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Serial No.01
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
Crl.M.C. No. 108/2023
Date of order: 19.02.2024
The Union of India & ors
Wallam Jingsuk Barim
vs
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice S. Vaidyanathan, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner
:
For the Respondents :
Mr. G. Yobi, Adv.
Mr. P. Yobin, Adv.
Mr. S. Singpho, Adv.
Mr. K.V. Kharlyngdoh, Adv.
Dr. N. Mozika, DSG with
Mr. K. Ch Gautam, Adv.
Ms. A. Pradhan, Adv.
ORDER
(Made by Hon’ble, the Chief Justice)
The petitioner is arrayed as an Accused No.3 (A3) in connection
with a Special NIA Case No.1 of 2022 (NIA Case No.RC-7/2022)
registered for the alleged offences punishable under Section
120B/121/121A/122 IPC read with Sections 3 and 5 of the Explosive
Substance Act, 1908 and a Charge Sheet was filed vide Charge Sheet
No.18/2022 dated 29.07.2022 under Section 120B IPC r/w Section 6 of
Explosive Substance Act, 1908.
2. The petitioner had moved bail applications before the Special
Judge (NIA) and the same was rejected on 22.09.2022, 09.03.2023 and
21.08.2023. Thereafter, the petitioner has filed a bail application before
this Court, which was taken up as Bail No.48 of 2023 and the same was
withdrawn on 28.09.2023 with liberty to file afresh application.
3. According to the petitioner, there are no materials to implicate
the petitioner, who is said to be a member of the banned Hynniewtrep
National Liberation Council (HNLC) and there is no order of detention
under Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. It is submitted by the
petitioner that for an offence falling under Section 120B IPC namely,
criminal conspiracy, the maximum punishment that can be imposed as
per the provision of the Act is either death or imprisonment for life and
there is no iota of evidence to show that the petitioner had deliberately
conspired with others to commit the offence of bomb blasting under
Section 6 of the Explosive Substance Act, 1908, thereby the petitioner
had abetted the offence.
4. It is further submitted by the petitioner that he is in judicial
custody for one year, nine months and twenty-five days as on the date
of filing this application on 13.12.2023 and that the prosecution has
enlisted 64 witnesses to be examined, which shows that the trial will
take numerous time and further incarceration of the petitioner in judicial
custody will cause great prejudice and affect the petitioner to effectively
prepare his defence for the fair trial.
5. It is also submitted that the Special Judge has failed to
appreciate the plea of the petitioner that he has nothing to do with
HNLC. Even though various averments have been raised in support of
the bail application, we are concerned only with regard to the
condonation of delay in entertaining the main appeal and according to
the petitioner, there is a delay of 114 days in filing the appeal.
6. The Special Judge (NIA) has rejected the last bail application
on 21.08.2023 and on receipt of the certified copy of the order on
13.09.2023, the Bail Application No.48 of 2023 was moved before this
Court, which was disposed of with liberty to the petitioner to file afresh
application. It was reiterated that the delay of 114 days will not cause
any prejudice to anyone except the petitioner, who is under
incarceration for nearly two years.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously argued that
though there is a limitation period prescribed under Section 21 of the
National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, the period of 30 days with
further 90 days to enable the Court to condone the delay in preferring
the appeal, the outer limit prescribed under the said provision is not an
absolute one, as the bail is the rule and jail is the exception. For the sake
of convenience, Section 21 is extracted below:
―21. Appeals.
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, an appeal
shall lie from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an
interlocutory order, of a Special Court to the High Court both
on facts and on law.
(2) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be heard by a bench
of two Judges of the High Court and shall, as far as possible,
be disposed of within a period of three months from the date
of admission of the appeal.
(3) Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie to any
Court from any judgment, sentence or order including an
interlocutory order of a Special Court.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) of
section 378 of the Code, an appeal shall lie to the High Court
against an order of the Special Court granting or refusing
bail.
(5) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a
period of thirty days from the date of the judgment, sentence
or order appealed from:
Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal after
the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied
that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the
appeal within the period of thirty days:
Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained after the
expiry of period of ninety days.‖
8. The respondent / NIA has filed the affidavit dated 07.02.2024,
stating that the petitioner was involved in a serious offence of crime and
permission was sought to reserve liberty to put forth the submissions on
merits in the bail application and confine the arguments with regard to
the non-maintainability of the application to condone the delay of 114
days in preferring the appeal.
9. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that there is no
sufficient cause shown by the petitioner to condone the delay of 114
days and in terms of Section 21 of the Act, which is referred to supra,
no application can be entertained beyond the outer time limit of 30 days
as prescribed under the Act of 2008. He has further contended that the
provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 much less Section 29 (2) will not
be applicable to this case, as the Act of 2008 is a special law, governing
the proceedings relating to the offences falling under the said Act.
Section 29 (2) of the Act, 1963 reads as follows:
“29(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for
any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation
different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the
provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the
period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of
determining any period of limitation prescribed for any
suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the
provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall
apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are
not expressly excluded by such special or local law.”
Thus, it was stated that the petitioner, having not shown any sufficient
cause for condoning the delay of 114 days in preferring the appeal, has
no statutory right to seek for condonation of delay and hence, the
application ought to be rejected at the threshold.
9.1. Learned counsel for the respondent has referred to the
following judgments in support of his contention that when there was a
restriction pressed into service in entertaining a delay petition, as the
power to condone the delay is restricted under the first proviso to subsection (5) of Section 21:
i) Nasir Ahammed vs. National Investigation Agency, reported in
MANU/KE/1598/2015/(2015) 3KLT 320;
19. In Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board v. Central
Electricity Regulatory Commission MANU/SC/0252/2010:
(2010 (2) KLT SN 34 (C. No. 43) SC : (2010) 5 SCC 23), the
Supreme Court held thus:
"32. In view of the above discussion, we hold that
S. 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked by this
Court for entertaining an appeal filed against the
decision or order of the Tribunal beyond the period of
120 days specified in S. 125 of the Electricity Act and
its proviso. Any interpretation of S. 125 of the
Electricity Act which may attract the applicability of S.
5 of the Limitation Act read with S. 29(2) thereof will
defeat the object of the legislation, namely, to provide
special limitation for filing an appeal against the
decision or order of the Tribunal and the proviso to S.
125 will become nugatory."
The N.I.A. Act is an Act to constitute an investigation
agency at the national level to investigate and prosecute
offences affecting the sovereignty, security and integrity of
India, security of State, friendly relations with foreign States
and offences under Acts enacted to implement international
treaties, agreements, conventions and resolutions of the United
Nations, its agencies and other international organizations and
for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The
superintendence of the N.I.A. shall vest in the Central
Government, as provided in S. 4 of the N.I.A. Act. S. 6
provides for investigation of scheduled offences. S. 7 provides
that the N.I.A. may request the State Government to associate
itself with the investigation. S. 9 mandates that the State
Government shall extend all assistance and co-operation to the
Agency for investigation of the scheduled offences. Special
courts are constituted under S. 11 for the trial of scheduled
offences. S. 15 of the N.I.A. Act provides for appointment of
Public Prosecutors and Additional Public Prosecutors. S. 16
provides for the procedure and powers of Special Courts. S. 19
of the N.I.A. Act states that the trial under the Act of any
offence by a Special Court shall be held on day-to-day basis on
all working days and have precedence over the trial of any
other case against the accused in any other Court (not being a
Special Court) and shall be concluded in preference to the trial
of such other case and accordingly the trial of such other case
shall, if necessary, remain in abeyance. Sub-section (2) of S.
21 states that every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be heard
by a Bench of two Judges of the High Court and shall, as far as
possible, be disposed of within a period of three months from
the date of admission of the appeal. The scope of the provisos
to sub-section (5) of S. 21 of the N.I.A. Act has to be
considered in the light of the other provisions in the Act. The
period of limitation provided under sub-section (5) of S. 21 is
thirty days. The first proviso to sub-section (5) empowers the
High Court to entertain an appeal after the expiry of thirty
days, if it is satisfied that the appellant has sufficient cause for
not preferring the appeal within the period of thirty days. The
second proviso provides that no appeal shall be entertained
after the expiry of the period of ninety days. The first proviso
to sub-section (5) of S. 21 itself deals with condonation of
delay in filing appeal and the delay up to sixty days (ninety
days from the date of order) can be condoned by the High
Court. By making a restriction that no appeal shall be
entertained after the expiry of the period of ninety days, the
application of S. 5 of the Limitation Act is expressly excluded.
The High Court has jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing
the appeal. But that power is restricted under the first proviso
to sub-section (5) of S. 21. A further restriction in the second
proviso is a clear indication that the High Court cannot
exercise the power under S. 5 of the Limitation Act to condone
the delay. To that extent, it amounts to an express exclusion of
S. 5 of the Limitation Act as contemplated under S. 29(2) of
the Limitation Act.
For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the
application for condonation of delay is not maintainable.
Accordingly, the application for condonation of delay as well
as the Criminal Appeal are dismissed as not maintainable.‖
ii) Sheikh Rahamtulla and others vs. National Investigation
Agency, reported in 2023 SCC Online Cal 493;
―57. Section 21 of the Act of 2008 has prescribed a
different set of limitation regulating the accessory right to
appeal to the High Court. Section 21 of the Act of 2008 has
allowed an unfettered and unconditional appeal to the High
Court within 30 days from the date of the judgment, order or
sentence. The first proviso has granted an extension of up to
90 days subject to the satisfaction of the High Court that the
appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal
within the period of 30 days.
58. For the first 30 days from the impugned judgment,
order or sentence of the Special Court, the appeal is unfettered,
unconditional and is not subject to any restriction.
Fundamental right to prefer the appeal in a case of conviction
affecting personal liberty has not been interfered with,
trampled upon or subjected to any restriction for the first 30
days from the date of the impugned judgment, order or
sentence.
******
74. The issue that has been noted in paragraph 1 of this
judgment has to be answered in the negative and as against the
appellant, in light of the discussions above. An appeal sought
to be filed after expiry of the period of 90 days from the date
of judgment or order or sentence, under Section 21 of the Act
of 2008 cannot be entertained. The period of 90 days from the
date of the judgment or order or sentence has to be calculated
on the principles analogous to Section 12 of the Limitation
Act, 1963.‖
10. Heard the learned counsel on either side and perused the
material documents available on record.
11. The petitioner/A3, who was booked under the NIA Act, 2008,
has been charge-sheeted for an offence under Section 120B IPC read
with Section 6 of the Explosive Substance Act, 1908 for the alleged
occurrence of a bomb blast. Admittedly, he has been undergoing
incarceration from 04.02.2022 and that his bail applications have been
rejected thrice. The last bail application filed by the petitioner was
disposed of with liberty to file afresh application, which has been filed
with a delay of 114 days. Of course, it is true that there is no restriction
to file number of bail applications before the Trial Court, but as per the
condition stipulated under the Act, it should be well within time. The
petitioner could have filed a bail application immediately after
withdrawal of the earlier application before the trial court.
12. Once a criminal act is committed by a person, the code of
Criminal Procedure will be put into operation and Sections 4 & 5 of
Cr.P.C. clearly contemplate that the offences committed under the
Indian Penal Code will necessarily have to be investigated in a thorough
manner without affecting the special enactment in existence. For the
sake brevity, Sections 4 & 5 of Cr.P.C. are extracted hereunder:
4. Trial of offences under the Indian Penal Code and
other laws.—
(1) All offences under the Indian Penal Code (45 of
1860) shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise
dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained.
(2) All offences under any other law shall be
investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with
according to the same provisions, but subject to any
enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner
of place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise
dealing with such offences.
5. Saving.—Nothing contained in this Code shall, in the
absence of a specific provision to the contrary, affect any
special or local law for the time being in force, or any special
jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of
procedure prescribed, by any other law for the time being in
force.‖
13. There is no doubt that the NIA Act of 2008 is a special
enactment. Though Article 21 of the Constitution enumerates the
Protection of Lives and personal liberty and to be more precise, no
person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according
to procedures established by law, insofar as bail is concerned, it comes
under the statutory right and not under the fundamental right.
14. The petitioner / A3 has relied upon two judgments of the High
Courts, namely, one rendered by the Delhi Court reported in 2019 SCC
OnLine Del 9158 (Farhan Shaikh v. State (National Investigating
Agency) and other by the Madras High Court in Crl.M.P.No.19676 of
2023 in Crl.A.SR.No.52810 of 2023 (Buhari @ Kichan Buhari vs.
State). The facts involved therein are distinguishable one, as the
petitioners therein have duly shown sufficient cause to condone the
delay as is evident from reading of Paragraph Nos.90 to 95 of the
judgment (Farhan Shaikh v. State (National Investigating Agency),
whereas the petitioner herein, having obtained adverse orders thrice and
having withdrawn the last one, had missed the bus in filing yet another
bail application in time and there was no whisper as to the cause for the
delay, thereby sufficient cause to the best satisfaction of this Court is
apparently absent, which is a mandatory requirement under the Act,
2008. Similarly, the Madras High Court in the given case (Buhari @
Kichan Buhari vs. State) proceeded on the basis that the fundamental
right enshrined under the Constitution cannot be given a go-by by a
procedural law, whereas, as stated earlier, bail is a statutory right and
not a fundamental right, so as to bring it within the ambit of violation of
fundamental right. Thus, the decision relied upon by the petitioner in the
said case will not inure to the benefit of the petitioner, as it would
amount to opening a Pandora box.
15. When the Special Law prescribes an outer time limit, this
Court cannot extend the time on the reasoning that it would amount to
legislation by the Court itself, which is not permissible. For example, if
any application is filed for discharge, it has got to be filed within the
time limit stipulated and if the contention of the petitioner is accepted
against the discharge petition, the accused will take his own sweet time
to file such a petition with a request to condone the delay. Though
Article 21 of the Constitution deals with personal liberty of a person, it
does not mean that the said Article can be invoked to overcome the
statutory provisions, more so, Special Enactments like NIA. For
example, under the Employees Provident Fund Act, 1952 r/w Rule 7(2)
of the Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1997 (extracted below), an outer
time limit of 120 days is prescribed under Section 7-I in preferring the
appeal beyond which the Tribunal will become functus officio.
―7(2) – Any person aggrieved by a notification issued
by the Central Government or an order passed by the Central
Government or any other authority under the Act, may within
60 days from the date of issue of the notification / order,
prefer an appeal to the Tribunal:
Provided that the Tribunal may if it is satisfied that the
appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring
the appeal within the prescribed period, extend the said
period by a further period of 60 days.‖
Similarly, under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 also, the
maximum period of 120 days is prescribed to prefer an appeal before
the Appellate Authority against the order of the Controlling Authority,
beyond which the Appellate Authority has no power to entertain the
same as also the condition of pre-deposit within the time is emphasized,
in the absence of which, no appeal can be entertained.
16. At this point of time, we feel it appropriate to refer to the
maxim ―Ut res magis valeat quam pereat‖, which means that the statues
must be construed so as to make them effective and constructive and not
ineffective or destructive. The Legislature was aware about the
provisions contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, yet with an
intention to curb the delay, legislature left it to the Rule making
authority to make a provision for limitation under the NIA Act, 2008.
The provisions of the Limitation Act is expressly excluded, as a specific
provision is made under the NIA Act, 2008. There is no bar for the
petitioner to file any number of bail applications before the Special
Court and if aggrieved by any order to be passed by the said Court, an
appeal can also be preferred before the Higher Forum within the time
prescribed under the NIA Act, 2008 and the Court is empowered to take
up the matter, provided the appeal is filed well within 120 days.
17. In the result, finding no substance in the argument of the
petitioner, we are of the view that the petition is liable to be dismissed.
Accordingly, Crl.M.C.No.108 of 2023 stands dismissed and the
petitioner / accused is at liberty to move the Special Court by way of
filing afresh bail application, if so advised. In case any such bail
application is filed, the Special Court is expected to try the same and
bring the issue to a logical conclusion without being uninfluenced by
any of the observations made hereinabove.
18. Even though initially we thought of condoning the delay and
expressed our view in that regard in the Open Court, after reserving the
case for orders and upon going through various judgments of the
Supreme Court and other High Courts and the principles of law, we
have changed our mind, which is permitted in terms of the dictum laid
down by the Supreme Court in the case of Kushalbhai Ratanbhai Rohit
and Others vs. State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 2014 SC 2291,
wherein it was held that once the order is signed, it attains finality and
Section 362 Cr.P.C. is a bar and the Court cannot recall the order, but
however, if it is not signed, the Court empowers to change its view.
(W.Diengdoh)
Judge
(S.Vaidyanathan)
Chief Justice
Meghalaya
19.02.2024
“Lam DR-PS”/“ar”
PRE-DELIVERY ORDER IN
Crl.M.C. No. 108/2023
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