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CGHC010451692024
2026:CGHC:46234-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
FA(MAT) No. 436 of 2024
Varsha Sahu W/o Rajesh Kumar Sahu Aged About 33 Years R/o B.T.I. Road,
Mahasamund, Tehsil And District - Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh At Present
R/o Ramantola, Near Gaura Shiv Mandir, Mahasamund, Tehsil And District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh
--- Appellant
versus
Rajesh Kumar Sahu S/o Bhagwat Prasad Sahu Aged About 34 Years R/o
Ward No. 28, Thetwaar Para, Mangal Bazar, Chhwani, Bhilai, Tehsil - Bhilai,
District Durg Chhattisgarh
---- Respondent
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Appellant
: Mr. Shobhit Koshta, Advocate
For Respondent
: Mr. Anmol Sharma, Advocate
Division Bench
Hon'ble Shri Parth Prateem Sahu, Judge
Hon'ble Smt. Sushma Sawant, Judge
Judgment On Board
(30.10.2026)
Per Parth Prateem Sahu, Judge
1.
Appellant/non-applicant-wife has filed this appeal questioning the
legality and sustainability of the impugned judgment and decree dated
27.11.2024, passed in Civil Suit No. 56-A/2024, whereby the Judge,
Family Court, Mahasamund, District – Mahasamund, has allowed the
application/suit of respondent/applicant-husband filed U/s.13 (1) (i-a)
(i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (In short ‘the Act, 1995’) granting
decree of divorce.
2.
The facts relevant for disposal of this present appeal are that a suit
under Sections 13 (1) (i-a) and (i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955
was filed by the applicant-husband (respondent herein) against the
non-applicant-wife (appellant herein) seeking a decree for dissolution
of marriage solemnized between the parties on the ground of cruelty
and desertion. It was pleaded that marriage of non-applicant/wife was
solemnized with respondent/husband on 18.04.2018 as per Hindu rites
and rituals at Mahasamund. After marriage out of their wedlock, one
son Prateek Sahu was born on 22.11.2020, who was presently
residing with non-applicant/wife. It was pleaded that after marriage,
applicant and non-applicant lived in a joint family with his parents.
Non-applicant/wife, however, started insisting for living separately
within a few months of marriage and frequently quarrelled with
applicant and his parents. She allegedly used abusive language
towards his parents and disturbed the family atmosphere. Applicant
further alleged that whenever he try to make her understand, she
quarreled with him and sometimes refuse to allow him to sleep in the
same room. She also pressurized him to seek a transfer to
Mahasamund, where her parental home is situated, and threatened to
harm herself and lodge a false complaint against him if he refused. It
was further stated that since September 2022,
non-applicant has
been residing at her parental home in Mahasamund along with their
minor son. Despite repeated efforts by applicant, his family members
and members of the community to persuade her to return to
matrimonial home, she has refused to resume cohabitation. Applicant
also claimed that he and his family provided her financial assistance
while she was living at her parental home and that he continued to visit
her and their child and give her money for expenses. It was further
pleaded that the non-applicant had filed a maintenance case against
him, during the proceedings of which both parties were counselled.
Pursuant thereto, applicant stayed at the non-applicant’s parental
home for about a month, but behaviour of non-applicant did not
improve. He further stated that he is paying monthly maintenance of
Rs.12,000/- to non-applicant. It was also pleaded that despite his
willingness to continue the marital relationship, the non-applicant is
unwilling to return to the matrimonial home.
Non-applicant had
voluntarily deserted him since September 2022 by leaving the
matrimonial home and residing at her parental home without sufficient
cause. Her conduct had caused him mental cruelty and it is no longer
possible for them to live together. Accordingly, he sought a decree of
divorce.
3.
Non-applicant/wife
filed
written
statement/reply
denying
the
averments/allegation made in the plaint. It was pleaded that after
marriage, she came to know that applicant was addicted to alcohol
and other intoxicants. Whenever she objected to his habits, he abused
and assaulted her and demanded a car as dowry. Parents of applicant
and brother also harassed and assaulted her when she complained
about his conduct. It was pleaded that in October 2018, applicant,
under the influence of alcohol, assaulted her, causing a head injury
which required eight stitches. When she sought help from her mother-
in-law, she poured kerosene on her and attempted to set her on fire.
Thereafter, she stayed at her parental home for about two and a half
months. In January 2019, the applicant and his family members
persuaded her to return at her matrimonial home and assured her that
such incidents would not be repeated. It was further pleaded that after
returning to the matrimonial home, the applicant again started
consuming alcohol and other intoxicants. During her pregnancy,
neither applicant nor his family members provided her proper care and
treatment. On 19.07.2019, the applicant and his family members
forcibly throw her out of the matrimonial home. She thereafter stayed
at her parental home, where she gave birth to a son, and the delivery
expenses were borne by her family. It was also pleaded that on
16.01.2020, applicant and his family members brought her back to the
matrimonial home. However, behaviour of applicant did not improve.
He continued consuming intoxicants, assaulted her and neglected the
child, including his medical expenses. She also alleged that applicant
was admitted to de-addiction centre at Rajnandgaon, but after a few
days, applicant started consuming alcohol and other intoxicants. In
October 2020, applicant again assaulted her, due to which she sought
police assistance by calling 112. A case was also registered against
applicant at Police Station Jamul under Sections 294, 323 and 506 of
the IPC. It was pleaded that despite a compromise between the
parties, applicant continued to abuse and assault her. On 07.08.2022,
the plaintiff and his family members again assaulted her and throw her
out of the matrimonial home. Thereafter, her family members took her
to Mahasamund, where she has been residing with her minor son.
Applicant and his family members had kept her clothes and jewellery
and were not returning them. She denied having deserted the
applicant or having insisted that he live separately from his family or
seek a transfer to Mahasamund. It was pleaded that she was always
willing to resume her matrimonial life, but the plaintiff was unwilling to
keep her with him and had been pressuring her to seek a divorce.
4.
Learned trial Court based on the pleadings made by respective parties
have formulated as many as four issues for consideration and upon
considering the evidence brought in record by the respective parties,
allowed the suit filed by applicant-husband, holding that the nonapplicant-wife had subjected applicant-husband to cruelty by refusing
to resume cohabitation and continue their matrimonial life and granted
decree of divorce in favour of applicant-husband. Being aggrieved with
the judgment and decree of divorce passed by learned Family Court,
appellant-wife has filed this appeal.
5.
Learned counsel for appellant would submit that learned trial Family
Court has passed the judgment and decree allowing the application
U/s. 13 of the Act, 1955 only on the basis of the presumption and
assumption. He contended that on the one hand, learned Family Court
has rejected the prayer made by respondent/applicant for grant of
decree of divorce on the ground of desertion observing that there was
sufficient reason for appellant-wife to reside separately, on the other
hand have granted decree of divorce observing that as appellant-wife
is residing separately for sufficient time and thereby caused cruelty
upon respondent-husband. He contended that in fact from the
pleadings made in the reply as also the evidence available in record, it
is
apparent
that
it
is
the
respondent/husband
who
treated
appellant/wife with cruelty. She was abused harassed and also
assaulted in intoxicated condition frequently. Appellant/wife when
found that respondent/husband is assaulting and abusing her in
drunken condition and it exceeded, she also lodged a report on which
MLC was done wherein in the report which is placed in record
mentions injuries due to assault. In above facts of the case, merely
non-residing of appellant-wife with respondent-husband will not come
within the purview of cruelty to have been committed by appellant-wife
upon respondent-husband. He also submits that as the impugned
judgment and decree is perverse to the pleadings and the evidence
available in record, hence, it be set-aside.
6.
Learned counsel for respondent opposes the submission made by
learned counsel for appellant and supports the impugned judgment
and decree passed by learned Family Court. He submits that the
conduct and behaviour of the appellant-wife amount to cruelty, as she
has voluntarily left the respondent-husband without any sufficient
reason. He submits that despite repeated efforts by the respondent to
bring her back, appellant is neither willing nor ready to return to the
matrimonial home and resume cohabitation with him. He submits that
refusing to live with husband to continue marital life is also a cruelty.
The appellant is residing separately for more than 5 years and there is
no chances of reconciliation between the parties. He submits that
learned Family Court after appreciation of the documentary and oral
evidence brought on record has passed the impugned judgment and
decree of divorce, which does not call for any interference. He relied
upon the decision of High Court of Madhya Pradesh in case of
Neelam Singh Rawat Vs. Smt. Lalita Rawat, Neutral Citation No.
2026:MPHC-GWL: 5953, judgment of this Court in case of Ayushi
Ginora (Agrawal) Vs. Sumit Agrawal, FA (MAT) No. 287 of 2025,
decided on 07.07.2026 and in case of Prashant Jha Vs. Isha Jha, in
F.A.(MAT) No. 41 of 2024, decided on 31.01.2025.
7.
We have heard learned counsel for parties and perused the record of
the trial Court.
8.
To prove his case, respondent/applicant-husband examined himself as
(A.W.-1) and one Urmila
Bai as (A.W.-2) and placed on record
information dated 27.06.2024 regarding non-cognizable offence as
(Ex.P-1), receipt of application made to Superintendent of Police and
Station House Officer, City Kotwali as (Ex.P-2), Ration Card as (Ex.P3), and photographs of marriage as Article 1 and 2. Appellant/nonapplicant-wife has also examined herself (NAW-1) and one Smt.
Shyama Sahu as (N.A.W.-2)
9.
The marriage between the parties is not in dispute. It is also not in
disputed that a son, namely, Prateek Sahu, was born out of their
wedlock. Applicant-husband has filed application U/s. 13 of the Act,
1955 on two counts i.e. grounds under Section 13 (1-a) cruelty and
Section 13 (1-b) desertion.
10.
So far as the issue with regard to desertion and thereby caused cruelty
upon respondent/husband has been found to be not proved by learned
Family Court. Learned Family Court in its order impugned in para 57
has recorded that mother of respondent/applicant-husband had
admitted in her evidence that respondent/applicant was consuming
intoxicants and was also admitted in the hospital. Family Court in para58 also on appreciation of evidence has observed that though the
respondent/applicant-husband
had
denied
the
suggestion
of
committing assault upon appellant/wife, however, taken note of the
documentary evidence of medical prescription dated 14.10.2024
(MLC) of Lalbahadur Shashtri Hospital, Bhilai (OPD) mentioning that
assault case and further that appellant/non-applicant wife has stated
she has lodged report against respondent/husband of assault in Police
Station – Jamul and thereafter, she went to hospital for treatment.
Learned Family Court further on appreciation of evidence on record
that the mother of respondent/husband (P.W.-2) had admitted that his
son has quarreled and assaulted non-applicant-wife upon which nonapplicant/wife lodged report in Police Station – Jamul. Above incident
was denied by non-applicant/husband in his cross-examination.
11.
The aforementioned facts and evidence as discussed by learned
Family Court is upon proper appreciation of evidence from which it is
clearly appearing that respondent/husband has not pleaded or stated
the correct facts and have tried to suppress the material facts from the
Courts. The said act of the respondent husband can be considered
that the respondent husband has not approached the learned Family
Court with clean hands.
12.
Section 13 (1b) of the Act, 1955 talks of desertion and it reads that
either husband or wife has deserted the petitioner for a continuous
period of not less than two years immediately preceding the
presentation of the petition. In explanation appended to Section 13 (1)
of desertion is that desertion
means the desertion of the petitioner by
the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without
the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the wilful
neglect of petitioner by other party to the marriage, and its
grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed
accordingly. The key word in the application for invoking the ground of
desertion as provided under Section 13 (1) (i-a) is one party deserted
the other to the marriage, without reasonable cause.
13.
The law with regard to ‘desertion’ is well settled. Hon’ble Supreme
Court In Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey, (2002) 2 SCC 73,
has explained that desertion means the intentional and permanent
leaving of one spouse by the other without consent and without any
reasonable cause and held as under :“8. “Desertion”, for the purpose of seeking divorce under
the Act, means the intentional permanent forsaking and
abandonment of one spouse by the other without that
other's consent and without reasonable cause. In other
words it is a total repudiation of the obligations of
marriage. Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place
but from a state of things. Desertion, therefore, means
withdrawing from the matrimonial obligations i.e. not
permitting or allowing and facilitating the cohabitation
between the parties. The proof of desertion has to be
considered by taking into consideration the concept of
marriage which in law legalises the sexual relationship
between man and woman in the society for the
perpetuation of race, permitting lawful indulgence in
passion to prevent licentiousness and for procreation of
children. Desertion is not a single act complete in itself, it
is a continuous course of conduct to be determined
under the facts and circumstances of each case. After
referring to a host of authorities and the views of various
authors, this Court in Bipinchandra Jaisinghbai Shah v.
Prabhavati [AIR 1957 SC 176] held that if a spouse
abandons the other in a state of temporary passion, for
example, anger or disgust without intending permanently
to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. It
further held: (AIR pp. 183-84, para 10)
“For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting
spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must
be there, namely (1) the factum of separation, and (2)
the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an
end (animus deserendi). Similarly two elements are
essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned:
(1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of
conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse
leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary
intention aforesaid. The petitioner for divorce bears
the burden of proving those elements in the two
spouses respectively. Here a difference between the
English law and the law as enacted by the Bombay
Legislature may be pointed out. Whereas under the
English law those essential conditions must continue
throughout the course of the three years immediately
preceding the institution of the suit for divorce, under
the Act, the period is four years without specifying
that
it
should
immediately
precede
the
commencement of proceedings for divorce. Whether
the omission of the last clause has any practical
result need not detain us, as it does not call for
decision in the present case. Desertion is a matter of
inference
to
be
drawn
from
the
facts
and
circumstances of each case. The inference may be
drawn from certain facts which may not in another
case be capable of leading to the same inference;
that is to say, the facts have to be viewed as to the
purpose which is revealed by those acts or by
conduct and expression of intention, both anterior
and subsequent to the actual acts of separation. If, in
fact, there has been a separation, the essential
question always is whether that act could be
attributable to an animus deserendi. The offence of
desertion commences when the fact of separation
and the animus deserendi coexist. But it is not
necessary that they should commence at the same
time. The de facto separation may have commenced
without the necessary animus or it may be that the
separation and the animus deserendi coincide in
point of time; for example, when the separating
spouse abandons the marital home with the intention,
express
or
implied,
of
bringing
cohabitation
permanently to a close. The law in England has
prescribed a three years' period and the Bombay Act
prescribed a period of four years as a continuous
period during which the two elements must subsist.
Hence, if a deserting spouse takes advantage of the
locus poenitentiae thus provided by law and decide to
come back to the deserted spouse by a bona fide
offer of resuming the matrimonial home with all the
implications of marital life, before the statutory period
is out or even after the lapse of that period, unless
proceedings for divorce have been commenced,
desertion comes to an end and if the deserted
spouse unreasonably refuses the offer, the latter may
be in desertion and not the former. Hence it is
necessary that during all the period that there has
been a desertion, the deserted spouse must affirm
the marriage and be ready and willing to resume
married
life
on
such
conditions
as
may
be
reasonable. It is also well settled that in proceedings
for divorce the plaintiff must prove the offence of
desertion, like and other matrimonial offence, beyond
all reasonable doubt. Hence, though corroboration is
not required as an absolute rule of law the courts
insist
upon
corroborative
evidence,
unless
its
absence is accounted for to the satisfaction of the
court.”
9. Following the decision in Bipinchandra case [AIR
1957 SC 176] this Court again reiterated the legal
position in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena [AIR
1964 SC 40] by holding that in its essence desertion
means
the
intentional
permanent
forsaking
and
abandonment of one spouse by the other without that
other's consent, and without reasonable cause. For the
offence of desertion so far as the deserting spouse is
concerned, two essential conditions must be there (1)
the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring
cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi).
Similarly two elements are essential so far as the
deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of
consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable
cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to
form the necessary intention aforesaid. For holding
desertion as proved the inference may be drawn from
certain facts which may not in another case be capable
of leading to the same inference; that is to say the facts
have to be viewed as to the purpose which is revealed
by those acts or by conduct and expression of intention,
both anterior and subsequent to the actual acts of
separation.
10. To prove desertion in matrimonial matter it is not
always necessary that one of the spouses should have
left the company of the other as desertion could be
proved while living under the same roof. Desertion
cannot be equated with separate living by the parties to
the marriage. Desertion may also be constructive which
can be inferred from the attending circumstances. It has
always to be kept in mind that the question of desertion
is a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and
circumstances of each case.
11. There is another aspect of the matter which
disentitles the appellant from seeking the relief of
divorce on the ground of desertion in this case. As
desertion in matrimonial cases means the withdrawal of
one party from a state of things i.e. the marital status of
the party, no party to the marriage can be permitted to
allege desertion unless he or she admits that after the
formal ceremonies of the marriage, the parties had
recognised and discharged the common obligation of the
married life which essentially requires the cohabitation
between the parties for the purpose of consummating
the marriage. Cohabitation by the parties is an essential
of a valid marriage as the object of the marriage is to
further the perpetuation of the race by permitting lawful
indulgence in passions for procreation of children. In
other words, there can be no desertion without previous
cohabitation by the parties. The basis for this theory is
built upon the recognised position of law in matrimonial
matters that no one can desert who does not actively or
wilfully bring to an end the existing state of cohabitation.
However, such a rule is subject to just exceptions which
may be found in a case on the ground of mental or
physical incapacity or other peculiar circumstances of
the case. However, the party seeking divorce on the
ground of desertion is required to show that he or she
was not taking the advantage of his or her own wrong. In
the instant case the appellant herself pleaded that there
had not been cohabitation between the parties after the
marriage. She neither assigned any reason nor
attributed the non-resumption of cohabitation to the
respondent. From the pleadings and evidence led in the
case, it is apparent that the appellant did not permit the
respondent to have cohabitation for consummating the
marriage. In the absence of cohabitation between the
parties, a particular state of matrimonial position was
never permitted by the appellant to come into existence.
In the present case, in the absence of cohabitation and
consummation of marriage, the appellant was disentitled
to claim divorce on the ground of desertion.”
14.
In the case at hand from marshaling of documentary and oral evidence
it would reveal that appellant/non-applicant-wife in written statement
filed before the learned trial Court has very categorically and
specifically pleaded that respondent/applicant used to consume liquor,
Ganja, Tabacoo, Cigarette and is addicted to all types of intoxicants. It
is also pleaded that her husband used to return home under
intoxicated condition each day and upon asking not to do so she was
being abused and assaulted by respondent/husband. She also
pleaded that from their wedlock they were blessed with a baby boy
and upon continuous request made to the respondent/husband of not
coming to home under intoxicated conditions, he started living in other
room and not even taking care of child. He was admitted de-addicted
center of Rajnandgaon twice initially for 20 days and 15 days and it
was in like manner admitted for four times. After few days, he again
started consuming liquor and coming to home in intoxicated conditions
and assaulting the appellant/wife. After assault, she lodged report to
the Police Station Jamul on 14.10.2020, she was sent for hospital for
her examination and it was also pleaded that based on report in Police
Station Jamul Crime No. 457 of 2020 was registered in which under
the assurance given by respondent/husband, case was closed on
submission of compromise/settlement in the month of January, 2022.
From the aforementioned facts of the case, it is appearing that conduct
of the respondent/husband of coming into home under intoxicated
conditions
regularly
abusing,
harassing,
and
assaulting
the
appellant/wife, based upon which criminal case was also registered, is
sufficient to show that it is not the respondent/husband, who was being
treated
with
cruelty
but
act
of
respondent/husband
against
appellant/wife to be cruel which gives cause and reason to the
appellant/wife to reside separately from her husband along with minor
child.
15.
Mother of the respondent/husband (P.W.-2) in her evidence admitted
that
respondent/husband
was
addicted
to
intoxicants.
The
aforementioned facts and evidence has been correctly taken into
consideration by the learned Family Court in the impugned order.
Accordingly, the learned trial Court has recorded the finding in para -67
of the impugned judgment that it is not being proved by
respondent/husband that appellant/non-applicant wife has deserted
him without any reasonable cause and decided the issue No.1 to be
not proved.
16.
However, the learned trial Court in para -68 of the judgment after
recording the reasons for residing separately of appellant/nonapplicant-wife from respondent/husband to be addicted to intoxicants
and under the intoxicated conditions used to abuse and assaulted the
appellant/wife but then erroneously considered separate residence of
appellant/wife to be act of cruelty. The said finding recorded by learned
Family Court is contradictory to the finding recorded to the Issue No.1,
which is not sustainable.
17.
From the impugned order and the findings recorded by the Family
Court it appears that learned Family Court in para-66 of the impugned
judgment had considered that there was continuously quarrel between
the two, police report was made, and further taking one line of
evidence of appellant/non-applicant wife, that she could not leave
alone in the company of her husband and thereby further concluded
that the marital relationship between the parties had deteriorated and
there was no possibility of reconciliation, to be the ground to record
that such act of not staying the appellant/non-applicant wife to be a
cruel act.
18.
The spouse treated with cruelty is to be ascertained upon evaluating
the pleadings and the evidence in its entirety. By taking any instance in
isolation or one sentence of evidence or pleading recording conclusion
and finding would not be correct and lawful.
19.
If one spouse is compelled to leave the company of the other and live
separately for valid and compelling reasons, such separate residence
cannot be treated as an act of cruelty by the spouse living separately.
Rather, the conduct of the spouse who, by his or her acts or behaviour,
compels the other to live separately may itself amount to cruelty upon
other. The spouse who by the act or the conduct treated the other
spouse with cruelty if granted decree of divorce by allowing application
submitted by him or her would be a situation awarding him or her,
which is not the object under Section 13 of the Act, 1955. Application
filed under Section 13 is to be considered only under the scope as
provided under Section 13 and it is to be allowed only if the party filing
an application U/s. 13 seeking dissolution of marriage by decree of
divorce makes out the ground as mentioned therein.
20.
From perusal of the para 68 of the impugned judgment would show
that learned trial Court fell into error in concluding that it is not
appearing that the situation between the two can be normalizing and it
is a cruelty.
21.
The evidence of D.W.-1/appellant-wife would show that she in her
evidence
has
denied
respondent/husband
the
that
suggestion
she
did
not
given
by
counsel
for
want
to
reside
with
respondent/husband but has specifically stated that if her husband
correct his behaviour and conduct, today also she is ready and willing
to reside with her husband.
22.
From the aforementioned evidence of appellant/wife it is appearing
that she left her matrimonial home under compelling circumstances
when her husband used to come in intoxicated conditions regularly
and used to abuse and assault her. In such circumstances, a normal
person cannot be expected to live in such situation enduring all things
and acts committed of assault and abuse by her husband upon her.
Therefore, the respondent/husband should not in any manner be
awarded of his own bad conduct by allowing his application for grant of
decree of divorce.
23.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Ashok Kumar Jain Vs.
Sumati Jain, reported in AIR 2013 SC 2916, has held that a Court
may justifiably refuse to grant relief where a party seeks to take
advantage of his or her own wrong or disability. The relevant para of
this judgment are as under :“13. Under Sub-clause (a) of Clause (1) of Section 23,
in any proceeding under the Act, if the Court is satisfied
that any of the grounds for granting relief exists and the
Petitioner is not in any way taking advantage of his or
her own wrong or disability for the purpose of such
relief, the Court shall grant relief Under Section 23(1)(a)
of the Act. Therefore, it is always open to the Court to
examine whether the person seeking divorce "is not in
any way taking advantage of his or her own wrong or
disability for the purpose of such relief". On such
examination if it is so found that the person is taking
advantage of his or her wrong or disability it is open to
the Court to refuse to grant relief.”
24.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Chetan Dass v. Kamla Devi,
(2001) 4 SCC 250, while considering the question as to whether a
party can be permitted to take advantage of his or her own wrong or
disability, observed as under:“18. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that in
certain situations, relief would be denied to the
petitioner where it is found that he is taking advantage
of his own wrong for the purposes of making out a case
to obtain the decree. He has drawn our attention to
Section 23(1) clauses (a), (b) and (e) of the Hindu
Marriage Act which are quoted below:
“23. Decree in proceedings.—(1) In any proceeding
under this Act, whether defended or not, if the court
is satisfied that—
(a) any of the grounds for granting relief exists and
the petitioner except in cases where the relief is
sought by him on the ground specified in sub-clause
(a), sub-clause (b) or sub-clause (c) of clause (ii) of
Section 5 is not in any way taking advantage of his
or her own wrong or disability for the purpose of
such relief, and
(b) where the ground of the petition is the ground
specified in clause (i) of sub-section (1) of Section
13, the petitioner has not in any manner been
accessory to or connived at or condoned the act or
acts complained of, or where the ground of the
petition is cruelty the petitioner has not in any
manner condoned the cruelty, and
(c)-(d)***
(e) there is no other legal ground why relief should
not be granted, then, and in such a case, but not
otherwise, the court shall decree such relief
accordingly.”
25.
The judgments relied upon by learned counsel for respondent, in
Neelam Singh Rawat (supra) of High Court of Madhya Pradesh and
in case of Ayushi Ginora (Agrawal) (supra) and Prashant Jha
(supra) of this Court, are distinguishable on facts. The facts and
circumstances of the present case are different from those of the
aforesaid cases, therefore, it will not give any benefit to the
respondent.
26.
For the foregoing discussions and in view of the decision of Hon’ble
Supreme Court we are of the considered opinion that learned Family
Court committed error in recording a finding that there was a
statement given by wife that she is having life threat she cannot reside
alone, and thereby there is no chance of normalizing the matrimonial
relationship
to be a ground of cruelty overlooking the specific
evidence/statement given by wife before the Court that if her husband
improves his behaviour and conduct, she is ready and willing to reside
with him, to be erroneous and perverse, which is not sustainable.
27.
Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and
decree dated 27.11.2024 is hereby set-aside.
28.
Decree be drawn up accordingly.
Sd/(Parth Prateem Sahu)
Judge
Balram
Sd/(Sushma Sawant)
Judge
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