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NAFR
INDRAJEET
SAHU
Digitally signed
by INDRAJEET
SAHU
Date: 2026.01.22
13:36:43 +0530
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRMP No. 8 of 2026
1 - Vikas Tiwari S/o Late Vivekanand Tiwari, Aged About 46 Years R/o House
No. 38/58, Semra Bada, Danganiya Raipur, District Raipur C.G.
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through District Magistrate, Raipur, District Raipur
C.G.
2 - Kunal Dubey, S/o Late Pradeep Dubey, R/o B-15, Maruti Residency,
Amlidih, P.S. New Rajendra Nagar, Raipur, Tehsil And District Raipur (C.G.)
3 - Hemantpal S/o Shankar Pal, R/o Behind Digjam Showroom, Near
Santoshi Nagar, P.S. Tikrapara, Raipur, Tehsil And District Raipur C.G.
... Respondent(s)
For Petitioner
For State
:
:
Shri Vaibhav P. Shukla, Advocate.
Ms. Sunita Manikpuri, Govt. Advocate.
Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J
Order on Board
07.01.2026
1.
The present Criminal Misc. Petition under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023
has been filed by the petitioner against the impugned order dated
30.10.2025 passed by 8th Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur, in
Criminal Revision No.217/2025 whereby the Criminal Revision of the
petitioner has been dismissed and the order dated 11.03.2025 passed
by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur, in Criminal Case
No.13508/2024, order framing charge, is affirmed.
2.
The subject matter in brief is that the petitioner is an accused in the
offence of Crime No.262/2024 registered at Police Station Rajendra
Nagar, Raipur, for the offence under Sections 452, 294 and 34 IPC on
a complaint made by Sanjay Tripathi. It is alleged that the complainant
is the Administrator of Krishna Kids Academy, New Rajendra Nagar,
Raipur. On 06.06.2024 he was being informed by the Headmistress of
the school Smt. Jaya Bakdu through telephone that some members of
NSUI entered into school premises and hurling slogans. He rushed to
the school and saw that the present petitioner and other members of
NSUI were hurling slogans inside the house and when he tried to stop
them, they started abusing him. They also abused the female staff of
the school. They felt annoyed by the abuses and after informing the
Head of the institution, he lodged the report. After investigation, the
charge sheet was filed against the petitioner and other accused
persons before the JMFC, Raipur. Vide order dated 11.03.2025 the trial
court framed charges for the offence under Sections 294, 452/34 IPC
against the petitioner. The order of framing charge dated 11.03.2025
was challenged by the petitioner before the revisional court which was
also dismissed by the impugned order dated 30.10.2025 and the same
is under challenge in the present Criminal Misc. Petition.
3.
Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the FIR against
the petitioner is a motivated complaint as he belongs to NSUI Union
who are protesting the illegal running of the school against the
government circulars and guidelines. The petitioner is prosecuting his
grievances in WP(PIL) No.22 of 2016 in which illegal running of the
school of complainant is the subject matter and only to keep away the
issue, the report has been lodged. He would further submit that charge
for the offence under Section 452 IPC has been framed against the
petitioner, but school does not come under the definition of dwelling
house and therefore the charge under Section 452 IPC cannot be
framed against him. There is no sufficient material to frame charge in
the case and the petitioner may be discharged from the alleged offence
by setting aside the impugned order. The petitioner would rely upon the
order dated 05.09.2012 passed by Delhi High Court in case of Seema
Gupta Vs. State & Others, Criminal M.C. No.3819 of 2011.
4.
On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes and have
submitted that there are prima facies sufficient evidence with respect to
offence allegedly committed by the petitioner. From the statement of
witnesses who are the employees of the school it is crystal clear that
they have duly identified the petitioner that he also trespassed the
school premises and hurling abuses. She would further submit that to
frame charge against the accused persons, only the prima facie
ingredients are to be considered and the trial court after considering
the entire material, framed the charge against the petitioner which does
not suffer from any infirmity.
5.
I have heard the counsel for the parties and perused the material
annexed with the petition.
6.
From perusal of FIR it transpires that a named report has been lodged
by the complainant that the petitioner along with other members of
NSUI entered into the school premises of Krishna Kids Academy, New
Rajendra Nagar on 06.06.2024 by making protest there and when the
complainant tried to stop them, they started hurling abuses and
misbehaved the female staff of the school. They felt annoyed by the
abuse and then report has been lodged. From the statement of Sanjay
Tripathi, Smt. Jaya Bakdu who is Headmistress of the school, Smt.
Tulsi Sahu, Peon, Smt. Kshama Sahu, Peon, Smt. Ombai Dhruw, Peon
and Smt. Mongra Bai, Peon, it primafacie demonstrates that on the
date of alleged incident the petitioner along with other members of
NSUI entered into the school premises and hurling abuses to the
female staff and other persons.
7.
The grievance of the petitioner is that no charge for the offence under
Section 452 IPC could be framed as school premise does not come
under the definition of a dwelling house. Offence Under Section 452
IPC is punishable for house trespass having having made preparation
for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint, which reads as under:
“452. House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or
wrongful restraint-Whoever commits house-trespass, having made
preparation for causing hurt to any person or for assaulting any
person, or for wrongfully restraining any person, or for putting and
person in fear of hurt, or of assault, or of wrongful restraint, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.”
8.
The house trespass is defined under Section 442 of IPC which reads
as under:
“442. House Trespass- Whoever commits criminal trespass by
entering into or remaining in any building, tent or vessel used as a
human dwelling or any building used as a place for worship, or as a
place for the custody of property, is said to commit “house-trespass”.
9.
The house trespass further involve the criminal trespass which has
been defined under Section 441 of IPC which reads as under:
“441. Criminal Trespass-Whoever enters into or upon property in the
possession of another with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate,
insult or annoy any person in possession of such property, or having
lawfully entered into or upon such property, unlawfully remains there
with intent thereby to intimidate, insult or annoy any such person, or
with intent to commit an offence, is said to commit “criminal trespass”.
10.
From the conjoint reading of these three Sections it would clearly
demonstrate that whoever criminally trespassed by entering into any
building, tent or vessels used as a human dwelling or any building used
as a place of worship or as a place for custody of the property, said to
commit house trespass. There are three separate ingredients for house
trespass i.e. (i) any building used as a human dwelling (ii) any building
used as a place of worship (iii) any building used as a place for custody
of the property. The school building would definitely cannot be a human
dwelling house or place of worship but it can be considered to be a
place for custody of the property where school furniture and other
educational assets are being kept in safe custody. The School building
was in exclusive possession of the complainant and the petitioner was
not having any right to forceful enter into the premises under the
possession of the complainant without their permission.
11.
In the matter of Mangaraj Barik & Others Vs. State of Orissa, 1982
CrLJ 1631, the Orissa High Court has held in paragraphs 5 & 6 as
under :
“5. Counsel had made submissions on the question whether a school
building would come under the expression "...any building, ...used as a
human dwelling..." In Section 442 of the I.P.C. The learned Additional
Government Advocate submitted that a schoolbuilding would satisfy
the test of a building used as a human dwelling and in support of his
contention
he
relied
on
the"
State
v.
Nihal
Singh
MANU/PH/0527/1970 : 1971) 73 PLR 440. In that case the meaning of
the expression "any building used as a human dwelling" in Section
380, I.P.C. was considered in the context of a railway waiting- room. It
was observed:
There can be no dispute that a railway waiting-room is a
building. The further point for consideration is whether it is used
as a human dwelling. The contention of Mr. Gour, is that the
word 'dwelling' in Section 380. Indian Penal Code, has a
restricted meaning, viz., a house or building used as a
permanent residence, and that it does not include such public
places where passengers may only rest for a while awaiting the
arrival of their train.
It is true that one fact of the dictionary meaning of 'dwell'
is 'to remain as in a permanent residence', 'to have one's abode
to reside, But that is not the only connotation of the term, which
is of wide amplitude and is used in several shades and senses.
The O. E. i.e., the original appearance of the word in English
(vide, Shorter Oxford Dictionary, Third Edition, and Webster's
New International Dictionary, Second Edition), was 'dwellan' or
'dwelianakin to 'dull' - which originally meant to linger, delay,
tarry." In current use also, it retains the meaning, "to abide,
remain or linger for a time in a place or condition."Thus
construed, the term "dwelling" in Section 380, Indian Penal
Code, means a building, tent or vessel, in which a person lives,
remains or lingers whether permanently or temporarily. A
Railway waiting-room, therefore is a 'building used as a human
dwelling' and a theft committed therein would be punishable
under Section 380, Indian Penal Code.
As pointed out in the aforesaid decision, a building need
not be used as a place of permanent residence in order to be
considered as a human dwelling. In the present case there can
be no dispute that the school is a building and on the strength of
the reasoning adopted in the aforesaid decision, I would further
hold that a school is a building used as a human dwelling within
the contemplation of Section 442, of the I.P.C. I would therefore
agree with the learned Courts below that the prosecution has
fully brought home the charge under Section 448, I.P.C. against
the petitioners.
6. This revision which has no merit is accordingly dismissed. The
conviction and sentence of the petitioners are confirmed.”
12.
From the entire material annexed with the petition, this court does not
find any infirmity or illegality in framing charge against the petitioner for
the offence under Section 452 IPC.
13.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the principles in the case of
State of M.P. vs. Deepak, 2019 (13) SCC 62, wherein it has been held
that at the stage of framing of charge, the court has to consider the
material only with a view to find out if there is a ground for presuming
that the accused had committed the offence. It is also held that the
court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with
a view to finding out if facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face
value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the
alleged offence and at the stage of framing charge, the court is not
required to appreciate the evidence on record and consider the
allegations on merits and to find out on the basis of the evidence
recorded is likely to be convicted or not. In the matter of Deepak
(Supra), in its judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:“14. It is of relevance to refer to certain judgments of this Court. In
Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (NCT of Delhi), the appellant and
two other individuals were charged under Section 306 read with
Section 34 of the Penal Code. It had been alleged that the appellant
and the other accused persons had forcibly compelled the
deceased to sign a settlement giving up a part of his share in the
profits from the sale of certain land. This led to a dispute and as a
result of the mental harassment suffered by the deceased, he
committed suicide. The Court affirmed the framing of charges by the
trial court. The two-Judge Bench of this Court laid down the
ingredients of the offence of abetment of suicide. D.K. Jain, J. held
thus: (SCC p. 611, para 19)
"19. As observed in Ramesh Kumar v. State of
Chhattisgarh, where the accused by his acts or by a continued
course of conduct creates such circumstances that the
deceased was left with no other option except to commit
suicide, an "instigation" may be inferred. In other words, in
order to prove that the accused abetted commission of suicide
by a person, it has to be established that:
(i) the accused kept on irritating or annoying the
deceased by words, deeds or wilful omission or conduct which
may even be a wilful silence until the deceased reacted or
pushed or forced the deceased by his deeds, words or wilful
omission or conduct to make the deceased move forward
more quickly in a forward direction; and
(ii) that the accused had the intention to provoke, urge or
encourage the deceased to commit suicide while acting in the
manner noted above Undoubtedly, presence of mens rea is the
necessary concomitant of instigation."
(emphasis supplied)
15. After due consideration of the facts and circumstances, the
Court noted that prima facie, the offence of abetment of suicide was
made out (Chitresh Kumar Chopra case, SCC p. 612, para 22)
"22. In the present case, apart from the suicide note,
extracted above, statements recorded by the police during the
course of investigation, tend to show that on account of
business transactions with the accused, including the
appellant herein, the deceased was put under tremendous
pressure to do something which he was perhaps not willing to
do. Prima facie, it appears that the conduct of the appellant
and his accomplices was such that the deceased was left with
no other option except to end his life and therefore. clause
Firstly
of
Section
IPC
was
attracted."
(emphasis supplied)
16. It was also noted that at the stage of framing of charges, the
Court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if
there is a ground for "presuming" that the accused had committed
the offence: (Chitreth Kumar Chopra case, SCC p. 613, para 25)
"25. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge, the
court is required to evaluate the material and documents on
record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging
therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of
all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence or offences
For this limited purpose, the court may sift the evidence as it
cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept as
gospel truth all that the prosecution states. At this stage, the
court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if
there is ground for "presuming" that the accused has
committed an offence and not for the purpose of arriving at the
conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction"
17. A two-Judge Bench of this Court, in Rajbir Singh v. State of U.P
noted that in accordance with Section 227, the High Court must
ascertain whether there is "sufficient ground for proceeding against
the accused of there is ground for "presuming that the offence has
been committed. G.P. Mathur. J. held thus: (SCC p. 56, paras 9-10)
"9. In Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal
Chordia the Court while examining the scope of Section 227
held as under:
'14. Section 227 itself contains enough guidelines as to
the scope of inquiry for the purpose of discharging an
accused. It provides that "the Judge shall discharge when he
considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused The "ground" in the context is not a
ground for conviction, but a ground for putting the accused on
trial. It is in the trial, the guilt or the innocence of the accused
will be determined and not at the time of framing of charge.
The court, therefore, need not undertake an elaborate inquity
in sifting and weighing the material. Nor is it necessary to
delve deep into various aspects. All that the court has to
consider is whether the evadentiary material on record, if
generally accepted, would reasonably connect the accused
with the crime."
10. The High Court, did not at all apply the relevant text,
namely whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused or whether there is ground for presuming
that the accused has committed as offence. If the answer is in
the affirmative an order of discharge cannot be passed and
the accused has to face the trial. The High Court after merely
observing that 'as the firing was aimed at the other persons
and accidentally the deceased Pooja Balmiki was passing
through that way and she was hit and further observing that
the applicant neither intended to kill the deceased nor was she
aimed at because of the reason that she was a Scheduled
Caste set aside the order by which the charges had been
framed against Respondent 2. There can be no manner of
doubt that the provisions of Section 301 IPC have been
completely ignored and the relevant criteria for judging the
validity of the order passed by the learned Special Judge
directing framing of charges have not been applied. The
impugned order is, therefore, clearly erroneous in law and is
liable to be set aside."
(emphasis supplied)
14.
In the matter of Captain Manjit Singh Virdi vs. Hussain Mohammad
Shattaf and Others 2023 (7) SCC 633, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
has held in para 12 of its judgment that:“12. The law on the point has been summarised in a recent
judgment of this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar
Kashyap³ Relevant paras are extracted below: (SCC pp. 197-98,
para 11)
"11....11.1. In P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, this Court
had an occasion to consider Section 227 CrPC. What is
required to be considered at the time of framing of the charge
and/or considering the discharge application has been
considered elaborately in the said decision. It is observed and
held that at the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to f
sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is
observed that in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would
take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the
police or the documents produced before the court which ex
facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against
the accused so as to frame a charge against him. It is further
observed that if g the Judge comes to a conclusion that there
is sufficient ground to proceed. he will frame a charge under
Section 228 CrPC, if not, he will discharge the accused. It is
further observed that while exercising its judicial mind to the
facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial
has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for
the court to enter s the pros and cons of the matter or into a
weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is
really the function of the court, after the trial starts.
11.2 to the recent decision of this Court in State of
Karnataka v. MR. Memah, one of us (D. Y. Chandrachud, J)
speaking for the Bench has observed and held in para 25 as
under: (SCC p. 526)
'25. The High Court ought to have been cognizant of the
fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for
discharge under the provisions of Section 219 CPC. The
parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction have
found expression in several decisions of this Court. It is a
settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an
application for discharge the court must proceed on the
assumption that the material which has been brought on the
record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in
order to determine whether the facts emerging from the
material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the
ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. In State of N.
v. N. Suresh Rajan, adverting to the earlier decisions on the
subject, this Court held: (N. Suresh Rajan case, SCC 721-22,
para 20)
"29....... At this stage, probative value of the
materials has to be gone into and the court is not
expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the
materials would not warrant a conviction In our opinion,
what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground
for presuming that the offence has been committed and
not whether a ground for convicting the accused has
been made out To put it differently, if the court thinks that
the accused might have the offence on t committed the
the basis of the materials on record on its probative value,
it can frame the charge, though for conviction, the court
has to come to the conclusion that the accused has
committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini
trial at this stage."
15.
The judgment relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner in Seema
Gupta (Supra) though considered that school building does not come
under the definition of dwelling house, but the definition of “used as a
place for custody of the property” has not been dealt with. Therefore,
no benefit could be extended to the petitioner by the judgment cited by
him.
16.
In view of the above facts and circumstances of the case, the evidence
available in the charge sheet as well as in the aforesaid law laid down
by the Supreme Court, the present petition does not have any merit
and is hereby dismissed.
Sd/(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
inder
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