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[2026:RJ-JP:5964-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 873/2023
Pawan Prajapati S/o Sh. Asha Lal Prajapati, Aged About 51
Years, R/o House No. 255/3, Dhan Mandi, Inside Delhi Gate,
Kumahar Mohalla, Ajmer.
----Appellant
Versus
1.
Union of India, Through its Secretary, Ministry of Home
Affairs, New Delhi.
2.
Director General of Police, Border Security Force, 10,
C.G.O. Complex, Lodhi Road, New Delhi- 3.
----Respondents
Connected With
D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 77/2024
1.
Union of India, Through its Secretary, Ministry of Home
Affairs, New Delhi.
2.
Director General of Police, Border Security Force, 10,
C.G.O. Complex, Lodhi Road, New Delhi-3.
----Appellants
Versus
Pawan Prajapati S/o Shri Asha Lal Prajapati, Aged About 51
Years, Resident of H. No. 255/3, Dhan Mandi, Inside Delhi Gate,
Kumahar Mohalla, Ajmer (Raj.)
----Respondent
For Appellant(s)
:
Mr. Ashish Kumar, Adv. in SAW
No.77/2024
Mr. Sunil Samdaria, Adv. with
Mr. Arihant Samdaria, Adv. in SAW
No.873/2023
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Sunil Samdaria, Adv. with
Mr. Arihant Samdaria, Adv. in SAW
No.77/2024
Mr. Ashish Kumar, Adv. in SAW
No.873/2023
HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE MR. SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE SANGEETA SHARMA
(2 of 21)
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[SAW-873/2023]
Judgment
1.
Date of Conclusion of arguments
:
09/01/2026
2.
Date on which the judgment was reserved
:
09/01/2026
3.
Whether the full judgment or only the
operative part is pronounced
:
Full judgment
4.
Date of pronouncement
:
27/02/2026
Per Mrs. Sangeeta Sharma, J:
1.
The present D.B. Special Appeal(Writ) Nos. 873/2023 and
77/2024
have
been
preferred
against
the
judgment
dated
19.07.2023 rendered by the learned Single Judge in S.B. Civil Writ
Petition No. 9900/2005, in which the following orders and
directions were passed:“22. ...the impugned orders dated 08.03.2004 and
31.08.2004 are quashed and set aside. The matter is
remitted back to the appropriate authority for
passing reasoned and speaking order after following
the provisions contained under Chapter VII of the
Rules of 1969 after granting opportunity of hearing
to both sides within a period of three months from
the date of receipt of certified copy of this order.
23. As a result, this petition is allowed in part. The
respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner
back in service but he will not be entitled to get any
back-wages from the date of his removal from
service till his reinstatement.”
2.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, the appellant–writ
petitioner has preferred D.B. Special Appeal(Writ) No. 873/2023,
seeking grant of back-wages and further assailing that part of the
impugned judgment whereby the matter has been remitted to the
competent disciplinary authority for passing a fresh order.
3.
On the other hand, the respondent–Union of India has filed
D.B. Special Appeal(Writ) No. 77/2024, calling in question the
interference
with
the
disciplinary
proceedings
and
consequential direction for reinstatement of the appellant.
the
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4.
[SAW-873/2023]
Since both the appeals emanate from the same judgment
and involve common factual matrix as well as interconnected
questions of law, they are being heard together and are disposed
of by this common judgment. For the sake of convenience, D.B.
Special Appeal(Writ) No. 873/2023 is treated as the leading
appeal, and the parties are referred to in accordance with their
respective status therein.
5.
The factual conspectus giving rise to the present appeals is
that the appellant was appointed as Constable (General Duty) vide
order dated 12.01.1995. On 27.10.2003, the appellant was
sanctioned
eight
days’
casual
leave
for
the
period
from
27.10.2003 to 04.11.2003, and was required to report back for
duty on 05.11.2003.
6. The appellant had reserved a train ticket for 04.11.2003, but
he did not resume duty on the stipulated date citing the sudden
cardiac illness of his mother. He subsequently rejoined duty
voluntarily on 20.01.2004.
7.
Consequent
thereto,
the
respondent-department
initiated
departmental proceedings against the appellant on the charge of
overstay of leave, which culminated in an order of dismissal dated
08.03.2004, passed by the Summary Security Force Court
(hereinafter referred to as “SSFC”). The statutory appeal preferred
by the appellant was dismissed by the Appellate Authority vide
order dated 31.08.2004.
8.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders, the appellant approached
this Court by filing a writ petition, inter alia, alleging procedural
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irregularities, violation of the principles of natural justice, and
dis-proportionality of punishment, which ultimately culminated in
the impugned judgment dated 19.07.2023.
9.
In the present Special Appeals, it is evident that both sides,
namely the appellant as well as the respondent–Union of India,
are aggrieved by the judgment rendered by the learned Single
Judge but for different reasons. The appeals, therefore, require a
careful examination of the parties’ respective grievances to assess
the legality and sustainability of the impugned judgment.
10. On behalf of the appellant, it has been contended, in
substance, that although the learned Single Judge had rightfully
set aside the order of dismissal and directed reinstatement of the
appellant in service, however, the denial of back-wages for the
period from the date of dismissal till reinstatement is wholly
arbitrary and bereft of any cogent reasons.
11.
It has further been contended that the direction issued by
the learned Single Judge remanding the matter to the disciplinary
authority for passing fresh orders after a lapse of nearly nineteen
years would only result in protracting the litigation and is
manifestly contrary to the settled principles governing service
jurisprudence.
12. With regards to the question of territorial jurisdiction, the
counsel submitted that since the partial cause of action arose in
Rajasthan as the impugned order of the Appellate Authority was
served upon him at his native place (Ajmer) which is well within
the territorial jurisdiction of this court.
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13.
[SAW-873/2023]
In support of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for
the appellant placed reliance upon the judgments of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya
Pradesh & Anr.; 2026 SCC OnLine SC 8, and Allahabad Bank
& Ors. v. Krishna Narayan Tiwari; (2017) 2 SCC 308,
Deepali
Gundu
Surwase
v.
Kranti
Junior
Adhyapak
Mahavidhyalaya & Ors.; (2013) 10 SCC 324; Nawal Kishore
Sharma vs. UOI and Ors, (2014) 9 SCC 329.
14. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent
contended
that
the
learned
Single
Judge
transgressed
the
permissible limits of judicial review by interfering with the
disciplinary proceedings without undertaking an examination of
the nature, gravity, and seriousness of the misconduct alleged
against the appellant. It was submitted that the scope of
interference in disciplinary matters being limited, the learned
Single Judge erred in setting aside the disciplinary action without
adjudicating the case on its merits.
15.
It was further urged that the writ petition was allowed solely
on the ground that the impugned orders were non-speaking,
without addressing or deciding vital issues arising in the matter,
including the question of territorial jurisdiction, compliance with
the procedural requirements prescribed under the BSF Rules, the
alleged plea of guilt, and the appellant’s habitual absenteeism. On
these premises, it was contended that the impugned judgment
could not be sustained in law and deserved to be set aside, with a
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consequential direction for remand of the matter to the learned
Single Judge for fresh consideration in accordance with law.
16. In support of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for
the respondent placed reliance upon the judgments of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India; (1990) 4
SCC 594, Union of India & Ors. v. IC-14827 Major A.
Hussain; (1998) 1 SCC 537, Union of India v. Dinesh
Kumar; (2010) 3 SCC 161, Union of India v. Mudrika Singh;
(2021) SCC OnLine SC 1173, State of Punjab & Ors. v. Ex.
C. Satpal Singh; 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1848, and Deepak
Dnyandev Jadhav v. Union of India & Ors.; SLP (Civil) No.
529/2018.
17.
Heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully examined
the pleadings, documents, and material placed on record along
with the decisions cited. The aforesaid rival contentions raise
important questions of law touching upon the following points:
Territorial
Jurisdiction;
compliance
of
procedural
rules:
Requirement of detailed reasoned order; disproportionately of
punishment; the propriety of remand after an inordinate lapse of
time, etc. These issues, which lie at the core of the present
controversy, are examined and answered in the succeeding
paragraphs in accordance with the facts of the case, the governing
legal principles, and the requirement of coherence and reasoned
adjudication.
18.
As regards the respondents’ objection relating to territorial
jurisdiction, it is an admitted fact that the appellate order dated
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31.08.2004 and subsequent communications were served upon
the appellant at his native place at Ajmer, Rajasthan. In the
present case, after preferring the statutory appeal against the
order dated 08.03.2004 passed by the SSFC, the appellant came
back to his native place at Ajmer and the order of the Appellate
Authority dated 31.08.2004 was served upon him at Ajmer,
Rajasthan. In the case of Nawal Kishore Sharma (Supra) the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:
17. …. A copy of the letter was sent to the appellant
at his native place in Bihar where he was staying after
he was found medically unfit. It further appears that
the appellant sent a representation from his home in
the State of Bihar to the respondent claiming
disability compensation. The said representation was
replied by the respondent, which was addressed to
him on his home address in Gaya, Bihar rejecting his
claim for disability compensation. It is further evident
that when the appellant was signed off and declared
medically unfit, he returned back to his home in the
district of Gaya, Bihar and, thereafter, he made all
claims and filed representation from his home address
at Gaya and those letters and representations were
entertained by the respondents and replied and a
decision on those representations were communicated
to him on his home address in Bihar. Admittedly, the
appellant was suffering from serious heart muscle
disease (dilated cardiomyopathy) and breathing
problem which forced him to stay in his native place,
wherefrom he had been making all correspondence
with regard to his disability compensation. Prima
facie, therefore, considering all the facts together, a
part or fraction of cause of action arose within the
jurisdiction of the Patna High Court where he received
a letter of refusal disentitling him from disability
compensation.
19.
The facts in the aforementioned case are similar to the facts
of the present case as the impugned orders passed by the
Appellate Authority, has been served upon the appellant within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Court thereby attracting Article
226(2) of the Constitution of India. Therefore, even a small
fraction of cause of action occurring within the court's jurisdiction
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[SAW-873/2023]
is sufficient to entertain the petition. The objection regarding
territorial jurisdiction is, therefore, devoid of merit and is rejected.
20.
To delve into the issue of procedural compliance, it is
apposite to reproduce the relevant provisions of the Border
Security Force Rules, 1969(hereinafter referred as ‘BSF Rules’)
which deals with the procedure of issuing charge-sheet, hearing of
charges against enrolled person and recording of evidence against
such person.
“43. Offence report.- Where it is alleged that a
person subject to the Act 1 [other than an officer or a
Subordinate Officer] has committed an offence
punishable thereunder the allegation shall be reduced
to writing in the form set out in Appendix IV.
44. Charge Sheet.- Where it is alleged that an
officer or a Subordinate Officer has committed an
offence punishable under the Act, the allegation shall
be reduced to writing in the form set out in Appendix
VI.
45. Hearing of the charge against an enrolled
person.- [(1) The charge shall be heard by the
Commandant of the accused in the following
manner:(i) The charge and statements of witnesses, if
recorded, shall be read over to the accused.
(ii) If written statements of witnesses are not
available, or where the Commandant considers its
necessary to call any witness, he shall hear as many
witnesses as he may consider essential to enable him
to determine the issue.
(iii) Wherever witnesses are called by the
Commandant, the accused shall be given opportunity
to cross-examine them.
(iv) Thereafter, the accused shall be given an
opportunity to make a statement in his defence.]
(2) After hearing the charge under sub-rule (1), the
commandant may,(i) award any of the punishments which he is
empowered to award, or
(ii) dismiss the charge, or
(iii) remand the accused, for preparing a
record of evidence or for preparation of an abstract
of evidence against him, or
(iv) remand him for trial by a Summary
Security Force Court:
Provided that, in cases where the Commandant
awards more than 7 days’ imprisonment or detention
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he shall record the substance of evidence and the
defence of the accused:
Provided further that, he shall dismiss the charge if in
his opinion the charge is not proved or may dismiss it
if he considers that because of the previous character
of the accused and the nature of the charge against
him it is not advisable to proceed further with it:
Provided also that in case of all offences punishable
with death a record of evidence shall be taken:
[Provided further that in case of offences under
Sections 14, 15, 17, 18 and offence of ‘murder’
punishable under Section 46 of the Act, if the
accused
has
absconded
or
deserted,
the
Commandant shall hear the charge in his absence
and remand the case for preparation of the record of
evidence.]
48. Record of evidence.- (1) [The officer ordering
the record of evidence] may either prepare the
record of evidence himself or detail another officer to
do so.
(2) The witnesses shall give their evidence in the
presence of the accused and the accused shall have
right to cross-examine all witnesses who give
evidence against him.
[Provided that where statement of any witness at a
court of inquiry is available, examination of such a
witness may be dispensed with the original copy of
the said statement may be taken on record. A copy
thereof shall be given to the accused and he shall
have the right to cross examine if he was not
afforded an opportunity to cross examine the witness
at the court of Inquiry.]
(3) After all the witnesses against the accused have
been examined, he shall be cautioned in the following
terms; “You may make a statement if you wish to do
so, you are not bound to make one and whatever you
state shall be taken down in writing and may be used
in evidence.” After having been cautioned in the
aforesaid manner whatever the accused states shall
be taken down in writing.
(4) The accused may call witnesses in defence and
the officer recording the evidence may ask any
question that may be necessary to clarify the
evidence given by such witnesses.
(5) All witnesses shall give evidence on oath or
affirmation:
Provided that, no oath or affirmation shall be given to
the accused nor shall be cross-examined.
(6) (a) The statements given by witnesses shall
ordinarily be recorded in narrative form and the
officer recording the evidence may, at the request of
the accused, permit any portion of the evidence to be
recorded in the form of question and answer.
(b) The witnesses shall sign their statements after
the same have been read over and explained to
them.
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[(6A) The provisions of section 89 of the Act shall
apply for procuring the attendance of witnesses
before the officer preparing the Record of Evidence.]
(7) Where a witness cannot be compelled to attend
or is not available or his attendance cannot be
procured without an undue expenditure of time or
money and after the officer recording the evidence
has given a certificate in this behalf, a written
statement signed by such witness may be read to the
accused and included in the record of evidence.
(8) After the recording of evidence is completed the
officer recording the evidence shall give a certificate
in the following form:“Certified that the record of evidence ordered
by............................................Commandant .......
..................was made in the presence and hearing
of the accused and the provisions of rule 48 have
been complied with”.
21.
Perusal of the record indicates that, from the procedural
standpoint, no serious infirmities are apparent, and we are unable
to accept the submission advanced on behalf of the appellant. The
material on record shows that the appellant was granted eight
days’ casual leave from 27.10.2003 to 04.11.2003, but he failed
to report back on expiry of the sanctioned leave and rejoined duty
only on 20.01.2004, thereby overstaying for a period of 77 days.
22.
The respondents have contended that the appellant was
served with the offence report on 03.02.2004 and was duly
informed of the allegation against him, specifying the charge
under Section 19(b) of the Border Security Force Act. Pursuant
thereto, an inquiry was conducted and statements of witnesses
were recorded on 11.02.2004, 12.02.2004 and 16.02.2004, prior
to issuance of the charge-sheet dated 01.03.2004. It has been
submitted that Rule 45 of BSF Rules provides for hearing of
charges and that the record of evidence can be prepared at that
stage. Further, the proviso to Rule 48(2) of BSF Rules also permits
recording of statements at an earlier stage.
(11 of 21)
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23.
[SAW-873/2023]
Insofar as the allegation of procedural non-compliance is
concerned, the record of evidence was conducted in the presence
of the appellant, and there is nothing to demonstrate that he was
denied the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses or to present
his defence. On the contrary, the record indicates that such
opportunity was afforded, which the appellant chose not to avail.
Once an opportunity has been provided, the requirement of
procedural fairness stands satisfied, and the delinquent cannot
subsequently contend that the proceedings were vitiated on that
ground. The appellant in the present case participated in the
proceedings
without
raising
any
contemporaneous
objection
regarding the alleged procedural irregularities, and therefore
cannot be permitted to challenge the same belatedly after
conclusion of the proceedings. In statutory appeal (Annexure-6 of
the writ petition) preferred against the order dated 08.03.2004,
while accepting overstay of leave for 77 days the only prayer
made by the appellant is that the punishment imposed upon him
of dismissal from the service may kindly be reduced to a
reasonable extent and order of SSFC be modified.
24.
How far the contention raised by the appellant that the
disciplinary
proceedings
stood
vitiated
on
account
of
non-
compliance with Rule 43 of the BSF Rules does not merit
acceptance. The offence report clearly indicated the nature of the
allegation and the statutory provision under which action was
proposed, thereby sufficiently apprising the appellant of the case
he was required to meet. Rule 43 of BSF Rules does not
contemplate a detailed disclosure akin to a formal charge-sheet
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but only requires that the allegation be reduced into writing so as
to inform the accused of the offence alleged.
25.
Insofar as the submission regarding supply of documents
only twenty-four hours prior to trial is concerned, Rule 63(6) of
BSF Rules expressly provides that in the case of a SSFC the period
of four days contemplated under Rule 63(4) of BSF Rules shall
stand reduced to twenty-four hours. The procedure adopted,
therefore, cannot be said to be contrary to the statutory
framework. It is also not the appellant’s case that he sought any
adjournment or additional time for preparation of defence which
was refused.
26.
It is well settled that the scope of judicial review in
disciplinary proceedings is limited and the High Court does not sit
as an appellate authority over the findings recorded by the
competent authority. Interference is warranted only where the
inquiry is conducted in violation of statutory provisions or
principles of natural justice resulting in prejudice, or where the
findings
are
perverse
or
unsupported
by
evidence.
Mere
procedural irregularities which do not go to the root of the matter
cannot vitiate the proceedings. The Supreme Court in Union of
India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610, has emphasised
that courts should refrain from interfering with disciplinary action
unless
substantial
illegality
or
miscarriage
of
justice
is
demonstrated. In the present case, no such grave procedural
infirmity is made out, and the learned Single Bench exceeded the
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permissible limits of judicial review in setting aside the disciplinary
action. The court held as under:
12. ...The High Court, in exercise of its powers under
Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not
venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High
Court can only see whether:
(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure
prescribed in that behalf;
(c) there is violation of the principles of natural
justice in conducting the proceedings;
(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from
reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations
extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;
(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be
influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly
arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person
could ever have arrived at such conclusion;
(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to
admit the admissible and material evidence;
(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously
admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the
finding;
(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of
India, the High Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in
case the same has been conducted in accordance
with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on
which findings can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may
appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless
it shocks its conscience.
27.
Furthermore, in the case of CISF vs. Abrar Ali; (2017) 4
SCC 507, a three Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
confirmed the law laid down in the case of Gunasekaran
(supra). Additionally, in the case of Union of India vs Subrata
Nath; 2022 SCC Online SC 1617, the Hon’ble Apex Court held
as under:“14. Citing the decision in State of Orissa v.
Bidyabhushan Mohapatra [State of Orissa v.
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[SAW-873/2023]
Bidyabhushan Mohapatra, 1962 SCC OnLine SC
106 : AIR 1963 SC 779] , it was contended that
keeping in mind the gravity of the established
misconduct, the disciplinary authority has the power
to impose a punishment on the delinquent officer
and such a punishment is not open for review by the
High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. It was also sought to be urged on behalf of
the appellants that the past conduct of the
respondent can be taken into consideration while
awarding penalty, subject to the condition that the
same is made a part of a separate charge, as was
done in the instant case. In support of the said
submission, the learned counsel cited Central
Industrial Security Force v. Abrar Ali.”
28.
So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the
appellant regarding the recording of reasons is concerned, citing
the verdict of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of S.N.
Mukherjee vs Union of India; (1990) 4 SCC 594, wherein, it
is held that reasons are required to be given by the appellate
authority. The relevant para has been reproduced as under:
“39. The object underlying the rules of natural
justice "is to prevent miscarriage of justice" and
secure "fair play in action." As pointed out earlier the
requirement about recording of reasons for its
decision by an administrative authority exercising
quasi-judicial functions achieves this object by
excluding chances of arbitrariness and ensuring a
degree of fairness in the process of decision-making.
Keeping in view the expanding horizon of the
principles of natural justice, we are of the opinion,
that the requirement to record reason can be
regarded as one of the principles of natural justice
which govern exercise of power by administrative
authorities. The rules of natural justice are not
embodied rules. The extent of their application
depends upon the particular statutory framework
whereunder jurisdiction has been conferred on the
administrative authority. With regard to the exercise
of a particular power by an administrative authority
including exercise of judicial or quasi- judicial
functions the legislature, while conferring the said
power, may feel that it would not be in the larger
public interest that the reasons for the order passed
by the administrative authority be recorded in the
order and be communicated to the aggrieved party
and it may dispense with such a requirement. It may
do so by making an express provision to that affect
as those contained in the Administrative Procedure
Act, 1946 of U.S.A. and the Administrative Decisions
(Judicial Review) Act, 1977 of Australia whereby the
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[SAW-873/2023]
orders passed by certain specified authorities are
excluded from the ambit of the enactment. Such an
exclusion can also arise by necessary implication
from the nature of the subject matter, the scheme
and the provisions of the enactment. The public
interest underlying such a provision would outweigh
the salutary purpose served by the requirement to
record the reasons. The said requirement cannot,
therefore, be insisted upon in such a case.”
29.
It is pertinent to note that the reliance placed by the
appellant on the aforesaid judgment is entirely misplaced and
devoid of merit. The said judgment primarily addresses the
mandatory requirement of passing a detailed and reasoned order,
but this obligation arises in those cases where the relevant
provisions of the statute or legislature have expressly mandated
such a detailed order. The underlying principle enunciated therein
comes into play only in situations where, notwithstanding a clear
and explicit legislative mandate to furnish a detailed order, the
concerned authority fails to do so.
30.
Additionally,
in
S.N.
Mukherjee
(Supra),
the
Court
categorically held that no reasoned order is required from the
confirming
authority.
This
principle
underscores
that
while
procedural fairness is essential in disciplinary proceedings, the
confirming authority is not obligated to provide detailed reasons
for its decision, particularly in the sentences recorded in the court
martial and similar forums. The relevant portion of the judgment
has been reproduced herein under:48. For the reasons aforesaid it must be held that
reasons are not required to be recorded for an order
passed by the confirming authority confirming the
findings and sentence recorded by the court martial as
well as for the order passed by the Central Government
dismissing the post-confirmation petition. Since we
have arrived at the same conclusion as in Som Datt
Datta case [(1969) 2 SCR 177 : AIR 1969 SC 414 :
1969 Cri LJ 663] the submission of Shri Ganguli that
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[SAW-873/2023]
the said decision needs reconsideration cannot be
accepted and is, therefore, rejected.
31.
On the same lines, the Supreme court in the case of Dinesh
kumar (supra) held as follows:
23. In this backdrop, it is clear that the provisions for
the SSFC and the appellate authority are pari materia,
more particularly in case of Rule 149 and Section
117(2) of the Act, with the provisions which were
considered in both the above authorities. Therefore,
there cannot be any escape from the conclusion that
as held by the Constitution Bench, the reasons would
not be required to be given by the SSFC under Rule
149 or by the appellate authority under Section 117(2)
of the Act. This position is all the more obtained in
case of SSFC, particularly, as the legislature has
chosen not to amend Rule 149, though it has
specifically amended Rule 99 w.e.f. 9-7-2003. It was
pointed out that in spite of this, some other view was
taken by the Delhi High Court in Nirmal Lakra v. Union
of India [(2003) 102 DLT 415] . However, it need not
detain us, since Rule 149 did not fall for consideration
in that case. Even otherwise, we would be bound by
law declared by the Constitution Bench in S.N.
Mukherjee v. Union of India
32.
The proceedings have been duly conducted by the SSFC in
accordance with the prescribed statutes and therefore, in the
present case, there is no requirement of detailed order under Rule
149 of BSF Rules, or by the appellate authority under Section 117
of BSF Act, as the case may be, thereby rendering the appellant's
reliance on the aforesaid judgment wholly inapplicable.
33.
Moreover, it is well settled that in disciplinary proceedings,
particularly in matters concerning uniformed forces, substantial
compliance with the prescribed procedure is sufficient and minor
deviations which do not affect the fairness of the process or cause
prejudice to the delinquent cannot be a ground to invalidate the
action taken. The appellant has failed to establish that any alleged
irregularity went to the root of the matter or resulted in
miscarriage of justice. As departmental enquiry is based on the
[2026:RJ-JP:5964-DB]
(17 of 21)
[SAW-873/2023]
preponderance of the evidence and the principles laid down in the
law of evidence are not strictly applicable, the same would,
therefore, not have strict application to departmental proceedings.
34.
To sum up the legal position, this Court is of the considered
opinion that being fact finding authorities, both the Disciplinary
Authority and the Appellate Authority are vested with the
exclusive power to examine the evidence to be adequate and
reliable.
35.
We have gone through the record of the present case, this
Court is not inclined to interfere in the departmental proceedings,
particularly when the conclusions are based upon facts proved on
the basis of evidence available on record and the appellant was
afforded ample opportunity of hearing during the enquiry. We find
that the findings with regard to proof of guilt are justified and
thus, not liable to be interfered with. The finding of the learned
Single Bench that the disciplinary proceedings stood vitiated on
account of procedural lapses cannot be sustained. Consequently,
there remains no question of remanding the matter back to the
disciplinary authority.
36.
As far as the question of quantum of punishment is
concerned, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of
Punjab vs. Ram Singh Ex-Constable, (1992) 4 SCC 54, held
that before awarding an order of dismissal from service, it shall be
mandatory that the dismissal order should be made only when
there are gravest acts of misconduct, since it impinges upon the
pensionary rights of the delinquent. Sometimes a misconduct of a
(18 of 21)
[2026:RJ-JP:5964-DB]
[SAW-873/2023]
minor character, which does not by itself warrant an order of
dismissal, but due to continued acts of misconduct produces an
insidious cumulative effect on service morale, may be a ground to
take a lenient view of giving an opportunity to reform. Despite
giving
such
opportunities,
if
the
delinquent
proved
to
be
incorrigible and found completely unfit to remain in service, then
to maintain discipline in the service, instead of dismissing the
delinquent, a lesser punishment of compulsory retirement or
demotion to a lower grade or rank, or removal from the service
without affecting his future chance of reemployment, if any, may
meet the ends of justice.
37.
In the present case, the appellant on four occasions had
overstayed leave granted to him and on two occasions, absented
himself from duty without leave. Consequently, penalties were
inflicted for the same. The charge against the appellant in this
matter
pertains
to
an
overstay
of
leave,
which,
though
undoubtedly a lapse in discipline in a uniformed force, does not by
itself necessarily warrant the extreme major penalty of dismissal
from service, particularly when the record indicates that the
appellant had joined duties on his own and had explained his
absence on account of serious illness of his mother. It is not a case
of desertion. It emerges that the delinquent had leave at his credit
and one good entry in his record, which could have been
considered
while
determining
the
quantum
of
punishment.
Disciplinary action must bear a reasonable nexus with the gravity
of the misconduct and cannot be imposed mechanically without
considering the mitigating circumstances. The Hon’ble Apex Court
[2026:RJ-JP:5964-DB]
(19 of 21)
[SAW-873/2023]
in the matter of Ranjit Thakur vs. Union of India; (1987) 4
SCC 611, while dealing with the sentence imposed by the Court
Martial and elaborating upon the extent of the judicial review,
observed as under:
“25. Judicial review generally speaking, is not
directed against a decision, but is directed against
the “decision-making process”. The question of the
choice and quantum of punishment is within the
jurisdiction and discretion of the court-martial. But
the sentence has to suit the offence and the
offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh.
It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as
to shock the conscience and amount in itself to
conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of
proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial
review, would ensure that even on an aspect which
is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the
court-martial, if the decision of the court even as to
sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the
sentence would not be immune from correction.
Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds
of judicial review. In Council of Civil Service Unions
v. Minister for the Civil Service [(1984) 3 WLR 1174
(HL) : (1984) 3 All ER 935, 950] Lord Diplock said:
“Judicial review has I think developed to a
stage today when, without reiterating any
analysis of the steps by which the
development has come about, one can
conveniently classify under three heads the
grounds on which administrative action is
subject to control by judicial review. The
first ground I would call ‘illegality’, the
second
‘irrationality’
and
the
third
‘procedural impropriety’. That is not to say
that further development on a case by case
basis may not in course of time add further
grounds. I have in mind particularly the
possible adoption in the future of the
principle of ‘proportionality’ which is
recognised in the administrative law of
several of our fellow members of the
European Economic Community;. . .”
38.
Furthermore, the above view also finds it’s support from the
CISF v. Abrar Ali, (2017) 4 SCC 507. The relevant para is
reproduced below:19. Though we are of the view that the High Court
ought not to have interfered with the order passed by
the disciplinary authority, the penalty of dismissal
[2026:RJ-JP:5964-DB]
(20 of 21)
[SAW-873/2023]
from service is not commensurate with delinquency.
The respondent was found guilty of desertion of the
Force for a period of five days and not improving his
conduct in spite of imposition of penalties on three
occasions earlier. For the above delinquencies, the
penalty of dismissal from service is excessive and
harsh. In our view, the penalty of compulsory
retirement would meet the ends of justice. We are
informed by the counsel for the appellants that the
respondent is entitled for pension as he has
completed 10 years of service. In order to avoid any
controversy, we direct that the respondent shall be
entitled for notional continuity of service till the date
of completion of minimum service required to make
him eligible for pension. He will not be entitled for
payment of salary and allowances for that period.
39.
Taking guidance from the settled proposition of law, we are
of the considered view that the appellant is guilty of overstaying
the sanctioned leave; however, this is not a case of desertion, as
the appellant voluntarily rejoined duty and there is one good
entry in his service record. The imposition of a major penalty,
therefore, is found to be shockingly disproportionate and not
commensurate with the misconduct alleged against the appellant.
40.
Accordingly, this Court is of the opinion that while the
findings recorded in the departmental inquiry with respect to the
proof of misconduct do not warrant interference, the punishment
imposed vide order dated 08.03.2004 and confirmed by the
Appellate Authority vide order dated 31.08.2004 deserves to be
modified. In our view, the penalty of compulsory retirement would
meet the ends of justice. In view of the observations made
hereinabove:
•
The D.B. Special Appeal(Writ) No.873/2023 is partly allowed
and D.B. Special Appeal(Writ) No.77/2024 is dismissed.
•
The punishment awarded to the appellant vide order dated
08.03.2004, as confirmed by the Appellate Authority vide
(21 of 21)
[2026:RJ-JP:5964-DB]
[SAW-873/2023]
order dated 31.08.2004, stands modified in the aforesaid
terms.
•
We direct that the appellant shall be entitled to notional
continuity of service till the date of completion of the
minimum qualifying service required to make him eligible for
pension. However, he shall not be entitled to payment of
salary
or
allowances
for
the
said
period.
Necessary
consequential orders shall be issued by the respondentdepartment(s) within a period of six weeks from the date of
this judgment.
41.
Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
(SANGEETA SHARMA),J
HEENA/48-49
(SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA), ACTING CJ
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