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NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WP227 No. 1095 of 2025
Order reserved on 17/04/2026
Order delivered on 15/06/2026
Vishal Sangram S/o Lajo Sangram Aged About 41 Years R/o Basant Vihar
Colony Tahsil And District Bilaspur C.G.
... Petitioner
versus
Harjeet Singh S/o Guru Bachan Singh Aged About 66 Years R/o L-10
Vinoba Nagar Bilaspur C.G.
... Respondent
(Cause title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioner
:
Mr. Dheerendra Pandey, Advocate
For Respondent
:
Mr. Vijay K. Deshmukh, Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
C.A.V. Order
1.
Present is a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
challenging the award dated 12.11.2022, passed by learned National
Lok Adalat, Bench No. 20, District Court, Bilaspur, in civil suit No. 62B/2022, whereby the award for recovery of Rs. 3,40,567/- has been
Digitally
signed by
VED
PRAKASH
VED
DEWANGAN
PRAKASH
DEWANGAN Date:
2026.06.15
20:08:41
+0530
passed against the defendant on the basis of compromise between
the parties.
2.
Brief facts of the case are that, the petitioner was defendant before
the learned trial Court. The respondent/plaintiff has filed a civil suit on
06.09.2022 for recovery of Rs. 3,00,000/- against the petitioner/
defendant with the pleading that the defendant borrowed an amount
of Rs. 3,00,000/- from the plaintiff on 06.07.2022. It was agreed
between the parties that the defendant shall pay the interest @ 1%
per month on the amount of loan and the said amount of loan was to
be repaid within one month. At the time of borrowing the amount, the
defendant
also
executed
a
hand
note/acknowledgment
on
06.07.2022. The defendant has not repaid any amount to the plaintiff
and the plaintiff is entitled for the entire amount of Rs. 3,00,000/- and
accrued interest thereon. The defendant was served with a legal
demand notice dated 06.08.2022 through registered AD post and
when the defendant neither repaid the borrowed amount nor replied
the notice, the civil suit has been filed by the plaintiff for recovery of
the borrowed amount of Rs. 3,00,000/- along with the accrued
interest from the date of 06.07.2022.
3.
The suit was filed on 06.09.2022 and on 08.09.2022 summons was
ordered to be issued to the defendant and the case was fixed for
29.09.2022. On 29.09.2022, the defendant appeared in the case
along with his counsel and made an application for compromise along
with the copy of the compromise deed. The statement of the plaintiff
and defendant on the compromise was recorded by the learned trial
Court on 29.09.2022 itself and the case was fixed for 12.11.2022
before the National Lok Adalat. Ultimately the case was placed
before the National Lok Adalat, Bench No. 20, District Court, Bilaspur
on 12.11.2022 and on that day, an award was passed on the basis of
compromise between the parties for recovery of Rs. 3,40,567/against the petitioner/defendant. The said award dated 12.11.2022 is
under challenge in the present writ petition.
4.
Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the impugned
award passed by the learned National Lok Adalat is illegal, arbitrary
and perverse. The learned trial Court should have considered that
the suit of the plaintiff itself was not maintainable for want of the
document of money lending license of the plaintiff as required under
Section 11-H read with Section 3(1)(a) and (b) and Section 7 of the
Chhattisgarh Money Lenders Act, 1934. Before passing the award or
considering the compromise, the learned trial Court and National Lok
Adalat should have satisfied itself for due compliance of the
mandatory provision of Money Lenders Act, 1934. He would also
submit that the signature of the defendant was obtained by the
plaintiff under coercion and the compromise was not on the free will
of the defendant. The plaintiff is a well known influential person who
involved in money lending business and extorting money from the
employees and putting them in fear of losing their employment. The
genuineness of the compromise ought to have been examined by the
learned trial Court and National Lok Adalat, yet the award has been
passed, therefore, the impugned award dated 12.11.2022 is liable to
be set aside.
5.
On the other hand learned counsel appearing for the respondent
opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner
and would submit that the petitioner/defendant is an employee of
South Eastern Coalfields Limited, Bilaspur and not a layman. He
borrowed an amount of Rs. 3,00,000/- from the respondent on
06.07.2022 and executed a hand note/acknowledgment for the
same. When he has not repaid the amount, the respondent has filed
the suit for recovery of the borrowed amount along with the interest.
The petitioner duly represented through his counsel before the
learned trial Court and after knowing fully well his position, he
entered into compromise on 29.09.2022 and his statement was also
recorded by the learned trial Court on the compromise on 29.09.2022
itself, thereafter the matter was placed before the National Lok Adalat
on 12.11.2022, where the award has been passed on 12.11.2022
itself. The said compromise dated 29.09.2022 and compromise
award dated 12.11.2022 have not been challenged by the petitioner
for about 3 years and it has only been challenged in the present writ
petition which is filed on 17.10.2025. The petitioner was an educated
person and employee of South Eastern Coalfields Limited. Knowing
fully well the executed hand note/acknowledgment of the borrowed
amount, he was represented in the suit through his counsel and he
duly executed Vakalatnama in favour of his counsel, thereafter a
compromise deed was also executed on 29.09.2022 and thereafter
his statement was also recorded by the learned trial Court on
29.09.2022, in which he confirmed the terms of compromise. Since
the date from his appearance before the learned trial Court till the
passing of the award, the petitioner was having ample opportunity to
deny the compromise, yet he willingly entered into compromise on
his own free will and after such a long time, he challenged the said
compromise award, which is not bona fide. At this stage the
maintainability of the suit cannot be objected, when the defendant
have entered into compromise in the suit. He would also submit that
Section 11-H of the Money Lenders Act, 1934, it provided that the
plaintiff should have hold a valid registration certificate, which the
plaintiff has in his possession. Filing of the certificate along with the
plaint was not necessary and it can be filed at the subsequent stage
also, therefore, the ground raised by the petitioner in the present writ
petition is misconceived and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
6.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival
submissions and perused the documents annexed with the writ
petition.
7.
The main ground of challenge in the present writ petition by the
petitioner is that the plaintiff/respondent has not filed the registration
certificate of his being the money lender under the Chhattisgarh
Money Lenders Act, 1934, the plaint itself was not maintainable as
provided under Section 11-H of the Act of 1934 and therefore, the
compromise between the parties, if any cannot be considered for
passing of the decree. When the objection raised by the petitioner in
view of Section 11-H of the Act of 1934, it would be necessary to
notice here the said provision, which reads as under:“11-H. Suit not to proceed without registration
certificate, etc. - No suit for the recovery of a
loan advanced by a money-lender shall proceed
in a civil court until the court is satisfied that he
holds a valid registration certificate or that he is
not required to have a registration certificate by
reason of the fact that he does not carry on the
business of money-lending in any of the district of
Chhattisgarh.
Provided that this section shall not apply to a suit
instituted before the 1st October, 1940.”
8.
From perusal of Section 11-H of the Act of 1934 provided only for
holding a valid registration certificate, however, there is no restriction
for maintaining a civil suit without filing the same along with the
plaint. The requirement is only that the plaintiff should have hold the
valid registration certificate under the Chhattisgarh Money Lenders
Act, 1934. Section 11-H provided that, no suit for recovery of a loan
shall proceed until the court is satisfied that the plaintiff hold a valid
registration certificate of money lending in the area. It is nowhere
provided that he should annexed the copy of the certificate along with
the plaint. From perusal of the order sheet dated 06.09.2022 and
08.09.2022 after satisfying the proper presentation of the suit, the
civil suit was ordered to be registered and summons was issued to
the defendant. Further, from perusal of the copy of the plaint annexed
at page No.19 of the petition, he clearly disclosed that the plaintiff is
a registered money lender, which could not be rebutted by the
defendant.
9.
When the defendant appeared in the case on 29.09.2022 through his
counsel and entered into compromise, his statement with respect to
the compromise was also recorded by the learned trial Court and he
signed the document of compromise as well as statement made
before the Court without raising any objection at that time, it can be
hold that he was well within the knowledge of entire proceeding and
consent of repayment of borrowed amount in installments. It is not a
case where on a singular instance his signature has been obtained
and which was placed before the court for compromise, but on
various instances he appeared before the Court and has signed
various documents of compromise to settle the dispute. He was
having ample opportunity to deny the settlement, if he actually not
willing to settle the dispute. After about 3 years of entering into
settlement the challenge of the compromise award on the ground
that maintainability of the suit cannot be said to be bona fide or the
compromise suffered from coercion upon the defendant.
10.
Another important aspect which cannot be ignored is that the
compromise award was passed on 12.11.2022, whereas the present
writ petition has been instituted only on 17.10.2025 after a lapse of
almost three years. The petitioner has neither pleaded nor
demonstrated any sufficient cause explaining the enormous delay in
approaching this Court. During this entire period, no steps appear to
have been taken for questioning the compromise deed, the
statement recorded before the trial Court or the award passed by the
National Lok Adalat. A party who consciously enters into a
compromise and thereafter remains silent for several years cannot
be permitted to invoke the extraordinary supervisory jurisdiction of
this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as a matter of
course. The unexplained delay and laches on the part of the
petitioner itself constitutes an additional ground for declining
interference with the impugned award.
11.
The learned National Lok Adalat has passed the award considering
the compromise between the parties and statement made by the
defendant before the learned trial Court on 29.09.2022 and the said
compromise award cannot be upset on the ground of maintainability
of the suit, particularly when the grounds raised by the petitioner
regarding maintainability of the suit is misconceived as the filing of
the registration certificate under the Money Lenders Act, 1934 is not
necessary along with the plaint, but what is necessary to have the
registration certificate with the petitioner.
12.
It is also pertinent to notice that the impugned award has been
passed on the basis of a compromise voluntarily entered into
between the parties. The petitioner not only signed the compromise
deed but his statement was also recorded before the Court
acknowledging the settlement. Once a party has consented to the
terms of settlement and a compromise award has been passed on
such consent, the same cannot ordinarily be assailed by invoking
supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution merely
on grounds which were available prior to the compromise. A consent
decree or compromise award stands on a different footing and can
be
questioned
only
on
limited
grounds
such
as
fraud,
misrepresentation or coercion of a serious nature, duly pleaded and
established. Except making bald allegations, the petitioner has
placed no material on record to substantiate the plea of coercion.
Therefore, the challenge to the compromise award itself is not
maintainable in the facts of the present case.
13.
The challenge raised by the petitioner to the compromise award is
also liable to be rejected in view of the settled principles laid down by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court governing consent decrees and
compromise awards. In Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh,
(2006) 5 SCC 566, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while considering the
effect of Order XXIII Rule 3 and Rule 3-A of the Code of Civil
Procedure, held in paragraph 17 that:
“17. The position that emerges from the amended
provisions of Order 23 can be summed up thus:
(i) No appeal is maintainable against a
consent decree having regard to the
specific bar contained in Section 96(3)
CPC.
(ii) No appeal is maintainable against the
order
of
the
court
recording
the
compromise (or refusing to record a
compromise) in view of the deletion of
clause (m) of Rule 1 Order 43.
(iii) No independent suit can be filed for
setting aside a compromise decree on the
ground that the compromise was not lawful
in view of the bar contained in Rule 3-A.
(iv) A consent decree operates as an
estoppel and is valid and binding unless it
is set aside by the court which passed the
consent decree, by an order on an
application under the proviso to Rule 3
Order 23.
Therefore, the only remedy available to a
party to a consent decree to avoid such
consent decree, is to approach the court
which recorded the compromise and made
a decree in terms of it, and establish that
there was no compromise. In that event,
the court which recorded the compromise
will itself consider and decide the question
as
to
whether
there
was
a
valid
compromise or not. This is so because a
consent decree is nothing but contract
between parties superimposed with the
seal of approval of the court. The validity of
a consent decree depends wholly on the
validity of the agreement or compromise on
which it is made.”
14.
In the present case, the petitioner voluntarily entered into the
compromise, his statement was recorded before the trial Court, and
thereafter the National Lok Adalat passed the award on the basis of
such compromise. Except making bald allegations of coercion, no
material
has
been
placed
on
record
to
establish
fraud,
misrepresentation or any circumstance vitiating the compromise.
Therefore, the petitioner cannot be permitted to assail the
compromise award in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
15.
Therefore, in view of the aforesaid consideration, I do not find any
good ground to interfere with the impugned award passed by the
learned National Lok Adalat based on the compromise between the
parties.
16.
Accordingly, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed.
17.
Registry is directed to transmit the trial Court record along with a
copy of this order to the Court concerned forthwith.
Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
ved
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