The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
24. Having regard to the totality of the circumstances, we are of the considered view that impugned order propounded by the Tribunal does not suffer from any patent illegality, jurisdictional error, perversity or violation of the settled principles governing judicial review so as to warrant interference by this Court. Consequently, present writ petition is found to be devoid of merit, hence dismissed. The common order dated 11.07.2025 passed by learned and petitioners are directed to comply with the directions contained in the impugned order in accordance with law.
25. The connected application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
26. There shall be no order as to costs. (Rajesh Sekhri) Judge (Sindhu Sharma) Judge Jammu
Full Judgment Text
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CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
Sr. No. 97
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
WP(C) No.
2456/2026
e
CR
....Petitioners
Union Territory of J&K and ors.
Through:
Mr. Ravinder Gupta, AAG with
Mr. Nirmal Kotwal, Advocate
Vs
Sandeep Kumar Sharma.
Through:
CORAM:
…Respondent
Mr. N. D. Qazi, Advocate.
HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE SINDHU SHARMA, JUDGE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SEKHRI, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
12.08.2026
(Rajesh Sekhri-J)
1.
The petitioner-UT and its instrumentalities have invoked Articles 226 and
227 of the Constitution of India for the quashment of a common order dated
11.07.2025 passed by learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Jammu Bench
[for short, “the Tribunal”], in O.A. Nos. 976/2024 and 1006/2024, whereby the
Original Application preferred by the respondent came to be allowed and
Government Order No. 214-PW(R&B) of 2021 dated 28.06.2021, to the extent
it denied benefit claimed by the respondent, came to be set aside.
2.
The facts giving rise to the present petition, briefly stated, are that
respondent was appointed as Draftsman in the Public Works (R&B)
Department during the period 2004-2008. His case before the Tribunal was
that though he was appointed in the lower scale, but since similarly situated
Draftsmen had subsequently been granted the higher pre-revised scale of
Rs.5150-8300 pursuant to judicial pronouncements and consequential
Government Orders, he was entitled to the same treatment. His claim was
rejected by Government Order dated 28.06.2021, which led to the filing of the
Original Application.
3.
The respondent principally relied upon parity with Draftsmen who had
already been granted the higher scale pursuant to judgment dated 03.10.2023
of the Srinagar Bench of the Tribunal in O.A. No. 851/2021.
4.
The petitioners resisted the claim, inter alia, on the ground that since
respondent had accepted his appointment on a scale prescribed under the
applicable Recruitment Rules, he could not, after several years turn around to
seek a higher scale contrary to the terms of his appointment. It was also
contended that an erroneous benefit granted to another employee could not
confer a right of negative equality. Reliance in this regard was placed
upon Suraj Parkash Gupta v. State of J&K; (2000) 7 SCC 561, State of U.P. v. J.P.
Chaurasia; (1989) 1 SCC 121, State Bank of India v. M.R. Ganesh Babu; (2002) 4 SCC
556, Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority v. Daulat Mal Jain; (1997) 1 SCC
35, Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Office;, (2013) 14 SCC 81 and State of
Haryana v. Ram Kumar Mann; (1997) 3 SCC 321.
5.
Mr. Ravinder Gupta, learned AAG appearing for the petitioners,
additionally submitted that respondent was appointed on compassionate
grounds under SRO-43 of 1994, whereas applicants in O.A. No. 851/2021 had
entered service through a regular selection process. It was, therefore,
contended that respondent could not claim parity with the applicants in the said
Original Application, as the source and mode of their initial appointment were
materially different. Learned counsel further submitted that the judgment in
Sham Paul Randhawa v. State & Ors., 2009 SLJ (II) 490, could not have been
WP(C) No.
2456/2026
treated as laying down a binding proposition of law applicable to all Draftsmen
merely because Special Leave Petition preferred against the said judgment was
dismissed by the Supreme Court by a non-speaking order. Placing reliance
upon Kunhayammed & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Anr., (2000) 6 SCC 359,
learned AAG submitted that dismissal of a Special Leave Petition by a nonspeaking order neither amounts to a declaration of law under Article 141 of the
Constitution nor results in merger of the judgment under challenge with the
order of the Supreme Court. It was, accordingly, contended that the Tribunal
fell into error in treating the judgment in Sham Paul Randhawa as binding
upon the petitioners or as conferring an enforceable right upon the respondent.
6.
Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand has defended the
impugned order by submitting that Tribunal had rightly found the respondent
similarly situated to Draftsmen who had already been granted the benefit.
According to him, the State, having extended the benefit to a number of
employees pursuant to judicial and administrative orders, could not deny the
same treatment to the respondent without a rational basis.
7.
We have considered the submissions and examined the record.
8.
It is by far settled now that scope of interference of the High Court under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution with an order of the Tribunal is very
limited. High Court does not exercise appellate jurisdiction over the Tribunal.
Interference is warranted only where there is a jurisdictional error, patent
illegality, violation of principles of natural justice, or a finding so perverse that
it is unsupported by the material on record.
9.
Testing on the aforesaid parameters, we are of the considered view that
impugned order does not call for interference.
WP(C) No.
2456/2026
10. It is not in dispute that several Draftsmen, who had initially entered the
department of PWD (R&B) in the lower scale, were subsequently granted the
pre-revised higher scale of Rs.5150-8300 pursuant to judicial proceedings and
consequential Government Orders. The Tribunal, upon consideration of the
material placed before it, found the respondent similarly situated to those
employees and also found no rational basis for differential treatment.
11. The principle that Article 14 does not envisage negative equality is well
settled. An illegal or erroneous benefit extended to one employee cannot be
claimed by another. The question, however, is whether the benefit extended by
the petitioners is an isolated illegality or forms part of a consistent course of
treatment adopted by the Government pursuant to judicial precedents and
administrative decisions.
12. In the present case, the material considered by the Tribunal indicates that
higher scale was extended by the petitioner-UT and its agencies to a number of
Draftsmen pursuant to judicial proceedings and Government Orders. The
Tribunal, therefore, did not grant the relief prayed for merely on the ground
that another employee had received an erroneous benefit but it proceeded on
the basis of parity with a class of employees whom petitioner-UT had already
treated in the same manner.
13. The petitioners have not demonstrated any legally sustainable distinction
between the respondent and his counterparts. Consequently, reliance by the
petitioners on the doctrine of negative equality is misplaced.
14. The distinction sought to be founded upon respondent's compassionate
appointment also does not advance the petitioners' case. No statutory provision
or Recruitment Rule has been brought to our notice which makes a particular
WP(C) No.
2456/2026
mode of initial appointment a disqualification to claim the pay scale attached
to a post, once the employee is appointed to and continues to hold that post.
15. Likewise, an employee’s appointment and joining on an initial pay scale
would not, by itself, amount to his accepting the appointment of that scale and
defeat his claim of pre-revised pay scale extended to his similarly
circumstanced counterparts. The claim before the Tribunal arose from
subsequent judicial and administrative developments and the treatment
accorded to similarly situated employees.
16. There cannot be an exception to the proposition of law that fundamental
recruitment rules cannot be relaxed. However, the Tribunal in the present case
was not called upon to exercise the power of relaxation of recruitment rules. It
was considering whether, after the Government extending higher scale to
similarly situated Draftsmen pursuant to judicial and administrative decisions,
could deny similar treatment to the respondent without any lawful justification.
17. If petitioners were of the view that grant of higher scale pursuant to
judicial orders was contrary to the governing rules, it was open to them to
challenge the legality of said orders in appropriate proceedings. Having
implemented such orders and extended the benefit to a number of employees,
the Union Territory cannot, for the purpose of denying parity to the
respondent, characterize the earlier benefit as illegal without establishing the
legal basis for the distinction sought to be maintained.
18. We may now deal with the contention based upon Kunhayammed. Learned
AAG has vehemently argued that dismissal of a Special Leave Petition (SLP)
by a non speaking order does not amount to a declaration of law under Article
141 of the Constitution and, ordinarily, would not result in the merger of a
WP(C) No.
2456/2026
judgment under challenge with the order of Hon’ble Supreme Court. We are of
the considered view that such a contention deserves outright rejection for the
simple reason that claim of the respondent before the Tribunal was not founded
solely upon the dismissal of SLP by Hon’ble Supreme Court, but upon the
consistent treatment extended to similarly situated counterparts of the
respondent pursuant to judicial precedents, followed by government decisions.
Therefore, we are unable to accept the submission of learned AAG that
Tribunal has committed an apparent error of law in referring to the judgment
of Sham Paul Randhawa because learned Tribunal considered the said judgment
in the context of subsequent course of action adopted by the petitioners in
extending the benefit to similarly circumstanced draftsmen.
19. Another contention urged by the petitioners is that learned Tribunal
mechanically reproduced the reasoning contained in the judgment dated
03.10.2023 passed by the Srinagar Bench in O.A. No. 851 of 2021 without
examining individual facts of the respondent’s case.
20. It is true that a Tribunal is required to independently apply its mind to the
facts of each case and cannot decide the matters mechanically merely by
reproducing the reasoning of another case. However, the mere fact that
Tribunal has substantially relied upon its earlier judgment does not, by itself,
constitute an error warranting interference. In the present case, learned
Tribunal noticed the rival pleadings, considered the Government Orders relied
upon by the respondents and specifically recorded that respondent stood on an
identical footing with the employees who had already been granted the
benefits. It was on that basis that the Tribunal held that there was no
justification for differential treatment.
WP(C) No.
2456/2026
21. On the issue of delay and laches, we find ourselves in agreement with the
conclusion drawn by learned Tribunal that since respondent had been pursuing
his grievance through various representations, the delay on the part of the
petitioner-UT and its instrumentalities in responding the representations and
extending similar benefit to the respondent cannot be attributed to him.
Reliance placed by the petitioners on Union of India v. Tarsem Singh; (2008) 8
SCC 648 is thus
ill-founded, because the principles regarding arrears
in
belated service claims may be relevant while working out consequential
monetary benefits, but they would not, by themselves, extinguish an otherwise
established entitlement where the wrong is found to be continuing and the
excuse of financial implications or burden on the public exchequer, in the
circumstances of the case, would not be available to the Government.
22. We are conscious that matters of revised pay, pay fixation or equation of
posts ordinarily fall within the exclusive domain of the executive and expert
bodies. The present case, however, does not involve judicial determination of a
new pay scale. The Tribunal has directed extension of a scale which had
already been granted to similarly situated Draftsmen pursuant to judicial
pronouncement on identical issues and consequent administrative actions.
23. Viewed from any angle, petitioners have not been able to establish before
us any jurisdictional error or perversity in the approach adopted by learned
Tribunal. The grounds raised in the present petition, though couched as errors
of law apparent on the face of the record, essentially seek re-appreciation of
the factual determination made by the Tribunal regarding the similarity of the
respondent with other Draftsmen, who were similarly circumstanced. Such an
WP(C) No.
2456/2026
exercise is not permissible in the limited supervisory jurisdiction of this court
under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.
24. Having regard to the totality of the circumstances, we are of the
considered view that impugned order propounded by the Tribunal does not
suffer from any patent illegality, jurisdictional error, perversity or violation of
the settled principles governing judicial review so as to warrant interference by
this Court. Consequently, present writ petition is found to be devoid of merit,
hence dismissed. The common order dated 11.07.2025 passed by learned
Tribunal in O.A. Nos. 976/2024 and 1006/2024 qua the respondent is upheld
and petitioners are directed to comply with the directions contained in the
impugned order in accordance with law.
25. The connected application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
26. There shall be no order as to costs.
(Rajesh Sekhri)
Judge
(Sindhu Sharma)
Judge
Jammu
12.08.2026
Paramjeet
Whether the judgment is speaking:
Whether the judgment is reportable:
WP(C) No.
2456/2026
Yes/No
Yes/No
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