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(MAC Nos.2293/2019 & 2036/2019)
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signed by
SISTA
SOMAYAJULU
SISTA
SOMAYAJULU Date:
2026.05.05
18:19:26
+0530
2026:CGHC:20733
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
MAC No. 2293 of 2019
{Arising out of award dated 16-7-2019 passed by the Additional Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal (FTC), North Bastar Kanker in Claim Case
No.13/2017}
United India Insurance Company Limited, through its Divisional
Manager, Divisional Office Ist Floor, Krishna Complex, Jail Road,
Kuctchery Chowk, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh
(Non-Applicant No.3)
--- Appellant
versus
1. Damyanti Keshari, Wd/o Late Narad Singh Keshari, aged 40 years,
(Applicant No.1)
2. Minor Purab Keshari, S/o Late Narad Singh Keshari, aged 12 years,
Minor through Mother-Damyanti Keshari,
(Applicant No.2)
Both are R/o Ward No.14, Nagar Panchayat Narharpur, Tah.
Narharpur, District North Bastar Kanker, Chhattisgarh
3. Ashok Kumar Jain, S/o Devlal Jain, aged 23 years, R/o Vill. Pataud,
P.S. & District North Bastar Kanker, Chhattisgarh
(Non-Applicant No.1)
4. Devendra Singh Thakur, S/o Chhabilal Thakur, aged 52 years, Caste
Kshatriya, R/o Kankaleen Para, M.G. Ward Kanker, District North
Bastar Kanker, Chhattisgarh
(Non-Applicant No.2)
5. Lata Keshari, Wd/o Narad Keshari, aged 47 years, R/o Vill. Birgudi,
Tah. Nagari, District Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh
(Non-Applicant No.4)
--- Respondents
AND
(MAC Nos.2293/2019 & 2036/2019)
MAC No. 2036 of 2019
{Arising out of award dated 16-7-2019 passed by the Additional Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal (FTC), North Bastar Kanker in Claim Case
No.13/2017}
Lata Keshri, Wd/o Late Narad Keshri, aged about 47 years, R/o
Village Birgudi, Tahsil Nagri, District Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh.
(Claimant)
--- Appellant
Versus
1. Damyanti Keshri, Wd/o Late Narad Singh, aged about 40 years.
2. Minor Purab Keshri, S/o Late Narad Keshri, aged about 12 years,
(minor) through natural guardian mother Damyanti Keshri.
Both R/o Ward No.14, Nagar Panchayat, Narharpur, Tahsil
Narharpur, District North Bastar Kanker, Chhattisgarh.
(Claimants)
3. Ashok Kumar Jain, S/o Devlal Jain, aged about 23 years, R/o Village
Patoud, Police Station and District North Bastar Kanker,
Chhattisgarh.
(Driver of offending vehicle Tata Indica bearing registration
No.CG-19/BD-0121)
4. Devendra Singh Thakur, S/o Chhabilal Thakur, aged about 52 years,
R/o Kankalin Para, M.G. Ward Kanker, District North Bastar
Kanker, Chhattisgarh.
(Owner of offending vehicle Tata Indica bearing registration
No.CG-19/BD-0121)
5. Branch Manager, The United India Insurance Company Limited,
Krishna Complex, 1st Floor, Jail Road, Katcheri Chowk, Raipur
Chhattisgarh.
(Insurer of offending vehicle Tata Indica bearing registration
No.CG-19/BD-0121)
--- Respondents
For Insurance Company
: Mr. Dashrath Gupta, Advocate.
For First Wife Lata Keshari
: Mr. Aditya Khare, Advocate.
For Second Wife Damayanti Keshari : Mr. Amit Kumar Sahu, Advocate.
Amicus Curiae
: Mr. Rahul Tamaskar and Mr. Shashank
Agrawal, Advocates.
Single Bench:Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal
(MAC Nos.2293/2019 & 2036/2019)
Judgment on Board
04/05/2026
1. Since both the above titled appeals, filed in terms of Section 173 of
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, ‘the MV Act’), arise out of a
common award dated 16-7-2019 passed by the Additional Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal (FTC), North Bastar Kanker in Claim Case
No.13/2017 and since common questions of facts and law are
involved in both these appeals, they have been clubbed together,
heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.
2. The Insurance Company has preferred MAC No.2293/2019
questioning the award, whereas first wife of the deceased has
preferred MAC No.2036/2019 questioning the apportionment of the
award amount, as 25% has been awarded to her.
3. The aforesaid challenge has been made on the following factual
backdrop: 4. Narad Singh Keshari had met with an accident on 27-12-2016 and
succumbed to the injuries.
Consequently, his second wife Smt.
Damayanti Keshari and her minor son Purab Keshari filed claim
petition under Section 166 of the MV Act impleading first wife Smt.
Lata Keshari as party non-applicant and also eventually, the
Insurance Company – United India Insurance Company Limited was
made party as the offending vehicle was insured with the said
Insurance Company. The Claims Tribunal after appreciating oral
and documentary evidence, came to the conclusion that since the
(MAC Nos.2293/2019 & 2036/2019)
deceased was Head Master in the school, he is entitled for a
compensation of ₹ 50,15,237/- and directed that 25% be paid to first
wife Smt. Lata Keshari and 25% be paid to second wife Smt.
Damayanti Keshari and remaining 50% has been awarded in favour
of minor Purab Keshari. In this factual backdrop, the aforesaid two
appeals have arisen.
5. Mr. Dashrath Gupta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant/Insurance Company in MAC No.2293/2019, would submit
that the Claims Tribunal is absolutely unjustified in granting the
claim petition, as there is inordinate delay in lodging the FIR, as the
incident occurred on 27-12-2016, whereas the FIR was lodged on 242-2017 and eventually, charge-sheet was filed on 4-3-2017 and
therefore the Insurance Company ought not to have been saddled
with liability to pay the compensation.
6. Mr. Aditya Khare, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant in MAC No.2036/2019 i.e. first wife of the deceased
namely Smt. Lata Keshari, would submit that since the present
appellant is the first wife of the deceased, the entire compensation
ought to have been paid to her.
7. Mr. Amit Kumar Sahu, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
second wife of the deceased namely Smt. Damayanti Keshari, would
submit that the Claims Tribunal is justified in awarding 25% of the
award amount to each of the two wives of the deceased and 50% to
minor Purab Keshari, which is strictly in accordance with law.
(MAC Nos.2293/2019 & 2036/2019)
8. Mr. Rahul Tamaskar, learned amicus curiae, would submit that
second wife Smt. Damayanti Keshari being the dependent would be
entitled for compensation in light of the decision of the Supreme
Court in the matter of Gujarat State Road Transport
Corporation, Ahmedabad v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai and
another1 followed in the matter of Montford Brothers of St.
Gabriel and another v. United India Insurance and
another2 and apportionment has rightly been made, as the first wife
is working as Supervisor in Urban Development Block, Village
Ghotul and the second wife is working as Lecturer (Panchayat). He
would rely upon the decision of the High Court of Jammu and
Kashmir and Ladakh in the matter of Zarifa Banoo and others v.
Manzoor Ahmad Sheergujri and others3 and that of the High
Court of Madras in the matter of Susila and others v. S.
Thirumalai and others4 to buttress his submission.
9. Mr. Shashank Agrawal, learned amicus curiae, would bring to the
notice of the Court the decision of the Bombay High Court in the
matter of Abdul Rahman and others v. Dayaram and others 5
to contend that the question of apportionment will not be guided by
the personal law and it will be guided by the level of dependency.
(1987) 3 SCC 234
(2014) 3 SCC 394
2023 SCC OnLine J&K 1015
2023 SCC OnLine Mad 2581
1988 SCC OnLine Bom 365
(MAC Nos.2293/2019 & 2036/2019)
10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their
rival submissions made herein-above and also gone through the
record with utmost circumspection.
MAC No.2293/2019 (United India Insurance Company
Limited v. Damyanti Keshari and others)
11. Firstly, this Court will decide the appeal filed on behalf of the
Insurance Company.
12. The quantum of compensation awarded by the Claims Tribunal is not
in dispute. The only submission raised on behalf of the Insurance
Company is, the incident occurred on 27-12-2016 and the FIR was
lodged on 24-2-2017, therefore, the delay in lodging the FIR is fatal
to the claimants and it ought to have been accepted by the Claims
Tribunal and the claim ought to have been rejected.
13. In the matter of Ravi v. Badrinarayan and others6, it has been
held by the Supreme Court that delay in lodging FIR cannot be a
ground to doubt claimant’s case and it is not a ground to dismiss the
claim petition. It has been observed by their Lordships as under: “17. It is well settled that delay in lodging the FIR cannot be
a ground to doubt the claimant's case. Knowing the Indian
conditions as they are, we cannot expect a common man to
first rush to the police station immediately after an accident.
Human nature and family responsibilities occupy the mind of
kith and kin to such an extent that they give more importance
to get the victim treated rather than to rush to the police
station. Under such circumstances, they are not expected to
act mechanically with promptitude in lodging the FIR with
the police. Delay in lodging the FIR thus, cannot be the
ground to deny justice to the victim.
6 (2011) 4 SCC 693
(MAC Nos.2293/2019 & 2036/2019)
18. In cases of delay, the courts are required to examine the
evidence with a closer scrutiny and in doing so the contents of
the FIR should also be scrutinised more carefully. If the court
finds that there is no indication of fabrication or it has not
been concocted or engineered to implicate innocent persons
then, even if there is a delay in lodging the FIR, the claim case
cannot be dismissed merely on that ground. The purpose of
lodging the FIR in such type of cases is primarily to intimate
the police to initiate investigation of criminal offences.
19. Lodging of FIR certainly proves the factum of accident
so that the victim is able to lodge a case for compensation but
delay in doing so cannot be the main ground for rejecting the
claim petition. In other words, although lodging of FIR is
vital in deciding motor accident claim cases, delay in lodging
the same should not be treated as fatal for such proceedings,
if claimant has been able to demonstrate satisfactory and
cogent reasons for it. There could be a variety of reasons in
genuine cases for delayed lodgement of FIR. Unless kith and
kin of the victim are able to regain a certain level of
tranquillity of mind and are composed to lodge it, even if,
there is delay, the same deserves to be condoned. In such
circumstances, the authenticity of the FIR assumes much
more significance than delay in lodging thereof supported by
cogent reasons.”
14. In view of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court in Ravi
(supra), the ground raised on behalf of the Insurance Company that
delay in lodging the FIR is fatal to the claimants, is rejected and
accordingly, the appeal filed on behalf of the Insurance Company
(MAC No.2293/2019) deserves to be dismissed and is hereby
dismissed.
MAC No. 2036 of 2019 (Lata Keshri v. Damyanti Keshri and
others)
15. Now, the appeal filed on behalf of the first wife of deceased Narad
Singh Keshari remains for consideration.
(MAC Nos.2293/2019 & 2036/2019)
16. The short question involved in this appeal is, whether the Claims
Tribunal is justified in holding the second wife – Smt. Damayanti
Keshari as legal representative/dependent and further justified in
awarding 25% compensation to her and 50% to her son minor Purab
Keshari?
17. Section 166 of the MV Act defines as to who shall be entitled for
compensation. Clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 166 states as
under: “166. Application for compensation.—An application for
compensation arising out of an accident of the nature
specified in sub-section (1) of section 165 may be made—
(a) and (b) xxx
xxx
xxx
(c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or
any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or
(d) xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx”
18. Thus, by virtue of Section 166(1)(c) of the MV Act, an application for
compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in
sub-section (1) of Section 165 may be made where death has resulted
from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the
deceased.
19. The term “legal representative” has not been defined in the MV Act,
it is defined in Section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,
which is as follows: -
(MAC Nos.2293/2019 & 2036/2019)
“2. (11) ‘legal representative’ means a person who in law
represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any
person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and
where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the
person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party
so suing or sued;”
20. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Montford Brothers of St.
Gabriel (supra) while noticing the definition of the term “legal
representative” as defined in Section 2(11) of the CPC and further
noticing the provisions contained in Section 166 of the MV Act, has
held that in case of death of a person in a motor vehicle accident,
right is available to a legal representative of the deceased or the agent
of the legal representative to lodge a claim for compensation under
the provisions of the Act, and observed as under: “10. From the aforesaid provisions it is clear that in case of
death of a person in a motor vehicle accident, right is
available to a legal representative of the deceased or the agent
of the legal representative to lodge a claim for compensation
under the provisions of the Act. The issue as to who is a legal
representative or its agent is basically an issue of fact and may
be decided one way or the other dependent upon the facts of a
particular case. But as a legal proposition it is undeniable
that a person claiming to be a legal representative has the
locus to maintain an application for compensation under
Section 166 of the Act, either directly or through any agent,
subject to result of a dispute raised by the other side on this
issue.”
Their Lordships further, considering the decision of Gujarat State
Road Transport Corporation case (supra), held as under: “12. Para 13 of the Report of Gujarat SRTC case [(1987) 3
SCC 234 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 482 : AIR 1987 SC 1690] reflects the
correct philosophy which should guide the courts interpreting
the legal provisions of beneficial legislations providing for
compensation to those who had suffered loss: (SCC p. 250)
(MAC Nos.2293/2019 & 2036/2019)
“13. We feel that the view taken by the Gujarat High
Court is in consonance with the principles of justice,
equity and good conscience having regard to the
conditions of the Indian society.
Every legal
representative who suffers on account of the death of a
person due to a motor vehicle accident should have a
remedy for realisation of compensation and that is
provided by Sections 110-A to 110-F of the Act. These
provisions are in consonance with the principles of law
of torts that every injury must have a remedy. It is for
the Motor Vehicles Accidents Tribunal to determine the
compensation which appears to it to be just as provided
in Section 110-B of the Act and to specify the person or
persons to whom compensation shall be paid. The
determination of the compensation payable and its
apportionment as required by Section 110-B of the Act
amongst the legal representatives for whose benefit an
application may be filed under Section 110-A of the Act
have to be done in accordance with well-known
principles of law. We should remember that in an
Indian family brothers, sisters and brothers' children
and some times foster children live together and they
are dependent upon the breadwinner of the family and
if the breadwinner is killed on account of a motor
vehicle accident, there is no justification to deny them
compensation relying upon the provisions of the Fatal
Accidents Act, 1855 which as we have already held has
been substantially modified by the provisions contained
in the Act in relation to cases arising out of motor
vehicles accidents. We express our approval of the
decision in Megjibhai Khimji Vira v. Chaturbhai
Taljabhai [AIR 1977 Guj 195] and hold that the brother
of a person who dies in a motor vehicle accident is
entitled to maintain a petition under Section 110-A of
the Act if he is a legal representative of the deceased.”
13. From the aforesaid quoted extract it is evident that only
if there is a justification in consonance with principles of
justice, equity and good conscience, a dependant of the
deceased may be denied right to claim compensation. Hence,
we find no merit in the submission advanced on behalf of the
respondent Insurance Company that the claim petition is not
maintainable because of the provisions of the Fatal Accidents
Act.”
(MAC Nos.2293/2019 & 2036/2019)
21. In Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation (supra), it has
been clearly held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that
brother of a person who dies in a motor vehicle accident is entitled to
maintain a petition under Section 110-A of the MV Act if he is a legal
representative of the deceased.
22. In the matter of Rameshwari Devi v. State of Bihar and
others7, their Lordships of the Supreme Court while considering a
matter of Family Pension and its entitlement to children of second
marriage, held that deceased employee, a Hindu, contracting second
marriage during subsistence of his first marriage, children born out
of second marriage, according to the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, were
legitimate though the marriage itself was void, and observed as
under: 14. It cannot be disputed that the marriage between Narain
Lal and Yogmaya Devi was in contravention of clause (i) of
Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act and was a void marriage.
Under Section 16 of this Act, children of a void marriage are
legitimate. Under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, property
of a male Hindu dying intestate devolves firstly on heirs in
clause (1) which include the widow and son. Among the
widow and son, they all get shares (see Sections 8, 10 and the
Schedule to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956). Yogmaya Devi
cannot be described as a widow of Narain Lal, her marriage
with Narain Lal being void. The sons of the marriage between
Narain Lal and Yogmaya Devi being the legitimate sons of
Narain Lal would be entitled to the property of Narain Lal in
equal shares along with that of Rameshwari Devi and the son
born from the marriage of Rameshwari Devi with Narain Lal.
That is, however, the legal position when a Hindu male dies
intestate. Here, however, we are concerned with the family
pension and death-cum-retirement gratuity payments which
are governed by the relevant rules. It is not disputed before
us that if the legal position as aforesaid is correct, there is no
7 (2000) 2 SCC 431
(MAC Nos.2293/2019 & 2036/2019)
error with the directions issued by the learned Single Judge in
the judgment which is upheld by the Division Bench in LPA
by the impugned judgment.”
23. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that second wife of the
deceased – Smt. Damayanti Keshari was living with the deceased
along with her minor son Purab Keshari at the time of accident and
therefore the Claims Tribunal has held that the second wife and her
son being the dependents of the deceased are entitled to maintain the
petition under Section 166 of the MV Act and thereafter proceeded to
make enquiry under that petition.
However, minor son of the
deceased out of his second marriage with Smt. Damayanti Keshari
would be the legitimate son of the deceased by virtue of Section 16(1)
of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. As such, their claim petition has
rightly been held to be maintainable and rightly been inquired into
by the Claims Tribunal for awarding the compensation.
Apportionment of Compensation
24. Now, the question of apportionment of the compensation awarded by
the Claims Tribunal would arise for consideration.
25. The Claims Tribunal has awarded a compensation to the tune of ₹
50,15,237/- and directed 25% of the said compensation be paid to
each of the wives i.e. first wife Smt. Lata Keshari and second wife
Smt. Damayanti Keshari, and remaining 50% was awarded in favour
of minor son Purab Keshari.
26. The law of apportionment is absolutely clear.
The Bombay High
Court in Abdul Rahman (supra) held that the compensation is
(MAC Nos.2293/2019 & 2036/2019)
being paid taking into consideration the dependency of the claimants
and in that regard, the courts are not to be guided by the
apportionment as provided under the personal law/Mohammedan
Law in that case.
27. Similarly, in Zarifa Banoo (supra), the Jammu and Kashmir and
Ladakh High Court, taking into account the decision of the Bombay
High Court in Abdul Rahman (supra) and that of the Supreme
Court in the matter of D. Shanmukha Sundaramma v. D.
Suneetha and others8 has held that the Court/Tribunal cannot be
guided by personal law while deciding upon the apportionment of the
compensation, which is to be paid taking into consideration the
dependency of the claimants, the personal law is not applicable.
28. Coming to the facts of the case, it is clear that though second wife of
the deceased Smt. Damayanti Keshari and minor son Purab Keshari
cannot be solely considered to be legal representatives of the
deceased under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, but certainly, they are
dependents for the purpose of claiming compensation under the MV
Act, as the apportionment of the compensation is to be made not as
per personal law, but as per the loss of dependency. Since the first
wife and the second wife, both, are earning, as the first wife is posted
as Superivsor in Urban Development Block, Village Ghotul, and the
second wife is Lecturer (Panchayat), they have rightly been awarded
25% each of the total compensation. Considering the fact that minor
Purab Keshari though is son of the deceased out of his wedlock from
8 (2009) 3 SCC 787
(MAC Nos.2293/2019 & 2036/2019)
second wife, but by virtue of Section 16(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act,
1955, he is the legitimate son of the deceased for all practical
purposes, therefore, he has rightly been awarded 50% of the
compensation.
29. In that view of the matter, I do not find any merit in the appeal filed
on behalf of first wife of the deceased Smt. Lata Keshari (MAC
No.2036/2019), it deserves to be and is accordingly, dismissed.
30. In the result, both the appeals filed on behalf of the Insurance
Company and the first of the deceased, stand dismissed. No order as
to cost(s).
31. Before parting with the record, I express my gratitude and
appreciation to Mr. Rahul Tamaskar and Mr. Shashank Agrawal,
Advocates, who appeared as amicus curiae and in short notice, have
prepared the case and made submission.
Soma
Sd/(Sanjay K. Agrawal)
Judge
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