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GAHC010263392025
IN THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM & ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Principal Seat at Guwahati
WP(C)/6870/2025
1.
Ashad Ali Sheikh,
S/O- Lt. Yeaj Uddin,
Resident of Village: Mayerchar Pt-VII,
P.O. Nayeralga, P.S. Bilasipara,
District- Dhubri, Assam, PIN-783348.
2.
Abdul Mannan Mondal,
S/O- Iman Ali Mondal,
Vill- Mayerchar Pt- VII,
P.O. Nayeralga, P.S. Bilasipara,
District- Dhubri, Assam, PIN-783348.
3.
Sohar Ali Mondal,
S/O- Lt. Siddik Ali Mondal,
R/O- Vill. Mayer Char Pt- VII
P.O.- Nayer Alga, P.S- Bilasipara
Dist.- Dhubri, Assam, PIN-783348.
4.
Shayedul Ahmed,
S/O- Lt. Abdul Aziz Ahmed,
Vill- Mayerchar Pt-VII,
P.O. Nayeralga, P.S. Bilasipara,
District- Dhubri, Assam, PIN-783348.
5.
Abu Bakkar Siddique,
S/O- Abdul Sk,
Vill- Mayerchar Pt-VII,
P.O. Nayeralga, P.S. Bilasipara,
District- Dhubri, Assam, PIN-783348.
6.
Abdus Sobur Mollah,
S/O- Lt. Haji Majom Ali,
R/O- Vill. Boyjeralga Pt- V,
P.O.- Nayer Alga, P.S.- Bilasipara,
Dist.- Dhubri, Assam, PIN-783348.
7.
Shahida Khatun Mondal,
D/o- Akbar Ali Mondal,
Vill- Mayerchar Pt-VII,
P.O. Nayeralga, P.S. Bilasipara,
District- Dhubri, Assam, PIN-783348.
8.
Habia khatun,
W/O- Joynal Abedin,
Vill- Mayerchar Pt-VII,
P.O. Nayeralga, P.S. Bilasipara,
District- Dhubri, Assam, PIN-783348.
9.
Korban Ali Mondal,
S/O- Lt. Jamat Ali Mondal,
Vill- Mayerchar Pt-VII,
P.O. Nayeralga, P.S. Bilasipara,
District- Dhubri, Assam, PIN-783348.
10. Altap Hussain,
S/O- Lt. Taher Ali,
Vill- Mayerchar Pt-VII,
P.O. Nayeralga, P.S. Bilasipara,
District- Dhubri, Assam, PIN-783348.
……..Petitioners
-VersusPage 2 of 57
1.
The State of Assam represented by the Chief Secretary to the
Government of Assam, Dispur, Guwahati-781006.
2.
The Secretary to the Government of Assam, Education
(Secondary) Department, Dispur, Guwahati-781006.
3.
The Director of Secondary Education, Assam, Kahilipara,
Guwahati-781019
4.
The Inspector of Schools, Dhubri District Circle,
Dhubri, Assam Pin-783301.
5.
The Assam Secondary School Education Board (ASSEB),
Represented by its Chairman, Joint Committee and Chairman,
ASSEB, Bamunimaidan, Ghy-21.
6.
The Secretary, Department of School Education, Dispur and
Member, Joint Committee, Dispur Ghy-06.
7.
The Additional Secretary, Finance (SIU), Department, Dispur and
Member, Joint Committee, Dispur Ghy-6.
8.
The Director of Secondary Education, Assam and Member, Joint
Committee, Kahilipara Ghy-19.
…….Respondents
WP(C)/6997/2025
Utpal Nath,
S/o Lt. Bhaben Kr. Nath,
Vill. RangachahiMajuli,
P.O. Rangachahi, P.S. Jengraimukh,
Dist. Majuli, Assam, PIN-785104.
……..Petitioner
-Versus1.
The State of Assam,
[To be represented by the Secretary to the Government of Assam,
School Education Department, Dispur, Guwahati-06].
2.
The Commissioner & Secretary to the Govt. of Assam,
Finance Department, Dispur, Guwahati-06.
3.
The Director of Secondary Education, Assam, Kahilipara,
Guwahati-19.
4.
The State Level Scrutiny Committee, Secondary Education
Department, Kahilipara, Guwahati-19.
(To be represented by the Chairman of the State Level Scrutiny
Committee, Secondary Education Department, Kahilipara,
Guwahati-19).
5.
The District Scrutiny Committee, Jorhat district
(To be represented by its Chairman-cum- the District Commissioner,
Jorhat, P.O. & Dist. Jorhat, Assam. PIN-785001.)
6.
The Joint Committee,
(To be represented by its Chairman, Janata Bhawan, Dispur,
Guwahati-06).
7.
The Inspector of Schools, JDC, Jorhat, P.O. & Dist. Jorhat,
Assam, PIN-785001.
…….Respondents
- B E F O R E-
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ROBIN PHUKAN
Advocate for the petitioners
:
Mr. M.U. Mondal
Mr. R. Islam
Advocate for the respondents
:
Mr. D. Saikia, AG-cum-Sr. Adv.
Mr. B. Kaushik, SC, SEC EDU
Date on which judgment is reserved :
24.02.2026
Date of pronouncement of judgment :
02.05.2026
Whether the pronouncement is of the
operative part of the judgment?
:
N/A
Whether the full judgment has been
pronounced?
:
Yes
JUDGMENT & ORDER (CAV)
Heard Mr. M.U. Mondal, learned counsel for the petitioners in
WP(C)/6870/2025, and Mr. R. Islam, learned counsel for the
petitioner in WP(C)/6997/2025. Also heard Mr. D. Saikia, learned
Advocate General-cum-Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. B. Kaushik,
learned standing counsel for the respondents in Secondary
Education Department in both the petitions.
2.
Since a common question of law is involved in both the
petitions and since the subject matters, being challenged in both
the petitions are same and the parties are also same, it is proposed
to dispose of both the petitions by this common judgment and
order.
3.
It is to be noted here that in WP(C) No. 6870/2025, the
petitioners have challenged the Resolution No. 6 of the Minutes
dated 25.09.2025, adopted by the Joint Committee and Chairman,
Assam State School Education Board (ASSEB) (Annexure-24) in
respect of Noser Mondal Memorial High School, Dist. Dhubri, Assam;
and also prayed for issuing direction to the respondents, particularly
the respondent Nos. 2 & 3 to pay the arear salary to the petitioners
by provincializing the services of the teaching and non-teaching
staffs of Noser Mondal Memorial High School, as per the
recommendation of District Scrutiny Committee, Dhubri, dated
16.02.2019, District Scrutiny Committee recommendation (Reverification),
dated
03.04.2023,
District
Scrutiny
Committee
recommendation (Original documents), Dhubri, dated 12.04.2023,
and State Level Scrutiny Committee recommendation dated
31.07.2023, Letter dated 14.08.2023, and order dated 15.12.2023,
in Contempt Case (C) No. 103/2021 and order dated 29.08.2025, in
WP(C) No. 2387/2025 w.e.f. 01.01.2021.
4.
And in WP(C) No. 6997/2025, the petitioner has challenged
the Joint Committee, constituted for the purpose of verification of
service particulars of serving teachers of venture Educational
Institutions for the purpose of provincialisation of their services and
also the Resolution No. 8 of the Minutes of the Joint Committee held
on 25.09.2025, qua the petitioner (Annexure-18); and also prayed
for issuing direction to the respondent authorities to provincialize
the service of the petitioner on the basis of recommendations made
by the District Scrutiny Committee and State Level Scrutiny
Committee as Tutor in the category of Post Graduate Teacher
(History) of Rangachahi TN HS School, at par with the other
similarly situated Post Graduate Teachers of the aforesaid school,
whose services have already been provincialized w.e.f 30.11.2021
(Annexure-7).
Background Facts:5.
The background facts, leading to filing of WP(C) No.
6870/2025, are briefly stated as under:
“There petitioners in WP(C) No. 6870/2025, altogether
10(ten) in numbers, are employee of Noser Mondal Memorial
High School in Dhubri district, which was established w.e.f.
01.01.1995. The petitioner Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are serving as
Assistant Teachers (Arts); petitioner Nos. 4 and 5 are serving
as Assistant Teachers (Science); petitioner Nos. 6 and 7 are
serving as Assistant Teachers (Arabic); petitioner No. 8 is
serving as an Assistant Teachers (Hindi); petitioner No. 9 is
serving as an LDA and petition No. 10 is serving as a GradeIV employee in the said School. The School is functioning
under the Inspector of Schools, DDC, Dhubri. All the
petitioners were appointed by the Managing Committee of
the said school and they are serving in their respective posts
and they are also eligible for being provincialized. Thereafter,
District Scrutiny Committee (DSC), Dhubri on 16.02.2019,
had recommended the names of the petitioners for
provincialization of their services, and subsequently, their
names were re-verified and authenticated and also rerecommended by the DSC, vide its reports dated 03.04.2023
and
12.04.2023,
vide
Letter
dated
27.04.2023,
and
accordingly, all the petitioners were recommended after reverification and authentication of the original documents as
per the Letter No. 33625/2023, dated 02.03.2023 and Letter
No. PC/CC/24/2021/83, dated 02.08.2022, issued by the
Director of Secondary Education, Assam. Thereafter, vide
order dated 29.08.2025, in WP(C) No. 2387/2025, the
respondent authorities were directed to provincialize the
services of the petitioners within a period of four months on
the basis of the Letter dated 14.08.2023. But, in spite of the
aforesaid communication, the services of the petitioners have
not yet been provincialized due to the impugned Resolution
No. 6, adopted in the Minutes, dated 25.09.2025, by the
Chairman, Joint Committee for provincialization of services
and Chairman, ASSEB, which is in violation of Sections 2, 3, 4
and 13 of the Assam Education (Provincialization of Services
of Teachers and Re-organization of Educational Institutions)
Act, 2017 („Act of 2017‟, for short).
5.1.
Being aggrieved, the petitioners have approached this Court
by filing the present petition seeking the reliefs as aforesaid.”
6.
The background facts, leading to filing of WP(C)
No.
6997/2025, are briefly stated as under:
“The petitioner herein is serving as Subject Teacher in
History in the Rangachahi T.N Higher Secondary School w.e.f
20.09.2004, and his name appeared in the UDISE regularly.
In the subject of History, a total 17, 24, and 11 numbers of
students had appeared in HS Examination, in the year 2014,
2015 and 2016 respectively. Thereafter, the DSC, Jorhat
recommended seven Post Graduate Teachers, including the
petitioner, for provincialization of their service and the same
was placed before the State Level Scrutiny Committee
(SLSC). Then the SLSC sought a report from the Chairman,
SEBA about enrolment of students in the HS Examination,
2016 in History. But, the Chairman, SEBA wrongly reported
enrolment in the subject of History as six. Thereafter, the
Controller
of
Examinations,
Assam
Higher
Secondary
Education Council, vide Letter dated 04.03.2021, informed
that the enrolment in the year 2016 was 11 (eleven), and
thereafter, the Director of Secondary Education, Assam, had
issued a letter, dated 08.11.2021, and the Secretary, AHSEC,
vide letter dated 25.11.2021, reported that 10 (ten) students
appeared in the HS Examination, 2016, which is the
minimum qualifying number. Thereafter, the Director of
Secondary Education, Assam vide order dated 30.11.2021,
provincialized the services of the five Post Graduate
Teachers, except however, the petitioner. The Director of
Secondary Education, Assam again issued a letter, dated
11.02.2022, seeking authentication of the subject wise
enrolment in HS Examination, 2016. Thereafter, the SLSC
had scrutinized the particulars and submitted proposal for
creation of 54 posts of eligible teachers. But, the Government
chooses to place the matter before the Joint Committee.
Thereafter, the Joint Committee had decided to re-verify the
proposals from the Chairman, DSC, who recommended the
name of the petitioner for provincialization of his service.
Then,
the
SLSC
recommended
the
in
its
meeting
name
of
dated
the
02.08.2023,
petitioner
for
provincialization, but the Joint Committee directed for reverification again by an independent authority and the said
authority verified the case of the petitioner and submitted
before the Director of Secondary Education, Assam for
provincialisation of the service.
However,
the
Joint
Committee,
vide
impugned
resolution, had decided to verify the proper reasons of
variation of enrolment data.
Further, the DSC and SLSC
recommended the name of the petitioner on several
occasions, but the Joint Committee is sitting over such
recommendations though the Joint Committee is not a
statutory body.
6.1.
And being aggrieved, the petitioner has approached this
Court by filing the present petition seeking the reliefs as aforesaid.”
7.
The respondent No. 1 has filed an affidavit-in-opposition,
wherein
it
is
stated
that
under
the
Act
of
2017,
once
recommendations for provincialization are received from the DSC
and SLSC in favour of a Teacher of a venture educational institution
for provincialization of services, the Administrative Department
starts the process for endorsement of the proposal for creation of
post to the Finance Department, in respect of the recommendation
for provincializing the services of Teachers by the SLSC for
provincialization; and that the Department of Finance, which is the
authority for creation of posts, has prescribed check list and has
specific conditions, which are to be fulfilled including ascertaining
the financial implications, fixation of different scales and grade pay
and ensuring that the eligibility conditions for the proposed post are
fulfilled and the recommended teachers are fully eligible to hold the
post of teacher or tutor, as the case may be and to ensure that no
errors occurred in the process of recommendation, so as to avoid
any loss to the public exchequer and to avoid a situation, whereby
the sanctioned posts would be filled up by non-eligible persons.
7.1.
It is also stated that the Department of School Education and
the Department of Finance constituted a joint team of officers and
staff to fast track the proposals, which are error free and also for
expediting the re-submission of the proposals, where there are
errors in calculations or shortcomings in assessing the eligibility
conditions etc. or in which there was a lack of clarity in the
proposal; and it is also observed that the recommendations of the
DSC and SLSC, sometimes, due to the huge load in dealing or
processing the recommendations for teachers, which had applied for
provincialization, would at times err in ensuring that only eligible
persons were recommended or at times failed to clearly reflect the
eligibility of persons recommended for provincialization and such a
situation had led to delays in post creation process, and these
anomalies act as a barrier to the completion of the process of
provincialization; and that the Government, having the experience
during the past, while provincializing the teachers under the
erstwhile statutes and therefore, to ensure a smooth process,
during the implementation of the provisions of the Act of 2017, and
in order to remove difficulties and delays, the Joint Committee was
formed with representatives from the Finance Department and
Department
of
School
Education
to
rectify
the
errors
in
documents/relevant papers prior to being endorsed to the post
creation branch of the Finance Department, so as to ensure that the
concurrence for the creation of post is accorded smoothly and
swiftly without any error.
7.2.
It is further stated that the very purpose of the Joint
Committee is to fast track the process of provincialization and to
ascertain whether necessary documents/papers, which are enclosed
with the proposal, are as per requirements in order to make the
process error free, prior to submission of the proposal to the
Finance Department for creation of post; and that the Joint
Committee was initially formed, vide Notification dated 27.01.2019,
and the same was later re-constituted, vide Notification dated
14.09.2022, in pursuance of the Administrative Reforms, Training,
Pension and Public Grievance's Notification No. AR.65/2022/3, dated
06.09.2022, and in partial modification of the Notification No.
PΜΑ.162/2019/651, dated 05.08.2022.
7.3.
It is also stated that the benefits and positive impact of
constituting the Joint Committee are reflected by the fact that after
having provincialized thousands of Teachers and Tutors, the
complaints of error in provincialization are very minimal and the
least which are detected are due to internal disputes between the
teachers and lack of assistance of the Head of the Schools. The
procedures were fast tracked with the assistance of the Joint
Committee and this aided in the provincialization of thousands of
teachers and tutors in the year 2021, within a very short period of
time, and in the process, multiple queries were avoided between
the two departments i.e. Finance and Education and matters were
resolved promptly due to assistance and verification of the Joint
Committee; and that public interest is being served by the Joint
Committee. It is also stated that the SLSC qua the petitioners, a
decision was taken for re-verification of the minutes of the DSC
dated 16.02.2019, as relevant page concerning the recommendation
of the petitioners is apparently without any date and as to complete
the process of provincialization without any error, and in the public
interest.
8.
The petitioners have filed a rejoinder affidavit denying the
statements and averments made in the affidavit-in-opposition filed
by the respondent No. 1.
9.
The respondent No. 2 has also filed an affidavit-in-opposition
on 20.02.2026, wherein it is stated that Section 13(7) of the Act of
2017 states that "The District Scrutiny Committee shall forward the
list of eligible teachers Base school-wise in accordance with the Act,
to the concerned Director, who shall place the matter before the
State Level Scrutiny Committee, to be constituted under sub-section
(10) of this Section and after making such further scrutiny as may
be required, shall forward the same to the concerned Department of
the State Government for consideration and for issuing Notification
in respect of the eligible institutions and teachers eligible for getting
their services provincialized." It has been clearly stated in Section
13(7) of the Act of 2017, that State Government will take up the
matter for the purpose of 'consideration' for further purpose of
issuing Notification for provincialisation, and according to Black's
Law Dictionary, to 'consider' means to 'fix the mind on, with a view
to careful examination, to examine and to inspect.' Consideration is
not
to
be
confounded
with
motive.
„Consideration‟
means
something, which is of value in the eye of law, benefit either to the
petitioner or to the respondent taking account of the circumstances.
To consider a matter does not mean to comply with the order
without careful examination or inspection. It is also stated that
Hon'ble Supreme Court in a catena of judgments, clearly stated the
meaning and the essence of the word to 'consider' in a matter,
which means to look at closely and carefully, to think or deliberate
on. A direction by the Court to 'consider' a matter requires the
authority to apply its mind to the facts and circumstances of the
case, and then take a decision thereon, in accordance with law. It is
pertinent to clarify that to 'consider' a matter, the authority will have
to consider the matter in accordance with law, with reference to the
facts and circumstances of the case, its power not being
circumscribed by any observations or findings of the Court.
Therefore, the respondents are obliged to take into account to
consider the matter, but not obligatory to comply it without applying
the mind. Similarly, the State Government is not bound to accept
recommendations made by the statutory committees, when final
power of issuing notification is conferred upon the Government after
consideration of a proposal received for provincialisation.
9.1.
It is also stated that in accordance with Rule 10 of the Assam
Rules of Executive Business, 1968, no department shall, without
previous consultation with the Finance Department, authorize any
orders (other than orders issued under any Act or Rules made there
under, or pursuant to any general or specific delegation made by
the Finance Department), and it is discernible that consultation with
the Finance Department is a mandate, not a discretion, and the
Department of Finance, which is the authority for creation of posts,
has prescribed a check list and has specific conditions which are to
be fulfilled including ascertaining the financial implications, fixation
of different scales and grade pay and ensuring that the eligibility
conditions for the proposed posts are fulfilled and the recommended
teachers are fully eligible to hold the post of teacher or tutor, as the
case may be, and to ensure that no errors occurred in the process
of recommendation, so as to avoid any loss to the public exchequer
and to avoid a situation, whereby the sanctioned posts would be
filled up by non-eligible persons; and with the above intent, in
exercise of power conferred under Article 162 of the Constitution of
India, the Governor of Assam constituted a Joint Committee,
consisting of the Department of School Education and Department
of Finance, to examine the provincialization of the services of the
teaching staff of Educational Institution, under the provisions of the
Act of 2017, and to avoid delays and to ensure error free
provincialisation of services of teacher under the Act of 2017, the
Government
constituted
the
Joint
Committee
comprising
of
members, who can aid to bring the process to its logical conclusion,
after receipt of proposal by the administrative department of the
State Government.
Submissions:Submission of learned counsel for the petitioners in
WP(C) No. 6870/2025,
10.
Mr. Mondal, learned counsel for the petitioners in WP(C) No.
6870/2025, submits that DSC, Dhubri on 16.02.2019, had
recommended the names of the petitioners for provincialization of
their services and thereafter, their names were re-verified,
authenticated and also re-recommended by the DSC, after reverification and authentication of the original documents as per the
Letter dated 02.03.2023 and the Letter dated 02.08.2022, issued by
the Director of Secondary Education, Assam. Mr. Mondal also
submits that however, the services of the petitioners have not been
provincialized, for which they preferred one writ petition, being
WP(C) No. 2387/2025, wherein a direction was issued to the
respondent authorities to provincialize the services of the petitioners
within a period of four months on the basis of the Letter dated
14.08.2023. However, the services of the petitioners have not been
provincialized due to the impugned Resolution No. 6, adopted in the
Minutes, dated 25.09.2025, by the Chairman, Joint Committee for
provincialization of services and Chairman, ASSEB. Mr. Mondal
further submits that constitution of the Joint Committee is not
contemplated under the Act of 2017, and what contemplated is only
DSC and SLCS, and once the DSC recommends the name of the
petitioners, the same are to be placed before the SLSC and if found
correct, then the SLSC has to approve the same and the proposal
has to be submitted to the Government for creation of post, and
that nowhere in the Act and Rules, constitution of Joint Committee
is provided, and as such, placing the matter of provincialisation
before the Joint Committee is not in accordance with law, and it
causes delay in provincialisation of the service of the petitioners to a
considerable extent. And therefore, the impugned Resolution No. 6
adopted in the Minutes dated 25.09.2025, is illegal and arbitrary
and the same is liable to be set aside.
10.1. In support of his submission, in respect of arbitrariness in
constitution of the Joint Committee and the impugned minutes of
meetings of the said Joint Committee, Mr. Mondal has referred to a
decision of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa
and Anr. vs. Mamata Mohanty, reported in (2011) 3 SCC 436.
Submission of learned counsel for the petitioners in
WP(C) No. 6997/2025,
11.
Mr. Islam, learned counsel for the petitioner, in WP(C) No.
6997/2025, has also subscribed to the submission advanced by Mr.
Mondal, learned counsel for the petitioners in WP(C) No.
6870/2025. Supplementing Mr. Mondal, Mr. Islam has drawn
attention of this Court to the observation made by a Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court in WP(C) No. 2426/2023, wherein it has been
observed that “Joint Committee which had also considered
the
case
of
the
petitioner
is
a
committee
not
contemplated under the provisions of the said Act of
2017 and accordingly, the exercise as required to be
now done in terms of the directions passed by this
Court hereinabove, shall be so carried out solely by
the State Level Scrutiny Committee and not by any other
Committee not contemplated under the provisions of the
Act of 2017.‛ Mr. Islam also submits that in spite of such
directions issued by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, in the instant
case, re-verification is again being carried out by the Joint
Committee only to delay the matter of provincialization of the
petitioner. Mr. Islam also submits that the Joint Committee, vide
impugned Resolution No. 8 of the Minutes of the Meeting held on
25.09.2025, qua the petitioner, has decided to re-verify the
documents, and that the petitioner is serving in a Higher Secondary
School as a Subject Teacher and regarding the enrolment, the
Director of Secondary Education, Assam has called for a report from
SEBA, which has no business with the enrolment of students in a
Higher Secondary School. Mr. Islam further submits that thereafter,
the report in respect of the enrolment of the students in History was
called for from the Assam Higher Secondary Education Council and
in the report furnished by the Council, enrolment number was
shown as 11 (eleven) and that the basic requirement for
provincialization of service is 10(ten) only and in spite of the
fulfilment
of
all
those
criteria,
and
the
petitioner
being
recommended by the DSC and SLSC after due verification, the Joint
Committee, which has already been held to be a committee not
contemplated under the Act of 2017 by a co-ordinate bench of this
court, has decided to re-verify it again.
11.1. Mr. Islam has also pointed out that the Director of SEBA is
the Chairman of the Joint Committee and the Director of Secondary
Education, Assam is the Member Secretary of the said Committee.
He also submits that the Director of Secondary Education, Assam is
also the Chairperson of the SLSC. He pointed it out that as
Chairperson of SLSC, she has recommended the name of the
petitioner for being provincialised his service. But, thereafter, as
member in the Joint Committee, she had decided to again re-verify
the same. Thus, according to him, the process adopted by the State
respondents, is strange and the same are contrary to the principles
of natural justice, and there is conflict of interest.
11.2. Under such circumstances, Mr. Islam has contended to set
aside the impugned resolution, adopted by the Joint Committee and
also to declare the Joint Committee as illegal, as not contemplated
under the Act of 2017.
Submission of learned counsel for the respondents in
both the writ petitions:12.
Per contra, Mr. Saikia, learned Advocate General-cum-Senior
Counsel for the respondents, by referring to the additional affidavit
filed by the respondent No. 1, submits that though constitution of
the Joint Committee is not provided in the Act of 2017, yet Section
13(7) of the Act of 2017 provides that the DSC shall forward the list
of eligible teachers, base school-wise, in accordance with the Act, to
the concerned Director, who shall place the matter before the SLSC
to be constituted under sub-section (10) of the said section and
after making such further scrutiny as may be required, shall forward
the same to the concerned Department of the State Government for
consideration and for issuing notification in respect of the eligible
institutions
and
teachers
eligible
for
getting
their
services
provincialized.
12.1.
Mr. Saikia also submits that under Section 13(7) of the Act
of 2017, State Government has to take up the matter for the
purpose of ‘consideration’ for further purpose of issuing
notification for provincialisation. By referring to two decisions of
Hon‟ble Supreme Court, one in Barium Chemicals Ltd. and
Anr. vs. A.J. Rana and Ors., reported in (1972) 1 SCC 240
and the other in Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern
Rly. and Anr. vs. T.R. Chellappan, reported in (1976) 3
SCC 190, Mr. Saikia submits that to 'consider' means to 'fix the
mind on, with a view to careful examination, to examine and to
inspect‟, and this „consideration‟ does not mean to carry out
direction being issued by the Court.
12.2.
Mr. Saikia further submits that though there is an Act and
the Rules are enacted prescribing the procedure of provincialization
of services of Teachers, being the Act of 2017 and the Rules of
2018, nowhere in the Act and Rules prescribed for constitution of
the Joint Committee. But, the Government has issued the
Notification constituting the Joint Committee under Section 13(7) of
the Act of 2017, for „consideration‟ of the recommendation of the
Teachers for provincialization of their services and the Government
has the authority to issue such Notification, and that the said Joint
Committee has aided the process of provincialization and not
delayed it, as contended by the petitioners, as it aid in error free
provincialisation and thousands of Teachers were provincialized by
the Joint Committee and only in those cases, where issues arises or
some anomalies have been noticed, the Joint Committee has
directed for re-verification of the same.
12.3.
Mr. Saikia also submits that with a view to „consider‟the
recommendation of the DSC and SLSC, the Government has created
the committee to aid the process and how to consider by the
Government is not prescribed under the Act and Rules and that a
vacuum is created and the this field i.e. how to consider, is not
occupied and therefore, in view of the doctrine of occupied filed and
in exercise of the power under Article 162 of the Constitution the
Governor had issued the Notification, constituting the Joint
Committee.
12.4. Mr. Saikia also submits that in the instant case, the Joint
Committee has not rejected the prayer of the petitioners in both the
petitions and that they have noticed some anomalies and therefore,
they have adopted a resolution to further verify the same, and the
Joint Committee, so constituted by the Government by a
Notification, is not illegal and no interference of this Court is
required at this stage, and therefore, Mr. Saikia has contended to
dismiss the petitions.
12.5.
In support of his submission, Mr. Saikia has referred to the
following decisions:
(i)
A.B. Krishna and Ors. vs. State of
Karnataka and Ors., reported in (1998) 3 SCC
495.
(ii) Satya Narain Shukla vs. Union of India and
Ors., reported in (2006) 9 SCC 69.
(iii) Mahendra Nath Mudoi and Ors. vs. State of
Assam and Ors., reported in (2017) 6 GLR 381.
(iv) P.H. Paul Manoj Pandian vs. P. Veldurai,
reported in (2011) 5 SCC 214.
13.
Having heard the submissions of learned counsel for both the
parties, this Court has carefully gone through the petitions and the
documents placed on record, and also the decisions referred to by
the learned counsel for both the parties, and also the Notification,
constituting Joint Committee.
Consideration of this court:
14.
It is not in dispute that the recommendations made by the
DSC and SLSC, to provincialize the services of the petitioners, in
both the writ petitions, have not been rejected by the Joint
Committee. It appears that the Committee had decided to further
verify the anomalies they had noticed. In order to deal with the
issue with greater precision, this Court deems it appropriate to
reproduce the said resolutions herein below.
15.
The impugned Resolution No. 8 of the minutes of the
meeting of the Joint Committee dated 25.09.2025, which relates to
provincialization of service of the petitioner in WP(C)
No.
6997/2025, which reads as under:
‚The Committee discussed the matter
concerning the provincialisation of services
for Ranjan Regon, PGT (Economics) and Utpal
Nath, PGT (History) at Rangachahi TN Higher
Secondary School and also Nandeswar Boruah, PGT
(Economics) in Barbali H.S. School, Dist:
Lakhimpur.
The services of Ranjan Regon, PGT
(Economics), Utpal Nath, PGT (History) and
Nandeswar Boruah, PGT (Economics) were not
provincialised earlier due to non-fulfilment of
the required enrolment of students in their
respective subjects.
On the basis of fresh report regarding
enrolment data received from ASSEB, Div.-II,
the State Level Scrutiny Committee recommended
the names of Ranjan Regon, Utpal Nath and
Nandeswar Boruah.
But the Joint Committee decided to verify
the proper reason as how the enrolment data can
be changed.‛
15.1. Further, the impugned Resolution No. 6, which relates to the
provincialisation of services of the petitioners in WP(C)
No.
6870/2025, in the minutes of the meeting of the Joint Committee
held on 25.09.2025, reads as under:‚The
Committee
discussed
the
matter
concerning the provincialisation of services of
Ashad Ali Sk A/T(Arts), Shyedul Ahmed A/T(Sc.),
Abu Bakkar Siddique A/T(Sc.), Shahida Khatun
A/T(Arabic), Abdul Mannan Mondal A/T(Arts) in
Noser Mondal Memorial High School, Dist.:
Dhubri.
Noser Mondal Memorial High School Dist.:
Dhubri was not provincialised earlier due to
late
submission
of
proposal
under
the
Provincialisation Act/2017.
There is no mention of a date in the
District Scrutiny Committee Report, which is
doubtful.
Now, the Committee has decided to obtain
enrolment of students from ASSEB, Div.-I and
also as well as to trace out when the District
Scrutiny Committee submitted the report to the
State Level Scrutiny Committee.‛
16.
But, herein these two petitions, the very constitution of the
said Committee is being challenged. And therefore, before a
discussion is directed into the merit of the resolutions, this Court
deemed it appropriate to examine as to whether constitution of the
Joint Committee is in accordance with law.
17.
It is not in dispute that the Act of 2017 and Rules of 2018, do
not provide for constitution of any committee except, however, the
DSC and SLSC. Once the proposal for provincialization of service is
accepted by the DSC then it recommended the same for being
placed before the SLSC, under Section 13 of the Act of 2017, and
once the SLSC approves the recommendation, the same has to be
forwarded to the Administrative Department of the Government for
creation of post after „consideration‟.
18.
Though in the additional affidavit filed by the respondent No.
1, a stand has been taken that the Government has issued the
Notification constituting the Joint Committee to „consider‟ the
proposal received by the Administrative Department from the SLSC
for creation of post, yet, as per submission of Mr. Saikia, the
learned Advocate General, a vacuum is created and the field is not
occupied and therefore, the State Government, in exercise of the
powers under Article 162 of the Constitution of India, had issued
the Notification creating Join Committee to consider the case of the
Teachers and Schools for Provincialisation under sub-section (7) to
Section 13 of the Act of 2017.
18.1. The Notification dated 27.01.2019, constituting the Joint
Committee is extracted herein below for ready reference:
‚GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM
FINANCE (SIU) DEPARTMENT
Dispur:: Ghy-6
Dated Dispur the 27th January, 2019
NOTIFICATION
No. ASE.208/2019/1: The Governor of Assam is
pleased to constitute a Committee as mentioned
below, to examine the cased for provoincializing
the
services
of
the
teaching
Staff
of
Educational Institution under the provisions of
Assam Education (Provincialization of Services
of Teachers & Recognisation of Educational
Institution) Act, 2017, as amended up to date:NAME
DESIGINATION
1. Sri R.C. Jain, Chairman, SEBA,
Chairman
2. Sri Preetam Saikia, IAS
Member
3. Sri G.K. Pegu, Addl. Secretary,
Finance Department
Member
4. Director, Secondary Education, Assam Member
Terms & Reference to the Committee:
1. To examine the proposals received for
provincialization of Secondary Schools and
teaching staff thereof and to ascertain whether
the proposals are in accordance with the
relevant
provisions
of
Assam
Education
(Provincialization of Services of Teachers and
Reorganization of Educational Institution) Act,
2017, as amended up to date.
2. To obtain further information/ clarification
required,
if
any,
from
competent
authority/person/
applicant
educational
institutions.
3. To obtain certification from the appropriate
authority on all information provided for
provincialization of school and teaching staff.
Secretarial Assistance:
The Educational (Secondary) Department will
provide secretarial assistance to the Committee.
Timeline for submission of Report by the
Committee:
The Committee will submit its report within 7
days from the date of notification.
Sd.
Principal Secretary to the Govt. of Assam
Finance Department, Dated Dispur the 27th
January, 2019‛
18.2. However, the said Notification was modified by another
Notification dated 14.09.2022, which is extracted herein below:
‚GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM
DEPARTMENT OF SCHOOL EDUCATION
DISPUR, GUWAHATI-6
ORDERS BY THE GOVERNOR OF ASSAM
NOTIFICATION
Dated Dispur, the 14th September, 2022
PΜΑ. 162/2019/653; In pursuance of Administrative
Reforms, Training, Pension and Public Grievances
Department's Notification No. AR.65/2022/3 dated
06/09/2022 and in partial modification of the
Notification
No.
PMA.162/2019/651
dated
05/08/2022, the Governor of Assam is pleased to
re-constitute
the
Joint
Committee
for
Provincialisation of Services, as mentioned below,
to examine the cases for provincialising the
services of the teaching staff of Educational
Institutions under the provisions of the Assam
Education
(Provincialization
of
Services
of
Teachers
&
Reorganisation
of
Educational
Institutions) Act, 2017, as amended.
Members of the Committee
Designation
1. Sri R.C. Jain, Chairman, SEBA
Chairman
2. Sr. most Secretary, Department
Member
of School Education
J. Sri Pradip Sarma, Deputy
Member
Secretary, Finance Department
(Representative of Finance Department)
4. Director of Elementary
Education/Secondary Education
(as case may be)
Member
Terms & Reference to the Committee:
1. To examine the
proposals received
for
provincialisation of teaching staff of Venture
I.P/Recognized UP Schools and to ascertain whether
the proposals are in accordance with the relevant
provisions of Assam Education (Provincialisation
of services of Teachers and Reorganisation of
Educational Institutions) Act, 2017, as amended up
to date.
2. To obtain further information/ clarifications
required, if any, from competent authority/person
/applicant of educational institutions.
3. To obtain certification from the appropriate
authority
on
all
information
provided
for
provincialisation of services of teaching staff of
Venture LP/Recognized UP Schools.
19.
Sd./Secretary to the Govt. of
Assam Department of School Education
Dated Dispur, the 14th September,
2022‛
This Court has carefully considered the submission of Mr.
Saikia, the learned Advocate General-cum-Senior Counsel for the
respondent and has also gone through the decisions referred to by
him, in this regard.
20.
It is not in dispute that the Government has enacted the Act
of 2017, to provincialize the Schools and Teachers and has also
enacted
the
Rules
2018,
prescribing
the
procedure
of
provincialization. Now, the question is while the State respondents
have enacted the Act and Rules, can it be said that the field is not
occupied. Under the aforesaid context, it becomes necessary to
understand what Doctrine of Occupied field is.
Doctrine of Occupied Field:21.
This Doctrine is a legal principle in Constitutional Law, which
deals with the distribution of powers to the government at different
levels in a federal system. This doctrine essentially means that if a
particular subject matter or field is exclusively occupied by
legislation, enacted by Parliament then the state legislature cannot
legislate on the same subject matter. This doctrine helps in
resolving conflicts between laws made by the Parliament and a state
legislature on the same subject. If Parliament legislates on a subject
in the Concurrent List and that law occupies the field, then any
inconsistent State legislation on the same subject, is rendered
ineffective to the extent of the conflict. This doctrine is closely
linked to Article 254 of the Indian Constitution and the broader
doctrine of repugnancy: where there is repugnancy between Union
and State laws, the Union law prevails. However, this Doctrine does
not absolutely bar the States from legislating on a subject. It only
makes their law inoperative to the extent it conflicts with a central
legislation, that has fully occupied that field.
21.1. This Doctrine of “occupied field” has been invoked by Hon‟ble
Supreme Court in numbers of cases, including the case of Forum
for Peoples Collective Efforts v. State of West Bengal
reported in 2021 SCC ONLINE SC 231, and in some recent
constitutional bench decisions, when discussing repugnancy and
denudation of State power, though sometimes as a restatement of
the repugnancy principle, under Article 254, rather than a wholly
separate doctrine.
22.
In the case of A.B. Krishna (supra), especially paragraph
Nos. 6, 7, 8 and 9, wherein, Hon‟ble Supreme Court has dealt with
the Doctrine of Occupied Field as under:‚6. It is primarily the legislature, namely,
Parliament or the State Legislative Assembly,
in whom power to make law regulating the
recruitment and conditions of service of
persons appointed to public services and posts,
in connection with the affairs of the Union or
the State, is vested. The legislative field
indicated in this article is the same as is
indicated in Entry 71 of List I of the Seventh
Schedule or Entry 41 of List II of that
Schedule. The proviso, however, gives power to
the President or the Governor to make Service
Rules but this is only a transitional provision
as the power under the proviso can be exercised
only so long as the legislature does not make
an Act whereby recruitment to public posts as
also other conditions of service relating to
that post are laid down.
7. The rule-making function under the proviso
to Article 309 is a legislative function. Since
Article 309 has to operate subject to other
provisions of the Constitution, it is obvious
that whether it is an Act made by Parliament or
the State Legislature which lays down the
conditions of service or it is a rule made by
the President or the Governor under the proviso
to that article, it has to be in conformity
with the other provisions of the Constitution
specially Articles 14, 16, 310 and 311.
8. The Fire Services under the State Government
were created and established under the Fire
Force Act, 1964 made by the State Legislature.
It was in exercise of the power conferred under
Section 39 of the Act that the State Government
made Service Rules regulating the conditions of
the Fire Services. Since the Fire Services had
been specially established under an Act of the
legislature and the Government, in pursuance of
the power conferred upon it under that Act, has
already made Service Rules, any amendment in
the
Karnataka
Civil
Services
(General
Recruitment) Rules, 1977 would not affect the
special provisions Validly made for the Fire
Services. As a matter of fact, under the scheme
of Article 309 of the Constitution, once a
legislature
intervenes
to
enact
a
law
regulating the conditions of service, the power
of the Executive, including the President or
the Governor, as the case may be, is totally
displaced on the principle of ‚doctrine of
occupied field‛. If, however, any matter is not
touched by that enactment, it will be competent
for the Executive to either issue executive
instructions or to make a rule under Article
309 in respect of that matter.
9. It is no doubt true that the rule-making
authority under Article 309 of the Constitution
and Section 39 of the Act is the same, namely,
the Government (to be precise, the Governor,
under Article 309 and the Government under
Section 39), but the two jurisdictions are
different. As has been seen above, power under
Article 309 cannot be exercised by the
Governor, if the legislature has already made a
law and the field is occupied. In that
situation, rules can be made under the law so
made by the legislature and not under Article
309. It has also to be noticed that rules made
in exercise of the rule-making power given
under
an
Act
constitute
delegated
or
subordinate legislation, but the rules under
Article 309 cannot be treated to fall in that
category and, therefore, on the principle of
‚occupied field‛, the rules under Article 309
cannot supersede the rules made by the
legislature.‛
23.
Same proposition is reiterated in the case of P.H. Paul
Manoj Pandian (supra), especially in paragraph No. 45, 46, 47 and
48. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced herein below for ready
reference:‚45. Departmental circulars are a common form
of
administrative
document
by
which
instructions
are
disseminated.
Many
such
circulars are identified by serial numbers and
published, and many of them contain general
statement of policy. They are, therefore, of
great importance to the public, giving much
guidance about governmental organisation and
the exercise of discretionary powers. In
themselves they have no legal effect whatever,
having no statutory authority. But they may be
used as a vehicle in conveying instructions to
which some statute gives legal force. It is now
the practice to publish circulars which are of
any importance to the public and for a long
time there has been no judicial criticism of
the use made of them.
46. Under Article 162 of the Constitution, the
executive power of the State extends to matters
with respect to which the State Legislature has
power to make laws. Yet the limitations on the
exercise of such executive power by the
Government are twofold; first, if any Act or
law has been made by the State Legislature
conferring any function on any other authority,
in that case the Governor is not empowered to
make any order in regard to that matter in
exercise of his executive power nor can the
Governor exercise such power in regard to that
matter through officers subordinate to him.
Secondly, the vesting in the Governor with the
executive power of the State Government does
not create any embargo for the legislature of
the State from making and/or enacting any law
conferring
functions
on
any
authority
subordinate to the Governor.
47. Once a law occupies the field, it will not
be open to the State Government in exercise of
its executive power under Article 162 of the
Constitution to prescribe in the same field by
an executive order. However, it is well
recognised that in matters relating to a
particular
subject
in
absence
of
any
parliamentary legislation on the said subject,
the State Government has the jurisdiction to
act and to make executive orders. The executive
power of the State would, in the absence of
legislation, extend to making rules or orders
regulating the action of the executive. But,
such orders cannot offend the provisions of the
Constitution and should not be repugnant to any
enactment of the appropriate legislature.
Subject to these limitations, such rules or
orders may relate to matters of policy, may
make classification and may determine the
conditions of eligibility for receiving any
advantage, privilege or aid from the State.
48. The powers of the executive are not limited
merely to the carrying out of the laws. In a
welfare State the functions of the executive
are ever widening, which cover within their
ambit various aspects of social and economic
activities. Therefore, the executive exercises
power
to
fill
gaps
by
issuing
various
departmental orders. The executive power of the
State is coterminous with the legislative power
of the State Legislature. In other words, if
the State Legislature has jurisdiction to make
law with respect to a subject, the State
executive can make regulations and issue
government orders with respect to it, subject,
however, to the constitutional limitations.
Such administrative rules and/or orders shall
be inoperative if the legislature has enacted a
law with respect to the subject. Thus, the High
Court was not justified in brushing aside the
Government Order dated 16-11-1951 on the ground
that it contained administrative instructions.‛
24.
Same proposition is laid down in the case of State of
Sikkim vs. Dorjee Tshering Bhutia and Ors., reported in
(1991) 4 SCC 243, wherein Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held as
under:‚15. The executive power of the State cannot be
exercised in the field which is already
occupied by the laws made by the legislature.
It is settled law that any order, instruction,
direction or notification issued in exercise of
the executive power of the State which is
contrary to any statutory provisions, is
without jurisdiction and is a nullity. But in
this case, we are faced with a peculiar
situation. The Rules, though enforced, remained
unworkable for about five years. The Public
Service Commission, which was the authority to
implement the Rules, was not in existence
during the said period. There is nothing on the
record to show as to why the Public Service
Commission was not constituted during all those
five years. In the absence of any material to
the contrary, we assume that there were
justifiable
reasons
for
the
delay
in
constituting the Commission. The executive
power of the State being divided amongst
various functionaries under Article 166(3) of
the Constitution of India there is possibility
of lack of co-ordination amongst various limbs
of
the
government
working
within
their
respective spheres of allocation. The object of
regulating the recruitment and conditions of
service by statutory provisions is to rule out
arbitrariness,
provide
consistency
and
crystallize the rights of employees concerned.
The statutory provisions which are unworkable
and
inoperative
cannot
achieve
these
objectives. Such provisions are non-est till
made operational. It is the operative statutory
provisions which have the effect of ousting
executive power of the State from the same
field. When in a peculiar situation, as in the
present case, the statutory provisions could
not be operated there was no bar for the State
Government to act in exercise of its executive
power. The impugned notification to hold
special selection was issued almost four years
after the enforcement of the Rules. It was done
to
remove
stagnation
and
to
afford
an
opportunity to the eligible persons to enter
the service. In our view the State Government
was
justified
in
issuing
the
impugned
notification in exercise of its executive power
and the High Court fell into error in quashing
the same.‛
25.
In the case of Satya Narain Shukla vs. Union of India
and Ors., reported in (2006) 9 SCC 69, Hon‟ble Supreme Court has
held as under:‚19. The
appellant
contended
that
this
provision of the Central Staffing Scheme is
ultra vires Articles 309 and 312 of the
Constitution. Amplifying this it is urged by
the appellant that several rules have been
framed by the Central Government in exercise of
its statutory powers under the AIS Act, 1951
i.e. the Indian Administrative Service (Cadre)
Rules, 1951; the Indian Administrative Service
(Fixation of Cadre Strength) Regulations, 1955;
Indian Administrative Service (Pay) Rules,
1954; Indian Administrative Service (Regulation
of
Seniority)
Rules,
1987;
Indian
Administrative Service (Probation) Rules, 1954;
and that these rules occupy the whole field of
executive discretion, and, therefore, by the
doctrine of occupied field there is no scope
left for exercise of executive action outside
the purview of these rules. It is difficult to
accept this contention. Each one of these rules
is intended to take care of a specific facet of
IAS. No set of these rules is exhaustive by
itself of all the service conditions applicable
to the IAS. It is, therefore, incorrect to
contend that the field of possible executive
action is completely occupied by the statute or
the
statutory
rules
framed
there
under,
deriving force from Article 309 read with
Article 312 of the Constitution. We have not
been shown any provisions in these Rules which
deal specifically with the subject of the
procedure for selection of officers from the
said
cadre
for
the
post
of
Additional
Secretary/Secretary to the Government of India.
This is a subject in respect of which the field
does not appear to be occupied. Consequently,
it was very much open to the executive to
resort to executive instructions by way of an
office memo for dealing with this subject. The
contention, therefore, must fail.”
26. Again a division bench of this court, in the case of Mahendra
Nath Mudoi and Ors. vs. State of Assam and Ors.,
reported in 2017 SCC OnLine Gau 1037, held as under:‚54. Again in A.B. Krishna (supra), Supreme
Court
referring
to
article
of
the
Constitution of India held that it is primarily
the Legislature, namely, Parliament or the
State Legislative Assembly with whom power to
make law
regulating
the
recruitment
and
conditions of service of persons appointed to
public services and posts in connection with
the affairs of the Union or State is vested.
The proviso, however, gives power to the
President or the Governor to make service
rules, but this is only a transitional
provision as the power under the proviso can be
exercised only so long as the Legislature does
not make an act whereby, recruitment to public
post, as also other conditions of service
relating to that post are laid down. However,
the rule making function under the proviso to
article 309 of the Constitution of India is a
legislative
function.
Elaborating
further,
Supreme Court held that under the scheme of
article 309 of the Constitution, once a
Legislature
intervenes
to
enact
a
law
regulating the conditions of service, the power
of the Executive, including the President or
the Governor, as the case may be, is totally
displaced on the doctrine of occupied field.
Power under article 309 cannot be exercised by
the Governor, if the Legislature has already
made a law and the field is occupied. In that
situation, rules can be made under the law so
made by the Legislature and not under article
309. Rules made in exercise of the rule making
power under an act constitute delegated or subordinate legislation, but the rules under
article 309 cannot be treated to fall in that
category and, therefore, on the principle of
occupied field, the rules under article 309
cannot supersede the rules made by the
Legislature. However, if any matter is not
touched by that enactment, it will be competent
for the Executive to either issue executive
instructions or to make a rule under article
309 in respect of that matter.
55. This
position
was
reiterated
in D.R.
Yadav (supra) wherein, it was held that there
cannot be any doubt whatsoever that rules
framed under the proviso to article 309 of the
Constitution of India would apply so long as a
statute or statutory rules or any other subordinate legislation governing the conditions
of service are not enacted or made or is not
otherwise operating in the field. In other
words, rules made under the proviso to article
309 of the Constitution are for a transitory
period and the same would give way to the
statutory rules once framed. However, if a
statute or rules made there under is already
operating in the field, the rules made under
the proviso to article 309 would not apply to
the services created there under.
56. Supreme Court has, however, clarified that
though
non-statutory
rules
cannot
modify
statutory rules, there is nothing to prevent
the Government from issuing administrative
instructions or frame rules under the proviso
to article 309 on matters in respect of which
the statutory rules are silent.‛
27. Thus, the legal proposition, that can be crystallised from the
aforesaid decisions and discussions is that once a law occupies the
field, it will not be open to the State Government, in exercise of its
executive power, under Article 162 of the Constitution of India, to
prescribe in the same field by an executive order. However, it is
well recognized that in matters relating to a particular subject, in
absence of any parliamentary legislation on the said subject, the
State Government has the jurisdiction to act and to make executive
orders. The executive power of the State would, in the absence of
legislation, extend to making rules or the orders regulating the
action of the executive. Nevertheless, such orders cannot offend the
provisions of the Constitution and should not be repugnant to any
enactment of the appropriate legislature. Subject to these
limitations, such rules or orders may relate to matters of policy, may
make classification and may determine the conditions of eligibility
for receiving any advantage, privilege or aid from the State.
28.
Thus, there is no doubt that when the field is not occupied,
the State respondents have the authority to issue Executive
Instructions or to make Rules under Article 309 of the Constitution
of India in respect of the matter.
Application of Doctrine of Occupied Field in the case
in hand:
29.
In the instant case, it is the categorical contention of the
learned Advocate General that the Joint Committee was constituted
by the Government to „consider‟ the proposal received by the
Administrative Department from the SLSC for creation of post and
that there is a vacuum as to how to consider the proposals and as
such the field is unoccupied and therefore, the State Government, in
exercise of the powers under Article 162 of the Constitution of
India, the Notification creating Join Committee to consider the case
of the Teachers and Schools for Provincialisation under sub-section
(7) to Section 13 of the Act of 2017.
29.1. The submission of Mr. Saikia, the learned Advocate General,
Assam cum- Senior Counsel for the state respondent received due
consideration of this court. Also this court has carefully gone
through the decisions relied upon by him, in
Krishna(supra) (ii) Satya
Narain
Mahendra Nath Mudoi (supra) and (iv)
(i)
A.B.
Shukla(supra)
(iii)
P.H.
Paul
Manoj
Pandian (supra), which have already been discussed in the
forgoing para.
29.2. Notably, in the case of A.B. Krishna(supra) it has been
held that „any matter’, which is not touched by that enactment, it
will be competent for the Executive to either issue executive
instructions or to make a rule under Article 309 in respect of that
matter. In the case of Mahendra Nath Mudoi (supra), relying
upon A.B. Krishna (supra) and another decision in D.R.
Yadav vs. R.K. Singh, reported in (2003) 7 SCC 110, held
that though non-statutory rules cannot modify statutory rules, there
is nothing to prevent the Government from issuing administrative
instructions or frame rules under the proviso to Article 309 ‘on
matters’ in respect of which the statutory rules are silent. In the
instant case the matter is ‘provincialisation of service’,
which field is already occupied by Act and Rules.
29.3. In the case of Satya Narain Shukla(supra) there was no
provisions in the Rules which deal specifically with the subject of the
‘procedure for selection of officers from the said
cadre for the post of Additional Secretary/Secretary to
the Government of India’. And under such circumstances the
Supreme Court has laid the proposition. In the case of P.H. Paul
Manoj Pandian (supra), it was held that if the State Legislature
has jurisdiction to make law with respect to a subject, the State
executive can make regulations and issue government orders with
respect to it, subject, however, to the constitutional limitations.
Such administrative rules and/or orders shall be inoperative if the
legislature has enacted a law with respect to the subject.
30. It is well settled that the precedential value of a decision has to
be understood in the given factual backdrop of the given case. In
the case of Divisional Controller, KSRTC vs. Mahadeva
Shetty and Anr., reported in (2003) 7 SCC 197 Hon‟ble
Supreme Court, while dealing with this issue, held that a judgment
ordinarily is a decision of the case before the Court and it is further
held that a decision often takes its colour from the question
involved in the case in which it is rendered and the scope and
authority of a precedent should never be expanded unnecessarily
beyond the needs of a given situation.
30.1.
Again in the case of Uttaranchal Road Transport
Corpn. and Ors. vs. Mansaram Nainwal, reported in (2006) 6
SCC 366, Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held that:‚………………. Reliance on the decision without
looking into the factual background of the case
before it is clearly impermissible. A decision
is a precedent on its own facts. Each case
presents its own features. It is not everything
said by a judge while giving judgment that
constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a
judge's decision binding a party is the
principle upon which the case is decided and
for this reason, it is important to analyse a
decision and isolate from it the ratio
decidendi. According to the well-settled theory
of precedents, every decision contains three
basic postulates: (i) findings of material
facts, direct and inferential. An inferential
finding of fact is the inference which the
judge draws from the direct, or perceptible
facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law
applicable to the legal problems disclosed by
the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the
combined effect of the above. A decision is an
authority for what it actually decides. What is
of the essence in a decision is its ratio and
not every observation found therein nor what
logically flows from the various observations
made in the judgment. The enunciation of the
reason or principle on which a question before
a court has been decided is alone binding as a
precedent…….‛
30.2.
Again in the case of
Bhavnagar
University
vs.
Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. and Ors., reported in (2003)
2 SCC 111, Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held that:
‚59. A decision, as is well known, is an
authority for which it is decided and not what
can logically be deduced there from. It is also
well settled that a little difference in facts
or additional facts may make a lot of
difference
decision.‛
30.3.
in
the
precedential
value
of
a
Dealing with the issue again in the case of Haryana
Financial Corporation and Anr. vs. Jagdamba Oil Mills
and Anr., reported in (2002) 3 SCC 496, Hon‟ble Supreme Court
has held as under:‚19. Courts should not place reliance on
decisions without discussing as to how the
factual situation fits in with the fact
situation of the decision on which reliance is
placed. Observations of courts are not to be
read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of
the statute. These observations must be read in
the context in which they appear. Judgments of
courts are not to be construed as statutes. To
interpret words, phrases and provisions of a
statute, it may become necessary for Judges to
embark upon
lengthy
discussions
but
the
discussion is meant to explain and not to
define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not
interpret judgments. They interpret words of
statutes, their words are not to be interpreted
as statutes…………‛
30.4.
Thus, the proposition, that can be crystallized from the
aforesaid decision is that - each case presents its own features. A
decision is a precedent on its own facts. Further, reliance on the
decision without looking into the factual background of the case
before it is clearly impermissible. What is binding a party in a
decision is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this
reason. Observation made in a decision must be read in the context
in which they appear and that the judgments of courts are not to be
construed as statutes.
30.5.
Thus, having considered the decisions relied upon by Mr.
Saikia, learned Advocate General in the factual background of the
case before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, this court is of the view
that the decisions relied upon by him would not advance his
argument.
31.
Further, from the materials placed on record and discussed
above, it becomes apparent that the Joint Committee in the instant
case, was not constituted by making any rules under Article 309 of
the Constitution of India. Indisputably, the same is constituted
under Article 162 of the Constitution of India. Now, the issue is
whether the state executive can constitute such a committee by
issuing such a notification under Article 162 of the Constitution of
India.
31.1.
Article 162 provides that the executive power of a State
extends to matters with respect to which the State Legislature has
power to make laws (subject to constitutional provisions). However,
this power is not unlimited. Once the State Legislature has enacted
a complete statutory scheme through an Act (and Rules framed
there under), the executive cannot issue orders or notifications that
are inconsistent with, override, supplement, or create parallel
mechanisms to the legislative framework.
31.2. It is well settled that executive actions must align with and
be traceable to the statute and they cannot amend or bypass it.
This principle is well-established in Indian jurisprudence. In the case
of Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur and Ors. vs. State of
Punjab reported in AIR 1955 SC 549, and subsequent cases it
has been emphasised that executive power cannot encroach on the
legislative domain or alter statutory processes. This is clear from the
observation made in para No. 14 of the said decision, which is
quoted as under:‚14. It may not be possible to frame an
exhaustive definition of what executive
function means and implies. Ordinarily the
executive power connotes the residue of
governmental functions that remain after
legislative and judicial functions are taken
away. The Indian Constitution has not indeed
recognised the doctrine of separation of
powers in its absolute rigidity but the
functions of the different parts or branches
of the Government have been sufficiently
differentiated and consequently it can very
well be said that our Constitution does not
contemplate assumption, by one organ or part
of the State, of functions that essentially
belong to another. The executive indeed can
exercise the powers of departmental or
subordinate legislation when such powers are
delegated to it by the legislature. It can
also, when so empowered, exercise judicial
functions in a limited way. The executive
Government, however, can never go against the
provisions of the Constitution or of any law.
This is clear from the provisions of article
154 of the Constitution but, as we have
already stated, it does not follow from this
that in order to enable the executive to
function there must be a law already in
existence and that the powers of executive
are limited merely to the carrying out of
these laws.‛
31.3. A Constitutional Bench of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case
of Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, reported in 1967
SCC OnLine SC 16, while dealing with the same issue has
held as under:
‚7. We
proceed
to
consider
the
next
contention of Mr. N.C. Chatterjee that in the
absence of any statutory rules governing
promotions to selection grade posts the
Government
cannot
issue
administrative
instructions
and
such
administrative
instructions cannot impose any restrictions
not found in the Rules already framed. We are
unable to accept this argument as correct. It
is true that there is no specific provision
in the Rules laying down the principle of
promotion of junior or senior grade officers
to selection grade posts. But that does not
mean that till statutory rules are framed in
this behalf the Government cannot issue
administrative instructions regarding the
principle to be followed in promotions of the
officers concerned to selection grade posts.
It is true that Government cannot amend or
supersede statutory rules by administrative
instructions, but if the rules are silent on
any particular point Government can fill up
the gaps and supplement the rules and issue
instructions not inconsistent with the rules
already framed.‛
32. In the instant case, in the specific context of provincialisation
of Teachers' services, the Assam Education (Provincialisation of
Services
of
Teachers
and
Re-organisation
of
Educational
Institutions) Act, 2017 provides a self-contained statutory code. It
provides for constitution of following two committees:(i)
District Scrutiny Committee (constituted under Section
13(1)–(5) by the Deputy Commissioner). This committee
scrutinises eligibility, verifies service records, prepares
lists of eligible institutions/teachers, and forwards the
verified recommendations to the Director for placing the
same before the State Level Scrutiny Committee.
(ii) State Level Scrutiny Committee (constituted under
Section 13(10) with specified members including the
Director as Chairman). This committee conducts physical
verification, resolves discrepancies (its decision is final
under Section 13(12) where differences arise with
District recommendations), and this Committee forwards
the matter onward.
32.1.
Then, after the verification by the SLSC, the verified
recommendations are forwarded to the "concerned Department of
the
State
Government
for
„consideration‟
and
for
issuing
Notification" in the Official Gazette (Section 13(7)). Provincialization
takes effect from the date of this Notification [Section 4(1)].
32.2. The Act also provides for an appellate mechanism. The State
Level
Committee
acts
as
appellate
recommendations.
And
the
State
forum
against
Government
District
(concerned
administrative department) itself is the appellate authority against
State Level recommendations (Section 14).
32.3. Thus, it appears that under the scheme of the Act of 2017,
the executive government has very limited executive discretion.
None of the provisions, authorizes creating an additional or parallel
committee to examine the recommendations of the two statutory
committees. The recommendation of the two statutory scrutiny
committees is not advisory in a loose sense. These committees form
the core verification and recommendation process. The role of the
department is limited to "consideration" within this framework
(including appeal), followed by notification.
32.4. In view of the aforesaid discussion and finding, this court is
of the view that for „consideration‟ of the recommendations of the
DSC and SLSC, under Section 13(7) of the Act, the executive, in the
name of the Governor, cannot issue a Notification under Article 162
to constitute a separate committee, while the field is already
occupied by the Act and the Rules framed there under, i.e. The
Assam Education (Provincialisation of Services of Teachers and Reorganisation of Educational Institutions) Act, 2017 and the Assam
Secondary Education (Provincialised School) Services Rules, 2018.
32.5.
And in view of above, the submission of Mr. Saikia, learned
Advocate General, failed mandate acceptance of this court. In the
instant case the field is occupied and as such the executive
Government, can never go against the provisions of the Constitution
and the Act and Rules already enacted. As held in the case of Rai
Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur(supra), the executive actions must
align with and be traceable to the statute and they cannot amend or
bypass it. As the field is occupied, to considered opinion of this
court the Doctrine of Occupied Filed, would not apply here in this
case.
33.
Thus, to recapitulate, on the following grounds the impugned
Notification, dated 27.01.2019, fails to withstand the legal scrutiny:(i)
It is ultra vires of the Act, and violative of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
(ii) The Joint Committee creates an extra-statutory body
outside the scheme of the Act of 2017 and Rules
2018.
(ii) It would potentially delay, (as in the present two
cases), override, or dilute the finality of statutory
recommendations and the appellate process.
(iii) It
amount
to
executive
legislation
or
supplementation, which is impermissible when the
field is occupied by the Act and Rules.
34.
Thus, the impugned Notification is required to be interfered
with being ultra-vires, in exercise of the power of judicial review. It
this context, this court deemed it necessary to deal with the scope
of judicial review of administrative action. While dealing with this
issue in the case of Tata Cellular v. Union of India,
reported in (1994) 6 SCC 651 Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held as
under:71. Judicial quest in administrative matters
has been to find the right balance between the
administrative discretion to decide matters
whether contractual or political in nature or
issues of social policy; thus they are not
essentially justiciable and the need to remedy
any unfairness. Such an unfairness is set right
by judicial review.
34.1.
Again, in para 77 of the said decision it has been held that-
‚The duty of the court is to confine itself to
the question of legality. Its concern should
be:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Whether a decision-making authority
exceeded its powers?
Committed an error of law,
committed a breach of the rules of
natural justice,
reached a decision which no reasonable
tribunal would have reached or,
abused its powers.
Therefore, it is not for the court to determine
whether a particular policy or particular
decision taken in the fulfilment of that policy
is fair. It is only concerned with the manner
in which those decisions have been taken. The
extent of the duty to act fairly will vary from
case to case. Shortly put, the grounds upon
which an administrative action is subject to
control by judicial review can be classified as
under:
(i) Illegality: This means the decision-maker
must understand correctly the law that
regulates his decision-making power and
must give effect to it.
(ii)Irrationality,
namely,
Wednesbury
unreasonableness.
(iii) Procedural impropriety.
The above are only the broad grounds but it
does not rule out addition of further grounds
in course of time. As a matter of fact,
in R. v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, ex Brind [(1991) 1 AC 696], Lord
Diplock refers specifically to one development,
namely,
the
possible
recognition
of
the
principle of proportionality. In all these
cases the test to be adopted is that the court
should, ‚consider whether something has gone
wrong of a nature and degree which requires its
intervention‛.
34.2.
Further in the case of Mamata Mohanty(supra) Hon‟ble
Supreme Court, while dealing with arbitrariness has held as under:‚59.
The rule of law inhibits arbitrary action
and also makes it liable to be invalidated.
Every
action
of
the
State
or
its
instrumentalities should not only be fair,
legitimate and above board but should be
without any affection or aversion. It should
neither be suggestive of discrimination nor
even give an impression of bias, favouritism
and nepotism. Procedural fairness is an implied
mandatory
requirement
to
protect
against
arbitrary action where statute confers wide
power coupled with wide discretion on an
authority. If the procedure adopted by an
authority offends the fundamental fairness or
established ethos or shocks the conscience, the
order stands vitiated. The decision-making
process remains bad.‛
34.3.
Thus, it appears that Indian jurisprudence has long
recognised that administrative actions are subject to judicial review
when they are arbitrary, unreasonable or violate constitutional
principles. Reference in this context can also be made to a decision
of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of EP Royappa vs. State
of Tamil Nadu reported in 1974 4 SCC 3.
35.
And here in this case, since the impugned Notification, is
contrary to the scheme of the Act and Rule, and also arbitrary and
illegal the same liable to be struck down in exercise of the power of
judicial review.
36.
If the Government needs any additional mechanism, it must
amend the Act (via the Legislature) or frame specific Rules under
the Act's rule-making power without resorting to a standalone
Article 162 notification. Notably, any notification, in the name of
Governor would carry no special immunity; they remain subject to
the same constitutional and statutory limits. It may also remove
difficulties and interpret provisions (Section 20).
The Principle of ‚nemo judex in causa sua‛
37. Besides being contrary to the statutory scheme of the Act of
2017, and the Rules of 2018, on another count also the Notifications
constituting Joint Committee, appear to be illegal. And this is, on
one hand the Director of Secondary/Elementary Education is the
Chairperson of the State level Committee. On the other hand he is
also a member of the Joint Committee.
38.
It is a fact that the 2017 Act and the Rules 2018, do not bar
the
Director
from
holding
multiple
roles
in
the
chain
of
provincialisation. Yet, it risks violating the principles of natural
justice, specifically the rule against bias („nemo judex in causa
sua‟- no one should be a judge in their own cause). An officer, who
serves as a member of the original (lower) committee and then
participates in a higher/review/appellate committee examining the
same decision often creates a reasonable apprehension of bias. This
can vitiate the higher committee's proceedings, even without proof
of actual bias. The test to be applied is objective i.e. whether a
reasonable person would apprehend that the decision-maker might
be influenced by their prior involvement. Prior involvement in the
original decision often leads to "institutional" or "departmental" bias,
where the officer may have a predisposition to defend or uphold the
earlier stance. As held by Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of
A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, reported in (1969) 2 SCC
262, a "reasonable likelihood" or genuine perception of bias is
enough to invalidate the process (drawing from cases like where a
committee member's personal interest tainted
the selection
process). Also there is conflict of interest/impartiality as the Director
being a member of the SLSC (as Chairman) and then Member of the
Joint Committee to „consider‟ the SLSC recommendations, in view of
the stand of the respondent authority, could mean reviewing or
endorsing their own committee's work. On this count also the
Notifications, constituting Joint Committee are liable to be interfered
with.
Conclusion:39.
The upshot of aforesaid discussion is that the legislature,
having spoken through the Act and Rules, the executive is bound by
it and cannot issue a Notification constituting a Joint Committee,
under Article 162, which is contrary to the statutory scheme.
40. In the result, this court finds sufficient merit in these petitions
and accordingly the same stand allowed. Under the given facts and
circumstances following orders are being passed:(i)
The Notification Dated 27.01.2019, thereby constituting
the Joint Committee, and subsequent Notification, dated
14.09.2022, modifying the first one, to consider the
recommendations of the two statutory committees,
being an extra statutory body, outside the scheme of the
Act and also being ultra-vires of the Act and Rules made
there under is liable to be interefered with. Accordingly,
the same stands set aside and quashed.
(ii)
Consequently, the follow up action, initiated pursuant to
the recommendation of the Joint Committee, in the
present two writ petitions are illegal and inoperative.
(iii)
Though, the Notification, constituting the Joint Committee
is interfered with, yet, on the principle of finality of
administrative action, it is impermissible to re-open
already settled cases.
(iv)
The respondent authorities shall process the relevant file
of the petitioners in both these petitions, as per
recommendation of the State Level Committee, for
follow up action, strictly, in accordance with the
provision of the Act.
(v)
Let the aforesaid exercise be carried out with in a period
of three months from the date of receipt of certified
copy of this order.
(vi)
The petitioner shall obtain a certified copy of this order
and place the same before the respondent No.2 within a
period of one week from today.
41. The parties have to bear their own cost.
JUDGE
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