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CGHC010367772019
2026:CGHC:41811
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
MAC No. 1892 of 2019
Vijay Kumar Pandey S/o. Panna Lal Pandey Aged About 55 Years R/o.
Village Lata P.S. Takhatpur District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. (Driver of
Offending Vehicle)
..Appellant.
versus
1 - Smt. Kaushilya Devi Wd/o. Late Guru Prasad Dhuri Aged About 52
Years R/o Village Amora P.S. Takhatpur District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.
(Claimant)
2 - Amit Kumar Dhuri S/o Late Guru Prasad Dhuri Aged About 17 Years
Minor Therefore Represented Through Respondent No.1-Mother
(Natural Guardian). R/o Village Amora P.S. Takhatpur District Bilaspur,
Chhattisgarh. (Claimant)
3 - Motilal Kesharwani S/o Pyarelal Kesharwani (Died) Through Legal
Representative (Legal Heir Added As Per Honble Court Order Dated
02.07.2025)
3 -(A) Sharad Kesharwani S/o Late Motilal Kesharwani Aged
About 55 Years.
3- (B) Suresh Kesharwani S/o Motilal Kesharwani Aged About
54 Years.
3- (C) Basant Kesharwani S/o Late Motilal Kesharwani Aged
About 50 Years.
3 -(D) Hemant Kesharwani S/o Late Motilla Kesharwani Aged
About 48 Years
3-(E) Kiran Kesharwani S/o Late Motilal Kesharwani Aged
About 46 Year.
All are resident of Village - Puchheli, Tahsil - Takhatpur, District
- Bilaspur (C.G.)
... Respondents
The date which the The
date
case is reserved for Judgment
order
when The
date
when
the
is Judgment is uploaded
pronounced
15-09-2026
25.09.2026
26.09.2026
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------For Appellant-Driver
: Mr. Pravin Kumar Tulsiyan, Advocate
For Respondent Nos.1 & 2/Claimants : Mr. Vikas Shrivastava, Advocate.
For Respondent No.3/Owner
: None though served.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Hon'ble Shri Santosh Sharma, Judge
C A V Judgment
1. By the instant appeal, the appellant is challenging the legality and
validity of the impugned award dated 19.09.2019 passed by the Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal, Bilaspur, C.G (in short 'the Tribunal') in
Claim Case No.44/2015, whereby the Tribunal has awarded a total
sum of Rs.2,53,000/- in death case.
2. Relevant facts for disposal of this appeal are that on 22.12.2010,
deceased Guru Prasad Dhuri was proceeding on his motorcycle, when
he reached near Village Motimpur Lata, respondent No.1 while driving
the Tractor bearing registration No.CG10-A-1031 (for short, ‘offending
vehicle’) in a rash and negligent manner dashed against the
motorcycle of deceased Guru Prasad. As a result of said accident,
deceased Guru Prasad sustained serious injuries on his head, face,
hands, legs and other parts of his body and succumbed to the said
injuries. The accident was reported to the concerned Police Station,
pursuant to which, a case was registered against respondent No.1
under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code.
3. Claimants, who are wife and son of deceased, filed a claim
application/petition before the Tribunal claiming a total compensation
of Rs.7,33,000/- under various heads on account of the accidental
death of deceased Guru Prasad. In the claim application, it was stated
that, at the time of the alleged accident, deceased Guru Prasad was
aged about 55 years and was earning Rs.6,000/- per month by
running an agricultural centre at Village Amora. On account of the
untimely death of Guru Prasad in the said accident, the claimants were
deprived of his income.
4. Non-applicant No.1/driver of offending vehicle (appellant herein) filed
reply to the claim application and denied the adverse averments made
therein.
5. Non-applicant No.2/Owner of offending vehicle (respondent No.3
herein) was remained ex-party before the Tribunal.
6. The learned Claims Tribunal, after considering the pleadings and the
evidence adduced by the respective parties, recorded a finding that
deceased Guru Prasad had died in accident which occurred on
account of the rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle by
non-applicant No.1/Appellant herein. Vide impugned award, the
Tribunal partly allowed the claim application and awarded a total
compensation of Rs.2,53,000/- to the claimants on account of the
accidental death of the deceased. The liability to satisfy the award was
fastened upon non-applicant No.1 (driver of offending vehicle).
7. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that impugned
award is contrary to law as the Tribunal has failed to properly
appreciate the testimony of the witnesses. The Tribunal has wrongly
disbelieved the statements of the witnesses examined on behalf of the
appellant and has erroneously recorded a finding that the appellant
was negligent at the time of the alleged incident. The Tribunal has
erred in exonerating non-applicant No.2 (respondent No.3 herein) from
its liability to pay the compensation despite recording a finding that
respondent No.3 was the registered owner of the offending vehicle on
the date of the incident. He contended that appellant has been
acquitted from the criminal case, copy of judgment of acquittal marked
Exhibit D-1. The Tribunal has erroneously relied upon the documents
forming part of the criminal proceedings, ignoring the settled position
of law that the statements/evidence recorded in criminal proceedings
and other documents forming part thereof cannot be treated as
conclusive in a claim proceeding; the claim application is required to
be adjudicated on the basis of the evidence and material brought on
record before the Claims Tribunal. Learned Counsel further contended
that the Tribunal has wrongly relied upon the FIR, although the same
was not duly proved by the claimants; the claimants neither produced
nor examined any witness for proving the FIR before the Claims
Tribunal. Learned Counsel further contended that looking to the nature
of occupation of the deceased, his age and evidence adduced before
the Tribunal, compensation awarded by the Tribunal is on the higher
side.
As such, impugned award be set aside.
In support of his
contention, learned Counsel places reliance upon the decision of
Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Naveen Kumar versus Vijay
Kumar & Ors, reported in AIR 2018 SC 983.
8. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.1 and
2/claimants submits that, upon due consideration of the facts and
based on the material/evidence available on record, the Tribunal has
rightly passed the impugned award, in which, interference is not
required. Appeal preferred by the appellant is devoid of merit and
deserves to be dismissed.
9. None for respondent No.3/Owner of offending vehicle, though notice
has been duly served upon him.
10. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned
award as well as record of the case.
11. It is undisputed that on the date of the accident, appellant was holding
a valid driving licence and offending vehicle was not insured with any
insurance company, therefore, no insurance company was impleaded
as a party to the claim proceedings.
12. So far as first ground that the compensation awarded by the Tribunal
is on the higher side is concerned, perusal of the impugned award
shows that, although the claimants pleaded that, on the date of the
accident, deceased Guru Prasad was aged about 55 years and was
earning Rs. 6,000/- per month by running an agricultural centre at
Village Amora, but no documentary evidence in support thereof was
produced. Therefore, in the absence of any reliable evidence
regarding the income of the deceased, keeping in view nature of his
occupation, date of the accident, wage structure prevailing on the date
of the accident, price index, cost of living and other relevant factors,
the Tribunal rightly assessed the income of the deceased at Rs.3,000/per month and, thereafter, upon adding the other permissible
benefits/consortium, the Tribunal has rightly calculated the amount of
compensation to the tune of Rs.2,53,000/- which cannot be said to be
on the higher side.
13. So far as second ground relating to the rash and negligent driving of
the offending vehicle by the appellant, resulting in accident and death
of deceased Guru Prasad, is concerned, upon perusal of the record it
is evident that on 22.12.2010, upon receiving information from the
informant regarding an accident at Village Motimpur-Lata, the police
reached the spot and found that deceased Guru Prasad had sustained
grievous injuries in the road accident and had died on the spot.
Thereafter, FIR No. 475/2010 (Exhibit P-1) was registered against the
appellant. The offending vehicle i.e. Tractor bearing Registration No.
CG10-A-1031 as well as Driving Licence of the appellant were seized
by the Police vide seizure memo Exhibits P-5 & P-6. After completion
of the investigation, the final report (Exhibit P-2) was submitted,
wherein driver of the offending vehicle Vijay Kumar Pandey (appellant
herein), was arrayed as an accused. The post-mortem report (Exhibit
P-3) also records that death of the deceased had occurred as a result
of a road accident.
14. Claimant's Witness No.2/Shriram Dhadsena in his evidence has stated
that, on 22.12.2010, he was travelling on his motorcycle from Village
Amora to Kukusda and, as soon as he reached near Motimpur-Lata
Road, the appellant -Vijay Kumar Pandey, while driving the offending
vehicle at a high speed and in a rash and negligent manner, overtook
him and proceeded towards the wrong side of the road, whereupon he
dashed against the motorcycle of deceased Guru Prasad, who was
coming from the opposite direction on his proper side of the road. As
a result of said impact, Guru Prasad sustained fatal injuries and died.
15. The appellant-Vijay Kumar Pandey was examined as NAW-1. In his
written statement, he pleaded that he was the licensed driver of the
offending vehicle and on the date of the incident, he had stopped at
the place of incident only for the purpose of rendering assistance to
the deceased, however, treating him as the person who had caused
the accident, a false report was lodged against him and his vehicle
had been wrongly seized. However, in his cross-examination, he
admitted that he had not made any complaint against the Takhatpur
Police before any higher police authority regarding such alleged false
implication or wrongful seizure of his vehicle. He further pleaded that
the alleged accident had occurred as a result of the motorcycle of the
deceased colliding with another vehicle. Whereas, in Criminal Case
No. 54/11 (Exhibit D-1), this witness deposed that he had not
witnessed the accident.
16. It is pertinent to mention that acquittal of the appellant in the criminal
case, as reflected from the judgment marked as Exhibit D-1, is the
result of a separate judicial proceeding. The mere fact that the
appellant was acquitted in the said criminal case cannot, by itself, be
relied upon in the present claim proceedings.
17. The effect of acquittal in criminal proceedings on the adjudication of a
claim petition under the Motor Vehicles Act has been considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Reena versus Managing
Director, Karnataka State Road Transport, reported in 2026 SCC
OnLine SC 1663; some precedents which is applied/dealt with in
MACT cases is also mentioned in the said case. Relevant para of said
case reads as under:
“20. We preface a few of the well-established
precedents in the adjudication of Motor Vehicle
Accident claims:
A. Police investigation records, including the FIR and
final Charge-Sheet, constitute valid, admissible, and
reliable prima facie evidence to establish rash and
negligent driving in MACT proceedings. Further, a
subsequent acquittal in a criminal case does not affect
the assessment of tortious liability under the MV Act.
B.Criminal proceedings and civil MACT Claim Petitions
operate in entirely distinct legal realms, as the degree
of “culpable rashness” required under Section 304-A of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”) is significantly
higher than civil negligence under the law of torts. The
findings, quashment, or acquittals in Criminal Court
cannot control or dictate the outcome of MACT
proceedings, which must be evaluated independently
on civil standards.
C. A site map or accident sketch cannot be read in
isolation or used as the sole basis to record
contributory negligence against a deceased driver in
the
absence
of
corroborating
ocular
evidence.
Furthermore, the non-examination of all potential
witnesses is not fatal to a claim if the existing record
adequately establishes negligence.
D. The spot where a lighter vehicle is found lying on a
site map post- accident cannot be assumed to be the
spot where the collision occurred, nor that it was being
driven on the wrong side, as a collision with a heavy,
speeding vehicle naturally pushes or drags the smaller
vehicle forward. The Charge Sheet points towards
prima facie driver complicity, and site maps alone
cannot establish contributory negligence without direct
contra- evidence.
E. Motor accident Claim Petitions under Section 166 of
the MV Act must be adjudicated on the touchstone of
“preponderance of probability” rather than proof
beyond reasonable doubt. Further, under Section 173
of the MV Act, the Appellate Court is required to
carefully marshal all oral and documentary evidence
before reversing a reasoned MACT award.”
18. In the present case, mere acquittal in criminal case does not
exonerated the liability of appellant to pay the compensation, he has to
established the point of accident separately.
19. Upon an overall appreciation of the oral as well as documentary
evidence available on record, no circumstance has emerged which
may indicate that death of deceased Guru Prasad was caused due to
any reason other than the accident in question and it is established
that deceased Guru Prasad died as a result of a road accident caused
by rash and negligent driving of the appellant.
20. So far as question as to whether respondent No.3 was the registered
owner of offending vehicle on the date of alleged accident and,
consequently, whether the registered owner, the person in possession
of the offending vehicle and its driver are liable to pay the amount of
compensation is concerned, the same requires consideration on the
basis of the evidence available on record.
21. The appellant filed his examination-in-chief by way of an affidavit
under Order XVIII Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, wherein he
stated that on the date of alleged accident, Motilal Kesharwani
(respondent No.3) was the registered owner of the offending vehicle.
In his cross-examination, he admitted that offending vehicle, i.e. tractor
and trolley, had been seized from him by the Investigating Officer of
Police Station Takhatpur and he had also been arrested in the present
case. He further admitted that he had purchased the said vehicle prior
to the accident and the vehicle was in his possession at the time of the
accident. He stated that, for this reason, the documents marked as
Exhibits D-2 and D-3 were in his possession and said vehicle was still
in his possession.
22. Perusal of the Registration Certificate (Exhibit D-2) seized as per
seizure memo Exhibit P-5, shows that the offending vehicle was
registered in the name of respondent No.3/Motilal Kesharwani.
However, as per Registration Certificate (Exhibit D-3), said offending
vehicle was transferred in the name of the appellant-Vijay Kumar
Pandey on 14.01.2011, whereas the alleged accident occurred on
22.12.2010. Thus, it is clear that, on the date of the accident, offending
vehicle stood registered in the name of respondent No.3.
23. However, appellant/non-applicant No.1, in his deposition, has
categorically admitted that he had purchased the vehicle in question
prior to the accident and said vehicle was in his possession at the time
of the accident. He has further admitted that Ex. D-2 and Ex. D-3 were
in his possession and that said vehicle (tractor and trolley) continue to
remain in his possession.
24. In view of the aforesaid admission and discussion, it is established
that, on the date of the accident, the appellant was in possession of
the offending vehicle, whereas said vehicle stood registered in the
name of respondent No.3/Motilal Kesharwani.
25. The expression “owner” is defined under Section 2(30) of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988, which reads as under:
“Section 2(30) : ‘owner’ means a person in whose
name a motor vehicle stands registered, and where
such person is a minor, the guardian of such minor,
and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject
of a hire-purchase agreement, or an agreement of
lease or an agreement of hypothecation, the person
in possession of the vehicle under that agreement.”
26. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Naveen Kumar (supra), has
considered the question as to who would be treated as the “owner” of
a motor vehicle and has held that the person in whose name the
vehicle stands registered would be treated as the owner. The relevant
paragraph of the said judgment reads as under:
“12. The consistent thread of reasoning which
emerges from the above decisions is that in view of
the definition of the expression ‘owner’ in Section
2(30), it is the person in whose name the motor
vehicle stands registered who, for the purposes of the
Act, would be treated as the ‘owner’. However, where
a person is a minor, the guardian of the minor would
be treated as the owner. Where a motor vehicle is
subject to an agreement of hire purchase, lease or
hypothecation, the person in possession of the
vehicle under that agreement is treated as the owner.
In a situation such as the present where the
registered owner has purported to transfer the vehicle
but continues to be reflected in the records of the
registering authority as the owner of the vehicle, he
would not stand absolved of liability. Parliament has
consciously
introduced
the
definition
of
the
expression ‘owner’ in Section 2(30), making a
departure from the provisions of Section 2(19) in the
earlier Act of 1939. The principle underlying the
provisions of Section 2(30) is that the victim of a
motor accident or, in the case of a death, the legal
heirs of the deceased victim should not be left in a
state of uncertainty. A claimant for compensation
ought not to be burdened with following a trail of
successive transfers, which are not registered with
the registering authority. To hold otherwise would be
to defeat the salutary object and purpose of the Act.
Hence, the interpretation to be placed must facilitate
the fulfilment of the object of the law. In the present
case, the First respondent was the ‘owner’ of the
vehicle involved in the accident within the meaning of
Section 2(30). The liability to pay compensation
stands fastened upon him. Admittedly, the vehicle
was uninsured. The High Court has proceeded upon
a misconstruction of the judgments of this Court in
Reshma (AIR 2015 SC 290) and Purnya Kala Devi.”
27. In view of above discussions, respondent No.3, being the registered
owner of the offending vehicle on the date of the accident, cannot
escape his liability to pay the compensation awarded to the claimants.
At the same time, the appellant, who was admittedly in possession of
the offending vehicle and was driving the same at the time of the
accident, cannot absolve himself of liability arising from the accident.
28. Accordingly, respondent No.3, being the registered owner of the
offending vehicle and the appellant, being the person in possession of
and driving the offending vehicle at the time of the accident, are jointly
and severally liable to satisfy the award of compensation passed in
favour of the claimants.
29. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. The impugned award is
modified to the aforesaid extent.
Sd/(Santosh Sharma)
Judge
J/-
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