article 341 and
342,
and
therefore,
in
Jarnail
Singh-I
(supra), it was observed that there was no
necessity to refer the judgment in Nagaraj
(supra) to a Seven-Judge Bench.
63.
In B.K. Pavitra (supra), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, observed that for equality to
be truly effective or substantive, the principle
must recognize existing inequalities in society
to over come them. Reservations are thus not
an exception to the rule of equality of
opportunity. They are rather the fulfilment of
effective
and
substantive
equality
by
accounting for the structural conditions into
which people are born. If Article 16(1) merely
postulates the principle of formal equality of
opportunity, then Article 16(4), by enabling
reservations due to existing inequalities,
becomes an exception to the strict rule of
formal equality in Article 16(1). However,
Article 16(1) itself sets out the principle of
substantive equality including the recognition
of existing inequalities, then Article 16(4)
becomes the enunciation of one particular
facet of the rule of substantive equality set out
in Article 16(1). With regard to adequacy of
representation, it was observed that the same
has to be assessed with reference to a
benchmark
on
adequacy,
which
conventionally, the same is linked by the
State
and
Central
Governments
the
percentage of reservation for the SCs and
STs to their percentage of population and
accordingly it was held that it is open to the
State to make reservation in promotion for
SCs
and
STs
proportionate
to
their
Laxmanrao
Patil
representation in general population.
64.
In
Dr.
Jaishri
(supra), six questions were formulated which
read as follows:
“(1) Whether judgment in Indra Sawhney v.
Union of India needs to be referred to a larger
Bench or requires a re-look by the larger
Bench in the light of subsequent constitutional
amendments, judgments and changed social
dynamics of the society, etc.?
(2) Whether Maharashtra State Reservation
(of Seats for Admission
in Educational
Institutions in the State and for Appointments
in the Public Services and Posts under the
State)
for
Socially
and
Educationally
Backward Classes (SEBC) Act, 2018 as
amended in 2019 granting 12% and 13%
reservation for Maratha community in addition
to 50% social reservation is covered by
exceptional circumstances as contemplated
by the Constitution Bench in Indra Sawhney
case?
(3) Whether the State Government on the
strength of Maharashtra State Backward
Class
Commission
Report
chaired
by
M.C.Gaikwad has made out a case of
existence
of
extraordinary
situation
and
exceptional circumstances in the State to fall
within the exception carved out in the
judgment of Indra Sawhney case?
(4) Whether the Constitution (One Hundred
and Second) Amendment deprives the State
Legislature of its power to enact a legislation
determining the socially and economically
backward classes and conferring the benefits
of the said community under its enabling
power?
(5) Whether, State power to legislate in
relation to “any backward class” under Article
15(4) and 16(4) is anyway abridged by Article
342-A read with Article 366(26-C) of the
Constitution of India?
(6) Whether, Article 342-A of the Constitution
abrogates States’ power to legislate or
classify in respect of “any backward class of
citizens” and thereby affects the federal
policy/structure of the Constitution of India? ”
65.
Hon’ble Justice L. Nageswara Rao,
Hon’ble Justice Hemant Gupta and Hon’ble
Justice S. Ravindra Bhatt, concurred with
Hon’ble Justice Ashok Bhushan and Hon’ble
Justice S. Abdul Nazir in respect of question
No. 1, 2 and 3 whereas, with regard to
question No. 4, 5 and 6, Hon’ble Justice L.
Nageswara Rao and Hon’ble Justice Hemant
Gupta concurred with Hon’ble Justice S.
Ravindra Bhatt.
66.
At paragraphs 10 and 194, Hon’ble
Justice S. Ravindra Bhatt stated as follows:
“10. A careful reading of the judgments in
Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, clarifies that
seven out of nine judges concurred that there
exists a quantitative limit on reservation –
spelt out at 50%. In the opinion of four judges,
therefore, per the judgment of B.P. Jeevan
Reddy, J., this limit could be exceeded under
extraordinary circumstances and in conditions
for which separate justification has to be
forthcoming by the State or the agency
concerned. However, there is unanimity in the
conclusion by all seven judges that an outer
limit
for
reservation
should
be
50%.
Undoubtedly, the other two judges, Ratnavel
Pandian and P.B. Sawant, JJ. indicated that
there is no general rule of 50% limit on
reservation. In these circumstances, given the
general
common
agreement
about
the
existence of an outer limit, i.e. 50%, the
petitioner’s argument about the incoherence
or uncertainty about the existence of the rule
or that there were contrary observations with
respect to absence of any ceiling limit in other
judgments
(the
dissenting
judgments
of
K.Subbarao, in T. Devadasan v Union of
India, the judgments of S.M. Fazal Ali and
Krishna Iyer, JJ. in State of Kerala v N.M.
Thomas and the judgment of Chinnappa
Reddy, J. in K.C. Vasanth Kumar v. State of
Karnataka) is not an argument compelling a
review or reconsideration of Indra Sawhney
rule.
xxx
xxx
xxx
“194. In view of the above discussion, my
conclusions are as follows:
194.1. Re Point (1): Indra Sawhney does not
require to be referred to a larger Bench nor
does it require reconsideration in the light of
subsequent
constitutional
amendments,
judgments and changed social dynamics of
the society, for the reasons set out by Ashok
Bhushan, J. and my reasons, in addition.
194.2. Re Point (2): The Maharashtra State
Reservation (of Seats for Admission in
Educational Institutions in the State and for
Appointments in the Public Services and
Posts under the State) for Socially and
Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC) Act,
2018 as amended in 2019 granting 12% and
13% reservation for Maratha community in
addition to 50% social reservation is not
covered by exceptional circumstances as
contemplated by the Constitution Bench in
Indra Sawhney case. I agree with the
reasoning
and
conclusions
of
Ashok
Bhushan, J. on this point.
194.3. Re Point (3): I agree with Ashok
Bhushan, J. that the State Government, on
the
strength
of
the
Maharashtra
State
Backward Class Commission Report chaired
by M.C. Gaikwad has not made out a case of
existence
of
extraordinary
situation
and
exceptional circumstances in the State to fall
within the exception carved out in Indra
Sawhney.”
67.
Question Nos. 4, 5 and 6 essentially
pertain to interpretation of Article 342-A of the
Constitution of India, which is not relevant for
the purpose of these cases.
68.
It will also be relevant to take note of
paragraphs 459, 474, 476, 480, 481, 515, 520
and 542 dealing with the first three questions
rendered in the judgment of Hon’ble Justice
Ashok Bhushan.
“459. We have noticed above that the majority
judgment in Indra Sawhney has laid down
that reservation shall not exceed 50% as a
rule. In the majority opinion, however, it was
held that looking to the diversity of the country
there may be some extraordinary situations
where reservation in exceptional cases is
made exceeding 50% limit. In this respect, we
may again refer to paras 809 and 810 of the
judgment of Indra Sawhney by which the
above proposition of law was laid down.
Paras 809 and 810 are to the following effect:
(SCC p. 735)
“809.
From
the
above
discussion,
the
irresistible conclusion that follows is that the
reservations contemplated in clause (4) of
Article 16 should not exceed 50%.
810. While 50% shall be the rule, it is
necessary not to put out of consideration
certain extraordinary situations inherent in the
great diversity of this country and the people.
It might happen that in far-flung and remote
areas the population inhabiting those areas
might, on account of their being out of the
mainstream of national life and in view of
conditions peculiar to and characteristical to
them, need to be treated in a different way,
some relaxation in this strict rule may become
imperative. In doing so, extreme caution is to
be exercised and a special case made out.”
xxx
xxx
xxx
474. We may revert back to para 810 where
Indra Sawhney has given illustration which
illustration is regarding certain extraordinary
situations. The exact words used in para 810
are: (SCC p. 735)
“810. … It might happen that in far-flung and
remote areas the population inhabiting those
areas might, on account of their being out of
the mainstream of national life and in view of
conditions peculiar to and characteristical to
them, need to be treated in a different way,
some relaxation in this strict rule may become
imperative. In doing so, extreme caution is to
be exercised and a special case made out.”
476. This Court in several judgments has
noticed that what can be the extraordinary
situations as contemplated in para 810 in few
other cases. We have referred above the
three-Judge Bench judgment in Union of India
v. Rakesh Kumar {(2010) 4 SCC 50}, where
the three-Judge Bench held that exceptional
case of 50% ceiling can be in regard to
Panchayats in scheduled areas. The above
three-Judge Bench has also been approved
and reiterated by the Constitution Bench of
this Court in K. Krishna Murthy {(2010) 7 SCC
202}. In the above cases this Court was
examining the reservation in Panchayats. In
the context of Part IX of the Constitution, 50%
ceiling principle was applied but exception
was noticed.
xxx
xxx
xxx
480. From the above, it is clear that both the
Commission and the High Court treated the
extraordinary
situations
with
exceeding
50%
for
granting
reservation
to
Marathas,
the
regard
to
separate
fact
that
population of backward class is 85% and
reservation limit is only 50%. The above
extraordinary circumstances as opined by the
Commission and approved by the High Court
is not extraordinary situation as referred to in
para 810 of Indra Sawhney judgment. The
Marathas are dominant forward class and are
in the mainstream of national life. The above
situation is not an extraordinary situation
contemplated by Indra Sawhney judgment
and both the Commission and the High Court
fell
in
error
in
accepting
the
above
circumstances as extraordinary circumstance
for exceeding the 50% limit. At this stage, we
may notice that what was said by Dr.
Ambedkar
in
the
Constituent
Assembly
Debates dated 30-11-1948 while debating
draft Article 10(3) [Article 16(4) of the
Constitution]. Dr Ambedkar by giving an
illustration said: (CAD Vol. VII)
“… Supposing, for instance, we were to
concede
in
full
the
demand
of
those
communities who have not been so far
employed in the public services to the fullest
extent, what would really happen is, we shall
be completely destroying the first proposition
upon which we are all agreed, namely, that
there shall be an equality of opportunity. Let
me
give
an
illustration.
Supposing,
for
instance, reservations were made for a
community or a collection of communities, the
total of which came to something like 70% of
the total posts under the State and only 30%
are retained as the unreserved. Could
anybody say that the reservation of 30% as
open
to
general
competition
would
be
satisfactory from the point of view of giving
effect to the first principle, namely, that there
shall be equality of opportunity? It cannot be
in my judgment. Therefore the seats to be
reserved, if the reservation is to be consistent
with clause (1) of Article 10, must be confined
to a minority of seats. It is then only that the
first principle could find its place in the
Constitution and effective in operation.”
481. The illustration given by Dr Ambedkar
that supposing 70% posts are reserved and
30% may retain as unreserved, can anybody
say that 30% as open to general competition
would be satisfactory from point of view of
giving effect to the first principle of equality,
the answer given by Dr Ambedkar was in the
negative. Thus, Constituent Assembly by
giving illustration has already disapproved
principle which is now propounded by the
High Court. We cannot approve the view of
the High Court based on the same view taken
by the Commission.
xxx
xxx
xxx
515. The reservation under Article 16(4) of
the Constitution is enabling power of the
State to make any provision for reservation of
appointment or posts in favour of other
backward class of citizens who in the opinion
of the State is not adequately represented in
the services under the State. The condition
precedent for exercise of power under Article
16(4) are that the backward class is not
adequately represented in the services under
the State.
xxx
xxx
xxx
520. The word “adequate” is a relative term
used in relation to representation of different
caste and communities in public employment.
The objective of Article 16(4) is that backward
class should also be put in mainstream and
they are to be enabled to share power of the
State by affirmative action. To be part of
public service, as accepted by the society of
today, is to attain social status and play a role
in governance. The governance of the State
is through service personnel who play a key
role in implementing government policies, its
obligation and duties. The State for exercising
its enabling power to grant reservation under
Article 16(4) has to identify inadequacy in
representation of backward class who is not
adequately
represented.
For
finding
out
adequate representation, the representation
of backward class has to be contrasted with
representation of other classes including
forward classes. It is a relative term made in
reference to representation of backward
class, other caste and communities in public
services.
xxx
xxx
xxx
542. Indra Sawhney has categorically held
that what is required by the State for
providing reservation under Article 16(4) is
not proportionate representation but adequate
representation.
The
Commission
thus
proceeds to examine the entitlement under
Article 16(4) on the concept of proportionate
representation in the State services which is a
fundamental
error
committed
by
the
Commission.”
69.
While dealing with the scope and reach
of judicial scrutiny in Dr. Jaishri Laxmanrao
Patil (supra), at paragraphs 508, 509 and
515, it is stated as follows:
“508. Indra Sawhney had referred to the
judgment of this Court in Barium Chemicals
{AIR 1967 SC 295} for the scope and reach of
judicial scrutiny. We need to refer the test
enunciated
in
Barium
Chemicals.
The
Constitution Bench in Barium Chemicals had
occasion to consider the expression “if in the
opinion of the Central Government occurring
in Section 237 of the Companies Act, 1956”.
Hidayatullah, J. laid down that no doubt the
formation of opinion is subjective but the
existence of the circumstances relevant to the
inference as the sine qua non for action must
be demonstrable. The following observations
were made in para 27: (Barium Chemicals
case, AIR p. 309)
“27. … No doubt the formation of opinion is
subjective but the existence of circumstances
relevant to the inference as the sine qua non
for action must be demonstrable. If the action
is
questioned
on
the
ground
that
no
circumstances leading to an inference of the
kind contemplated by the section exists, the
action might be exposed to interference
unless the existence of the circumstances is
made out. As my Brother Shelat has put it
trenchantly: (Barium Chemicals case, AIR p.
325, para 64)
‘64. … It is not reasonable to say that the
clause permitted the Government to say that
it has formed the opinion on circumstances
which it thinks exist.…’
Since the existence of “circumstances” is a
condition fundamental to the making of an
opinion, the existence of the circumstances, if
questioned, has to be proved at least prima
facie.”
509. Shelat, J. with whom Hidayatullah, J.
has agreed in para 63 laid down the following:
(Barium Chemicals case, AIR p. 324)
“63. … Therefore, the words, “reason to
believe” or “in the opinion of” do not always
lead to the construction that the process of
entertaining “reason to believe” or “the
opinion” is an altogether subjective process
not lending itself even to a limited scrutiny by
the court that such “a reason to believe” or
“opinion” was not formed on relevant facts or
within the limits or as Lord Radcliffe and Lord
Reid called the restraints of the statute as an
alternative safeguard to rules of natural
justice where the function is administrative.”
515.
The reservation under Article 16(4) of
the Constitution is enabling power of the
State to make any provision for reservation of
appointment or posts in favour of other
backward class of citizens who in the opinion
of the State is not adequately represented in
the services under the State. The conditions
precedent for exercise of power under Article
16(4) are that the backward class is not
adequately represented in the services under
the State.”
70.
At paragraph 688, conclusions in
Dr.
Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil (supra) is recorded.
Conclusions relevant for our purpose, namely,
688.1 to 688.21 are reproduced here in
below.
“688. From our foregoing discussion and
finding we arrive at the following conclusions:
688.1. The greatest common measure of
agreement
in
six
separate
judgments
delivered in Indra Sawhney is:
688.1.1. Reservation under Article 16(4)
should not exceed 50%.
688.1.2. For exceeding reservation beyond
50%,
extraordinary
circumstances
as
indicated in para 810 of B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J.
should exist for which extreme caution is to
be exercised.
688.2. The 50% rule spoken in Balaji and
affirmed in Indra Sawhney is to fulfil the
objective of equality as engrafted in Article 14
of which Articles 15 and 16 are facets. 50% is
reasonable and it is to attain the object of
equality. To change the 50% limit is to have a
society which is not founded on equality but
based on caste rule.
688.3. We are of the considered opinion that
the cap on percentage of reservation as has
been laid down by the Constitution Bench in
Indra Sawhney is with the object of striking a
balance between the rights under Articles
15(1) and 15(4) as well as Articles 16(1) and
16(4). The cap on percentage is to achieve
principle of equality and with the object to
strike a balance which cannot be said to be
arbitrary or unreasonable.
688.4. Providing reservation for advancement
of any socially and educationally backward
class in public services is not the only means
and method for improving the welfare of
backward class. The State ought to bring
other
measures
including
providing
educational facilities to the members of
backward
class
free
of
cost,
giving
concession in fee, providing opportunities for
skill development to enable the candidates
from the backward class to be self-reliant.
688.5. There can be no quarrel that society
changes, law changes, people change but
that does not mean that something which is
good
and
proven
to
be
beneficial
in
maintaining equality in the society should also
be changed in the name of change alone.
688.6. When the Constitution Bench in Indra
Sawhney held that 50% is upper limit of
reservation under Article 16(4), it is the law
which is binding under Article 141 and to be
implemented.
688.7. We find that the Constitution Bench
judgment in Indra Sawhney is also fully
applicable in reference to Article 15(4) of the
Constitution of India.
688.8. The setting aside of 50% ceiling by the
eleven-Judge Bench in T.M.A. Pai Foundation
{(2002) 8 SCC 481} as was laid down by St.
Stephen’s case {(1992) 1 SCC 558} i.e. 50%
ceiling
in
admission
in
aided
minority
institutions has no bearing on the principle of
50% ceiling laid down by Indra Sawhney with
respect to reservation. The judgment of
T.M.A. Pai was in reference to rights of
minority under Article 30 and is not relevant
for reservation under Articles 16(4) and 15(4)
of the Constitution.
688.9.
The
Constitution
(Eighty-first
Amendment) Act, 2000 by which clause (4-B)
was inserted in Article 16 makes it clear that
ceiling
of
50%
“has
now
received
constitutional recognition”.
688.10. We fully endorse the submission of
Shri Rohatgi that extraordinary situations
indicated in para 810 of Indra Sawhney case
were only illustrative and cannot be said to be
exhaustive. We however do not agree with Mr
Rohatgi that para 810 provided only a
geographical test. The use of the expression
“on being out of the mainstream of national
life”, is a social test, which also needs to be
fulfilled for a case to be covered by exception.
688.11. We do not find any substance in any
of the 10 grounds urged by Shri Rohatgi and
Shri Kapil Sibal for revisiting and referring the
judgment of Indra Sawhney to a larger Bench.
688.12. What was held by the Constitution
Bench in Indra Sawhney on the relevance
and significance of the principle of stare
decisis clearly binds us. The judgment of
Indra Sawhney has stood the test of time and
has never been doubted by any judgment of
this Court. The Constitution Bench judgment
of this Court in Indra Sawhney neither needs
to be revisited nor referred to a larger Bench
for consideration.
688.13. The Constitution Bench in M. Nagaraj
does not contain any ratio that ceiling of 50%
reservation may be exceeded by showing
quantifiable contemporary data relating to
backwardness.
The
Commission
has
completely misread the ratio of the judgment,
when the Commission took the view that on
the quantifiable data ceiling of 50% can be
breached.
688.14. The Commission and the High Court
found
existence
of
the
extraordinary
situations with regard to exceeding 50%
ceiling in respect to grant of separate
reservation
to
Marathas
because
the
population of backward class is 80% and
reservation limit is only 50%, containing the
Marathas in pre-existing reservation for OBC
shall
not
be
justice
to
them,
which
circumstance is not covered under the
parameters indicated in Indra Sawhney case
as extraordinary circumstance to breach 50%
ceiling.
688.15. We have found that no extraordinary
circumstances were made out in granting
separate reservation of Maratha community
by exceeding the 50% ceiling limit of
reservation.
The
2018 Act
violates
the
principle of equality as enshrined in Article 16.
The exceeding of ceiling limit without there
being any extraordinary circumstances clearly
violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution
which makes the enactment ultra vires.
688.16. The proposition is well settled that
Commissions’ reports are to be looked into
with
deference.
However,
one
of
the
parameter of scrutiny of Commission’s report
as approved by this Court is that on the basis
of data and materials referred to in the report
whether
conclusions
arrived
at
by
the
Commission are justified.
688.17. The measures taken under Articles
15(4) and 16(4) can be examined as to
whether
they
violate
any
constitutional
principle, and are in conformity with the rights
under Articles
14,
and
of
the
Constitution. The scrutiny of measures taken
by the State, either executive or legislative,
thus, has to pass the test of constitutional
scrutiny.
688.18. The word “adequate” is a relative
term used in relation to representation of
different castes and communities in public
employment. The objective of Article 16(4) is
that backward class should also be put in
mainstream to enable to share power of the
State by affirmative action. To be part of
public service, as accepted by the society of
today, is to attain social status and play a role
in governance.
688.19. We have examined the issues
regarding representation of Marathas in State
services on the basis of facts and materials
compiled by Commission and obtained from
the
States
and
other
sources.
The
representation of Marathas in public services
in Grades A, B, C and D comes to 33.23%,
29.03%, 37.06% and 36.53% computed from
out of the open category filled posts, is
adequate and satisfactory representation of
Maratha community. One community bagging
such number of posts in public services is a
matter of pride for the community and its
representation in no manner can be said to
be not adequate in public services.
688.20. The Constitutional precondition for
providing reservation as mandated by Article
16(4) is that the backward class is not
adequately represented in the public services.
The
Commission
misconception
that
laboured
under
unless
Maratha
community is not represented equivalent to its
proportion, it is not adequately represented.
Indra Sawhney has categorically held that
what is required by the State for providing
reservation
under
Article
16(4)
is
not
proportionate representation but adequate
representation.
688.21. The Constitutional precondition as
mandated by Article 16(4) being not fulfilled
with regard to Maratha class, both the
Gaikwad Commission’s Report/Report of the
Gaikwad
Commission
and
consequential
legislation are unsustainable.”
71.
In Jarnail Singh & Others-II (supra),
with regard to proportionate representation as
test of adequacy in promotional posts, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court
had observed as
follows:
“3) PROPORTIONATE REPRESENTATION
AS TEST OF ADEQUACY
30. In R.K. Sabharwal (supra), it was
observed that State Governments may take
the total population of a particular Backward
Class and its representation in the State
services for the purpose of coming to a
conclusion
that
there
is
inadequate
representation in the State services. In M.
Nagaraj (supra), this Court was of the
considered view that the exercise of collecting
quantifiable data depends on numerous
factors, with conflicting claims to be optimised
by the administration in the context of local
prevailing conditions in public employment.
As equity, justice and efficiency are variable
factors and are context-specific, how these
factors should be identified and counterbalanced will depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case. The attempt of
the learned Attorney General for India to
impress upon this Court that the proportion of
SCs and STs in the population of India should
be taken as the test for determining whether
they
are
adequately
represented
in
promotional posts, did not yield results. This
Court in Jarnail Singh (supra) found no fault
with M. Nagaraj (supra) regarding the test for
determining the adequacy of representation in
promotional
posts
in
the
State.
While
emphasising the contrast in the language
used between Article 330 and Articles 16(4-A)
and 16(4-B) of the Constitution, this Court
declined the invitation of the learned Attorney
General for India to hold that the proportion of
SCs and STs to the population of India should
be the test for determining inadequacy of
representation
in
promotional
posts.
Therefore, we are not persuaded to express
any opinion on this aspect. It is for the State
to assess the inadequacy of representation of
SCs and STs in promotional posts, by taking
into account relevant factors.”
72.
While striking down Rule 9.3 of the
Madhya
Pradesh
Medical
and
Dental
Graduate Entrance Examination Rules, 2003,
which increased the percent of reservation to
56.94%, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh,
in Mayank Jain (supra) had observed as
follows:
“In this context we may refer with profit
to the Constitution Bench decision rendered
in the case of Dr. Preeti Shrivastava v. State
of M.P. and Ors., {AIR 1999 SC 2894},
wherein the Apex Court held as under:-"...... While the object of Article 15(4) is to
advance equality principle by providing for
protective discrimination in favour of the
weaker sections so that they may become
stronger and be able to compete equality with
others more fortunate, one can not also
ignore the wider interests of society while
devising
such
Undoubtedly,
special
protective
provisions.
discrimination
in
favour of backward, including Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes is as much in
the interest of society as the protected
groups. At the same time, there may be other
national
interests,
such
as
promoting
excellence at the highest level and providing
the best talent in the country with the
maximum available facilities to excel and
contribute to society, which have also to be
borne in mind. Special provisions must strike
a reasonable balance between these diverse
national
interests.
Moreover,
study
and
training at the level of specialities and superspecialities in medicine involve discharging
the duties attached to certain specified
medical posts in the hospitals attached to the
medical
institutions
giving
education
in
specialities and super-specialities....…"
We are conscious that the aforesaid
decision was rendered in the context of
reservation
for
admission
to
the
Post
Graduate Course in various professional
faculties but we have referred to the aforesaid
paragraph to indicate what is the view of the
Apex Court in relation to weaker sections and
what their Lordships have stated therein. We
may repeat at the cost of repetition that the
cause put forth by the State for advancement
of the weaker section can not distort the
dictum of the Apex Court. It was contended
before us that in certain exceptional cases
extra reservation is permissible. But, in our
considered opinion, the present one does not
fit into the said prism. When the students are
appearing in the examination harbouring
hope that when they would qualify they would
be selected their hopes can not be marred or
smothered by ushering in a rule of this type.
The said Rule does not subserve the
constitutional philosophy and as we have
noted earlier it runs contrary to the principles
laid down by the Apex Court. If we allow
ourselves to say so, an innovative attempt
has been made to frame a rule to enhance
the conception of reservation which the law
prescribes. By no stretch of rationalization or
ratiocination it can be conceived that this is
the field where this innovative approach is
warranted. On the contrary, it is absolutely
unthinkable.”
73.
Grant of reservation under Articles 15(4)
or 16(4), either by legislative measure or by
an executive order are measures which act
as
a
tool
and
means
to
attain
the
constitutional goal of fulfilment of the principle
of equality. Such reservation are enabling
provisions to facilitate the State to make any
provision for reservation for appointment on a
post in favour of backward class of citizens.
Unless the educational and economic interest
of the weaker sections of the people are
promoted
by
affirmative
action,
the
constitutional goal of establishing social and
economic equality will not be attained and as
such, while Article 15(4) provides for making
any special provision for the advancement of
any socially and educationally backward
classes of citizens or for the SCs and STs,
Article 15(5) provides for making any special
provision for advancement of any socially and
educationally backward classes of citizens or
for the SCs and STs relating to their
admission to educational institutions including
aided
or
unaided
private
educational
institutions other than minority educational
institutions referred to in Article 30(1). It is
worth remembering that framers of the
Constitution intended the Constitution to bring
in winds of social change in a caste-ridden
society. It needs no reiteration that equality
has been recognized as a basic feature of our
Constitution and to preserve equality, a
harmonious balance has to be struck to
ensure that the fundamental ethos and the
spirit as encapsulated in Articles 14 and 16
reign supreme and at the same time, to
ensure that it galvanises social and economic
upliftment of the backward classes. The
condition precedent for exercise of power
under Article 16(4) is that backward class is
not adequately represented in the services
under the State. Reservation can be made in
service and educational institutions only when
the State is satisfied that representation of
backward classes of citizens therein is not
adequate. In order to ascertain the extent of
reservation, the State has to justify the
existence of compelling reasons, namely,
backwardness, inadequacy in representation
and overall administrative efficiency before
making provision for reservation.
74.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indra
Sawhney (supra) had observed that not only
should a class be a backward class for
meriting reservations, it should also be
inadequately represented in the services
under the State. The language of Clause (4)
makes it clear that the question whether a
backward class of citizens is not adequately
represented in the services under the State is
a matter within the subjective satisfaction of
the State. This opinion can be formed by the
State on its own, i.e., on the basis of the
material it has in its possession already or it
may
gather
such
material
through
a
Commission/Committee, person or authority.
There must be some material upon which the
opinion is formed. While observing that in a
matter of the present nature, the Court should
show due deference to the opinion of the
State, it does not, however, mean that the
opinion formed is beyond judicial scrutiny
altogether. It was further held that Article
16(4) speaks about adequate representation
and not proportionate representation and
adequate representation cannot be read as
proportionate representation. Accordingly, it
was held that it was not possible to accept the
theory
of
proportionate
representation,
though
the
proportion
population
of
of
backward classes to the total population
would certainly be relevant. It was held that
the power conferred by Article 16(4) should
be exercised reasonably and fairly, in a fair
manner and within reasonably limits - and
what is more reasonable than to say that
reservation under Clause 16(4) shall not
exceed 50% of the appointments or posts,
barring
certain
extra-ordinary
situations.
Accordingly, it was held that it is an irresistible
conclusion that the reservation contemplated
in Article 16(4) should not exceed 50%.
While holding 50% to be the rule, it was also
observed that it is necessary to point out
certain extraordinary situations inherent in the
great diversity of our country and the people.
It might so happen that in far-flung and
remote areas the population inhabiting those
areas might, on account of their being out of
the main stream of national life and in view of
conditions peculiar to and characteristical to
them, they need to be treated in a different
way, some relaxation in this strict rule may
become imperative. In doing so, extreme
caution is to be exercised and a special case
made out. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also
held that for the purpose of applying the rule
of 50%, a year should be taken as the unit
and not the entire strength of the cadre,
service or the unit, as the case may be.
*
*
*
*
*
*
82. Special provisions contemplated by Article
15(4),
15(5)
or
16(4)
must
be
within
reasonable limits. As noted earlier, it was
observed in Balaji (supra) that a special
provision should be less than 50% and how
much less than 50% would depend upon the
relevant prevailing circumstances in each
case. Any reservation contemplated in Article
16(4) should not exceed 50% was held to be
the rule in Indra Sawhney (supra), which can
be breached only on certain extraordinary
situations and on a special case made out. It
was also observed that such power has to be
exercised with extreme caution.
In Indra
Sawhney (supra), it was categorically held
what is required by the State for providing
reservation
under
Article
is
not
proportionate representation, but adequate
representation, which cannot be read as
proportionate
representation.
The
principle
reiterated
Dr.
was
in
said
Jaishri
Laxmanrao Patil (supra). In Nagaraj (supra)
also, ceiling limit of 50% was reiterated. It
was also held that reservation under Article
16(4) should not exceed 50% and for
exceeding reservation beyond 50%, there has
to be extraordinary circumstances as held in
Indra Sawhney (supra). It was further held
that the judgment in Indra Sawhney (supra)
is fully applicable in reference to Article 15(4).
It was further held that Constitution 81st
Amendment Act 2000 by which clause 4(B)
was inserted in Article 16 makes it clear that
ceiling
of
50%
has
now
received
constitutional recognition.
83.
In view of the above, the principles
enunciated regarding the ceiling of 50% in
Indra Sawhney (supra) are also applicable in
respect of Article 15(5) of the Constitution.”
56. The next and most important question is the effect of the order
dated 01.05.2023 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLP
(C) Nos.18816-18817 of 2022 and connected proceedings. The
respondents have heavily relied upon the said order to contend
that the recruitment process was protected and that the State was
permitted to proceed with appointments and promotions.
57. There can be no dispute that the order dated 01.05.2023 is
binding upon all concerned and must be given its full effect.
However, the said order has to be understood in its proper context
and in the manner in which it was passed. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court
permitted
the
State
to
proceed
with
the
selection/recruitment and promotion processes and to make
appointments and promotions, but expressly directed that such
appointments and promotions would remain subject to the result
of the proceedings pending before it. Thus, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court did not finally adjudicate upon or approve the constitutional
validity of the reservation arrangement. Equally, the order did not
confer a permanent or indefeasible right upon any selected
candidate.
58. The expression "subject to the outcome" employed by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court is of decisive significance. It indicates that the
process may continue so that public administration is not brought
to a standstill, but the rights created pursuant thereto remain
provisional and subordinate to the final adjudication of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court. In other words, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
balanced
two
competing
considerations:
the
immediate
administrative necessity of filling vacancies and maintaining
functioning of the State machinery, and the requirement that the
final rights of the parties should abide by the ultimate decision
concerning the validity of the reservation framework.
59. The interim protection granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court,
therefore, cannot be construed as an order validating the quashed
notification dated 29.11.2012 or the model rosters which were
declared unconstitutional by this Court. Nor can it be read as
authorising the State to disregard the constitutional limitations
governing
reservation.
The
protection
is
procedural
and
conditional in nature; it is not a declaration of substantive validity.
60. This distinction assumes considerable importance. If the order
dated 01.05.2023 were interpreted as reviving the quashed
reservation notification for all purposes, the words "subject to the
outcome of the proceedings" would become meaningless. The
very purpose of imposing such condition was to ensure that
whatever appointments or promotions were made during the
pendency of the proceedings would remain capable of being
moulded in accordance with the final decision of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court. Therefore, the State was entitled to proceed with
the process, but it was not entitled to treat the reservation
arrangement as finally settled or to confer upon the selected
candidates an absolute right immune from the final decision of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court.
61. The Court is also unable to accept the submission of the
respondents
that
the
order
dated
01.05.2023
completely
immunises the impugned advertisement from judicial scrutiny. The
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 does not stand excluded
merely because proceedings on the reservation issue are pending
before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The question before this Court
is whether the respondent authorities acted in accordance with
the law declared by this Court and whether the recruitment
process, particularly the reservation roster adopted therein, could
legally be sustained after the judgment dated 19.09.2022. The
pendency of the Special Leave Petition does not authorise the
executive to proceed as though the judgment dated 19.09.2022
had never been delivered. At the same time, the order dated
01.05.2023 prevents this Court from directing that all recruitment
and promotion activity must come to an end. The two judicial
orders have, therefore, to be harmoniously implemented.
62. The proper approach, in the opinion of this Court, is to recognise
that the respondents may continue the recruitment and promotion
process in view of the liberty granted by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court, but every consequential right arising from such process
must remain expressly subject to the final decision in the pending
proceedings. This approach neither nullifies the order of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court nor permits the respondents to claim that
the reservation arrangement has received final judicial approval.
63. The impugned advertisement, insofar as it adopts the reservation
pattern founded upon the notification dated 29.11.2012 and the
consequential model rosters already declared unconstitutional,
therefore cannot be sustained in its present form. The State
authorities were required to proceed in accordance with the
reservation framework legally available to them after the judgment
dated 19.09.2022, subject always to the protection and conditions
contained in the order dated 01.05.2023 of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court. The State could not achieve indirectly, through the
impugned advertisement and consequential roster, what stood
directly invalidated by the judgment of this Court. The principle of
judicial discipline applies not merely to formal compliance with the
operative portion of a judgment but also to executive action which
has the effect of substantially reproducing the very arrangement
that has been declared unconstitutional.
64. The contention of the respondents that the excessive numerical
figures are explained by the inclusion of backlog vacancies
cannot, therefore, be accepted as a complete answer. The
existence of backlog vacancies may explain why a particular
recruitment may contain a numerical composition different from
the ordinary reservation percentage. But it cannot answer the
prior question as to whether the reservation points forming the
foundation of those backlog vacancies were themselves legally
sustainable. The State must necessarily distinguish between a
vacancy lawfully carried forward from a valid reservation roster
and a vacancy claimed to be backlog merely because it arose
under
a
reservation
arrangement
subsequently
declared
unconstitutional.
65. The Court is not holding that backlog vacancies, as a class, are
constitutionally impermissible. On the contrary, backlog vacancies
are
recognised
in
the
constitutional
scheme.
What
is
impermissible is to employ the concept of backlog to preserve,
perpetuate or revive a reservation arrangement which has ceased
to have legal efficacy. The respondents must, therefore, undertake
the recruitment exercise on the basis of a legally sustainable
roster and thereafter give due effect to the order dated 01.05.2023
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The material placed before this
Court further shows that the petitioners approached this Court
promptly. The examination was conducted on 10.06.2023, the
result was declared on 02.07.2023 and the proceedings were
instituted on 06.07.2023, i.e. before the first selection list dated
12.08.2023. Thus, the petitioners cannot be non-suited on the
ground of delay, acquiescence or having approached the Court
only after their non-selection. The petitioners participated in the
examination because they were otherwise qualified and because
the recruitment process was open to them. Participation in an
unconstitutional or legally defective selection process cannot
operate as an estoppel against a candidate challenging the
legality of the reservation arrangement, particularly when the
challenge was raised at the earliest available opportunity.
66. The Court is equally conscious that the recruitment concerns a
large number of vacancies and that several candidates may have
already been selected or appointed. This Court is not inclined to
direct wholesale termination of appointments already made. Such
a direction would be contrary to the protective approach adopted
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and would also cause avoidable
administrative disruption. The appropriate relief must, therefore,
be moulded so as to protect both the constitutional rights of the
petitioners and the interests of candidates who have already
participated in the recruitment.
67. Article 226 confers wide powers upon the High Court to mould
relief according to the facts and circumstances of the case. The
Court is not required to adopt an all-or-nothing approach. Where
the illegality lies in the manner in which the reservation roster has
been applied, and where the recruitment has proceeded during
the pendency of litigation pursuant to orders of the constitutional
courts, the Court can direct reconsideration and continuation of
the process in a manner which preserves the rights of all
concerned. In the present cases, such a course is particularly
appropriate because the final determination regarding the
reservation framework is pending before the Hon'ble Supreme
Court.
68. It is accordingly held that the respondents were not justified in
treating the notification dated 29.11.2012 and the consequential
model rosters, insofar as they were declared unconstitutional by
the judgment dated 19.09.2022, as an independent and
unrestricted source of authority for prescribing the impugned
reservation. The impugned advertisement and the consequential
recruitment process, to that extent, cannot be permitted to operate
as though the quashed reservation framework continues to have
unconditional and final legal validity.
69. At the same time, this Court cannot ignore the subsequent order
dated 01.05.2023 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The
said order expressly permits the process of recruitment and
promotion to go on, but makes the resultant appointments and
promotions subject to the final outcome of the proceedings
pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. This Court is,
therefore, required to preserve the recruitment process rather
than bring it to an absolute halt, while ensuring that no candidate
obtains an indefeasible right contrary to the ultimate decision of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
70. In this view of the matter, the appropriate relief would be to allow
the writ petitions and direct the respondents to proceed with the
recruitment process in accordance with law, subject to the final
outcome of SLP (C) Nos.18816-18817 of 2022 and connected
proceedings. The respondents shall ensure that the candidature
of the petitioners and other similarly situated candidates is
considered in accordance with the legally permissible reservation
framework and the directions of the competent constitutional
courts. It is made clear that this Court is not directing that any
candidate belonging to any particular category should be
displaced merely on the basis of the present judgment. The
protection granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 01.05.2023
shall remain operative. Any appointment already made pursuant
to the impugned recruitment shall continue, but such continuation
shall be expressly subject to the final outcome of the proceedings
pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
71. Similarly, the State shall be at liberty to proceed with further
appointments
and
promotions
so
that
the
administrative
functioning of the State is not adversely affected. However, every
such appointment or promotion shall carry a clear and
unambiguous stipulation that the appointment/promotion is
subject to the final outcome of SLP (C) Nos.18816-18817 of 2022
and connected matters and to any further order that may be
passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The said stipulation shall
not be treated as a mere formality. It shall constitute an integral
and enforceable condition of every appointment order, promotion
order and consequential service order issued pursuant to the
recruitment/promotion
process
covered
by
the
present
controversy. The authorities shall ensure that the condition is
incorporated in the body of the order itself and not merely by way
of a separate communication or internal departmental note.
72. The reason for issuing such a direction is apparent. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court, while permitting the recruitment and promotion
process to proceed, has consciously protected the final
adjudication by making the appointments and promotions subject
to the outcome of the pending proceedings. Any appointment or
promotion made without incorporating such condition would dilute
the protection expressly granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
and may create equities which were never intended to arise
during the pendency of the proceedings.
73. Consequently, no selected candidate shall claim that mere
issuance of an appointment order during the pendency of the
proceedings
has
conferred
an
absolute,
indefeasible
or
irreversible right upon him or her in respect of continuation in
service, seniority, promotion, consequential benefits or any other
service benefit, insofar as such right is affected by the final
determination of the reservation issue pending before the Hon'ble
Supreme Court.
74. Correspondingly, the petitioners shall also not be denied
consideration merely on the ground that the recruitment process
has already progressed or that appointments have been made.
Their candidature shall be considered in accordance with the
directions issued herein and in conformity with the final decision of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court. If, upon implementation of the final
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, any consequential
reworking of the selection, appointment, seniority or promotion
becomes necessary, the respondents shall undertake such
exercise strictly in accordance with law.
75. The Court further directs that the respondents shall not treat the
order dated 01.05.2023 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as
a declaration of validity of the reservation notification dated
29.11.2012 or the model rosters which were the subject matter of
the judgment dated 19.09.2022. The said order is to be
understood as permitting continuation of the process, subject to
the final adjudication. The substantive validity of the reservation
framework shall remain open to and governed by the final
decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. This construction, in the
opinion of the Court, strikes the constitutionally appropriate
balance. On one hand, it gives full respect to the judgment dated
19.09.2022
and
the
constitutional
principles
governing
reservation; on the other hand, it gives full effect to the
subsequent order dated 01.05.2023 of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court permitting the State to proceed with recruitment and
promotion. It also protects the interests of candidates who have
already been appointed while preserving the rights of the
petitioners and similarly situated candidates.
76. The Court accordingly holds that the petitioners have made out a
case for interference. The reservation arrangement reflected in
the impugned advertisement, insofar as it proceeds upon the
quashed notification dated 29.11.2012 and the consequential
model rosters declared unconstitutional, cannot be sustained as
an independent and unconditional basis for making appointments.
The respondents are consequently required to regulate the further
recruitment exercise in accordance with law and subject to the
final outcome of the proceedings pending before the Hon'ble
Supreme Court. In the peculiar facts of the present cases,
however, the relief shall not take the form of annulment of every
appointment already made pursuant to the impugned recruitment.
Such a course would be neither necessary nor consistent with the
order dated 01.05.2023 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
Instead, all such appointments shall remain protected subject to
the final outcome of the proceedings pending before the Hon'ble
Supreme Court. The same principle shall apply to promotions
already made or which may hereafter be made during the
pendency of the proceedings.
77. In view of the foregoing discussion and the findings recorded
hereinabove, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
petitioners have made out a case for interference under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. The impugned advertisement
dated 04.05.2023, insofar as it proceeds upon and gives effect to
the reservation arrangement founded upon the notification dated
29.11.2012 and the consequential model rosters which had
already been declared unconstitutional by this Court in WPC
No.591 of 2012 and connected matters, cannot be sustained in
law. Accordingly, the impugned advertisement dated 04.05.2023,
to
the
extent
it
incorporates
the
aforesaid
reservation
arrangement, is hereby quashed and set aside.
78. Consequently, all consequential actions taken by the respondents
on the basis of the impugned reservation arrangement shall stand
subject to the directions contained in this judgment and, more
importantly, to the final outcome of SLP (C) Nos.18816-18817 of
2022 and connected proceedings pending before the Hon'ble
Supreme Court. This Court, however, considers it neither
necessary nor appropriate to direct wholesale cancellation of the
recruitment process or termination of candidates who have
already been appointed, particularly in view of the specific order
dated 01.05.2023 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
permitting the State to proceed with the process subject to the
final outcome of the proceedings.
79. Accordingly, the respondents are directed to proceed with the
recruitment and promotion process in accordance with law and in
conformity with the order dated 01.05.2023 passed by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court. The respondents shall reconsider and regulate
the vacancies and the reservation roster in accordance with the
law declared by this Court, subject to the final adjudication by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid proceedings.
80. It is made clear that the setting aside of the impugned
advertisement, to the extent indicated hereinabove, shall not
result in automatic termination of the persons who have already
been appointed pursuant thereto. Their appointments shall
continue, but strictly subject to the final outcome of SLP (C)
Nos.18816-18817 of 2022 and connected matters and any further
order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. No appointee shall,
therefore, claim any indefeasible right on the basis of such
appointment contrary to the final decision of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court.
81. The respondents shall, however, ensure that every appointment
order issued hereafter pursuant to the recruitment process in
question contains, in clear and unambiguous terms, a specific
stipulation that the appointment is "subject to the final outcome
of
SLP (C)
Nos.18816-18817
of
and
connected
proceedings pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and
to any further order passed therein." The said stipulation shall
constitute an integral condition of such appointment and shall be
specifically incorporated in the appointment order itself.
82. Similarly, every promotion order issued hereafter, where the
promotion is in any manner connected with or affected by the
reservation framework which is the subject matter of the
proceedings before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, shall specifically
record that such promotion is subject to the final outcome of SLP
(C) Nos.18816-18817 of 2022 and connected proceedings and to
any further order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court therein.
The concerned authorities shall not issue any such promotion
order without incorporating the aforesaid condition. It is further
directed that the same condition shall be incorporated, wherever
applicable,
in
orders
relating
to
seniority,
confirmation,
regularisation or any other consequential service benefit arising
out of the appointments or promotions made during the pendency
of the proceedings before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The
purpose of such stipulation is to ensure that no equity is created in
favour of any individual which may operate to defeat or frustrate
the final judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
83. Upon final adjudication of the aforesaid proceedings by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court, the respondent authorities shall be
bound to give full and consequential effect to the judgment/order
so
rendered.
If
such
final
adjudication
necessitates
re-
determination of the reservation roster, selection, appointment,
promotion, seniority or any other consequential service benefit,
the competent authorities shall undertake the necessary exercise
strictly in accordance with the final directions of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court.
84. It is clarified that this Court has not expressed any final opinion
upon the ultimate validity of the reservation framework which is
presently under consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
The relief granted herein is intended to give effect to the judgment
dated 19.09.2022 passed by this Court, while simultaneously
preserving the liberty granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court by its
order dated 01.05.2023 to continue the recruitment and promotion
process subject to the final outcome of the pending proceedings.
85. For the reasons aforesaid, the batch of writ petitions is allowed.
The impugned advertisement dated 04.05.2023, insofar as it gives
effect to the reservation arrangement founded upon the
notification dated 29.11.2012 and the consequential model rosters
declared unconstitutional by this Court, is quashed and set aside.
The consequential recruitment and promotion processes shall,
however, be permitted to continue in terms of the order dated
01.05.2023 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, subject to the
final outcome of SLP (C) Nos.18816-18817 of 2022 and
connected matters.
86. All interim orders, if any, shall stand merged in this final order,
subject to the directions contained herein.
87. There shall be no order as to costs.
Sd/(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Yogesh
The date when the
judgment is
reserved
06.08.2026
The date when the
judgment is
pronounced
14.10.2026
The date when the judgment is
uploaded on the website
Operative
Full
------
14.10.2026
Head-Note
Constitutional validity of reservation — Effect of judicial declaration of
invalidity — Executive authorities cannot act upon a reservation
framework already held unconstitutional, unless protected by a
subsequent
order
of
the
Supreme
Court
—
Recruitment/
appointment/promotion may proceed subject to the final outcome of
proceedings pending before the Supreme Court, with consequential
orders expressly made subject thereto.
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