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Serial No. 02
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WP(C) No. 189 of 2018
Date of Decision: 15.02.2021
Shri. Vivek Agarwal & Ors.
Vs.
The Secretary, Executive
Committee, Garo Hills
Autonomous District Council
& Ors.
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice H. S. Thangkhiew, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) :
Mr. R. Kar, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
Mr. S. Dey, Adv. (For R 1).
Mr. K. P. Bhattacharjee, Adv. with
Mr. H. Abraham, Adv. (For R 2).
:
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
1.
Yes/No
Yes/No
The petitioners herein are partners in a firm known as M/S GLR
Pharmaceuticals which runs a business on the basis of licenses issued by
the concerned Government departments and also under a Trading License
issued by the respondent No. 1. The main grievance as set out, apart from
also impugning letter dated 11.06.2018, is that the respondent No. 1 vide
a general circular dated 13th June, 2018, notified a decision of the
respondent No. 1 to not renew the Trading License of the said firm
ostensibly because of complaints received from some NGO’s. Being
aggrieved thereby, this writ petition has been filed before this Court.
2.
Mr. R. Kar, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the
petitioners through a firm named M/S GLR Pharmaceuticals had been
conducting business, since 2014 under valid licenses issued by the
Directorate of Health Services, Municipal License issued by the Tura
Municipal Board and Trading License from the GHADC (Respondent
No. 1) issued under the Garo Hills District (Trading by Non-Tribals)
Regulation, 1957. Learned counsel submits that the initial Partnership
Deed as well as a Deed of Retirement dated 08.11.2017, when one of the
partners retired have been duly registered before the Office of the SubRegistrar, West Garo Hills, Tura. He submits that due to business rivalry,
persons inimical to the petitioners created problems for their business,
and it appears that these persons exerted pressure on the respondents No.
1 and 2, which resulted in the impugned orders dated 11.06.2018 and
13.06.2018 Learned counsel submits that these impugned orders are
arbitrary and violative of the principles of Natural Justice, inasmuch as,
the petitioners were not given a show cause or were they heard before
their issuance. He submits that the impugned letter dated 11.06.2018,
issued by the Tura Municipal Board (Respondent No. 2), is illegal on the
face of the record as well as the order dated 13.06.2018, which he submits
is beyond the scope of law that regulates trading by non-tribals. As such,
he submits the impugned orders being patently illegal are liable to be set
aside and quashed.
3.
Mr. S. Dey, learned counsel on behalf of the respondent No. 1, at
the outset has raised questions as to the maintainability of the writ
petition by contending that the trading license was issued to the firm and
that the firm is not before this Court as petitioner and that moreover, as
per Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, no suit to enforce a
right arising from a contract shall be instituted in any Court by or on
behalf of a firm against any third party unless the firm is registered and
the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as a
partner in the firm. He submits that apart from the fact that the firm is not
before this Court, the same is also not registered with Registrar of Firms,
but it is only registered with the Sub- Registrar. Learned counsel submits
that the effect of non-registration and non-joinder of necessary parties
has rendered the writ petition unmaintainable in the eye of law and
deserves no consideration by this Court.
4.
Learned counsel on the other contentions raised, submits that it is
not a fact that the trading license has been cancelled, but only that a
decision had been taken by the respondent No. 1, in its meeting held on
20.04.2018, to not renew the trading license due to certain complaints
lodged by social organizations which were to be ascertained before any
further action was to be taken. Learned counsel further submits that the
process has not concluded, and the matter is yet to be adjudicated finally
as the writ petitioners have in the meantime come before this Court.
Learned counsel contends that the writ petition does not contain full
averments of the grounds on which equity is sought and as such, the writ
petitioners are not entitled to any relief as claimed. Learned counsel also
on this aspect has placed reliance in the case of Katra Education Society,
Allahabad vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. reported in AIR 1966 SC
1307 and also on the case of Amrit Lal Berry vs. Collector of Central
Excise, New Delhi & Ors., And K.N. Kapur & Ors. vs. Collector of
Central Excise, Central Revenue and Ors. reported in (1975) 4 SCC
714. He therefore submits that, there is no illegality in the impugned
order dated 13.06.2018, in view of the circumstances as mentioned and
that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
5.
Mr. K.P. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2,
only submission in defence of the order dated 11.06.2018, is that the
Municipal license was temporarily suspended in view of the non-renewal
of the trading by non-tribal license by the respondent No. 1, and that no
license can be issued by the Tura Municipal Board (Respondent No. 2),
unless the applicant produces a valid trading license issued by the
respondent No. 1.
6.
I have heard learned counsels for the parties. The fact that the
impugned orders were issued without hearing or show cause is not in
controversy. However, the objection raised as to the maintainability of
the writ petition shall have to be dealt with first. It would therefore be
apposite to quote Section 69 of the Act, which is as follows:
“69. Effect of non-registration. -(1) No suit to
enforce a right arising from a contract or
conferred by this Act shall be instituted in any
court by or on behalf of any person suing as
a partner in a firm against the firm or any
person alleged to be or to have been a partner
in the firm unless the firm is registered and
the person suing is or has been shown in the
Register of Firms as a partner in the firm.
(2) No suit to enforce a right arising from a
contract shall be instituted in any Court by or
on behalf of a firm against any third party
unless the firm is registered and the persons
suing are or have been shown in the Register
of Firms as partners in the firm.
(3) The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2)
shall apply also to a claim of set-off or other
proceeding to enforce a right arising from a
contract, but shall not affect,(a) the enforcement of any right to sue
for the dissolution of a firm or for
accounts of a dissolved firm, or any
right or power to realise the property of
a dissolved firm, or
(b) the powers of an official assignee,
receiver or Court under the Presidencytowns Insolvency Act, 1909 (3 of 1909)
or the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920
(5 of 1920) to realise the property of an
insolvent partner.
(4) This section shall not apply,(a) to firms or to partners in firms
which have no place of business in the
territories to which this Act extends, or
whose places of business in the said
territories, are situated in areas to
which, by notification under section 56,
this Chapter does not apply, or
(b) to any suit or claim of set-off not
exceeding one hundred rupees in value
which, in the Presidency-towns, is not
of a kind specified in section 19 of the
Presidency Small Cause Courts Act,
1882 (5 of 1882), or, outside the
Presidency-towns, is not of a kind
specified in the Second Schedule to the
Provincial Small Cause Courts Act,
1887 (9 of 1887), or to any proceeding
in execution or other proceeding
incidental to or arising from any such
suit or claim.”
7.
Plainly read Section 69(1) of the Act, bars partners of an
unregistered firm from initiating proceedings for enforcing a right arising
from a contract or conferred by this Act. Section 69(2) bars the filing of
a suit to enforce a right arising from a contract by or on behalf of a firm
against any third party unless the firm is registered and the persons suing
have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners. Section 69(3) refers
to claim of set-off or other proceedings to enforce a right arising from a
contract with exceptions as provided in Section 69(3) (a) and (b). In the
instant case, the petitioners who have come before this Court are partners
in the said firm and an authorization to the petitioner No.1 to represent
the other partners had also been filed by way of an affidavit dated
02.07.2018.
8.
The petitioners here, have questioned the impugned action of the
respondents No. 1 and 2 in suspending the operation of the trading license
of the firm namely GLR Pharmaceuticals of which they are all partners,
and do not seek to enforce or impeach any contractual obligation. The
challenge is to the impugned orders which has affected them as partners
in carrying on the business of the firm for which licenses had been
granted and abruptly suspended or not renewed, without the due process
of law being followed. Admittedly, the impugned orders had been issued
without affording any opportunity to the petitioners to show cause or be
heard. The invocation of Article 226 by the petitioners against the
unreasonable and arbitrary action of the respondents No. 1 and 2
therefore cannot be defeated by referring to Section 69 of the Indian
Partnership Act. This proceeding being one for the enforcement of a
fundamental right and not arising out of a contract, Section 69 of the Act
in the opinion of this Court, cannot act as a bar for the petitioners to pray
for the reliefs as set out in the writ petition.
9.
The impugned orders in question dated 11.06.2018 and
13.06.2018, being patently arbitrary and also not in consonance with the
provisions of the Garo Hills District, (Trading by Non-Tribals)
Regulation, 1957, are therefore, liable to be interfered with in exercise of
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, even though the writ has
been filed by partners of an unregistered firm within the meaning of the
Indian Partnership Act of 1932. The decisions relied upon by the learned
counsel for the respondent No. 1 are therefore not relevant in the context
of the discussions and facts as placed above.
10.
For the reasons and circumstances aforestated, the writ petition is
allowed and the impugned orders dated 11.06.2018 and 13.06.2018 are
set aside and quashed. Needless to add, any further action by the
respondents in this matter shall be done strictly in accordance with law
and by following the principles of Natural Justice.
Judge
Meghalaya
15.02.2021
“D.Thabah-PS”
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