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Sr. No.3
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
LPA No. 90/2026
CM No.2867/2026
1. Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir through
Principal Secretary to Government Home
Department, Jammu and Kashmir, Civil Secretariat,
Srinagar/ Jammu. UT of J&K and Ors.
2. Director General of Police, Jammu and Kashmir,
Jammu/ Srinagar.
3. Senior Superintendent of Police Kupwara.
…..Appellants.
Through:
Mr. Mohsin S. Qadri, Sr. AAG with
Ms. Maha Majeed, Assisting Counsel
Vs.
Mushtaq Ahmad Shah Son of Abdul Khaliq Shah
Resident of Kawari Liderwan Tehsil Trehgam District
Kupwara.
….Respondent
Through:
Mr. M. A. Wani, Advocate, with
Mr. Zain ul Abidin, Advocate
CORAM:
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEVKUMAR, JUDGE
ORDER (Oral)
10.09.2026
1.
In this case the facts submitted before this Court are that the
appellants are aggrieved by an order dated 15.09.2025, whereby the Writ
Court disposed of the writ petition [WP(C) No.1073/2021] quashing the order
dated 24.04.2021 and directing the respondents to reinstate the petitioner as
SPO (Special Police Officer).
2.
The respondent herein was engaged as SPO by District Police Officer
in District Police Office, Kupwara, vide order dated 11.10.2000. In the month
of April 2021, the respondent during his deployment in Police Station
Kupwara prepared and signed a false and fabricated verification report in
respect of one Ghulam Rasool War S/o Abdul Rehman War R/o Gonipora,
Hyhama, who was involved in number of criminal cases of Police Station
Kupwara, depicting the misconduct. The formal departmental enquiry was
ordered vide order dated 26.04.2021 by the District Police Officer, Kupwara,
and the findings recorded in the order dated 12.05.2025 recommended the
SPO to be disengaged. The allegation against the respondent was that he
managed the issuance of fake verification report while verifying that person
in question was not involved in any subversive activities. On such gross
negligence and misconduct, the respondent SPO was disengaged on
24.01.2021. It is noted that aggrieved by such disengagement, the petitioner
approached the Writ Court which quashed the order of disengagement while
directing to reinstate the petitioner as SPO with liberty to the Police
Department to revisit and reconsider the case of the petitioner after issuance
of a show cause notice to the petitioner.
3.
The counsel for the appellants submits that Sections 18, 19 and 20 of
the Police Act, 1983, have to be read in tandom to understand the powers,
privileges, protections and immunities which were required to be given to
such SPOs. The counsel for the appellants further submitted that the
immunities in question were strictly operational in nature arising out of the
work exigencies laid down in the Statute itself but does not call for the
procedural safeguards which are available to a full time regular police officer
as the tenure of the SPO is purely of temporary nature on honorarium based
arrangement which does not amount to hold him a civil post. The counsel for
the appellants submits that Section 19 of the Act was not giving any kind of
entitlement at the same level of a regular police officer whether it was a
protection or any other immunity but actually was a need based requirement
which required the SPO to act with such immunity for maintaining the law
and order. As per counsel for the appellants, the powers, privileges and
protections were strictly for maintaining the law and order and discharging
the duties thereon and could not be compared with the procedural safeguards
which are available to a regular public servant under Article 311 of the
Constitution. The counsel for the appellants submits that a proper enquiry
was held and enquiry had reasons for arriving at a conclusion that it was not
a fit case for continuance of the respondent as SPO.
4.
The counsel for the appellants has referred to the judgment of State of
J&K and others v. Mohammad Iqbal Mallah : 2014 SCC OnLine J&K 58,
whereby the Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court had laid down that once
the respondent was not holding a post regulated by any statutory rules then it
was not possible for the department to hold a departmental enquiry which
might have been necessary in case of a regular police officer. The counsel for
the appellants submits that the respondent does not hold the civil post and
once there is demeanour issue with the SPO in question, he has no right to
such post and there shall be no requirement of law to hold an enquiry to
comply with the rules and the principles of natural justice.
5.
The counsel has further relied upon the judgment in Aijaz Rashid
Khanday v. State of J&K and others [WP(C) No.1757/2019 decided on
04.07.2024] , and emphasized para-10 which reads as follows:
10) From a perusal of the provisions contained in Section 18 of
the Police Act, it is revealed that SPOs are appointed by Police
Officers above a particular rank for specific purposes when the
police force ordinarily employed for preserving the peace is not
sufficient for its preservation and for the protection of the
inhabitants. The provision makes it clear that residents of
neighbourhood can be appointed as SPOs for dealing with
specific contingencies. Thus, engagement of SPOs is not of a
permanent nature but it is only to take care of a particular
contingency. It is in this context that the provisions contained
in Section 19 of the Act are required to be interpreted. By doing
so, it becomes axiomatic that SPOs enjoy same powers, privileges
and protections as do the ordinary officers in the matter of crowd
control, prevention of unlawful assemblies or contingencies of like
nature. The said provision cannot be interpreted in a manner so
as to extend even the powers, privileges and protections relating
to service conditions of an ordinary police officer to the SPOs,
who, admittedly, do not hold any civil posts regulated by any
Statutory rules. Therefore, they are not entitled to any protection
as afforded to ordinary police officers under Police Rules or Civil
Service Regulations. I am supported in my aforesaid view by the
judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in State of J&K v.
Mohammad Iqal Mallah (LPA No.153 of 2012 decided on
05.06.2014).
6.
The counsel for the respondent has, however, relied upon the
judgment in Gh. Haider v. State of J&K : 2014 JKJ 3 461 in which it was
held that though the engagement of the petitioner was temporary in nature
then in case of a stigmatic order an opportunity of hearing is to be given
before terminating the services. However, the said judgment does not support
any full scale enquiry. The relevant part of the judgment reads as follows:
10. A Division Bench of this Court in LPASW No. 105/2011
decided on 01.03.2013, has held that the State-appellant was
required to hold an inquiry into the matter and pass fresh order
after giving opportunity of hearing to the writ petitioner.
11. It is not in dispute that the initial engagement of petitioner
was temporary in nature, therefore, the simplicitor order of
termination would not have given him any right to challenge the
same. However, the specific stand taken by the respondents is
that the petitioner was removed from service as he had misused
his official position by harassing one Din Mohammad, which is
stigmatic in nature. The petitioner, therefore, was required to be
afforded an opportunity of hearing before terminating his
services.
12. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, the writ petition
is allowed and the order of termination so far as it pertains to the
petitioner is quashed. However, respondents are at liberty to
conduct inquiry against the petitioner in accordance with the
rules occupying the field and complete the same within a period
of two months from the date a copy of this order is served upon
them. Petitioner's retention in service or otherwise shall depend
on the outcome of such inquiry.
7.
The counsel for the respondent has also referred to the judgment in
UT of J&K and others v. Shahen Shah (LPA No.152/2025 decided on
06.08.2025) and the relevant para thereof reads as follows:
9. In the present case, respondent-writ petitioner has put a
challenge in the writ petition to the order dated 20.09.2019 on
the ground that the same is in contravention of the rules of
natural justice, having been issued without holding a
departmental enquiry or giving an opportunity of being heard to
the respondent-writ petitioner to explain his position and
vindicate his honour, but, the sole basis upon which the order
impugned dated 20.09.2019 has been issued against the
respondent-writ petitioner by the SSP, Jammu, was that he was
involved in case FIR No.113/2019 registered with Police Station
Domana for the commission of offences punishable under
Sections 376/342 RPC. In the said FIR, the respondent- writ
petitioner was acquitted of the charges levelled against him vide
judgment dated 27.12.2021 passed by the Presiding Officer, Fast
Track Court, Jammu. On being acquitted, the respondent-writ
petitioner approached the appellants-writ respondents and
submitted representation dated 19.02.2022, however, no action
was taken on his representation. Before passing the order dated
20.09.2019 by which the respondent writ petitioner was
disengaged, the appellants-writ respondents were required to
provide an opportunity of being heard to the respondent writ
petitioner, so as to defend his position, but, in the instant case,
appellants- writ respondents without affording any opportunity
of being heard to the respondent-writ petitioner have
terminated/disengaged the respondent-writ petitioner from the
service which is palpably bad in the eyes of law as the order
impugned being stigmatic in nature has been passed in violation
of the principles of natural justice.
10. The judgment dated 05.06.2014 relied upon by Mrs. Monika
Kohli, learned Sr. AAG in case titled State of J&K and others Vs.
Mohammad Iqbal Mallah passed in LPA No. 153 of 2012 is
distinguishable on facts and is not applicable in the present case.
In the present case, respondent-petitioner was disengaged on the
ground that he was involved in serious criminal case, but, later
on he was acquitted of the charges levelled against him by the
Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court, Jammu and also on being
remained absent from duties.
11. It is settled law that even where appointment is contractual
and contractual employee is to be disengaged on account of
some misconduct or adverse performance, he/she is required to
be heard before disengaging him/her from services. In this
context, it would be appropriate to take note of the judgment of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in case titled U.P. State
Road Transport Corporation and others Vs. Brijesh Kumar and
another, reported in 2024 INSC 638. The para 19 is relevant,
which is extracted here as under :“19. The services of the respondent have been
determined solely on the ground of misconduct as
alleged but without holding any regular inquiry or
affording any opportunity of hearing to him. The
termination order has been passed on the basis of
some report which probably was not even supplied to
the respondent. No show cause notice appears to have
been issued to the respondent. Therefore, the order of
termination of his services, even if on contractual
basis, has been passed on account of alleged
misconduct without following the Principles of Natural
Justice. The termination order is apparently stigmatic
in nature which could not have been passed without
following the Principles of Natural Justice.”(Emphasis
added).
8.
The counsel has also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex
Court in Swati Priyadarshini v. The State of Madhya Pradesh : AIR 2024
SC 4339 in which the purport was that the notice had to be given if the
removal of the contractual employee was to be examined. The relevant part
of the judgment reads as follows:
“31. Perusal of Clause 4 makes it clear that ordinarily, for
inefficiency, one month’s notice is sufficient. The Clause also
makes it clear that if someone is found to have indulged in
“undesirable activities”, the Mission Director was competent to
terminate such person’s services “with immediate effect”. We
are afraid that the Respondents have placed themselves in a
Catch-22 situation. If the order dated 30.03.2013 falls within the
former part of Clause 4, as contended by the respondent, on
the premise that it is a case of termination simpliciter and nonstigmatic, then one month’s notice was required to be issued to
the appellant, which admittedly was not done in the instant
matter. Arguendo, were the order dated 30.03.2013 to be seen as
falling under the latter part of Clause 4, it would be stigmatic, as
made clear by the use of the words “indulged in undesirable
activities amounting to degradation of dignity of Mission.
32. In either of the above-noted eventualities, the Impugned
Judgment would have to necessarily be set aside. Nevertheless,
let us examine the reasoning of the Division Bench, which opined
that the order is non-stigmatic and simpliciter non-renewal of
contract. The order dated 30.03.2013 was, quite obviously, the
culmination of the process set into motion by the two SCNs,
which has been overlooked by the Division Bench. The mere nonmention of the background situation or the SCNs in the order
dated 30.03.2013 cannot, by itself, be determinative of the nature
of the order.
9.
The counsel has also referred to the judgment in Sharaz Hussain
Shah v. State of J & K and others
(LPA No.134/2018 decided on
26.07.2023) in which the court has dealt with the applicability of Rule 359
of the Jammu & Kashmir Police Rules, 1960, viz-a-viz Section 18 of the
Police Act, 1983. The para-16 of the judgment reads as follows:
16. The plea and contention of the official respondents that the
petitioner appellant herein came to be disengaged after holding
an enquiry in accordance with Rule 359 supra patently and
factually is found to be incorrect and without any basis.
The judgment referred and relied upon by the counsel for
the respondents passed in case “State of J&K and Ors Vs.
Mohammad Iqbal Mallah”, supra wherein the Division Bench
has held that in the matter of disengagement of an SPO there is
no requirement of law to hold an enquiry for complying with the
rules of principle of natural justice for being not holding a post,
is manifestly distinguishable and not applicable to the instant
case for the sole reason that the respondents themselves have
admitted in the reply filed before the writ court that a
departmental enquiry in conformity with Rule 359 supra was
conducted whereafter the petitioner was disengaged. The
judgment supra thus would not lend any support to the
respondents.
10.
The counsel for the respondent also referred to the judgment in Nihal
Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors. : AIR 2013 SC 3547, whereby the
Hon’ble Apex Court has directed creation of cadre or sanctioned post
regarding the pay anomalies. Relevant paras 35 and 36 reads as follows:
35. Therefore, it is clear that the existence of the need for
creation of the posts is a relevant factor reference to which the
executive government is required to take rational decision based
on relevant consideration. In our opinion, when the facts such as
the ones obtaining in the instant case demonstrate that there is
need for the creation of posts, the failure of the executive
government to apply its mind and take a decision to create posts
or stop extracting work from persons such as the appellants
herein for decades together itself would be arbitrary action
(inaction) on the part of the State.
36. The other factor which the State is required to keep in mind
while creating or abolishing posts is the financial implications
involved in such a decision. The creation of posts necessarily
means additional financial burden on the exchequer of the State.
Depending upon the priorities of the State, the allocation of the
finances is no doubt exclusively within the domain of the
Legislature. However in the instant case creation of new posts
would not create any additional financial burden to the State as
the various banks at whose disposal the services of each of the
appellants is made available have agreed to bear the burden. If
absorbing the appellants into the services of the State and
providing benefits at par with the police officers of similar rank
employed by the State results in further financial commitment it
is always open for the State to demand the banks to meet such
additional burden. Apparently no such demand has ever been
made by the State. The result is – the various banks which avail
the services of these appellants enjoy the supply of cheap labour
over a period of decades. It is also pertinent to notice that these
banks are public sector banks. We are of the opinion that neither
the Government of Punjab nor these public sector banks can
continue such a practice consistent with their obligation to
function in accordance with the Constitution. Umadevi’s
judgment cannot become a licence for exploitation by the State
and its instrumentalities.
11.
Heard learned counsel for the parties at length.
12.
The jurisprudence regarding the issue is quiet on the same tandem.
The bare reading of Sections 18, 19 and 20 of the Police Act, 1983, clears the
legislative intent behind calling for appointment of Special Police Officers
who could help the police personnel in meeting the exigencies of law and
order arising in a particular localised area. The legislative intent called for
immediate steps to be taken by the concerned police authorities for
preservation and protection of the inhabitants and the properties which would
be impacted by a sudden unlawful assembly and disturbance of peace by
gathering support of local people which have been specifically claimed as
residents of the neighbourhood and could help out to meet such exigencies.
Since, such temporary measures were required to maintain the law and order
conditions, the legislature further gave them certain immunities in terms of
powers laid down under Section 19 whereby the powers, privileges and
functions were brought at par with the ordinary police officers so as to ensure
that if any incident while meeting out the eventuality happens, the person so
appointed will get the required immunity, protection and compensation in the
shape of privileges, thus, incentivising such temporary appointment and
extracting such human resources for the immediate purpose.
13.
It is needless to say that unless such immunities, privileges and
protections were afforded any person would be hesitant to be a supportive
parameter of the regular police force as it could involve risk and cost apart
from the emoluments for the services rendered. To meet out the risk and cost
of maintaining the law and order such Section 19 is in the statute book. But,
Section 20 is equally important to understand the parameters of Sections 18
and 19 because the refusal to serve as SPO has been though reflecting to
attract a conviction but the resultant penalty is only a fine not exceeding fifty
rupees for each such neglect, thus, indicating the intent of the legislation
envisaged under Section 18, 19 and 20. The courts have time and again in the
judgments referred to, while refusing to go into the factual parameters of
each case, narrowed down the compass of the judicial examination by
stipulating that the minimum level of the parameters of the natural justice
would even operate for a contractual employee and in the present perspective
as well. The judgments are indicating that such minimum opportunity of
hearing need to be given before any final order is passed for discontinuing
the SPO particularly when it is stigmatic.
14.
It is needless to say that this Court is not hesitant to lay down and say
that if at all such SPO is no longer required due to the end of exigencies
envisaged under Section 18 and the termination is only on account of end of
the task in question then probably even the parameters of natural justice
would not be attracted as it would amount to only completion of the task in
question for which the powers under Section 18 were invoked. Even in the
contractual employment, it is a settled phenomenon that a person could be
ousted for his misconduct, end of the contractual period and if the scheme or
project for which he is employed comes to an end. Similarly, in the present
perspective under Section 18 of the Act if the powers are invoked for a
particular exigency and the exigency would come to an end it would be a
natural corollary that role of the SPO will also automatically come to an end
but in the exceptional cases, where services of SPO is terminated or
disengaged on account of any misconduct then it shall be a minimum
requirement as laid down in various jurisprudences such as UT of J&K and
others v. Shahen Shah (supra) that the opportunity of hearing and doctrine
of audi alteram partem has to be followed. This court is of the firm opinion
that in the given perspective of Sections 18 and 19, Article 311 of the
Constitution will not operate and only the immediate safeguard of a notice
and a reply to the satisfaction of the respondent shall operate. Hence, while
agreeing with the judgment in Mohammad Iqbal Mallah as well as the
judgment in Gh. Haider and Shahen Shah this Court deems it appropriate to
modify the impugned order to the extent that for disengagement of people
appointed under Section 18 of the Act, it shall be a requirement that
wherever a stigma or allegation has resulted into such disengagement, they
shall be entitled to a notice prior to the disengagement and after such notice
is given and reasonable opportunity for filing reply or hearing is given, the
appellant shall be free to pass appropriate orders. Accordingly, it is directed
that in the present case the order dated 24.04.2021, for the reasons
mentioned, shall stand quashed but at the same time the appellants are given
liberty to revisit the issue and reconsider the case of the petitioner after
issuance of show cause notice and providing an adequate opportunity of
hearing.
15.
It is apt to note that since the termination was stayed, the period of
continuation shall depend upon the decision taken by the appellants.
However, the decision shall be taken expeditiously, preferably within thirty
days from today.
16.
It is needless to say that any observation in the impugned order which
indicates or reflects that a regular enquiry or any kind of procedure envisaged
for a regular police officer to take action would not operate in these cases.
17.
Disposed of in the above terms.
(SANJEEV KUMAR)
JUDGE
(DR. PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI)
CHIEF JUSTICE
Srinagar
10.09.2026
Abdul Qayoom, Secy.
Abdul Qayoom Lone
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this document
19.09.2026 11:51
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