The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
12. In view of the fact that the respondent has retired in 2011, we request the CAT to dispose of the Original Application as expeditiously as possible, preferably, within a period of six months from the date of 2025:MLHC:1141-DB communication of this order, without granting any adjournment to either of the parties unless it is unavoidable. We make it clear that we have not gone into the merits of the order passed by the disciplinary authority.
13. The writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated
08. 04.2024 is set aside. However, there shall be no order as to costs. (H.S. Thangkhiew) Judge (Soumen Sen) Chief Justice Meghalaya
Full Judgment Text
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2025:MLHC:1141-DB
Serial No.04
Daily List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WP (C) No.382/2025
Date of order: 26.11.2025
Union of India represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Personnel,
Public Grievances and Pensions (Department of Personnel and
Training), DOPT, Government of India, North Block, New Delhi110001.
..... Petitioner
Vs.
Shri Arindam Som, IAS (Retd.)
..... Respondent
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Soumen Sen, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Mr. Justice H.S. Thangkhiew, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner
: Dr. N. Mozika, DSGI with
Ms. K. Gurung, Adv
For the Respondent
i)
ii)
: Mr. B. Chakraborty, Adv with
Mr. S.D. Upadhya, Adv
Whether approved for
Yes
reporting in Law journals etc.:
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
JUDGMENT: (per the Hon’ble, the Chief Justice) (Oral)
This writ petition has been filed by the Union of India assailing
the judgment and order dated 08.04.2024 passed by the Central
Administrative Tribunal (for short ‘CAT’), Guwahati Bench in OA
No.040/0287/2018.
2025:MLHC:1141-DB
2.
The OA was filed by the respondent assailing the order dated
17.11.2017 passed by the disciplinary authority imposing a penalty of
withholding 30% of the monthly pension of the respondent for a period
of two years.
3.
The CAT, without going into the merits of the matter, set aside
the order dated 17.11.2017 passed by the disciplinary authority only on
the ground that there has been inordinate delay and laches on the part of
the respondent in initiating the disciplinary proceeding against the writ
petitioner and relying upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in State
of Punjab & ors v. Chaman Lal Goyal1 and P.V. Mahadevan v. Md.
T.N. Housing Board2, quashed the charges. The CAT, in quashing the
entire disciplinary proceedings, has also relied upon the guidelines
issued for monitoring and expeditious disposal of the disciplinary
proceedings cases vide DOPT’s OM No.425/2012-AVD-IV(A) dated
29.11.2012 and the Circular No.02/01/2016 of Central Vigilance
Commission (CVG) dated 18.01.2016.
4.
The Union of India is assailing this order on the ground that the
CAT could not have set aside the entire disciplinary proceedings
without adverting to the merits of the matter.
(1995) 2 SCC 570
(2005) 6 SCC 636
2025:MLHC:1141-DB
5.
Dr. N. Mozika, learned DSGI appearing on behalf of the writ
petitioner has submitted that although the disciplinary proceedings were
initiated one day prior to the retirement of the respondent, there were
sufficient materials and evidence on record justifying the initiation of
the disciplinary proceedings. The details were not available to the
disciplinary authority prior to the date when it was decided to initiate
disciplinary proceedings as the respondent was initially on deputation
and it was on the basis of a complaint received from the FCI, it was
decided to issue a show cause notice that had ultimately culminated in a
charge-sheet and resulted in a penalty being imposed by the disciplinary
authority.
6.
The learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that there
has been an inexcusable and inordinate delay on the part of the writ
petitioners in initiating the disciplinary proceedings, as admittedly, the
charge-sheet was issued on the day of his retirement and the
proceedings continued for almost six years thereafter. Although the
relevant guidelines on which reliance had been placed by the CAT
mandatorily cast an obligation on the authorities concerned to conclude
the proceedings as expeditiously as possible and within a reasonable
time, the period of six years cannot be considered to be a reasonable
2025:MLHC:1141-DB
time for the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings and the entire
proceeding smacks of arbitrariness, malice and unfair of the writ
petitioner.
7.
The learned counsel has relied upon a few decisions of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, including the decisions already referred to in
the impugned judgment, to argue that initiation of a disciplinary
proceeding after an inordinate delay clearly vitiates the proceedings as it
is likely to cause substantial prejudice to the respondent in defending
the said proceedings. In the absence of an explanation being offered for
not being able to initiate the disciplinary proceedings prior to the date of
his retirement, it has to be presumed that a serious breach would likely
to cause to the respondent in the event such proceedings are allowed to
continue. In furtherance of his argument and the decisions relied upon
by the CAT, the learned counsel has referred to the decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India & ors3
(paragraphs 16, 17 and 19) to argue that the initiation of disciplinary
proceedings on the verge of retirement and continuing for almost six
years thereafter evidently would prejudice the delinquent officer and the
writ petitioner would not be required to prove prejudice in such
(2006) 5 SCC 88
2025:MLHC:1141-DB
circumstances. The strong presumption of prejudice by reason aforesaid
facts is required to be inferred is the sheet anchor of his argument.
8.
The only issue required to be decided in this writ petition is
whether the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings on the verge of
retirement of the respondent and continuing such proceedings for almost
six years before it had culminated in a final order passed by the
disciplinary authority would vitiate the entire disciplinary proceedings.
In our respectful reading of the decisions cited by the learned counsel
for the respondent and also the decisions referred to in the impugned
judgment, it does not demonstrate that in every case merely because the
disciplinary proceedings were initiated at a very late stage and may have
been continued for some time, would vitiate the entire disciplinary
proceedings. The decisions cited and relied upon by the learned counsel
for the respondent are clearly distinguishable on facts, as in all the
cases, it could be seen that at the stage when the proceedings were
initiated, the employee approached the court for redressal in which it
has been clearly argued and demonstrated that in the event of the
proceedings being initiated at this stage, it is likely to cause serious
prejudice to the employee concerned as it would be well-nigh
impossible for the employee to defend his case because of the long
2025:MLHC:1141-DB
passage of time. All the decided cases relied upon by the learned
counsel for the respondent would demonstrate that the employee therein
have clearly urged and was able to show that they would be unable to
produce the relevant documents or witness to defend them in the said
proceedings and in such background, it was held that continuation of the
disciplinary proceedings would cause serious prejudice to the employee
and would be in violation of the principles of fairness, justice and
equity. It was considered to be a serious procedural and substantial
breach of the rule of fairness in the event such proceedings were
allowed to continue. Unlike the decisions on which reliance has been
placed by the learned counsel for the respondent, the respondent has
defended the proceedings well at every stage and in fact, he had also
made a detailed representation against the imposition of any kind of
penalty either recommended by the UPSC on the disciplinary authority
which however, did not find favour with the disciplinary authority. In
fact, the disciplinary authority did not agree with the recommendation
of the UPSC in imposing 20% penalty on the monthly pension for a
period of two years, and had enhanced it to 30% monthly pension for a
period of two years.
2025:MLHC:1141-DB
9.
The delayed initiation of the disciplinary proceedings has been
considered in a recent judgment in Union of India through Secretary
and ors v. Udai Bhan Singh4. In paragraph 18, in which on
consideration of the earlier decisions, the order of the Supreme Court
held thus:
“18. Now, it is well settled that the aspect of delay has to be dealt
with on the facts of each case. In the decision of this Court
in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh, the irregularities,
which were the subject matter of an inquiry related to 1975-1977.
Hence, this Court held that it was not reasonable that the
department had taken more than twelve years to initiate a
disciplinary proceeding despite being aware of the irregularities.
That was a case where there was an unexplained delay in the
initiation of disciplinary proceedings. Subsequently, the position
of law has been clarified by the decisions of this Court in State of
Punjab v. Chaman Lal Goyal , State Of A.P v. N.
Radhakishan. and Forest Department v. Abdur Rasul
Chowdhury. In State of A.P. v. Appala Swamy , this Court after
referring to the earlier decisions held thus:
“12.... So far as the question of delay in concluding the
departmental proceedings as against a delinquent officer is
concerned, in our opinion, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down
therefor. Each case must be determined on its own facts. The
principles upon which a proceeding can be directed to be quashed
on the ground of delay are:
(1) where by reason of the delay, the employer condoned
the lapses on the part of the employee:
(2) where the delay caused prejudice to the employee.
Such a case of prejudice, however, is to be made out by the
employee before the inquiry officer.
(2021) 11 SCC 393
2025:MLHC:1141-DB
13. This aspect of the matter is now squarely covered by
the decisions of this Court in Prohibition & Excise Deptt. v. L.
Srinivasan; SBI; Registrar, Coop. Societies v. Sachindra Nath
Pandey.”
10.
In view of the aforesaid, the judgment of the CAT cannot be
sustained. However, insofar as the imposition of a penalty is concerned,
the length of time could be a relevant consideration, as all these steps in
the disciplinary proceedings are to be completed within a reasonable
time. The disciplinary authority is required to decide the matter on the
preponderance of evidence, but if there is perversity and lack of good
faith manifest from the records and the respondent is able to justify its
action, the imposition of penalty by the disciplinary authority in the
limited scope of judicial review is required to be considered. It has to be
seen if the respondent has acted bonafide and view taken by him is a
possible view which at least finds support from the observation by
UPSC in respect of one of the charges. If a decision for transportation at
a higher rate is taken to ensure seamless supply of food grains merely
because it is awarded temporarily to an entity at a higher rate may not
ipso facto held to be a deliberate act to favour that entity. The newly
selected entity has performed well during the contract period and
nothing adverse was reported against it. This issue was only raised
almost after six years on the verge of his retirement. There is nothing on
2025:MLHC:1141-DB
record to show that audit has raised any objection at any point of time.
The respondent has in the note elaborately discussed the reason for
higher rate and there has been no audit query or objection raised
contemporarily. The respondent did not hide any fact. Mere error of
judgment may not be a ground to hold an employee for misconduct. In
the light of such issues as raised by the writ petitioner in the said
proceedings, the quantum of punishment has to be assessed if at all it
were held to be a misconduct. It is trite law that in deciding the quantum
it has to be seen if it is arbitrary. The respondent appears to have
flawless service career except the alleged incident for which
disciplinary proceeding was initiated. Whether the punishment is
disproportionate, if charges are at all established, is another matter to be
considered by the CAT. We find that the impugned penalty imposed by
the disciplinary authority is in fact, the subject-matter of challenge
before the CAT.
11.
Accordingly, the matter is remanded to the learned CAT for a
fresh decision on the issues discussed in this order.
12.
In view of the fact that the respondent has retired in 2011, we
request the CAT to dispose of the Original Application as expeditiously
as possible, preferably, within a period of six months from the date of
2025:MLHC:1141-DB
communication of this order, without granting any adjournment to
either of the parties unless it is unavoidable. We make it clear that we
have not gone into the merits of the order passed by the disciplinary
authority.
13.
The writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated
08.04.2024 is set aside. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
(H.S. Thangkhiew)
Judge
(Soumen Sen)
Chief Justice
Meghalaya
26.11.2025
“Lam DR-PS
LAMPHRANG KHARCHANDY
Date: 2025.11.27 17:11:04 IST
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