The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
16. Apart from the same, the trial court failed to assign reasons while condoning the delay of 680 days. Of course, this Court is not swayed away by the observations of the trial court vis-à-vis the conduct of the wife in the court. The legal position referred to supra supports the case of the petitioner. The trial Court, in the considered opinion of this Court, failed to exercise its jurisdiction properly. If the order of the trial Court is allowed to continue, it would cause a travesty of justice. Therefore, the orders under revision warrant interference.
17. Given the facts and circumstances of the case and discussion supra, orders dated 13.02.2025 in l.A.No.475 of 2024 and dated 30.06.2025 in I.A.No.17 of 2025 in H.M.O.P.No.34 of 2021 on the file of the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kavali are hereby set aside. I.A.No.475 of 2024 and I.A.No.17 of 2025 stand dismissed. However, this order will not preclude the respondent from claiming statutory entitlements, if any, as per law.
18. Accordingly, the civil revision petitions are disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed. Dated: 27.07.2026 THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI CIVIL REVISION PETITION Nos.3014 and 3025 of 2025 Dated: 27.07.2026
Full Judgment Text
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CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH: AMARAVATI
****
CIVIL REVISION PETITION NOs: 3014 and 3025 of 2025
VELURI RAMESH NAIDU, S/O. PITCHAIAH (LATE), AGED
42 YEARS, OCC. JR. ASST, LABOUR DEPT., R/O. KAVALI
VILLAGE AND MANDAL, NELLORE DISTRICT.
… Petitioner
Versus
NUTHAKI GEETHA BHAGAVATHI, AGED 40 YEARS,
OEE.TEACHER IN GURUKUL SEHOOL, R/O.D.NO. 14-3158, NOOKALAMMA STREET, NARSIPATNAM, ANKAPALLI
DISTRICT
… Respondent
DATE OF ORDER PRONOUNCED :
27.07.2026
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI
1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers
may be allowed to see the order?
:
Yes/No
2. Whether the copy of order may be
marked to Law Reporters/Journals?
:
Yes/No
3. Whether His Lordship wish to
see the fair copy of the order?
:
Yes/No
_____________________
SUBBA REDDY SATTI, J
* HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI
CIVIL REVISION PETITION NOs: 3014 and 3025 of 2025
% 27.07.2026
Civil Revision Petition Nos. 3014 and 3025 of 2025
VELURI RAMESH NAIDU, S/O. PITCHAIAH (LATE), AGED
42 YEARS, OCC. JR. ASST, LABOUR DEPT., R/O. KAVALI
VILLAGE AND MANDAL, NELLORE DISTRICT.
… Petitioner
Versus
NUTHAKI GEETHA BHAGAVATHI, AGED 40 YEARS,
OEE.TEACHER IN GURUKUL SEHOOL, R/O.D.NO. 14-3158, NOOKALAMMA STREET, NARSIPATNAM, ANKAPALLI
DISTRICT
… Respondents
! Counsel for Petitioner
:
^ Counsel for Respondent
:
< Gist:
> Head Note:
? Cases referred:
1) AIR 1997 Raj 63
2) (2020) 11 SCC 253
3)
(1987) 1 Rajasthan LR 520
4)
(2020) 11 SCC 253
5) (2018) 9 SCC 691
6)
(1978) 3 SCC 258
This Court made the following:
Ms Kamireddy Divya, learned counsel
for the petitioner
Sri V.N.V.Surya Dattu, learned counsel
for the respondent
APHC010596862025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
[3331]
MONDAY, THE 27th DAY OF JULY 2026
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI
CIVIL REVISION PETITION NOs: 3014 and 3025/2025
Between:
1. VELURI RAMESH NAIDU, S/O. PITCHAIAH (LATE),
AGED 42
YEARS, OCC. JR. ASST, LABOUR DEPT., R/O. KAVALI VILLAGE
AND MANDAL, NELLORE DISTRICT.
...PETITIONER
AND
1. NUTHAKI GEETHA BHAGAVATHI, Aged 40 years, Oee.Teacher in
Gurukul Sehool,
R/o.D.No. 14-3-158, Nookalamma street,
Narsipatnam, Ankapalli District.
...RESPONDENT
Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, praying that in the
circumstances stated in the grounds filed herein, the High Court may be
pleased to Memorandum of Civil Revision Petition to this Hon’ble Court
against the Order dated 13.02.2025 passed in l.A.No.475/2024 in
H.M.O.P.No.34 of 2021 and Order dated 30.06.2025 passed in
I.A.No.17/2025 in H.M.O.P.No.34 of 2021 on the file of the Court of Civil
Judge (Senior Division), Kavali, Nellore District
IA NO: 1 OF 2025
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to
grant stay of all further proceedings in H.M.O.P.No.34 of 2021 on the file of
the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kavali, Nellore District and/or pass
IA NO: 2 OF 2025
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to
vacate the stay granted by the Hon’ble Court in CRP 3014 of 2025 order
dated 14-11-2025 and pass
Counsel for the Petitioner:
1. KAMIREDDY DIVYA
Counsel for the Respondent:
1. V.N.V.SURYA DATTU
The Court made the following common order:
Heard Ms Kamireddy Divya, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri
V.N.V.Surya Dattu, learned counsel for the respondent.
2.
Since the issue involved in both the revision petitions is interconnected,
these revision petitions are disposed of by a common order. The parties to the
revision petitions are referred to as the husband and the wife.
3.
The husband filed the above two revision petitions against the order
dated 13.02.2025 in l.A.No.475 of 2024 in H.M.O.P.No.34 of 2021 filed under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay of 680 days in filing the
petition to set aside the exparte decree, and the order dated 30.06.2025 in
I.A.No.17 of 2025 in H.M.O.P.No.34 of 2021 under Order IX Rule 13 CPC on
the file of the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kavali.
4.
Husband filed H.M.O.P.No.34 of 2021 on the file of the Civil Judge
(Senior Division), Kavali under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act,
1995, for dissolution of the marriage dated 26.08.2007. The summons was
served on the respondent. She engaged an advocate and filed vakalat on
23.03.2022. The H.M.O.P. was adjourned for filing a counter on several dates,
i.e., 23.03.2022, 11.04.2025, 28.04.2022, 23.06.2022 and 01.08.2022. On
01.08.2022, the husband appeared before the Court. The learned counsel
appearing for the wife reported ‘no instructions’. The trial Court set the wife ex
parte on 01.08.2022. The husband filed his chief examination as P.W.1 on
08.08.2022 and got marked Exs.A1 and A2. Eventually, a decree was passed
dissolving the marriage on11.08.2022.
5.
Thereafter, the husband waited for five months. The wife did not file any
appeal against the order dated 11.08.2022, and hence, the husband married
one Smt. S.Tejaswini on 11.02.2023. They were blessed with a female child
named Sai Sruthika.
6.
Be that as it may, the wife filed I.A.No.475 of 2024 under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act to condone the delay of 680 days in filing of the petition to
set aside the ex parte decree. In the affidavit filed in support of the petition, it
was contended that she engaged a counsel. However, the counsel colluded
with her husband and misled her. Despite contacting the learned counsel, he
did not inform her about the stage of the proceedings in H.M.O.P. Later, she
filed the petition to condone the delay. With the above set of allegations, the
wife filed I.A.No.17 of 2025 to set aside the ex parte decree.
7.
The husband filed a counter and pleaded about the decree passed by
the trial Court and his marriage with Smt. S.Tejaswini, and the baby born out
of wedlock. The trial Court, by an order dated 13.02.2025, allowed I.A.No.475
of 2024 on payment of Rs.680/- to the DSLF through MLSC, Kavali, on or
before 03.03.2025. Thereafter, the trial Court allowed I.A.No.17 of 2025 by an
order dated 30.06.2025 on payment of Rs.500/- payable to MLSC, Kavali, on
or before 10.07.2025.
8.
Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that no reasons were
assigned by the trial Court while condoning the delay of 680 days. She would
further submit that by the time when the applications were filed to condone the
delay and to set aside the ex parte decree, the husband remarried after the
expiry of the statutory period. Out of wedlock, they were blessed with a female
child. The trial Court failed to assign reasons while allowing the petition to
condone delay or in the petition to set aside the ex parte decree. Learned
counsel relied upon the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the
Composite High Court in C.R.P.No.2623 of 2009 dated 06.08.2009, the order
of the High Court of Rajasthan in Surendra Kumar vs. Kiran Devi1 and the
order of the Apex Court in Krishnaveni Rai vs. Pankaj Rai and others2.
9.
Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, would submit
that the advocate appearing for the wife misled her in collusion with the
husband. Out of wedlock, they were blessed with two children. Without any
proper reasons, the husband discarded the wife and filed the H.M.O.P on the
file of the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kavali. The wife resides in a different
place, and hence, the husband colluded with the advocate appearing for the
wife, resulting in an ex parte decree.
10.
The point for consideration is:
Whether the orders dated 13.02.2025 in l.A.No.475 of 2024 and dated
30.06.2025 in I.A.No.17 of 2025 in H.M.O.P.No.34 of 2021 on the file of
the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kavali, suffer from any illegality?
11.
The facts narrated supra require no reiteration. As seen from the
material, the husband filed H.M.O.P.No.34 of 2021 seeking divorce. The wife
received summons and engaged an advocate. However, no counter was filed.
The H.M.O.P was adjourned on four occasions. On 01.08.2022, the advocate
appearing for the wife reported ‘no instructions’. Thereafter, the husband filed
the chief affidavit, got marked Exs.A1 and A2, and examined himself as
P.W.1. Eventually, the marriage was dissolved by a decree and divorce was
granted on 11.08.2022. Thereafter, the husband married one Smt. S.Tejaswini
on 11.02.2023. Out of wedlock, they were blessed with a female child.
12.
Learned Single Judge of the composite High Court in C.R.P.No.2623 of
2009 considered the identical issue where an application was filed by the wife
AIR 1997 Raj 63
(2020) 11 SCC 253
under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, after 10 years of the decree, observed as
follows:
“There is another important angle to this case. After the decree of
divorce was granted to him, the petitioner married another woman, and
is said to have begot a child through her. That marriage was very much
legal, since it was performed after the marriage between the petitioner
and the respondent was dissolved. The effect of the order under
revision would be, that the marriage of the petitioner with another
woman would become illegal. The couple would become guilty of
bigamy. The children born out of that wedlock would become
illegitimate. When such serious consequences, as to their social status
are involved, the present wife of the petitioner and the children through
that marriage, become the effected parties, and they would have a say
in the matter. No efforts were made in this direction.”
Eventually, the order passed by the trial Court was set aside.
13.
The Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court in Surendra Kumar’s case
observed as follows:
“6. It has not been disputed before me that after passing of the ex
parte decree in favour of the petitioner by the Distt. Judge on 11-81992, the petitioner contacted a second marraige after four months. In
such a situation, the important question that arises for determination is
whether the ex parte decree can be set aside?
7. This question arose in Harjeet Singh v. Guddi's case3, , and it was
held by this Court that when second valid marriage is contacted, it is in
the interest of justice to dismiss the application for setting aside the ex
parte decree for divorce. Again the same question was considered in
Smt. Shimla Devi v. V. Kiran Kumar's case, (1994) 3 WLC 519, and it
was held that by contacting a second marriage, the interest of second
wife intervenes. Reference was also made to P. Venkateswarlu v.
Motor & General Traders, AIR 1975 SC 1409 for the proposition that all
the proceedings of the courts can and must take conscious cognizance
of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the
proceedings provided the rules of fairness to both the sides are
scrupulously obeyed. For the above reasons, it was held that the
application moved by the first wife under Order 9, Rule 13 for setting
(1987) 1 Rajasthan LR 520
aside the ex pane decree passed against her and in favour of her
husband was not maintainable.”
14.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnaveni Rai Vs Pankar Rai4 case,
considered Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, observed as follows:
“32. As held by this Court in Anurag Mittal v. Shaily Mishra Mittal 5,
the object of Section 15 is to provide protection to the person who had
filed an appeal against the decree of dissolution of marriage and to
ensure that such appeal was not frustrated. The protection afforded by
Section 15 is primarily to a person contesting the decree of divorce. As
observed by Bobde, J. in his concurring judgment in Anurag Mittal
(supra):“I am in agreement with the view taken by Nageswara Rao, J. but it is
necessary to state how the question before us has already been settled
by the decision in Lila Gupta v. Laxmi Narain [Lila Gupta v. Laxmi Narain,
(1978) 3 SCC 258] . Even when the words of the proviso were found to
be prohibitory in clear negative terms — “it shall not be lawful”, etc., this
Court held that the incapacity to marry imposed by the proviso did not
lead to an inference of nullity, vide para 9 of Lila Gupta [Lila Gupta v.
Laxmi Narain, (1978) 3 SCC 258] . It is all the more difficult to infer nullity
when there is no prohibition; where there are no negative words but on
the other hand positive words like “it shall be lawful”. Assuming that a
marriage contracted before it became lawful to do so was unlawful and
the words create a disability, it is not possible to infer a nullity or voidness
vide paras 9 and 10 of Lila Gupta case…
………. What is held in essence is that if a provision of law prescribes an
incapacity to marry and yet the person marries while under that
incapacity, the marriage would not be void in the absence of an express
provision that declares nullity. Quae incapacity imposed by statute, there
is no difference between an incapacity imposed by negative language
such as “it shall not be lawful” or an incapacity imposed by positive
language like “it shall be lawful (in certain conditions, in the absence of
which it is impliedly unlawful)”. It would thus appear that the law is already
settled by this Court that a marriage contracted during a prescribed period
will not be void because it was contracted under an incapacity. Obviously,
this would have no bearing on the other conditions of a valid marriage.
The decision in Lila Gupta case thus covers the present case on law.
33. In Leela Gupta v. Laxmi Narain & Ors. reported 6, this Court
held:
(2020) 11 SCC 253
(2018) 9 SCC 691
(1978) 3 SCC 258
“…..the interdict of law is that it shall not be lawful for a certain
party to do a certain thing which would mean that if that act is done
it would be unlawful. But whenever a statute prohibits a certain
thing being done thereby making it unlawful, without providing
consequence for the breach, it is not legitimate to say that such a
thing when done is void because that would tantamount to saying
that every unlawful act is void.” (Paragraph 10).
“….Merely because each one of them is prohibited from
contracting a second marriage for a certain period, it could not be
said that despite there being a decree of divorce for certain
purposes the first marriage subsists or is presumed to subsist……..
An incapacity for second marriage for a certain period does not
have effect of treating the former marriage as subsisting…..”
(paragraph 13).
“Thus, examining the matter from all possible angles and keeping
in view the fact that the scheme of the Act provides for treating
certain marriages void and simultaneously some marriages which
are made punishable yet not void and no consequences having
been provided for in respect of the marriage in contravention of the
proviso to Section 15, it cannot be said that such marriage would
be void” (paragraph20)”
34. In any case, the bar of Section 15 is not at all attracted in the facts
and circumstances of this case, where the appeal from the decree of
divorce had been filed almost a year after expiry of the period of
limitation for filing an appeal. Section 15 permits a marriage after
dissolution of a marriage if there is no right of appeal against the
decree, or even if there is such a right to appeal, the time of appealing
has expired without an appeal having been presented, or the appeal
has been presented but has been dismissed. In this case no appeal
had been presented with the period prescribed by limitation.
35. The bar, if any, under Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act applies
only if there is an appeal filed within the period of limitation, and not
afterwards upon condonation of delay in filing an appeal unless of
course, the decree of divorce is stayed or there is an interim order of
Court, restraining the parties or any of them from remarrying during the
pendency of the appeal.
36. As observed above, the appeal was infructuous for all practical
purposes, from the inception, since the Appellant’s ex-husband had
lawfully remarried after expiry of the period of limitation for filing an
appeal, there being no appeal till then”.
15.
In the case at hand, as referred supra, an application to condone the
delay and an application to set aside the ex parte decree were filed after the
husband had remarried and was blessed with a female child. The learned trial
court failed to consider the said aspect and the expressions of the Apex Court
and other High Courts referred to supra while condoning the delay and also
setting aside the ex parte decree.
16.
Apart from the same, the trial court failed to assign reasons while
condoning the delay of 680 days. Of course, this Court is not swayed away by
the observations of the trial court vis-à-vis the conduct of the wife in the court.
The legal position referred to supra supports the case of the petitioner. The
trial Court, in the considered opinion of this Court, failed to exercise its
jurisdiction properly. If the order of the trial Court is allowed to continue, it
would cause a travesty of justice. Therefore, the orders under revision warrant
interference.
17.
Given the facts and circumstances of the case and discussion supra,
orders dated 13.02.2025 in l.A.No.475 of 2024 and dated 30.06.2025 in
I.A.No.17 of 2025 in H.M.O.P.No.34 of 2021 on the file of the Civil Judge
(Senior Division), Kavali are hereby set aside. I.A.No.475 of 2024 and
I.A.No.17 of 2025 stand dismissed. However, this order will not preclude the
respondent from claiming statutory entitlements, if any, as per law.
18.
Accordingly, the civil revision petitions are disposed of. There shall be
no order as to costs.
As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.
___________________________
JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI
Dated: 27.07.2026
SNI
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI
CIVIL REVISION PETITION Nos.3014 and 3025 of 2025
Dated: 27.07.2026
SNI
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