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C/AO/209/2025
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2026
Reserved On
: 19/12/2025
Pronounced On : 09/01/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/APPEAL FROM ORDER NO. 209 of 2025
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR STAY) NO. 1 of 2025
In R/APPEAL FROM ORDER NO. 209 of 2025
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE NIRAL R. MEHTA
==========================================================
Approved for Reporting
Yes
No
==========================================================
VARUN PROCON PVT LTD & ORS.
Versus
STATE BANK OF INDIA & ORS.
==========================================================
Appearance:
MR IH SYED, SR. ADVOCATE WITH MR.ADITYA J PANDYA(6991) for the
Appellant(s) No. 1,2,3
MR PC KAVINA, SR. ADVOCATE WITH MS. BHAVNA D ACHARYA(6406)
for the Respondent(s) No. 1
==========================================================
CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE NIRAL R. MEHTA
CAV JUDGMENT
1.
The present Appeal from Order, at the
instance of original plaintiffs under Order XLIII
Rule 1(r) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,
is directed against order dated 29th September,
2025 passed by learned City Civil Court No.23,
Ahmedabad
in
Civil
Exh.7.
By
the
Court
was
said
pleased
Suit
No.778
order,
to
of
below
learned
City
Civil
dismiss
the
interim
C/AO/209/2025
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2026
application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of
the Code, 1908.
Case of the Appellants (Original Plaintiffs)
Plaintiff No.1 is a company engaged in
2.
the
business
construction
Nos.2
and
of
and
Plaintiff
real
allied
were
No.1
estate
activities.
appointed
on
development,
as
05.09.2014
Plaintiff
Directors
and
of
07.03.2016
respectively. Defendant No.5, who is the nephew
of
Plaintiff
Nos.2
and
3,
was
appointed
as
a
Director of Plaintiff No.1 on 31.10.2014.
Ms. Avani Dharmesh Patel, who claims to
2.1
be
a
Director
of
Plaintiff
No.1,
was
only
an
Additional Director and was never appointed as a
Director
in
the
Annual
General
Meeting
of
Plaintiff No.1.
2.2
It is the case of the plaintiffs that,
taking
advantage
of
the
strained
relationship
between Plaintiff No.2 and his wife, Defendant
No.5,
in
collusion
with
the
other
defendants,
removed all original documents such as sale deeds
and other title documents relating to the suit
property from the residence of Plaintiff No.2. At
the relevant time, Plaintiff No.2 was detained at
Navrangpura
Police
Station
and
was
restrained
from entering the Navrangpura area pursuant to an
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CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2026
order passed by this Court.
It
2.3
is
further
alleged
that
Defendant
No.1 Bank accepted the suit property as security
without verifying the title of the property or
the
authority
of
the
person
executing
mortgage
deed
and
without
obtaining
clearance
report.
According
to
the
any
the
title
plaintiffs,
the Bank officials were in collusion with the
other defendants.
2.4
Plaintiff No.2 came to know about the
alleged
fraudulent
mortgage
deed
executed
by
Defendant No.5 only when a complaint came to be
lodged at Navrangpura Police Station.
Consequently,
2.5
the
plaintiffs
were
constrained to file Civil Suit No.778 of 2016
before the learned City Civil Court, Ahmedabad,
seeking
a
declaration
that
the
mortgage
deed
dated 12.01.2015 is illegal, that the defendants
have
no
right,
title
or
interest
in
the
suit
property, and for permanent injunction.
2.6
Defendant No.1 Bank appeared in the said
suit and filed its written statement, denying the
averments made in the plaint. The Bank primarily
contended
jurisdiction
that
the
Civil
in
view
of
the
Court
had
no
initiation
of
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CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2026
proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, and that the
mortgage was validly created.
After filing of the suit, the matter was
2.7
transferred from one court to another and, for a
substantial
2020,
it
period
from
remained
June
before
a
to
vacant
December
court
on
account of administrative reasons.
Thereafter, Defendant No.1 Bank obtained
2.8
an
order
dated
18.07.2025
in
Criminal
Miscellaneous Application No.5169 of 2025 under
Section
physical
of
the
SARFAESI
Act
of
suit
possession
the
for
taking
property.
According to the plaintiffs, the said order was
obtained on the basis of a fraudulent mortgage
deed, which is the subject matter of challenge in
the civil suit.
2.9
The
considering
learned
the
City
Civil
pleadings
and
Court,
after
submissions,
dismissed the injunction application at Exh.7 by
order dated 29.09.2025.
Case of Respondent No.1 - Bank
3.
On 05.01.2015, the State Bank of India,
Bareja Branch, Ahmedabad, sanctioned a loan of
Rs.16.50
crores
in
favour
of
M/s.
Satsang
Infrabuild Private Limited, consisting of a cash
C/AO/209/2025
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2026
credit limit of Rs.15.00 crores and a term loan
of Rs.1.50 crores. Respondent Nos.3 and 4, namely
Mr.
Ritesh
D.
Kotak
and
Mr.
Nilesh
D.
Kotak,
stood as personal guarantors. Plaintiff No.1 –
M/s. Venus Procon Private Limited – and Astha
Organisers
Private
Limited
stood
as
corporate
guarantors.
At the time of sanction of the loan, Mr.
3.1
Ritesh Kotak and Mr. Nilesh Kotak were Directors
of
the
borrower
(Respondent
company.
No.5)
and
Mr.
Ms.
Krunal
Avni
D.
H.
Patel
Patel
were
Directors of Plaintiff No.1.
3.2
were
Mr. Krunal Patel and Ms. Darshana Patel
Directors
of
Astha
Organisers
Private
Limited at the relevant time.
3.3
On
agreement
10.01.2015,
was
a
corporate
executed
by
guarantee
Plaintiff
No.1,
followed by execution of a registered mortgage
deed dated 12.01.2015, bearing Serial No.343 of
2015 before the Sub-Registrar.
3.4
On
24.12.2015,
the
borrower’s
loan
account was classified as a Non-Performing Asset
(NPA).
3.5
Thereafter,
on
28.12.2015,
a
demand
notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act
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CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2026
was issued to the borrower and guarantors, though
effective service could not be completed.
3.6
On
08.01.2016,
filed
Original
Respondent
Application
No.8
of
No.1
Bank
under
Section 19 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks
and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 before the
learned Debt Recovery Tribunal.
3.7
On 12.01.2016, the learned Debt Recovery
Tribunal passed an order in favour of the Bank in
terms of paragraph 7(c) thereof. The said order
has not been challenged by the appellants.
3.8
On 11.04.2016, the appellants filed the
present Civil Suit No.778 of 2016 along with an
injunction application at Exh.7 against the Bank
and others, without disclosing the pendency of
the
proceedings
before
the
Debt
Recovery
Tribunal. The Bank filed its written statement in
the suit on 31.12.2016.
3.9
On 03.01.2025, the Bank initiated fresh
proceedings under the SARFAESI Act by issuing a
notice under Section 13(2) to the borrower and
corporate
guarantors,
which
was
served
on
08.01.2025.
3.10
On 15.03.2025, Appellant No.2 replied to
the said notice through his advocate. The Bank,
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CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2026
by communication dated 20.03.2025, conveyed its
reasons for not accepting the objections raised.
On 04.04.2025, when the Bank attempted
3.11
to
affix
the
possession
notice
on
the
suit
property, its authorised officer was obstructed.
Consequently,
3.12
on
14.05.2025,
the
Bank
filed Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.5169
of 2025 under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act for
enforcement of its security interest. The said
application
was
allowed
18.07.2025.
The
said
by
order
order
has
dated
not
been
challenged by the appellants in accordance with
law. The injunction application at Exh.7, which
had been pending since 2016, was pressed only in
the
year
after
the
Bank
initiated
proceedings under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act.
Under Challenge
4.
Being
aggrieved
and
dissatisfied
with
the order dated 29.09.2025 passed by the learned
City Civil Court No.23, Ahmedabad in Civil Suit
No.778 of 2016 below Exh.7, the appellants, who
are the original plaintiffs, have preferred the
present Appeal From Order before this Court.
5.
Advocate
This
Court
has
heard
Mr.
I.H.
Syed
assisted
learned
by
Senior
learned
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CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2026
Advocate Mr. Aditya Pandya for the appellants,
and
learned
Senior
Advocate
Mr.
Percy
Kavina
assisted by learned Advocate Ms. Bhavna Acharya
for respondent No.1 Bank, who appeared on caveat.
Considering that the issue involved in
5.1
the present Appeal From Order is within a limited
scope,
and
advocates
with
the
appearing
consent
for
of
the
the
main
learned
contesting
parties, the Appeal From Order is taken up for
hearing at the stage of admission.
Learned Senior Advocate Mr.Syed for the
6.
appellants, while assailing the impugned order,
has made following submissions:
6.1
It is submitted that the impugned order
passed
by
facie
illegal,
settled
the
learned
City
arbitrary
provisions
of
Civil
and
law
Court
contrary
and,
is
ex
to
the
therefore,
the
same deserves to be quashed and set aside.
6.2
At
the
outset,
it
is
contended
that
there was no resolution of Plaintiff No.1–company
authorising creation of a mortgage or empowering
any person to execute such mortgage. In view of
Section 179 of the Companies Act, creation of a
mortgage requires a specific resolution of the
company.
In
absence
of
such
resolution,
the
C/AO/209/2025
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2026
mortgage
is
void
and
non
est
in
law.
It
is,
therefore, submitted that the learned trial court
ought to have granted injunction in favour of the
appellants.
It is further submitted that no valid
6.3
resolution was placed on record before the trial
court. The so-called resolution produced across
the bar before this Court bears the signature of
a person who was not a Director at the relevant
time.
Hence,
the
said
resolution
cannot
be
treated as a valid resolution in compliance with
Section 179 of the Companies Act.
It is also submitted that the learned
6.4
trial court failed to appreciate that the Bank
had
not
exercised
due
diligence
before
sanctioning and disbursing the loan and before
accepting the suit property as security. Had the
Bank verified the records properly, it would have
noticed
that
there
was
no
valid
resolution
authorising creation of the mortgage in respect
of the company’s property for a loan granted to a
third party. In these circumstances, the balance
of
convenience
was
clearly
in
favour
of
the
appellants, and the trial court ought to have
granted injunction.
6.5
It is contended that the finding of the
C/AO/209/2025
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2026
learned
trial
treated
as
a
court
50%
that
owner
of
a
Director,
being
the
company,
could
validly deal with 50% of the company’s assets, is
wholly erroneous and contrary to the provisions
of the Companies Act. Such a finding is legally
unsustainable and deserves to be set aside, and
consequently the application at Exh.7 ought to
have been allowed.
6.6
It
principal
mortgage
is
further
challenge
deed
in
allegedly
submitted
the
suit
executed
that
is
by
to
the
the
Defendant
No.5 in respect of a loan granted to Defendant
No.2, on the grounds of fraud and collusion. The
Civil Court, being competent to adjudicate upon
such issues, ought to have protected the suit
property by granting injunction. It is submitted
that if the measures initiated by the Bank under
the SARFAESI Act are permitted to proceed and the
property is not protected, the suit itself would
become infructuous. Therefore, in the interest of
justice, the learned trial court ought to have
granted
the
injunction
as
prayed
for
by
the
appellants.
6.7
To strengthen the aforesaid submission,
heavy reliance is placed on the decision in case
of Central Bank of India v. Prabha Jain [(2025) 4
SCC 38].
C/AO/209/2025
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2026
By
6.8
making
above
submissions,
Learned
Senior Advocate for the appellants, has prayed to
allow the Appeal From Order.
Learned Senior Advocate Mr.Kavina, while
7.
supporting the impugned order, has made following
submissions:
At the outset, learned Senior Advocate
7.1
for
respondent
No.1
Bank
contended
that
the
learned trial court ought to have rejected the
application at Exh.7 on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
written
It
was
statement,
submitted
the
Bank
that
had
in
the
raised
a
preliminary objection regarding the competence of
the Civil Court to entertain the suit. According
to the Bank, the Debt Recovery Tribunal alone has
jurisdiction to adjudicate the grievances raised
by the appellants and the suit itself is liable
to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It was further
submitted that although the learned trial court
rejected Exh.7 on different grounds, it ought to
have
decided
rejected
the
jurisdiction
the
issue
of
application
on
is
question
a
pure
jurisdiction
that
basis.
of
and
Since
law,
the
ultimate rejection of Exh.7 cannot be faulted.
7.2
Learned
Senior
Advocate
further
C/AO/209/2025
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2026
submitted that prior to filing of the civil suit,
the
Bank
had
already
initiated
recovery
proceedings before the learned DRT under the RDDB
Act,
wherein
an
interim
order
of
the
Bank
against
appellants.
It
appellants
neither
appeared
challenged
the
favour
DRT
nor
was
was
pointed
passed
the
out
before
interim
in
present
that
the
the
learned
order
passed
therein. According to the Bank, filing of the
civil suit without pursuing the remedy before the
DRT amounts to an abuse of process of law and is
intended only to delay the recovery proceedings.
7.3
It
was
also
submitted
that
the
appellants have not approached the Civil Court
with clean hands. There has been a deliberate
suppression
of
material
facts
inasmuch
as
the
pendency of proceedings before the learned DRT
was not disclosed in the plaint. This conduct,
according to the Bank, ought to have been taken
into
consideration
by
the
learned
trial
court
while rejecting the application at Exh.7.
7.4
Learned
Senior
Advocate
submitted
that
considering the limited scope of the Civil Court
in matters of this nature, the impugned order
rejecting Exh.7 does not call for interference.
It was further submitted that since the issue of
C/AO/209/2025
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2026
jurisdiction is purely a question of law, this
Court,
while
deciding
the
present
Order,
may
Appeal
From
substitute
its
own
reasoning
while
maintaining the operative part of the impugned
order.
It was contended that, in substance, the
7.5
appellants have challenged the validity of the
mortgage and creation of security, which squarely
falls within the jurisdiction of the learned DRT
under
Section
appellants,
being
of
the
SARFAESI
corporate
Act.
The
guarantors,
fall
within the definition of “borrower” under Section
2(f)
of
the
Section
grievance
Act,
of
2002.
Once
measures
under
Act
are
initiated,
any
the
against
such
measures
can
be
raised
before the DRT, which has ample power to examine
even
the
validity
of
the
security
interest.
Therefore, it was prayed that the Appeal From
Order be dismissed even if this Court finds fault
with the reasoning adopted by the learned trial
court, as the rejection of Exh.7 is otherwise
justified.
To
7.6
submissions,
substantiate
learned
the
Senior
aforesaid
Advocate
for
respondent No.1 Bank placed reliance on Section
of
the
SARFAESI
Act,
contending
that
the
C/AO/209/2025
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2026
jurisdiction
of
the
Civil
Court
is
expressly
barred in respect of matters which the DRT or the
Appellate
Tribunal
is
empowered
to
determine
under the Act. It was submitted that the suit
itself is barred under Section 34 and, on this
ground also, the application at Exh.7 was liable
to be rejected.
It
7.7
was
further
submitted
that
the
learned trial court has misapplied the decision
of
the
Hon’ble
Supreme
Court
in
the
case
of
Prabha Jain (supra). According to the Bank, the
facts of the said case were entirely different,
as possession of the property had already been
taken and the principal relief before the Civil
Court related to the validity of a sale deed. In
the present case, by way of Exh.7, the appellants
seek
injunction
against
measures
taken
under
Section 14 of the Act, 2002, and possession has
not yet been taken by the Bank. Therefore, the
Civil Court ought to have accepted the objection
regarding lack of jurisdiction.
7.8
It was also pointed out that although
the suit and the application at Exh.7 under Order
XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code were filed in the
year 2016, the application was not effectively
pressed until the year 2025. Only after the Bank
obtained an order under Section 14 of the Act,
C/AO/209/2025
2002,
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2026
the
appellants
sought
to
activate
Exh.7
with a view to frustrate the said order. It was
submitted
that
once
SARFAESI
proceedings
have
been initiated and statutory measures are taken,
the Civil Court is barred under Section 34 from
granting
any
injunction
against
such
measures.
Hence, the learned trial court was justified in
rejecting the application.
Lastly, it was submitted that though the
7.9
appellants have challenged the mortgage deed in
the
civil
challenged
suit,
they
have
the
corporate
not
disputed
guarantee
or
agreement
executed by Plaintiff No.1. Thus, the status of
the
appellants
as
corporate
guarantors
is
admitted. The challenge to the mortgage on the
ground of non-compliance with Section 179 of the
Companies
Act
is,
therefore,
nothing
but
an
attempt to obstruct and delay the lawful recovery
proceedings initiated by the Bank.
7.10
By
making
Senior
Advocate
for
above
submissions,
respondent
No.1
Learned
requested
this Court to dismiss the Appeal From Order.
8.
Points for determination:
(i)
Whether
have
granted
the
learned
injunction
trial
which
court
would
could
amount
to
granting stay against the measures taken under
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Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002?
(ii)
Whether under Section 17 of the SARFAESI
Act, 2002 learned DRT has jurisdiction to decide
the validity of a deed/document by which security
interest is created?
9.
To decide the aforesaid questions, this
Court feels necessary to refer certain relevant
provisions of the Act, 2002.
2(f) “borrower” means any person who, or a pooled
investment vehicle as defined in clause (da) of
section
of
the
Securities
Contracts
(Regulation) Act, 1956 which has been granted
financial assistance by any bank or financial
institution or who has given any guarantee or
created any mortgage or pledge as security for
the financial assistance granted by any bank or
financial institution and includes a person who,
or a pooled investment vehicle which becomes
borrower of a asset reconstruction company
consequent upon acquisition by it of any rights
or interest of any bank or financial institution
in relation to such financial assistance or who
has
raised
funds
through
issue
of
debt
securities;
13.
Enforcement
of
security
interest.—(1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in section 69
or section 69A of the Transfer of Property Act,
1882, any security interest created in favour of
any secured creditor may be enforced, without the
intervention of court or tribunal, by such
creditor in accordance with the provisions of
this Act.
(2) Where any borrower, who is under a liability
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to a secured creditor under a security agreement,
makes any default in repayment of secured debt or
any installment thereof, and his account in
respect of such debt is classified by the secured
creditor as non-performing asset, then, the
secured creditor may require the borrower by
notice in writing to discharge in full his
liabilities to the secured creditor within sixty
days from the date of notice failing which the
secured creditor shall be entitled to exercise
all or any of the rights under sub-section (4).
Provided that—
(i) the requirement of classification of
secured debt as non-performing asset
under this sub-section shall not apply
to a borrower who has raised funds
through issue of debt securities; and
(ii) in the event of default, the
debenture trustee shall be entitled to
enforce security interest in the same
manner as provided under this section
with
such
modifications
as
may
be
necessary and in accordance with the
terms
and
conditions
of
security
documents executed in favour of the
debenture trustee.
(3) The notice referred to in sub-section (2)
shall give details of the amount payable by the
borrower and the secured assets intended to be
enforced by the secured creditor in the event of
non-payment of secured debts by the borrower.
(3A) If, on receipt of the notice under subsection
(2),
the
borrower
makes
any
representation or raises any objection, the
secured
creditor
shall
consider
such
representation or objection and if the secured
creditor comes to the conclusion that such
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CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2026
representation or objection is not acceptable or
tenable, he shall communicate within fifteen days
of receipt of such representation or objection
the
reasons
for
non-acceptance
of
the
representation or objection to the borrower:
Provided that the reasons so communicated or
the likely action of the secured creditor at the
stage of communication of reasons shall not
confer any right upon the borrower to prefer an
application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under
section 17 or the Court of District Judge under
section 17A.
(4) In case the borrower fails to discharge his
liability in full within the period specified in
sub-section (2), the secured creditor may take
recourse to one or more of the following measures
to recover his secured debt, namely:—
(a) take possession of the secured assets of
the borrower including the right to transfer
by way of lease, assignment or sale for
realising the secured asset;
(b) take over the management of the business
of the borrower including the right to
transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale
for realising the secured asset:
Provided that the right to transfer
way of lease, assignment or sale shall
exercised only where the substantial part
the business of the borrower is held
security for the debt:
by
be
of
as
Provided
further
that
where
the
management of whole of the business or part
of the business is severable, the secured
creditor shall take over the management of
such business of the borrower which is
relatable to the security for the debt;
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(c) appoint any person (hereafter referred to
as the manager), to manage the secured assets
the possession of which has been taken over
by the secured creditor;
(d) require at any time by notice in writing,
any person who has acquired any of the
secured assets from the borrower and from
whom any money is due or may become due to
the borrower, to pay the secured creditor, so
much of the money as is sufficient to pay the
secured debt.
(5) Any payment made by any person referred to in
clause (d) of sub-section (4) to the secured
creditor shall give such person a valid discharge
as if he has made payment to the borrower.
(5A) Where the sale of an immovable property, for
which a reserve price has been specified, has
been postponed for want of a bid of an amount not
less than such reserve price, it shall be lawful
for any officer of the secured creditor, if so
authorised by the secured creditor in this
behalf, to bid for the immovable property on
behalf of the secured creditor at any subsequent
sale.
(5B) Where the secured creditor, referred to in
sub-section (5A), is declared to be the purchaser
of the immovable property at any subsequent sale,
the amount of the purchase price shall be
adjusted towards the amount of the claim of the
secured creditor for which the auction of
enforcement of security interest is taken by the
secured creditor, under sub-section (4) of
section 13.
(5C) The provisions of section 9 of the Banking
Regulation Act, 1949 shall, as far as may be,
apply to the immovable property acquired by
secured creditor under sub-section (5A).
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(6) Any transfer of secured asset after taking
possession thereof or take over of management
under sub-section (4), by the secured creditor or
by the manager on behalf of the secured creditor
shall vest in the transferee all rights in, or in
relation to, the secured asset transferred as if
the transfer had been made by the owner of such
secured asset.
(7) Where any action has been taken against a
borrower under the provisions of sub-section (4),
all costs, charges and expenses which, in the
opinion of the secured creditor, have been
properly
incurred
by
him
or
any
expenses
incidental thereto, shall be recoverable from the
borrower and the money which is received by the
secured creditor shall, in the absence of any
contract to the contrary, be held by him in
trust, to be applied, firstly, in payment of such
costs, charges and expenses and secondly, in
discharge of the dues of the secured creditor and
the residue of the money so received shall be
paid to the person entitled thereto in accordance
with his rights and interests.
(8) Where the amount of dues of the secured
creditor together with all costs, charges and
expenses incurred by him is tendered to the
secured creditor at any time before the date of
publication of notice for public auction or
inviting quotations or tender from public or
private treaty for transfer by way of lease,
assignment or sale of the secured assets,—
(i)
the
secured
assets
shall
not
be
transferred by way of lease assignment or
sale by the secured creditor; and
(ii)
in case, any step has been taken by
the secured creditor for transfer by way of
lease or assignment or sale of the assets
before tendering of such amount under this
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sub-section, no further step shall be taken
by such secured creditor for transfer by way
of lease or assignment or sale of such
secured assets.
(9) Subject to the provisions of the Insolvency
and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, in the case of]
financing of a financial asset by more than one
secured creditors or joint financing of a
financial asset by secured creditors, no secured
creditor shall be entitled to exercise any or all
of the rights conferred on him under or pursuant
to sub-section (4) unless exercise of such right
is
agreed
upon
by
the
secured
creditors
representing not less than sixty per cent in
value of the amount outstanding as on a record
date and such action shall be binding on all the
secured creditors:
Provided that in the case of a company in
liquidation, the amount realised from the sale of
secured assets shall be distributed in accordance
with the provisions of section 529A of the
Companies Act, 1956:
Provided further that in the case of a
company
being
wound
up
on
or
after
the
commencement of this Act, the secured creditor of
such company, who opts to realise his security
instead of relinquishing his security and proving
his debt under proviso to sub-section (1) of
section 529 of the Companies Act, 1956, may
retain the sale proceeds of his secured assets
after depositing the workmen's dues with the
liquidator in accordance with the provisions of
section 529A of that Act:
Provided also that liquidator referred to in
the second proviso shall intimate the secured
creditor the workmen's dues in accordance with
the provisions of section 529A of the Companies
Act, 1956 and in case such workmen's dues cannot
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be ascertained, the liquidator shall intimate the
estimated amount of workmen's dues under that
section to the secured creditor and in such case
the secured creditor may retain the sale proceeds
of the secured assets after depositing the amount
of such estimate dues with the liquidator:
Provided also that in case the secured
creditor
deposits
the
estimated
amount
of
workmen's dues, such creditor shall be liable to
pay the balance of the workmen's dues or entitled
to receive the excess amount, if any, deposited
by the secured creditor with the liquidator:
Provided also that the secured creditor shall
furnish an undertaking to the liquidator to pay
the balance of the workmen's dues, if any.
(10) Where dues of the secured creditor are not
fully satisfied with the sale proceeds of the
secured assets, the secured creditor may file an
application in the form and manner as may be
prescribed to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having
jurisdiction or a competent court, as the case
may be, for recovery of the balance amount from
the borrower.
(11) Without prejudice to the rights conferred on
the secured creditor under or by this section,
the secured creditor shall be entitled to proceed
against the guarantors or sell the pledged assets
without
first
taking
any
of
the
measured
specifies in clauses (a) to (d) of sub-section
(4) in relation to the secured assets under this
Act.
(12) The rights of a secured creditor under this
Act may be exercised by one or more of his
officers authorised in this behalf in such manner
as may be prescribed.
(13) No borrower shall, after receipt of notice
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referred to in sub-section (2), transfer by way
of sale, lease or otherwise (other than in the
ordinary course of his business) any of his
secured assets referred to in the notice, without
prior written consent of the secured creditor.
17. Application against measures to recover
secured
debts.—(1)
Any
person
(including
borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures
referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13
taken by the secured creditor or his authorised
officer
under
this
Chapter,
may
make
an
application along with such fee, as may be
prescribed, to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having
jurisdiction in the matter within forty five days
from the date on which such measure had been
taken:
Provided
that
different
fees
may
be
prescribed for making the application by the
borrower and the person other than the borrower.
(1A) An application under sub-section (1) shall
be filed before the Debts Recovery Tribunal
within the local limits of whose jurisdiction—
(a) the cause of action, wholly or in part,
arises;
(b) where the secured asset is located; or
(c) the branch or any other office of a bank
or financial institution is maintaining an
account in which debt claimed is outstanding
for the time being.
(2) The Debts Recovery Tribunal shall consider
whether any of the measures referred to in subsection (4) of section 13 taken by the secured
creditor for enforcement of security are in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and
the rules made thereunder.
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(3) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal, after
examining the facts and circumstances of the case
and evidence produced by the parties, comes to
the conclusion that any of the measures referred
to in sub-section (4) of section 13, taken by the
secured creditor are not in accordance with the
provisions of this Act and the rules made
thereunder, and require restoration of the
management or restoration of possession, of the
secured assets to the borrower or other aggrieved
person, it may, by order,—
(a) declare the recourse to any one or more
measures referred to in sub-section (4) of
section 13 taken by the secured creditor as
invalid; and
(b) restore the possession of secured assets
or management of secured assets to the
borrower or such other aggrieved person, who
has made an application under sub-section
(1), as the case may be; and
(c) pass such other direction as it may
consider
appropriate
and
necessary
in
relation to any of the recourse taken by the
secured creditor under sub-section (4) of
section 13.
(4) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal declares the
recourse taken by a secured creditor under subsection (4) of section 13, is in accordance with
the provisions of this Act and the rules made
thereunder,
then,
notwithstanding
anything
contained in any other law for the time being in
force, the secured creditor shall be entitled to
take recourse to one or more of the measures
specified under sub-section (4) of section 13 to
recover his secured debt.
(4A) Where—
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(i) any person, in an application under subsection (1), claims any tenancy or leasehold
rights upon the secured asset, the Debt Recovery
Tribunal, after examining the facts of the case
and evidence produced by the parties in relation
to such claims shall, for the purposes of
enforcement of security interest, have the
jurisdiction to examine whether lease or tenancy,
—
(a) has expired or stood determined; or
(b) is contrary to section 65A
Transfer of Property Act, 1882; or
of
the
(c) is contrary to terms of mortgage; or
(d) is created after the issuance of notice
of default and demand by the Bank under subsection (2) of section 13 of the Act; and
(ii) the Debt Recovery Tribunal is satisfied that
tenancy right or leasehold rights claimed in
secured asset falls under the sub-clause (a) or
sub-clause (b) or sub-clause (c) or sub-clause
(d) of clause (i), then notwithstanding anything
to the contrary contained in any other law for
the time being in force, the Debt Recovery
Tribunal may pass such order as it deems fit in
accordance with the provisions of this Act.
(5) Any application made under sub-section (1)
shall be dealt with by the Debts Recovery
Tribunal
as
expeditiously
as
possible
and
disposed of within sixty days from the date of
such application:
Provided that the Debts Recovery Tribunal
may, from time to time, extend the said period
for reasons to be recorded in writing, so,
however, that the total period of pendency of the
application with the Debts Recovery Tribunal,
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shall not exceed four months from the date of
making of such application made under sub-section
(1).
(6) If the application is not disposed of by the
Debts Recovery Tribunal within the period of four
months as specified in sub-section (5), any part
to the application may make an application, in
such form as may be prescribed, to the Appellate
Tribunal
for
directing
the
Debts
Recovery
Tribunal
for
expeditious
disposal
of
the
application pending before the Debts Recovery
Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal may, on such
application, make an order for expeditious
disposal of the pending application by the Debts
Recovery Tribunal.
(7) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the
Debts Recovery Tribunal shall, as far as may be,
dispose of the application in accordance with the
provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks
and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 and the
rules made thereunder.
34. Civil court not to have jurisdiction.—No
civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain
any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter
which a Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate
Tribunal is empowered by or under this Act to
determine and no injunction shall be granted by
any court or other authority in respect of any
action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any
power conferred by or under this Act or under the
Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial
Institutions Act, 1993.
Analysis of the Statutory Provisions:
10.
A plain reading of Section 2(f) of the
SARFAESI Act clarifies the meaning of the term
“borrower”. The provision makes it clear that not
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only the principal debtor, but also any person
who
has
given
mortgage
or
a
guarantee
or
has
created
a
pledge
as
security
for
financial
assistance
granted
by
a
or
financial
institution,
falls
within
bank
the
definition
of
a
borrower.
Section 13 of the Act empowers banks and
10.1
financial
institutions
interest
created
in
to
enforce
their
favour
the
security
without
the
intervention of any court or tribunal. However,
the
exercise
compliance
of
such
with
the
power
is
mandatory
subject
to
procedure
prescribed under the Act. Under Section 13(2), a
statutory demand notice is required to be issued
to the borrower, calling upon him to discharge
his liability in full within a period of sixty
days.
10.1.1
Section 13(3A) further provides that if,
upon receipt of such notice, the borrower makes
any representation or raises any objection, the
secured creditor is duty-bound to consider the
same.
If
the
secured
creditor
finds
the
representation or objection to be unacceptable,
reasons for such non-acceptance are required to
be
communicated
to
the
borrower
stipulated period.
within
the
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Upon
completion
of
the
above
process,
Section 13(4) authorises the secured creditor to
take
recourse
to
one
or
more
of
the
measures
specified therein for enforcement of the security
interest.
10.2
Section 17 provides a statutory remedy
to any person, including the borrower, who is
aggrieved by any of the measures taken by the
secured creditor under Section 13(4). Such person
is entitled to approach the learned Debt Recovery
Tribunal
having
jurisdiction
within
forty-five
days from the date on which such measures are
taken.
10.2.1
As per Section 17(2), the learned DRT is
required to examine whether the measures taken by
the secured creditor under Section 13(4) are in
accordance with the provisions of the Act and the
Rules framed thereunder. Further, under Section
17(3), if the learned DRT, upon consideration of
the facts, circumstances and evidence on record,
comes to the conclusion that the measures taken
are not in conformity with the provisions of the
Act, it is empowered to declare such measures
invalid and to restore possession of the secured
asset or management thereof, as the case may be.
10.3
Section 34 of the Act expressly bars the
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jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of any
matter which the learned DRT or the Appellate
Tribunal is empowered to determine under the Act.
The provision further mandates that no injunction
shall be granted by any court or authority in
respect of any action taken or proposed to be
taken under the powers conferred by the SARFAESI
Act, 2002 or under the RDDB Act.
For
11.
aforesaid
the
purpose
questions,
appropriate
to
of
this
note
answering
Court
certain
the
deems
it
relevant
and
undisputed facts of the case, which are as under:
The
(i)
guarantor
Limited,
appellant–plaintiff
of
to
extended
M/s.
whom
Satsang
the
financial
State
is
a
corporate
Infrabuild
Bank
assistance
of
Private
India
has
amounting
to
Rs.16.50 crores.
(ii)
In
guarantor,
its
the
capacity
as
a
appellant–plaintiff
corporate
executed
a
corporate guarantee agreement in favour of the
Bank
and
thereafter
executed
a
mortgage
deed
creating a security interest over its properties.
It is an admitted position that in Civil Suit
No.778 of 2016, the plaintiff has challenged only
the mortgage deed and has neither disputed nor
challenged the corporate guarantee.
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(iii)
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The
Bank
instituted
proceedings
under
Section 19 of the RDDB Act before the learned
Debt Recovery Tribunal for recovery of its dues,
wherein the learned DRT passed an interim order
dated 12.01.2016 against the appellant–plaintiff.
The said order has not been challenged by the
appellant–plaintiff.
(iv)
On
11.04.2016,
the
appellant–plaintiff
instituted Civil Suit No.778 of 2016 along with
an application for injunction against the Bank
and others. Significantly, the plaint does not
disclose the pendency of the proceedings under
Section 19 of the RDDB Act.
(v)
On
31.12.2016,
the
Bank
filed
its
written statement in the suit as well as in the
injunction
application,
raising
a
preliminary
objection regarding maintainability of the suit
in view of Sections 34 and 17 of the SARFAESI
Act, 2002. Thereafter, for a continuous period of
about nine years, the appellant–plaintiff did not
effectively
pursue
the
injunction
application
under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908, and allowed the same to
remain pending.
(vi)
On
03.01.2025,
the
Bank
initiated
proceedings under the SARFAESI Act by issuing a
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notice under Section 13(2) to the borrower and
the corporate guarantor. On 15.03.2025, Plaintiff
No.2 responded to the said notice. The Bank, by
its communication dated 20.03.2025, conveyed the
reasons for not accepting the objections raised.
Thereafter,
on
14.05.2025,
the
Bank
filed
an
application under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act,
being Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.5169
of 2025, seeking assistance for enforcement of
the security interest. The competent Court, by
order dated 18.07.2025, allowed the application
and
permitted
the
Bank,
inter
alia,
to
take
possession of the secured assets.
(vii)
Pursuant to the said order, the Court
Commissioner issued notice for taking possession
of the secured assets, whereupon the appellant–
plaintiff
pressed
into
service
the
pending
injunction application in the civil suit.
12.
In
view
of
the
aforesaid
factual
background, this Court now proceeds to decide the
points for determination framed hereinabove.
12.1
With regard to Point for Determination
No.(i), on a careful examination of the record,
it clearly emerges that the appellant–plaintiff
is a corporate guarantor by virtue of a corporate
guarantee
agreement,
which
has
admittedly
not
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been disputed or challenged. In light of Section
2(f) of the SARFAESI Act, the appellant squarely
falls within the definition of a “borrower”. Once
the
appellant
is
treated
as
a
borrower,
any
grievance relating to the measures taken under
the SARFAESI Act, 2002 is ordinarily required to
be
adjudicated
by
the
learned
Debt
Recovery
Tribunal.
A perusal of the plaint shows that the
12.1.1
principal challenge is to the mortgage deed by
which
the
Therefore,
security
interest
while
considering
has
been
the
created.
prayer
for
interim relief under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, the foremost issue
that requires consideration is whether the Civil
Court has jurisdiction to grant such relief, as
the question of jurisdiction goes to the very
root of the matter.
In
12.1.2
the
present
case,
the
issue
of
jurisdiction was raised before the learned trial
court and was dealt with by placing reliance on
the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case
of
Prabha
Jain
(supra).
This
Court
has,
therefore, examined the said decision in detail.
On
a
careful
reading,
it
is
evident
that
in
Prabha Jain (supra), the principal relief sought
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was for setting aside a sale deed alleged to be
fraudulent. The subsequent prayers related to the
mortgage
created
possession.
Hon’ble
In
Supreme
thereafter
and
recovery
of
the
that
factual
background,
Court
held
the
that
dispute,
being primarily one of civil rights arising out
of an alleged fraudulent sale, fell within the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Significantly,
in that case, possession had already been taken
and
transferred
SARFAESI
to
a
proceedings,
third
and
party
there
under
was
no
the
direct
challenge to the statutory measures taken under
the SARFAESI Act.
12.1.3 The facts of the present case stand on an
entirely different footing. Here, the appellant
himself is a borrower and is facing proceedings
not only under the RDDB Act but also under the
SARFAESI
13(2)
Act.
Statutory
notice
under
has
been
served,
objections
considered
and
rejected,
and
an
Section
have
been
order
under
Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act has already been
passed against the appellant. Pursuant thereto,
the Bank is entitled to take possession of the
secured
asset
for
enforcement
of
its
security
interest.
12.1.4 Though allegations of fraud and collusion
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have been pleaded, the substance of the suit is a
challenge to the mortgage deed and the security
interest created in favour of the Bank. Grant of
injunction
effect,
in
such
amount
to
circumstances
staying
the
would,
in
operation
and
implementation of the order passed under Section
14 of the SARFAESI Act. Such an injunction would
directly
run
contained
in
which
contrary
Section
prohibits
Civil
to
the
express
bar
of
the
SARFAESI
Act,
Courts
from
granting
injunctions in respect of actions taken or to be
taken under the Act.
12.1.5 To further strengthen this conclusion, it
is
pertinent
provides
a
to
note
complete
that
and
the
SARFAESI
efficacious
Act
statutory
remedy under Section 17 before the learned DRT,
where even the validity of the security interest
and the measures adopted by the secured creditor
can be examined. Permitting parallel proceedings
before the Civil Court at the interim stage would
defeat
the
legislative
intent
and
render
the
discussion,
this
opinion
the
statutory bar under Section 34 otiose.
12.1.6
In
view
Court
is
of
of
the
the
above
considered
that
learned trial court could not have granted an
injunction
which
would
effectively
stay
the
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measures taken under Section 14 of the SARFAESI
Act, 2002.
I answer the question accordingly.
With regard to Point for Determination
12.2
No.(ii), a reading of Section 17 of the SARFAESI
Act, 2002 makes it clear that the learned Debt
Recovery Tribunal is vested with full authority
to adjudicate any grievance raised by a person,
including a borrower, who is aggrieved by any of
the
measures
adopted
by
the
secured
creditor
under the Act. The provisions of Sections 17(2)
and 17(3) further reinforce that the learned DRT
has ample jurisdiction to examine the validity
and
propriety
of
the
measures
taken
by
the
considering
the
learned
is
secured creditor.
12.2.1
In
challenge
particular,
to
any
while
measure,
the
DRT
competent to examine the validity of the security
interest itself. This includes assessing whether
the deed creating the security interest, such as
a
mortgage
deed,
was
validly
executed
and
enforceable. In the present case, the appellants’
main contention is that the mortgage deed was
executed without a statutory resolution of the
company
as
required
under
Section
of
the
Companies Act. Such a challenge directly goes to
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the validity of the security interest and falls
squarely within the jurisdiction of the learned
DRT under Section 17. The DRT has full power to
declare whether the security interest is legally
enforceable
or
otherwise
for
the
purposes
of
recovery under SARFAESI proceedings.
At this stage, it is important to note
12.2.2
the explicit bar contained in Section 34 of the
Act,
which
clearly
stipulates
that
the
Civil
Court has no jurisdiction to entertain any suit
or proceedings in respect of matters which the
learned
DRT
or
the
Appellate
Tribunal
is
empowered to determine. Section 34 also prohibits
the
Civil
Court
from
granting
any
injunction
against actions taken, or proposed to be taken,
under the powers conferred by the SARFAESI Act or
the RDDB Act.
12.2.3
In
under
the
the
present
SARFAESI
Act
case,
once
proceedings
were
initiated
and
an
order under Section 14 was passed permitting the
Bank to take possession of the secured property,
any attempt to seek an injunction in the Civil
Court would effectively frustrate the statutory
proceedings
and
would
run
contrary
to
the
purpose, scope, and intent of the Act.
12.2.4 In my considered view, the learned DRT has
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full power to examine all questions that touch
upon the validity of the mortgage deed and the
security interest. While exercising powers under
Section 17, the DRT can scrutinize, inter alia:
whether
the
mortgage
deed
was
legally
executed;
whether the borrower or corporate guarantor
had
the
necessary
authority
to
create
the
security;
whether the deed is void or non est in law
due to lack of statutory compliance;
whether the property in question is exempted
from being mortgaged;
whether
registration
mandatory
and
has
of
been
the
deed
properly
was
complied
with; and
generally, whether the security interest is
valid,
enforceable,
and
capable
of
being
recovered under SARFAESI proceedings.
12.2.5
All
necessary
these
to
aspects
determine
are
the
incidental
legality
of
and
the
SARFAESI action, and the learned DRT is fully
empowered to decide such matters. Civil Courts
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cannot,
under
Section
34,
assume
jurisdiction
over such disputes.
I answer the question accordingly.
Observations on Contentions of the Appellant:
With regard to the contention that there
13.
was no resolution of the company authorising the
creation of the mortgage or empowering any person
to
execute
the
same
under
Section
of
the
Companies Act, it is observed that this issue
primarily goes to the validity and enforceability
of
the
security
hereinabove,
interest
such
a
itself.
question
As
discussed
falls
squarely
within the jurisdiction of the learned DRT under
Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. Once the
appellant is treated as a borrower under Section
2(f)
of
the
Act,
he
cannot
invoke
the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court in a manner which
would directly or indirectly interfere with the
statutory proceedings under the RDDB Act or the
SARFAESI Act. Any dispute regarding the validity
of
the
security
mortgage
interest
deed
or
the
creation
can
and
ought
to
be
of
the
raised
before the learned DRT under Section 17, which
has
exclusive
competence
matter.
to
adjudicate
the
C/AO/209/2025
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2026
With respect to the contention regarding
13.1
the finding of the learned trial court that a
Director
is
the
owner
of
the
company
and
competent to deal with its assets, it is noted
that although the reasoning adopted by the trial
court may be erroneous, the final conclusion that
the
Civil
Court
cannot
grant
relief
in
the
present circumstances, however, is correct. It is
a well-settled principle of law that where the
reasoning is flawed but the ultimate conclusion
is correct, an appellate court can substitute its
own reasoning to sustain the decision by applying
the
principle
of
“right
conclusion,
wrong
reasoning”. In the present case, while the trial
court’s
findings
regarding
the
ownership
and
competence of the Director are legally incorrect,
a holistic examination of the record shows that,
in view of Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, the
Civil Court prima facie lacks jurisdiction. This
Court, therefore, upholds the final outcome of
the trial court’s order while disapproving the
erroneous reasoning and findings.
13.2
Regarding
the
mortgage
deed
executed
was
contention
that
fraudulently
the
or
in
collusion, and that therefore the Civil Court has
jurisdiction
to
adjudicate
the
dispute,
this
contention is not acceptable in the facts of the
C/AO/209/2025
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2026
present case. The appellant, being a corporate
guarantor
within
the
definition
of
“borrower”,
chose not to appear before the learned DRT in the
proceedings
challenge
under
the
Furthermore,
the
RDDB
interim
the
civil
Act,
nor
order
passed
suit
along
did
he
therein.
with
the
interim injunction application was filed in 2016
but was allowed to remain dormant for nearly nine
years, and was pressed into service only after
the Bank initiated proceedings under the SARFAESI
Act and obtained an order under Section 14.
13.2.1 Once the possession order under Section 14
has been passed, any injunction granted by the
Civil Court would, in effect, amount to staying
the statutory proceedings under the SARFAESI Act,
which
is
expressly
barred
under
Section
34.
Allowing the Civil Court to entertain such a suit
under
the
guise
of
allegations
of
fraud
or
collusion would open the door for unscrupulous
borrowers to evade recovery proceedings through
clever
drafting
and
manipulation
of
legal
pleadings.
13.2.2 In the circumstances, mere allegations of
fraud or collusion cannot confer jurisdiction on
the Civil Court to interfere with the statutory
measures undertaken by the secured creditor under
C/AO/209/2025
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2026
the SARFAESI Act. The proper forum for raising
such challenges is the learned DRT, which has
comprehensive powers under Section 17 to examine
the legality, validity, and enforceability of the
security
interest,
including
any
alleged
irregularities in the execution of the mortgage
deed.
14.
For the foregoing reasons, the present
Appeal From Order is devoid of any merits and
thereby deserves to be dismissed and is dismissed
accordingly
with
no
order
as
to
costs.
Civil
Application also stands disposed of accordingly.
(NIRAL R. MEHTA,J)
ANUP
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