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Serial No. 50
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
MA No. 384/2012
Date of Pronouncement: 13.07.2026
Uploaded on: 17.07.2026
United India Insurance Co. Ltd.,
Divisional Officer-II, Purani Mandi,
Jammu, through Dr. Rajpal
S/o Shri Pitamaber Lal, Sr. Divisional
Manager, Jammu.
…..Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s)
Through: Mr. Vishnu Gupta, Advocate
Vs
01.
Som Nath S/o Gulzar Singh,
R/o Village Kotli Harchanda
P/o Bhatian District Gurdaspur (PB).
02.
Parvesh Gupta S/o Shiv Raj Gupta
R/o R-36, Kailash Nagar, Jammu
C/o M/S Bhagat Ram Harbans Lal,
Rajinder Bazar, Jammu.
03.
Suraj alias Shiv Ram
S/o Dewan Chand, R/o Prem Nagar,
Jogi Gate, Jammu.
.…. Respondent(s)
Through: Mr. Rakesh Kumar, Advocate for R-1.
Mr. Rohit Kohli, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. Raghav Gaind, Advocate for R-2.
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PARIHAR, JUDGE
ORDER
13.07.2026
01.
The present appeal has been preferred by the appellant–Insurance Company
challenging the award dated 24.03.2012 passed by the Motor Accident
Claims Tribunal, Jammu (hereinafter referred to as "the Tribunal") in Claim
Petition No. 366.
MA No. 384/2012
02.
The facts, in brief, are that on 26.09.1996, respondent No. 1, while
proceeding on foot towards Ware House, Jammu, was allegedly hit by Load
Carrier bearing Registration No. JKR/9852, which was being driven by
respondent No. 3 in a rash and negligent manner. As a consequence of the
accident, respondent No. 1 sustained grievous injuries and thereafter
instituted a claim petition before the Tribunal seeking compensation.
03.
Upon appreciation of the evidence, the Tribunal held that respondent No. 1
had suffered 20% permanent disability of the left lower limb, resulting in
stiffness of the left ankle, pain in the calf muscle, and shortening of the left
leg. The Tribunal further assessed the annual loss of income at Rs. 9,600/and awarded a total compensation of Rs. 2,25,000/-, inclusive of the interim
compensation, payable by the appellant–Insurance Company. The Tribunal
directed that the awarded amount, except the component towards future
loss of income, shall carry interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the
date of filing of the claim petition till its realization. However, since the
claim petition had been dismissed twice for non-prosecution during its
pendency, the Tribunal excluded a period of ten years while calculating the
interest payable.
04.
Aggrieved by the said award, the appellant–Insurance Company has
preferred the present appeal primarily on the ground that respondent No. 1
was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident and had
materially contributed to the occurrence of the accident.
05.
It is further contended on behalf of the appellant that the accident had
occurred at 5:50 P.M. on 26.09.1996, whereas the offending vehicle was
MA No. 384/2012
insured only at 7:30 P.M. on the same day. According to the appellant, the
owner of the vehicle had fraudulently obtained the insurance policy after
the occurrence of the accident by concealing and suppressing the material
fact that the accident had already taken place.
06.
Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the previous
insurance policy had expired on 24.09.1996 and, therefore, there was no
valid insurance coverage at the time of the accident. It is argued that the
appellant led evidence before the Tribunal to establish that the accident had
taken place at 5:50 P.M. and that the subsequent registration of the FIR was
merely an afterthought. It is also submitted that respondent No. 1 himself
admitted in his testimony that the accident had occurred at about 7:00 P.M.
Consequently, it is argued that, irrespective of the exact timing, the vehicle
was not covered by a valid insurance policy when the accident occurred
and, therefore, the liability, if any, ought to have been fastened upon the
owner of the vehicle and not upon the appellant–Insurance Company.
07.
Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents supports the
impugned award and submits that the Tribunal has correctly appreciated the
evidence on record. It is contended that the appellant's plea that the accident
occurred at 5:50 P.M. stands belied by the documentary evidence,
particularly the FIR, which records the time of occurrence as 8:45 P.M and
the Medical Record Department (MRD) entry No. 124658, which shows
that respondent No. 1 was admitted to the hospital on 26.09.1996 at 9:10
P.M. The same MRD number also finds mention in the disability
MA No. 384/2012
certificate. It is, therefore, argued that the investigator's assertion regarding
the time of admission to the hospital is not borne out by the official records.
08.
It is further submitted that the allegation that respondent No. 1 was in an
intoxicated condition at the time of the accident is an afterthought, as no
such plea was taken before the Tribunal, nor was respondent No. 1
confronted with any such suggestion during the course of evidence. It is
lastly contended that the Tribunal has correctly assessed the extent of
permanent disability suffered by respondent No. 1 and the consequential
loss of earning capacity, and that the compensation awarded is just, fair,
and calls for no interference.
09.
Learned counsel for the appellant, placing reliance upon the decision of the
Supreme Court in Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar & Another, 2011 ACJ 1,
submitted that while assessing compensation on account of permanent
disability, the Tribunal is required to first determine whether the claimant
has suffered any permanent disability and, if so, the extent thereof. It was
contended that the disability suffered by respondent No. 1 pertains only to a
particular limb and not to the whole body. Therefore, where the disability is
expressed with reference to a specific limb, the Tribunal is required to
assess the impact of such disability on the overall functioning of the body
and its consequential effect on the claimant's earning capacity before
awarding compensation.
10.
Learned counsel further placed reliance upon the judgment in National
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sobina Iakia & Others, 2007 ACJ 2043, to contend
that the insurance policy covering the offending vehicle had already expired
MA No. 384/2012
prior to the accident and that the renewal premium was deposited only after
the occurrence of the accident. It was, therefore, argued that the contract of
insurance was not in force at the time of the accident and, consequently, no
liability could be fastened upon the appellant–Insurance Company.
11.
I have heard both the learned counsels at length and examined the record.
12.
Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon the decision
reported in 2007 ACJ 2043 to contend that the question which arose for
consideration therein was whether an Insurance Company could be held
liable to pay compensation for an accident that had occurred during a
period when the insurance policy was not in existence. It was held that, in
order to curb the growing practice of obtaining insurance policies after the
occurrence of accidents, the effectiveness of an insurance policy
commences only from the date and time specifically mentioned therein and
cannot be given retrospective effect.
13.
In the present case, it is an admitted position that, as per the policy
documents placed on record by the appellant, the offending vehicle bearing
Registration No. JKR/9852, a Mini Load Carrier (1985 Model), was
insured
under
Policy
No.111800/31/21/13054/96,
Certificate
No.
6/13054/96, commencing from 26.09.1996 and ending on 25.09.1997. On
the other hand, the respondents have asserted that the accident occurred at
8:45 P.M. on 26.09.1996, whereafter FIR No.438/96 u/s 279/337 RPC
came to be registered at 8:55 P.M. on the basis of Daily Diary Entry No. 29
dated 26.09.1996, recorded at Police Post, Nehru Market. The FIR records
that information had been received from a reliable source that the aforesaid
MA No. 384/2012
vehicle, while being driven in a rash and negligent manner, had struck a
pedestrian, caused injuries.
14.
The Tribunal rejected the appellant's contention that the offending vehicle
was not insured at the time of the accident, holding that the evidence
adduced by the appellant was insufficient to substantiate the said plea. The
Tribunal recorded a finding that the accident had occurred at 8:45 P.M. on
26.09.1996. In arriving at the said conclusion, reliance was placed upon the
testimony
of
PW-Kuldeep
Choudhary,
Medical
Record
Keeper,
Government Medical College, Jammu, who deposed that respondent No. 1
was admitted to the hospital on 26.09.1996 at 9:10 P.M. The said fact also
finds corroboration from the Medical Record Department (MRD) Entry No.
123658.
15.
The Tribunal, accordingly, disbelieved the appellant's version that the
accident had taken place at 5:50 P.M. However, learned counsel for the
appellant contends that the Tribunal failed to appreciate that respondent No.
1, in his own deposition, admitted that the accident had occurred at about
7:00 P.M. According to the appellant, this admission assumes significance
while determining whether a valid policy of insurance was in force at the
time of the accident and, consequently, whether the liability could legally
be fastened upon the appellant–Insurance Company.
16.
In the light of the statement of the injured (respondent No. 1), the medical
record produced before the Tribunal, and the contents of the First
Information Report, the appellant's assertion that the accident had occurred
at 5:50 P.M. stands completely discredited. Merely because respondent No.
MA No. 384/2012
1, while deposing before the Tribunal nearly fourteen years after the
occurrence, stated that the accident had taken place at about 7:00 P.M.,
such an approximation cannot be construed to override or displace the
contemporaneous documentary evidence available on record.
17.
The accident occurred on 26.09.1996, whereas respondent No. 1 was
examined before the Tribunal on 29.12.2010, almost fourteen years after
the occurrence. It is a matter of common experience that, with the passage
of time, human memory tends to fade. Therefore, no undue advantage can
be drawn by the appellant from the claimant's approximate recollection of
the time of the accident, particularly when the contemporaneous
documentary evidence relied upon by the Tribunal consistently establishes
that the occurrence took place at 8:45 P.M.
18.
The appellant's plea that the accident had occurred at 5:50 P.M. rests solely
upon hearsay material. The investigation report dated 15.09.2003, relied
upon by the appellant, merely records that the investigator visited the
Government Medical College, Jammu, where an unidentified official,
purportedly maintaining hospital records, informed him that the injured had
been brought to the hospital at about 5:50 P.M. Such information is clearly
hearsay and carries little evidentiary value. Significantly, when PWKuldeep Choudhary, the Medical Record Keeper, Government Medical
College, Jammu, entered the witness box, no suggestion whatsoever was
put to him regarding the alleged admission of respondent No. 1 at 5:50
P.M. On the contrary, the witness categorically deposed that, as per the
official hospital record, the injured was admitted at 9:10 P.M., on
MA No. 384/2012
26.09.1996. The Tribunal was, therefore, fully justified in placing reliance
upon the official medical record in preference to the unsubstantiated
investigation report.
19.
A perusal of the insurance policy further reveals that the entries "07:30
P.M." and "For MACT Case Only" appear to have been written in ink
different from that used for the remaining particulars contained in the
policy document. The policy, as originally issued, does not unequivocally
indicate the precise time from which the insurance cover was to become
operative, and the aforesaid entries prima facie appear to have been inserted
subsequently. When this aspect was specifically put to the learned counsel
for the appellant during the course of hearing, no satisfactory explanation
could be furnished.
20.
Once the claimant had established, on the basis of reliable documentary
evidence, that the accident had occurred after the time from which the
insurance policy became effective, and the appellant failed to dislodge that
evidence by leading cogent and convincing material, the Tribunal rightly
concluded that the offending vehicle stood insured with the appellant–
Insurance Company with effect from 26.09.1996 at 7:30 P.M.
Consequently, the liability to satisfy the award was rightly fastened upon
the appellant. Ld. Counsel for the appellant also sought to contend that
respondent No. 1 had contributed to the occurrence of the accident on the
ground that the Medico-Legal Report recorded that he was under the
influence of alcohol when he was brought to the hospital.
MA No. 384/2012
21.
The said contention deserves to be rejected. Neither the First Information
Report nor the police investigation attributes any negligence or contributory
negligence to respondent No. 1. On the contrary, the evidence adduced by
the claimant, duly corroborated by the FIR and the police investigation,
establishes that the offending vehicle bearing Registration No. JKR/9852
approached from behind, was driven in a rash and negligent manner, and
struck the claimant, resulting in a fracture of his left leg. The claimant
further deposed that the driver neither sounded the horn nor exercised due
care
before
hitting
him.
This
testimony
remained
substantially
unchallenged during cross-examination, and no evidence was led by the
appellant to establish that the claimant had contributed to the occurrence of
the accident. Mere reference in the Medico-Legal Report to the claimant
being under the influence of alcohol, in the absence of any evidence
establishing a causal connection between such condition and the occurrence
of the accident, is wholly insufficient to sustain a plea of contributory
negligence.
22.
It was next contended that the claimant had suffered only 20% permanent
disability of the left lower limb and not of the whole body and, therefore,
the Tribunal erred in assessing the loss of earning capacity on that basis. It
was also argued that the disability certificate had been issued more than
eight years after the accident.
23.
Though the submission is not without substance, the evidence on record
does not support the appellant's contention. Dr. R.S. Manhas, who issued
the disability certificate (Exhibit PW-RSM), categorically deposed that the
MA No. 384/2012
claimant had suffered 20% permanent disability of the left lower limb,
resulting in stiffness of the left ankle, pain in the calf muscle, and
shortening of the left leg. The witness further stated that these injuries
would permanently impair the claimant's ability to run, walk briskly, and
perform strenuous physical work. It also stands established on record that
the claimant was employed as a mason, a vocation requiring continuous
physical labour. This fact was never disputed by the appellant. In these
circumstances, the Tribunal rightly assessed the functional disability by
taking into account the impact of the injuries on the claimant's earning
capacity rather than merely the percentage of physical disability certified
with respect to the limb. The assessment of functional disability at 20%
cannot, therefore, be said to be arbitrary or contrary to the evidence on
record.
24.
Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon the decision of the
Supreme Court in Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v.
Vibhor Fialok & Another Civil Appeal 1337-1338/2019 D.O. D 18.02.2025
to contend that the percentage of functional disability adopted by the
Tribunal bears no reasonable nexus with the medical evidence. The reliance
placed on the aforesaid decision is misconceived. In that case, although the
medical evidence certified 40% permanent disability of the right lower
limb, the Tribunal proceeded to assess 40% disability of the whole body.
The High Court enhanced the functional disability to 48%, whereas the
Supreme Court held that the disability of a particular limb could not
automatically be equated with disability of the whole body and, in the facts
MA No. 384/2012
of that case, assessed the whole-body disability at 12%. The claimant
therein was engaged in private employment involving comparatively less
physical exertion. The facts of the present case stand on an entirely
different footing, as the claimant was working as a mason, whose
livelihood depends predominantly upon physical mobility and manual
labour. Consequently, the ratio of the aforesaid judgment is distinguishable
on facts and does not advance the appellant's case.
25.
I have also considered the memorandum of appeal and the grounds urged
therein. Upon a careful appraisal of the entire material available on record, I
find myself in agreement with the submissions advanced on behalf of the
respondents. The Tribunal has appreciated the oral and documentary
evidence in its correct perspective and has recorded findings which are
supported by the evidence on record. No perversity, illegality, or
misappreciation of evidence has been demonstrated so as to warrant
interference in appellate jurisdiction. The quantum of compensation
awarded is also just and reasonable. It is noteworthy that the Tribunal has
already excluded a period of ten years while awarding interest, having
regard to the fact that the claim petition had twice been dismissed for nonprosecution during its pendency.
26.
In view of the foregoing discussion, I find no merit in the present appeal.
The impugned award does not call for any interference.
27.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. The compensation awarded by the
Tribunal, if not already paid, shall be released to respondent No. 1
forthwith in terms of the award. Any amount already paid, whether by way
MA No. 384/2012
of interim compensation or during the pendency of the proceedings, shall
be duly adjusted against the final amount and if deposited during appeal
shall be released. In case not then Tribunal shall take steps to execute the
award in its entirety. Copy of order be notified to Tribunal and record be
sent back.
(Sanjay Parihar)
Judge
Jammu
13.07.2026
Renu
Whether the order is speaking : Yes
Whether the order is reportable: Yes
Renu Bala
2026.07.17 10:41
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
Jammu
MA No. 384/2012
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