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Serial No. 01
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
Crl. Petn. No.31 of 2019
Date of Decision: 21.11.2022
Shri Vijaykumar Dineshchandra
Agarwal
Vs.
Sankar Padam Thapa
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s)
:
Mr. H. L. Shangreiso Sr. Adv. with
Mr. A. Syiem, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
:
Mr. A. Khan, Adv. (For R/1)
JUDGMENT&ORDER
1.
The petitioner has come before this Court with this application
under Section 482 Cr.PC seeking to quash the proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 44(S) of 2019 pending before the Court of the Judicial
Magistrate, Shillong.
2.
The petitioner is a permanent resident of Lalpura, Rampara, Nava
Yard, Chhani Road, Nizampura, District, Vadodara, Gujarat and is the
Chairman of the Orion Education Trust.
3.
It is the case of the petitioner that the William Carey University a
State recognized Private University, sponsored/owned by the ACTS Group
of Institutions, was facing severe financial crisis has accordingly entered
into an understanding with the Orion Education Trust to hand over the
management and administration of the said University to the Trust. A
Memorandum of Understanding dated 12.10.2017 was drawn up in this
regard.
4.
The petitioner as the Chairman of the Orion Education Trust has
also issued authorization letter to all concerned to the effect that the
respondent herein was duly entrusted with the task to Liaison with
governmental authorities and to undertake such activities, so as to facilitate
the effective transition of all administrative control from Agriculture Crafts
Trades and Studies (ACTS). For his services, the respondent would be paid
by the petitioner.
5.
The petitioner has then stated that the respondent has alleged that
the petitioner has issued a cheque for ₹ 5,00,000,000/- (Rupees five crore)
only bearing No. 000013 dated 13.10.2018 drawn on Kotak Mahindra
Bank, Vadodara Branch in favour of the respondent for services rendered.
The respondent has also deposited the said cheque in his ICICI Bank
account, at Laitumkhrah, Shillong, East Khasi Hills on 07.12.2018, but the
cheque was dishonored with the endorsement ‘Insufficient funds’.
6.
The respondent then caused issue of a demand notice under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act (N.I. Act) on 19.12.2018, the
said notice being sent by registered post AD which was received by the
petitioner on 27.12.2018.
7.
The respondent then filed the complaint case before the Court of
the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Shillong registered as C.R. Case No.
44(S) of 2019 for the offence under Sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act as well as under Section 420 IPC.
8.
The petitioner has also averred that in response to the notice issued
by the respondent under Section 138 N.I. Act, the petitioner has replied to
the same on 21.12.2018 stating specifically that since the respondent was
allowed to look after the affairs of the Trust, for the purpose of expending
the day-to-day requirements of the Trust. In this connection, the petitioner
has issued several blank signed cheques to the respondent.
9.
The petitioner was however surprised to receive a message from
the Kotak Mahindra Bank on 08.12.2018 informing him of cheque for
rupees five crore was deposited in the Bank by the respondent. The Bank
was immediately requested to stop payment of the same.
10.
The petitioner has reiterated that the said cheque was never issued
to the respondent, but that he has misused the blank cheques given to him
for another purpose as aforesaid. In the said notice dated 21.12.2018, the
respondent was also requested to return the said cheque, but he did not
response to the notice.
11.
The petitioner then lodged an FIR against the respondent on
05.05.2019 before the Gotri Police Station, Vadodara which was registered
as C.R. No 1-70 of 2019 under Section 406/420/465/467/471/506(2) and
511 IPC.
12.
The petitioner has then entered appearance before the Court of the
Judicial Magistrate at Shillong in the said case filed by the respondent and
has raised the issue of maintainability for non-joinder of necessary parties.
13.
Heard Mr. H.L. Shangreiso, learned Sr. counsel for the petitioner
who has contended that the petitioner as Chairman of the said Orion
Education Trust simply discharged his duties as such and not in his
personal capacity, non impleadment of the Trust as a party to the complaint
has struck at the root of the maintainability of the said complaint.
14.
It is submitted that in this case, the Orion Education Trust is a
registered Public Trust under the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950. As per
the Trust Deed, the petitioner is the Settler of the Trust and there are also
three other Trustees, namely; i) Mr. Gaurav Mahendrabhai Gupta, ii) Mr.
Mehul Rasiklal Thakkar and iii) Mr. Sunil Dineshchandra Agarwal.
Therefore, any liability incurred in course of functioning of the Trust will
be that of the Trust and not of an individual Trustee or of the petitioner in
this case, even though he is the Chairman of the said Trust.
15.
The provision of Section 141 of the N.I. Act requires that if an
offence under Section 138 of the Act was committed by a company, then
not only will the person or persons who are in charge of and was
responsible to the company for the conduct of its business will be
impleaded as accused, but even the company itself has to be made an
accused in the case. In this regard, nothing is said that the petitioner was in
charge of the conduct of the business of the Trust in question and neither
was the Trust made an accused, therefore, on this ground alone, the
complaint of the respondent is not maintainable.
16.
To support his contention, the learned Sr. counsel has cited the
case of Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours Private Limited:
(2012) 5 SCC 661 para 59 & 64.
17.
Another case in this regard was cited by the learned Sr. counsel
being the case of Himanshu v. B. Shivamurthy & Anr: (2019) 3 SCC 797
wherein at para 11,12,13 & 14, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that if
the complaint was lodged only against the appellant without arraigning the
company as an accused, the complaint against the appellant who is the
Director of the said company is not maintainable.
18.
On the question as to whether a Trust can be considered as a legal
entity or not to be deemed to be a company within the meaning of Section
141 of the N. I. Act, the learned Sr. counsel has referred to the case of M/s
Abraham Memorial Educational Trust which is a Trust and 7 others who
are all Trustee of the said Abraham Trust v. C. Suresh Babu, in Crl. OP
Nos. 12630 & 12661 of 2012 who is the complainant who was issued with
cheques which were dishonoured has filed a complaint under Section 138
of the N.I. Act arraying the Trust as an accused and the Trustees as those
responsible for the affairs of the Trust. On being challenged by the Trust
and its Trustees, the Hon’ble Madras High Court has held at para 66 and
67 of the said judgment that a Trust, either private or public/charitable or
otherwise, is a juristic person who is liable for punishment for an offence
punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act.
19.
Another ground taken by the petitioner is that under Section 141
of the Negotiable Instruments Act, there is a specific provision that the
person who is in charge and is responsible for the conduct of the business
of the company shall be liable to be proceeded against for committing an
offence under Section 138 of the Act.
20.
In the complaint petition filed by the respondent, there is no
specific averment to the effect that the petitioner is responsible for the
conduct of the business of the Trust since there are also three other Trustees
who are running and managing the affairs of the Trust. In this regard, the
case of K.P.G. Nair v. Jindal Menthol India Ltd: (2001) 10 SCC 218, para
9 and the case of S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd v. Neeta Bhalla & Anr:
(2005) 8 SCC 89 para 17 & 18 was referred to by the learned Sr. counsel
for the petitioner to support this contention.
21.
Mr. A. Khan, learned counsel for the respondent in reply to the
argument advanced by the petitioner has submitted that under Section 141
of the N.I. Act, a company can be made an accused in a case under Section
138 of the said Act and the ‘Explanation’ to the said section clarifies that
‘Company’ means any body corporate and includes a firm or other
association of individuals. However, in the light of the law laid down by
the Hon’ble Madras High Court in the case of M/s Abraham Memorial
Educational Trust (supra), wherein it was held that a Trust is a juristic
person, therefore a Trust can be impleaded as an accused.
22.
If this proposition is accepted by this Court, Mr. Khan has then
submitted that the respondent/complainant may be allowed to implead the
Trust as an accused in the complaint, for which an application for
amendment of the said complaint will be filed before the learned
Magistrate. As to the provision for amendment of the complaint, the case
of S.R. Sukumar v. S. Sunaad Raghuram: AIR 2015 SC 2757 was cited
and the relevant para being 17, 18 & 19 was referred to, the same being
reproduced herein as follows:“17. Insofar as merits of the contention regarding allowing of
amendment application, it is true that there is no specific provision in the
Code to amend either a complaint or a petition filed under the provisions
of the Code, but the Courts have held that the petitions seeking such
amendment to correct curable infirmities can be allowed even in respect
of complaints. In U.P. Pollution Control Board vs. Modi Distillery And
Ors., (1987) 3 SCC 684, wherein the name of the company was wrongly
mentioned in the complaint that is, instead of Modi Industries Ltd. the
name of the company was mentioned as Modi Distillery and the name
was sought to be amended. In such factual background, this Court has
held as follows:“…The learned Single Judge has focused his attention only on the
technical flaw in the complaint and has failed to comprehend that the
flaw had occurred due to the recalcitrant attitude of Modi Distillery
and furthermore the infirmity is one which could be easily removed
by having the matter remitted to the Chief Judicial Magistrate with a
direction to call upon the appellant to make the formal amendments
to the averments contained in para 2 of the complaint so as to make
the controlling company of the industrial unit figure as the
concerned accused in the complaint. All that has to be done is the
making of a formal application for amendment by the appellant for
leave to amend by substituting the name of Modi Industries Limited,
the company owning the industrial unit, in place of Modi
Distillery…. Furthermore, the legal infirmity is of such a nature
which could be easily cured...”
18. What is discernible from the U.P. Pollution Control Board’s case is
that easily curable legal infirmity could be cured by means of a formal
application for amendment. If the amendment sought to be made relates
to a simple infirmity which is curable by means of a formal amendment
and by allowing such amendment, no prejudice could be caused to the
other side, notwithstanding the fact that there is no enabling provision in
the Code for entertaining such amendment, the Court may permit such
an amendment to be made. On the contrary, if the amendment sought to
be made in the complaint does not relate either to a curable infirmity or
the same cannot be corrected by a formal amendment or if there is
likelihood of prejudice to the other side, then the Court shall not allow
such amendment in the complaint.
19. In the instant case, the amendment application was filed on
24.05.2007 to carry out the amendment by adding paras 11(a) and 11 (b).
Though, the proposed amendment was not a formal amendment, but a
substantial one, the Magistrate allowed the amendment application
mainly on the ground that no cognizance was taken of the complaint
before the disposal of amendment application. Firstly, Magistrate was yet
to apply the judicial mind to the contents of the complaint and had not
taken cognizance of the matter. Secondly, since summons was yet to be
ordered to be issued to the accused, no prejudice would be caused to the
accused. Thirdly, the amendment did not change the original nature of
the complaint being one for defamation. Fourthly, the publication of
poem ‘Khalnayakaru’ being in the nature of subsequent event created a
new cause of action in favour of the respondent which could have been
prosecuted by the respondent by filing a separate complaint and therefore
to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, the trial court allowed the
amendment application. Considering these factors which weighed in the
mind of the courts below, in our view, the High Court rightly declined to
interfere with the order passed by the Magistrate allowing the amendment
application and the impugned order does not suffer from any serious
infirmity warranting interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Article
136 of the Constitution of India.”
23.
The learned counsel has further relied on two other judgments,
that is, the case of Sarabjit Singh v. State of NCT of Delhi & Ors. where
in an order dated 18.10.2018, the Hon’ble High Court had allowed notice
under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to be issued upon the company/second
respondent as an additional accused, apparently on the company not being
named in the array of accused in the complaint under Section 138 N.I. Act.
Similarly, the case of Mrs. Manjula Kapoor v. State of H.P. & Anr: 2016
SCC OnLine HP 2124 was also cited in which the Hon’ble Himachal
Pradesh High Court at para 11 of the said judgment has directed the
Magistrate to implead the company as an accused and to issue notice under
Section 319 Cr.P.C.
24.
In view of the above, the learned counsel for the respondent has
submitted that the Trust may be impleaded as accused as the omission
thereof in the proceedings before the Trial Court is a curable defect and
that notice under Section 319 Cr.P.C. be allowed to be issued.
25.
From the submission and contention of the parties what could be
understood is that the petitioner has assailed the proceedings before the
Trial Court on two grounds, firstly, that the Trust which is the body
incorporate to which the petitioner as the Chairman and Trustee is
answerable and as such, any act purportedly done in furtherance of the
objectives of the said Trust is done for and on behalf of the Trust and as
such, the alleged cheque issued by the petitioner being done in the name of
the Trust, proceedings under Section 138 N.I. Act has to include the Trust
as a party. Secondly, that the respondent has filed the complaint before the
Trial Court against the petitioner in his capacity as the Chairman of the said
Orion Education Trust, but no specific averments has been made stating
that he is in charge of, and was responsible to the Trust for the conduct of
the business of the Trust and on this ground alone the complaint would fail
for non-joinder of proper and necessary parties.
26.
As to the status of the Trust in these proceedings, the learned
counsel for the petitioner citing the case of M/s Abraham Memorial
Educational Trust & Ors v. C. Suresh Babu: Crl.OP Nos. 12630 & 12661
of 2012 wherein, the Hon’ble Madras High Court while elaborating on the
words “association of individuals” as found in explanation (a) to Section
141 of the N. I. Act, has concluded that a Trust having two or more person
will fall within the ambit of “association of individuals” and thus, such a
Trust is a company, has contended that the Orion Education Trust can
therefore be regarded as a company and in view of Section 141 the Trust
invariably has to be arrayed as an accused in the said complaint.
27.
This proposition of law was not disputed by the learned counsel
for the respondent and this Court on an overall appreciation of the principle
stated is also in respectful agreement with the findings of the Hon’ble
Madras High Court in this regard.
28.
It follows suit that, the Trust being in the nature of a company the
respondent ought to have impleaded the same as a party or an accused in
the complaint which was not done so. However, in answer to this, the
learned counsel for the respondent has referred to the case of S. R. Sukumar
(supra) to say that in this case, the court considering the issue of
amendment of a complaint or petition the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held
that easily curable legal infirmity could be cured by means of a formal
application for amendment. If the amendment sought to be made relates to
a simple infirmity which is curable by means of a formal amendment and
by allowing such amendment, no prejudice could be cause to the other side,
notwithstanding the fact that there is no enabling provision in the Code for
entertaining such amendment, the court may permit such an amendment to
be made.
29.
It is stressed by the respondent that he may be allowed to file a
petition for amendment of the complaint before the Trial Court to implead
the Trust as a party and if allowed, such amendment would cause no
prejudice to the petitioner.
30.
The learned counsel for the respondent has also argued before this
Court that taking recourse to the provision of Section 319 Cr.P.C, the Trial
Court may be directed to issue summons to the Trust in question and to
implead the said Trust as a party in the proceedings. The authority in the
case of Mrs. Manjula Kapoor (supra) was cited, wherein the Hon’ble High
Court on being made aware that the in a complaint case under Section 138
N. I. Act, the complainant therein had proceeded against the petitioner as a
representative of the company but the company was not impleaded as a
party. On consideration of the arguments of the parties, the Court directed
that the Trial Court cause issue of show cause notice suo motu to the
company in question under Section 319 Cr.PC and thereafter, to implead
the said company as a co-accused in the case.
31.
In this case too, it is submitted that the respondent/complainant
may be allowed to file an application for impleadment of the Trust and for
issue of notice under Section 319 Cr.P.C.
32.
Before answering the question as to whether the Trust is required
to be impleaded in the proceedings before the Trial Court, the issue as to
whether the petitioner has been named as a person who was in charge and
responsible for the conduct of the business of the Trust and was impleaded
in the complaint as such, has to be answered in the first instance.
33.
The fact that the respondent is aware that the petitioner is the
Chairman of the said Orion Education Trust is apparent inasmuch as, he
was designated as a representative of the said Trust to handle the affairs of
the Trust at Shillong, therefore, the respondent cannot plead ignorance as
to the role of the petitioner in the Trust. As contended by the learned Sr.
counsel for the petitioner there is no specific averment in the complaint
indicating that the petitioner/accused is in charge and responsible for the
affairs of the Trust. This according to the learned Sr. counsel strikes at the
very root of the complaint and on this ground alone the complaint
proceedings have to be quashed.
34.
In the case of S. M. S Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (supra) at para 10, 17
and 18 a three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as
follows:“10. While analysing Section 141 of the Act, it will be seen that it
operates in cases where an offence under Section 138 is committed by a
company. The key words which occur in the Section are "every person".
These are general words and take every person connected with a
company within their sweep. Therefore, these words have been rightly
qualified by use of the words:
" who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of,
and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the
business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed
to be guilty of the offence etc."
What is required is that the persons who are sought to be made
criminally liable under Section 141 should be, at the time the offence
was committed, in charge of and responsible to the company for the
conduct of the business of the company. Every person connected with
the company shall not fall within the ambit of the provision. It is only
those persons who were in charge of and responsible for conduct of
business of the company at the time of commission of an offence, who
will be liable for criminal action. It follows from this that if a director
of a Company who was not in charge of and was not responsible for
the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time, will
not be liable under the provision. The liability arises from being in
charge of and responsible for conduct of business of the company at
the relevant time when the offence was committed and not on the
basis of merely holding a designation or office in a company.
Conversely, a person not holding any office or designation in a
Company may be liable if he satisfies the main requirement of being
in charge of and responsible for conduct of business of a Company
at the relevant time. Liability depends on the role one plays in the
affairs of a Company and not on designation or status. If being a
Director or Manager or Secretary was enough to cast criminal
liability, the Section would have said so. Instead of "every person"
the section would have said "every director, manager or secretary in
a company is liable"...etc. The legislature is aware that it is a case of
criminal liability which means serious consequences so far as the
person sought to be made liable is concerned. Therefore, only
persons who can be said to be connected with the commission of a
crime at the relevant time have been subjected to action.
17. K.P.G. Nair v. Jindal Menthol India Ltd. (2001) 10 SCC 218, was
a case under the Negotiable Instruments Act. It was found that the
allegations in the complaint did not in express words or with
reference to the allegations contained therein make out a case that at
the time of commission of the offence, the appellant was in charge of
and was responsible to the company for the conduct of its business.
It was held that requirement of Section 141 was not met and the
complaint against the accused was quashed. Similar was the position
in Katta Sujatha v. Fertilizers & Chemicals Travancore Ltd. (2002) 7
SCC 655. This was a case of a partnership. It was found that no
allegations were contained in the complaint regarding the fact that
the accused was a partner in charge of and was responsible to the
firm for the conduct of business of the firm nor was there any
allegation that the offence was made with the consent and
connivance or that it was attributable to any neglect on the part of
the accused. It was held that no case was made out against the
accused who was a partner and the complaint was quashed. The
latest in the line is the judgment of this Court in Monaben Ketanbhai
Shah v. State of Gujarat. (2004) 7 SCC 15. It was observed as under:
"4. .It is not necessary to reproduce the language of Section
141 verbatim in the complaint since the complaint is required to
be read as a whole. If the substance of the allegations made in
the complaint fulfil the requirements of Section 141, the
complaint has to proceed and is required to be tried with. It is
also true that in construing a complaint a hypertechnical
approach should not be adopted so as to quash the same. The
laudable object of preventing bouncing of cheques and
sustaining the credibility of commercial transactions resulting in
enactment of Sections 138 and 141 has to be borne in mind.
These provisions create a statutory presumption of dishonesty,
exposing a person to criminal liability if payment is not made
within the statutory period even after issue of notice. It is also
true that the power of quashing is required to be exercised very
sparingly and where, read as a whole, factual foundation for the
offence has been laid in the complaint, it should not be quashed.
All the same, it is also to be remembered that it is the duty of the
court to discharge the accused if taking everything stated in the
complaint as correct and construing the allegations made therein
liberally in favour of the complainant, the ingredients of the
offence are altogether lacking. The present case falls in this
category as would be evident from the facts noticed hereinafter."
It was further observed:
"6 …The criminal liability has been fastened on those who, at
the time of the commission of the offence, were in charge of and
were responsible to the firm for the conduct of the business of the
firm. These may be sleeping partners who are not required to
take any part in the business of the firm; they may be ladies and
others who may not know anything about the business of the
firm. The primary responsibility is on the complainant to make
necessary averments in the complaint so as to make the accused
vicariously liable. For fastening the criminal liability, there is no
presumption that every partner knows about the transaction. The
obligation of the appellants to prove that at the time the offence
was committed they were not in charge of and were not
responsible to the firm for the conduct of the business of the firm,
would arise only when first the complainant makes necessary
averments in the complaint and establishes that fact. The present
case is of total absence of requisite averments in the complaint."
18. To sum up, there is almost unanimous judicial opinion that
necessary averments ought to be contained in a complaint before a
persons can be subjected to criminal process. A liability under
Section 141 of the Act is sought to be fastened vicariously on a person
connected with a Company, the principal accused being the company
itself. It is a departure from the rule in criminal law against vicarious
liability. A clear case should be spelled out in the complaint against
the person sought to be made liable. Section 141 of the Act contains
the requirements for making a person liable under the said provision.
That respondent falls within parameters of Section 141 has to be
spelled out. A complaint has to be examined by the Magistrate in the
first instance on the basis of averments contained therein. If the
Magistrate is satisfied that there are averments which bring the case
within Section 141, he would issue the process. We have seen that
merely being described as a director in a company is not sufficient to
satisfy the requirement of Section 141. Even a non-director can be
liable under Section 141 of the Act. The averments in the complaint
would also serve the purpose that the person sought to be made liable
would know what is the case which is alleged against him. This will
enable him to meet the case at the trial.”
35.
This Court need not go further than this to be convinced that there
must be a specific averment in the complaint to the extent indicating that
the petitioner herein was in charge and responsible for the affairs of the
Trust. Since this material fact has not been indicated in the complaint,
though an attempt has been made by the respondent/complainant to show
that the petitioner is the Chairman of the Trust at the relevant period,
nothing is said about him being in charge and responsible for the conduct
of the Trust. The requirements of Section 141 N.I. Act has therefore not
been met by the respondent and on this ground alone, the proceedings
before the Trial Court are liable to be quashed.
36.
As to whether the company or the Trust in this case has to be
arrayed as an accused in the proceedings has also been answered in the
positive, since it is a clear mandate of Section 138 of the Act. Failure to
arraign the Trust as an accused in the complaint, would render the
proceedings therein ineffectual. The case of Aneeta Hada (supra), at para
58, 59 & 65 referred to by the petitioner is relevant in this regard. The same
is reproduced below as: “58. Applying the doctrine of strict construction, we are of the
considered opinion that commission of offence by the company is an
express condition precedent to attract the vicarious liability of others.
Thus, the words “as well as the company” appearing in the section make
it absolutely unmistakably clear that when the company can be
prosecuted, then only the persons mentioned in the other categories
could be vicariously liable for the offence subject to the averments in
the petition and proof thereof. One cannot be oblivious of the fact that
the company is a juristic person and it has its own respectability. If a
finding is recorded against it, it would create a concavity in its
reputation. There can be situations when the corporate reputation is
affected when a Director is indicted.
59. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we arrive at the irresistible
conclusion that for maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of
the Act, arraigning of a company as an accused is imperative. The other
categories of offenders can only be brought in the drag-net on the
touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated in the
provision itself. We say so on the basis of the ratio laid down in C.V.
Parekh (1970) 3 SCC 491, which is a three-Judge Bench decision. Thus,
the view expressed in Sheoratan Agarwal (1984) 4 SCC 352, does not
correctly lay down the law and, accordingly, is hereby overruled. The
decision in Anil Hada (2000) 1 SCC 1 is overruled with the qualifier as
stated in para 51. The decision in Modi Distillery (1987) 3 SCC 684, has
to be treated to be restricted to its own facts as has been explained by us
hereinabove.
65. Before we part with the case, we must record our uninhibited and
unreserved appreciation for the able assistance rendered by the learned
counsel for the parties and the learned amicus curiae.”
37.
As to the contention of the respondent relying on the case of S.R.
Sukumar(supra), that impleadment can be allowed by way of an
amendment to the petition/complaint, the learned Sr. counsel for the
petitioner has pointed out that as per para 4 of the said judgment, it would
appear that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has arrived at the conclusion so
mentioned, since it was noticed that there is already an application seeking
for amendment of the complaint already on record. However, the fact
remains that such an application has not been preferred by the
respondent/complainant since he has chosen to cement this point by
referring to the case of Mrs. Manjula Kapoor (supra) wherein, direction for
suo motu impleadment of the company as accused was made.
38.
In such a situation, the above contention of the respondent cannot
be sustained, since an explanation in this regard could be seen from a case
dealt by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on similar facts and circumstances, in
the case of Pawan Kumar Goyal v. State of UP & Anr:.Criminal Appeal
No. 1999 of 2022, wherein vide Order dated 17.11.2022 at para 23 of the
same the Court has held as follows: “23. In view of the above, arguments advanced by learned counsel for
the appellant that an additional accused can be impleaded subsequent
to the filing of the complaint merits no consideration, once the
limitation prescribed for taking cognizance of the offence under Section
142 of NI Act has expired. More particularly, in view of the fact that
neither any effort was made by the petitioner at any stage of the
proceedings to arraign the company as an accused nor any such
circumstances or reason has been pointed out to enable the Court to
exercise the power conferred by proviso to Section 142, to condone the
delay for not making the complaint within the prescribed period of
limitation.”
39.
The proposition as noticed above can be applied to the case of the
parties herein and in doing so, this Court would say that since the
respondent being aware of the fact that a Trust is involved, the alleged
cheque issued by the petitioner being on behalf of the said Trust, failure to
implead the Trust as an accused at the relevant time and failure to file any
application seeking amendment of the complaint to this effect at the
relevant time, has therefore resulted in the proceedings to fall foul of the
provisions of Section 141 of the N.I. Act which cannot be cured at this
stage.
40.
In the light of the above observations and findings, this Court
finds that this petition deserves to be considered and allowed and the same
is hereby done so.
41.
In view thereof, the petition is allowed. The proceedings in C.R
Case No. 44(S) of 2019 as well as the summon order dated 11.02.2019 is
hereby set aside and quashed.
42.
Petition disposed of. Parties to bear their own costs.
Judge
Meghalaya
21.11.2022
“N. Swer, Stenographer”
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