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NIRMALA
RAO
2026:CGHC:9329
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
MAC No. 2375 of 2025
1 - Vinay Kumar Tiwari S/o Shri Uday Narayan Tiwari, Aged About 28 Years R/o
Shankar Nagar, Ward No. 37, In Front Of Gudakhu Factory, Police Station- Torwa,
Tahsil And District Bilaspur (C.G.)
... Appellant(s)
versus
1 - Swati D/o Late Shri Vijay Kumar Sahu, Aged About 32 Years R/o Vijayapuram
Colony, B-50, Near Science College, Seepat Road, Police Station- Sarkanda, Tahsil
And
District
Bilaspur
(C.G.)
2 - Anurag Kumar Sahu, S/o Late Shri Vijay Kumar Sahu, Aged About 35 Years R/o
Vijayapuram Colony, B-50, Near Science College, Seepat Road, Police StationSarkanda,
Tahsil
And
District
Bilaspur
(C.G.)
3 - Balram Prasad Sahu, S/o Late Shri Malikram Sahu, Died Through Lrs-
3.1 - (A) Sumitra Sahu Wd/o. Late Shri Balram Sahu, Aged About 35 Years R/o.
Ward No. 6, Darrighat, Police Station And Tahsil- Masturi, District Bilaspur (C.G.)
Present Address- Near Jairam Nagar Railway Crossing, Kotmi Sonar Road, District
Bilaspur
(C.G.)
3.2 - (B) Simran Sahu, D/o Late Shri Balram Sahu, Aged About 14 Years Minor
Through Natural Guardian (Mother) Respondent No. 3a Sumitra Sahu, R/o. Ward
No. 6, Darrighat, Police Station And Tahsil- Masturi, District Bilaspur (C.G.) Present
Address- Near Jairam Nagar Railway Crossing, Kotmi Sonar Road, District Bilaspur
(C.G.)
3.3 - (C) Khushi Sahu, D/o. Late Shri Balram Sahu, Aged About 13 Years Minor
Through Natural Guardian (Mother) Respondent No. 3(A) Sumitra Sahu, R/o. Ward
No. 6, Darrighat, Police Station And Tahsil- Masturi, District Bilaspur (C.G.) Present
Address- Near Jairam Nagar Railway Crossing, Kotmi Sonar Road, District Bilaspur
(C.G.)
4 - Branch Manager, Iffco Tokiyo Insurance Company Limited, Branch Office- Shop
No.- 205, Second Floor, M.M. Silver Bhawan, Udyog Bhawan, Ring Road No. 1,
Mahavir Nagar, Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.)
... Respondent(s)
For Appellant
For Respondents No.1 & 2
For Respondent No.4
:
:
:
Shri Akash Shrivastava, Advocate.
Shri Mohd. Ruhul Ameen, Advocate.
Shri P.R. Patankar, Advocate alongwith
Shri Swapnil Thawaney, Advocate.
Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey
Order on Board
23.02.2026
1.
Heard on I.A. No.1 of 2025, an application for condonation of delay in
filing the instant appeal.
2.
The appellant/ owner of the offending vehicle has filed this appeal
under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act challenging the award
dated 2.3.2023, passed by the learned Eighth Additional Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur
in Claim Case
No.839 of 2018 whereby the learned Tribunal passed an award to the
tune of Rs.80,47,451/- alongwith interest @ 9% per annum on account
of death of Vijay Kumar Sahu and fastened liability with the owner of
the vehicle with a stipulation that the Insurance Company shall
indemnify the compensation and recover the same from the owner of
the vehicle.
3.
Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that there is a delay of
880 days in filing the present appeal.
He would contend that an
ex parte award was passed against the owner of the offending vehicle
on 2.3.2023. He would submit that on 10.9.2025, the appellant herein
received execution notice and thereafter, he collected the documents
and approached his counsel to prefer this appeal. He would submit
that delay part has properly been explained by the appellant and same
may be condoned.
4.
On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent/ Insurance
Company would oppose.
He would submit that the owner of the
vehicle appeared before the learned Tribunal and filed its reply and
subsequently, failed to appear, therefore, he was proceeded ex parte.
He would submit that the appellant had knowledge of pending claim
case before the learned Tribunal but failed to participate in the
proceedings and, therefore, the reasons assigned in the application for
condonation of delay are not available to the appellant. They would
submit that the appellant failed to explain the cause of delay properly
and therefore, the application deserves to be dismissed.
5.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
documents present on record.
6.
Admittedly, the award was passed on 2.3.2023, whereas the present
appeal has been preferred on 28.10.2025.
In the application for
condonation of delay, it is stated that the appellant received notice of
the execution proceedings on 10.9.2025 and thereafter, collected the
documents and filed this appeal. It appears that initially the appellant
appeared before the learned Tribunal and filed reply and thereafter,
failed to appear and was proceeded ex parte. This fact has not been
disclosed by the appellant in the application for condonation of delay.
7.
Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba
Reddy (Died) by LRs. & Others vs. The Special Deputy Collector
(LA) reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 : 2024 4 SCR 241 : 2024
INSC 286 dealt with the object of the law of limitation. In para 10 & 11,
the object and import of Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act were
considered and it was observed thus:“10. Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the sake of
convenience, is reproduced herein-below:
3. Bar of limitation. - (1) Subject to the provisions
contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit
instituted, appeal preferred, and application made
after the prescribed period shall be dismissed,
although limitation has not been set up as a defence.
11. Though Section 3 of the Act mentions about suit,
appeal and application but since in this case we are
concerned with appeal, we would hereinafter be
mentioning about the appeal only in context with the
limitation, it being barred by time, if at all, and if the
delay in its filing is liable to be condoned.”
8.
The Hon’ble Court referred to various judgments in the matter of
Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) in paras 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23, which
are reproduced herein-below:“19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap
Narain Singh and Ors, A.I.R. 1935 PC 85, it had been
held that the court cannot grant an exemption from
limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of
hardship. The court has time and again repeated that
when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay
is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it
ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds
alone.
20. In this connection, a reference may be made to
Brijesh Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors,
2014 (4) SCALE 50, wherein while observing, as above,
this Court further laid down that if some person has
obtained a relief approaching the court just or
immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other
persons cannot take the benefit of the same by
approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the
ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion.
21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra
Pradesh & Ors.,[2011] 3 SCR 217 : (2011) 4 SCC 363,
where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation
for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications
for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High
Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and
objective manner. High Court should have exercised the
discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The
liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for
delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of
limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as
‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented approach’ and
‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the
substantial law of limitation.
22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand &
Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors., AIR 2009 SC
1927, that the merits of the case cannot be considered
while dealing with the application for condonation of delay
in filing the appeal.
23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land
Acquisition Officer, [2013] 8 SCR 227 : (2013) 14 SCC
81, this Court held that the discretion to condone the
delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the
facts and circumstances of each case. The expression
‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the
Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence,
inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also
observed that even though limitation may harshly affect
rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its
rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have
no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have
no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds.”
9.
In para 26, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati
Subba Reddy (supra) summarized the judgments passed in the above
stated decisions and the same is reproduced herein-below:“26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of
the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this
Court, it is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there
should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to
remedy rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or
availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease
to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be
construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be
construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be
construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal
approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of
substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same
cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation
contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to
condone the delay if sufficient cause had been
explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in
nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause
is established for various factors such as, where there is
inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar
matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to
the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the
cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered
in condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on
the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and
condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions
have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the
statutory provision.”
10.
In para 30, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that condonation of the
delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of
the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case
for condoning the delay is not a correct approach. Para 30 is
reproduced herein-below:“30. The aforesaid decisions would not cut any ice as
imposition of conditions are not warranted when
sufficient cause has not been shown for condoning the
delay. Secondly, delay is not liable to be condoned
merely because some persons have been granted relief
on the facts of their own case. Condonation of delay in
such circumstances is in violation of the legislative intent
or the express provision of the statute. Condoning of the
delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been
deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that
they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not
a correct approach, particularly when both the above
decisions have been rendered in ignorance of the earlier
pronouncement in the case of Basawaraj (supra).”
11.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy
(supra) further held that the phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented
approach’ and ‘cause for the advancement of substantial justice’
cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale
matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and reopened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
12.
Considering the contents of the application for condonation of delay
and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, I do not find any
sufficient ground to allow the application.
Accordingly, I.A. No.1 is
hereby rejected and subsequently, the appeal is also dismissed.
Sd/(Rakesh Mohan Pandey)
Judge
Nimmi
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