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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No.660 of 2025
Date of Decision: 03.07.2026
__________________________________________________________________________
Virender Kumar
……...Petitioner
Versus
Punjab National Bank
…....Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?
_____________________________________________________________________________
For the Petitioner:
Mr. Naveen Kumar Bhardwaj, Advocate.
For the Respondent: Mr. Arvind Sharma, Advocate.
__________________________________________________________________________
Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)
Instant criminal revision petition filed under Section 438 read
with Section 442 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, lays
challenge to judgment dated 04.09.2025, passed by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge (II), Kangra at Dharamshala, District Kangra, Himachal
Pradesh, in Criminal Appeal No.6-K/X/2025, titled as Virender Kumar Vs.
Punjab National Bank, affirming judgment of conviction and order of sentence
dated 02.01.2025/16.01.2025, passed by the learned Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Court No.1, Kangra, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh,
in Cr. Complaint No.111-II/2019, whereby the learned trial Court while
holding the petitioner-accused (hereinafter, ‘accused’) guilty of having
committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act (in short the ‘Act’), convicted and sentenced him to
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undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year and pay compensation
to the tune of ₹1,64,400/- to the respondent-complainant.
2.
Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the record are
that respondent-complainant (hereinafter, ‘complainant’) instituted a
complaint under Section 138 of the Act, in the competent Court of law
averring therein that on 15.01.2014, it advanced loan to the tune of
₹6,92,000/- to the accused for purchasing vehicle. Though aforesaid amount
was to be paid in regular installments, but since accused defaulted in making
installments, sum of ₹81,700/- became due up to 31.03.2019 in the loan
account. Accused with a view to discharge his lawful liability issued Cheque
bearing No.124643 dated 04.04.2019 (Ex.C2) of Punjab National Bank,
Sunhi, in favour of complainat-Bank. However, fact remains that aforesaid
Cheque on its presentation to the Bank concerned was dishonoured vide
return memo with remarks ‘Funds Insufficient’. Immediately, after receipt of
aforesaid return memo, complainant served accused with legal notice dated
05.04.2019, calling upon him to make the payment good well within
stipulated time. However, since petitioner-accused failed to make the
payment
good
within
the
time
stipulated
in
the
legal
notice,
respondent/complainant was compelled to initiate proceedings under
Section 138 of the Act in the Court of learned Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Court No.1, Kangra, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh.
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3.
by
Learned trial Court on the basis of material adduced on record
the
respective
parties,
vide
judgment/order
dated
02.01.2025/16.01.2025, held the petitioner-accused guilty of having
committed offence under Section 138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted
and sentenced him, as per the description given hereinabove.
4.
Though, at first instance, accused preferred an appeal in the
Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge (II), Kangra at Dharamshala,
District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh,
however, same was dismissed vide
judgment dated 04.09.2025. In the aforesaid background, petitioner-accused
has approached this Court by way of instant proceedings, seeking therein
his acquittal after setting aside the judgments of conviction recorded by the
Courts below.
5.
Vide order dated 26.11.2025, Coordinate Bench of this Court
suspended the substantive sentence imposed by the learned Court below,
subject to petitioner/accused depositing 30% of the total amount of
compensation and furnishing personal bond in the sum of ₹50,000/-.
Though aforesaid order was complied with, but thereafter matter was
repeatedly adjourned enabling petitioner to either settle the matter with the
complainant or deposit the remaining amount. However, fact remains that
despite repeated opportunities, needful has been not done and as such, this
Court has no option but to decide the petition on its merits.
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6.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
material adduced on record, vis-a-vis reasoning assigned in the impugned
judgments, this Court sees no reason to agree with learned counsel
representing the petitioner, that Courts below have fallen in grave error while
appreciating the evidence, rather this Court finds that both the Courts below
have meticulously dealt with each and every aspect of the matter and there
is no scope left for interference.
7.
In his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., accused
specifically admitted factum of advancement of loan by the complainantBank as well as his having issued Cheque and signatures thereupon.
Accused in afore statement contended that said Cheque was issued merely
as a security, but despite repayment of entire loan amount, complainant
misused the security Cheque. Since factum with regard to issuance of
Cheque as well as
signatures thereupon never came to be disputed, no
illegality can be said to have been committed by the learned Courts below
while invoking Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, which speak about
presumption in favour of the holder of the Cheque that Cheque was issued
towards discharge of a lawful liability. No doubt, aforesaid presumption is
rebuttable, but to rebut such presumption, accused either can refer to the
documents and evidence led on record by the complainant or presumption
can be rebutted by leading positive evidence, if any.
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8.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V. State of
Gujarat, 2013(1) RCR(Criminal), has categorically held that if the accused is
able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence
of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. To raise
probable defence, accused can rely on the materials submitted by the
complainant. Needless to say, if the accused/drawer of the Cheque in
question neither raises a probable defence nor is able to contest existence of
a legally enforceable debt or liability, statutory presumption under Section
139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence
comes into play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras No.23 to
25 of the judgment herein:“23. Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the
matter of Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section
139 is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been
included in furtherance of the legislative objective of
improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While
Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong criminal
remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the
rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to
prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. The Court
however, further observed that it must be remembered
that the offence made punishable by Section 138can be
better described as a regulatory offence since the
bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil
wrong whose money is usually confined to the private
parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a
scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the
construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses
and the defendant accused cannot be expected to
discharge an unduly high standard of proof”. The Court
further observed that it is a settled position that when an
accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139,
the standard of proof for doing so is all preponderance of
probabilities.
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24. Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a
probable defence which creates doubt about the existence
of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution
can fail. The accused can rely on the materials submitted
by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and
it is inconceivable that in some cases the accused may not
need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If however,
the accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises
a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a
legally enforceable debt or liability, obviously statutory
presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act regarding
commission of the offence comes into play if the same is
not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by the
complainant.
25. It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in
order to qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the
NI Act precedes a statutory notice where the drawer is
called upon by allowing him to avail the opportunity to
arrange the payment of the amount covered by the cheque
and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of such
a notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment
within the time stipulated under the statute does not pay
the amount, that the said default would be considered a
dishonour constituting an offence, hence punishable. But
even in such cases, the question whether or not there was
lawfully recoverable debt or liability for discharge whereof
the cheque was issued, would be a matter that the trial
court will have to examine having regard to the evidence
adduced before it keeping in view the statutory
presumption that unless rebutted, the cheque is
presumed to have been issued for a valid consideration.
In view of this the responsibility of the trial judge while
issuing summons to conduct the trial in matters where
there has been instruction to stop payment despite
sufficiency of funds and whether the same would be a
sufficient ground to proceed in the matter, would be
extremely heavy.”
9.
In the case at hand, complainant while examining Mr. Subrato
Dutta as CW-1 successfully proved on record that it had advanced loan to
the tune of ₹6,92,000/- in favour of accused, who defaulted in making the
repayment, as a result thereof, sum of ₹81,700/- became due. Afore witness
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also successfully proved on record that though accused issued Cheque
Ex.C2, amounting to ₹81,700/-, but same was returned, vide return memo
Ex.C3, on account of insufficient funds in the bank account of the accused.
Afore witness also successfully proved on record that before instituting
proceedings under Section 138 of the Act, Bank served accused with legal
notice Ex.C4, calling upon him to make the payment good within stipulated
time. By placing on record postal receipt Ex.C5 and acknowledgement Ex.C6,
complainant also proved on record that legal notice was duly served upon
accused, but yet he failed to make the payment. Cross-examination
conducted upon afore witness if perused in its entirety, nowhere suggests
that accused was able to extract anything contrary, to what this witness
stated in examination-in-chief, rather pattern of cross-examination of CW-1
conducted on behalf of accused clearly establishes factum with regard to
issuance of Cheque as well as signatures thereupon. As has been noticed
hereinabove, accused attempted to carve out a case that Cheque in question
was issued as a security, but same was misused, however, aforesaid defence
never came to be probablised by leading cogent and convincing evidence.
10.
By now it is well settled that dishonour of cheque issued as
security can also attract offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act. Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Sripati Singh v. State of
Jharkhand, Criminal Appeal No. 1269-1270 of 2021, decided on 28.10.2021,
has held as under:
-8-
“16. A cheque issued as security pursuant to a financial transaction
cannot be considered as a worthless piece of paper under every
circumstance. ‘Security’ in its true sense is the state of being safe and
the security given for a loan is something given as a pledge of payment.
It is given, deposited or pledged to make certain the fulfilment of an
obligation to which the parties to the transaction are bound. If in a
transaction, a loan is advanced and the borrower agrees to repay the
amount in a specified timeframe and issues a cheque as security to
secure such repayment; if the loan amount is not repaid in any other
form before the due date or if there is no other understanding or
agreement between the parties to defer the payment of amount, the
cheque which is issued as security would mature for presentation and
the drawee of the cheque would be entitled to present the same. On
such presentation, if the same is dishonoured, the consequences
contemplated under Section 138 and the other provisions of N.I.
Act would flow.”
11.
Needless to say, expression “Security cheque” is not a
statutorily defined expression in the Negotiable Instruments Act, rather same
is to be inferred from the pleadings as well as evidence, if any, led on record
with regard to issuance of security cheque. The Negotiable Instruments Act
does not per se carve out an exception in respect of a “security cheque” to
say that a complaint in respect of such a cheque would not be maintainable
as there is a debt existing in respect whereof the cheque in question is issued,
same would attract provision of Section 138 of the Act in case of its
dishonour.
12.
If the evidence led on record by the respective parties is read in
conjunction, this Court sees no reason to differ with the findings returned by
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the Courts below that complainant successfully proved on record that
accused had issued Cheque towards discharge of his lawful liability. Since
factum of issuance of Cheque by the accused as well as his signatures
thereupon was never disputed, presumption as available under Section 118
and 139 of the Act rightly came to be invoked in the case of the petitioner
that Cheque in question was issued in discharge of lawful liability. Since no
evidence worth credence ever came to be led on record to rebut the
presumption, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the Courts
below while holding petitioner/accused guilty for the commission of offence
punishable under Section 138 of the Act.
13.
Having scanned the entire evidence adduced on record by the
respective parties, this Court finds that all the basic ingredients of Section
138 of the Act are met in the case at hand. Since Cheque issued by accused
towards discharge of his lawful liability was returned on account of
insufficient funds in the bank account of accused and he despite having
received legal notice failed to make the payment good within the stipulated
time, complainant had no option but to institute proceedings under Section
138 of the Act, which subsequently rightly came to be decided by both the
Courts below on the basis of pleadings as well as evidence adduced on record
by the respective parties.
14.
Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under
Section 397 of the Cr.P.C to re-appreciate the evidence, especially in view of
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the concurrent findings of fact and law relied upon by the Courts below. In
this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex
Court in case State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan
Namboodiri (1999) 2 Supreme Court Cases 452, wherein it has been held
as under:“In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and
examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of
satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of
any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction
is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional
power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court
nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction.
Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High
Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own
conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been
appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in
appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of
the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross
miscarriage of justice.”
15.
Since after having carefully examined the evidence in the present
case, this Court is unable to find any error of law as well as fact, if any,
committed by the Courts below, while passing impugned judgments, there is
no occasion, whatsoever, to exercise the revisional power.
16.
True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and another
Versus Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court Case 241; has
held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of justice or misuse of
judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is
salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of
the process or
miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/incorrectness committed by
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inferior criminal court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order,
but learned counsel representing the accused has failed to point out any
material irregularity committed by the Courts below while appreciating the
evidence and as such, this Court sees no reason to interfere with the wellreasoned judgments passed by the Courts below.
17.
Consequently, in view of the discussion made hereinabove as
well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no valid
reason to interfere with the well-reasoned judgments recorded by the Courts
below, which otherwise, appear to be based upon proper appreciation of
evidence available on record and as such, same are upheld.
18.
Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is dismissed
being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to surrender himself
before the learned trial Court within a period of six weeks to serve the
sentence as awarded by the learned trial Court, if not already served. Bail
bonds of the petitioner, if any, are cancelled. Interim order dated 26.11.2025
stands vacated. Amount, if any, deposited by the petitioner-accused with the
learned trial Court as well as Registry of this Court is ordered to be released
in favour of complainant by remitting the same in its bank account, detail
whereof, shall be furnished by its counsel within a period of one week.
Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
t
(Sandeep Sharma),
Judge
July 03, 2026
(Rajeev Raturi)
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