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IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT: HYDERABAD
HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K. LAKSHMAN
AND
HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE K. SUJANA
CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No. 1151 OF 2011
(CNR No. HBHC010578072011)
Reserved on: 24.08.2026
Pronounced on:10 .09.2026
Uploaded on:
10.09.2026
Between
Union of India repr. by Chief Engineer, Bangalore
…Appellant
and
M/s Phoenix Engineers & Contractors and
Another
…Respondents
This Court passed the following
JUDGMENT: (per Hon’ble Sri Justice K. Lakshman)
Heard Mr. N. Bhujanga Rao, learned Deputy Solicitor General
of India for the Appellant and Mr. G. Jonathan, learned counsel for
Respondent No. 1.
2. This Appeal has been filed under Section 37 of the
Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter, “the Act, 1996”)
assailing the judgment dated 30.06.2011 in A.O.P. No. 466 of 2003
passed by the Learned Principal District Judge, Ranga Reddy District,
at L.B. Nagar; whereby the petition filed under Section 34 of the Act,
1996 seeking to set aside the arbitral award dated 31.12.2002 was
dismissed.
3. The Appellant and Respondent No. 1 entered into an
agreement bearing No. CE(AF)/BAN/AFA/HYD-07 of 1994-95 for
construction of School Building Type ‘A’ and Staff Quarters to
Kendriya Vidyalaya No. 2 at AFA Hyderabad. The total cost of
construction was Rs. 1,51,41,809.31/-. The construction commenced
on 14.04.1994 and was completed on 25.08.1998. During the course
of execution of the contract, certain disputes arose between the
parties, due to which the matter was referred to arbitration.
Respondent No. 2 was appointed as the Sole Arbitrator in terms of the
Arbitration Agreement.
4. Before the learned arbitrator, Respondent No. 1 made
fourteen (14) claims whereas the Appellant made four (4) counterclaims. The arbitrator passed an award dated 31.12.2002 partly
allowing the claims of Respondent No. 1. The total amount claimed
by Respondent No. 1 was Rs. 1,79,60,874/, of which claims to the
extent of Rs. 10,71,712/- were allowed. On the contrary, the Appellant
claimed an amount of Rs. 1,20,000/-, of which claims to the extent of
Rs. 5,970/- were allowed. The claims of Respondent No. 1 allowed by
the Learned Arbitrator are extracted in a table hereunder:
Claim No.
Nature of Claim
Due to not supplying water as per
contract, but charging for it
Non-payment of accepted contract
rates for water tank and cycle shed
Due to change of soil condition
from hard dense to black cotton
Damages for delayed payments for
inadequate funds position
Damages due to supervision of
work, delay in giving decision,
order in specialized work without
payment
Damages due to prolongation of
contract
11 & 12
Arbitration
and
other legal
expenses & interest on all payments
withheld and on the claims @ 18%
p.a. from the date of actual
completion till the date of decree
Award
Rs. 64,717/Rs. 1,01,495/Rs. 56,500/Rs. 8,500/Rs. 2,16,000/-
Rs. 6,24,500/Simple interest
@12%
from
01.07.1999 and
future interest
@10%
from
01.04.2003
5. Aggrieved by the said award, the Appellant herein filed a
petition under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 vide A.O.P. No. 466 of
2003 seeking to set aside the award contending that the arbitral award
was beyond the scope of reference, vague, uncertain and incorrect.
The learned arbitrator erred in rejecting the counter-claims of the
Appellant herein and wrongly considered the inadmissible evidence
adduced by Respondent No. 1 contractor. On the contrary, Respondent
No. 1 argued that the petition filed under Section 34 of the Act, 1996
was not maintainable as none of the grounds raised by the Appellant
fell within the ambit of the said provision, and thereby the petition
was liable to be dismissed.
6. The Learned Judge referred to a catena of judgments of the
Supreme Court pertaining to the limited jurisdiction of a Court under
Section 34 of the Act, 1996 while examining the correctness of an
arbitral award. It was observed that the arbitrator minutely considered
the submissions made by both parties and logically sustained a part of
the claims while rejecting the others. Thus, the Learned Judge
dismissed the petition holding that the reasoning of the arbitrator was
well-founded and logical, not requiring any interference. Challenging
the said judgment, the Appellant preferred the present appeal.
7. It is the specific contention of the Appellant that the
arbitrator erred in partly allowing the claims of Respondent No. 1
while passing the arbitral award. The Appellant made the following
submissions:
i.
The arbitrator exceeded the scope of reference of disputes to
arbitration.
ii.
The arbitral award suffers from patent illegality.
iii.
The arbitral award is unreasoned and contrary to law under
Section 31(3) of the Act.
iv.
The impugned judgment is not based on reasoning and there is
no consideration of the grounds/contentions raised by the
Appellant.
8. The Appellant submits that the Learned Judge erred in
dismissing the petition filed under Section 34 of the Act, 1996. The
arbitral award is vague and uncertain, and the arbitrator failed to
appreciate and enquire into the counter-claims made by the Appellant.
In support of the aforesaid contentions, the Appellant places reliance
on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dyna
Technologies Private Limited v. Crompton Greaves Limited1, PSA
SICAL Terminals Private Limited v. Board of Trustees of V.O.
Chidambranar Port Trust Tuticorin and Others2, ONGC v. Saw
Pipes Limited3, and Grid Corporation of Orissa Limited v.
Balasore Technical School4.
9. Per contra, Respondent No. 1 submits that the learned
arbitrator fairly and correctly considered the reasons and grounds
while partly awarding the claims of Respondent No. 1. Thereafter, the
Learned Judge vide impugned judgment dated 30.06.2011 in A.O.P.
No. 466 of 2003 clearly observed that there was no error in the arbitral
award. The Arbitrator considered all the aspects minutely while
passing the award, strictly in accordance with the terms of reference
of disputes to arbitration. The Appellant, instead of complying with
the aforesaid judgment, unnecessarily preferred an appeal challenging
the same, without any justification. Moreover, this Court vide order
(2019) 20 SCC 1
(2023) 15 SCC 781
2003 (5) SCC 705
(2000) 9 SCC 552
dated 28.10.2011 in C.M.A. M.P. No. 1975 of 2011 granted interim
stay on the execution of the arbitral award insofar as award amount of
Rs. 6,24,500/- relating to Claim No. 6 (damages due to prolongation
of contract). Respondent No. 1 is claiming 12% interest on Rs.
6,24,500/- awarded in Claim No. 6, contending that it has been 15
years since the interim stay has been granted and more than 28 years
since the dispute between the parties is pending.
10. Respondent No. 1 is a partnership firm formed after
executing a partnership deed dated 16.07.1993 between the following
persons: (1) Mr. Anil Patel, (2) Mr. Amit Patel, (3) Mr. Kishanlal
Mehra, and (4) Mr. Ashwini Mehra. It is the specific allegation of
Respondent No. 1 firm that Mr. Ashwini Kumar Mehra (Respondent
No. 3), who is merely a dummy partner, without informing the other
partners and without any authorization, consent or knowledge,
fabricated documents and filed C.M.A. M.P. No. 1277 of 2015 in
C.M.A. M.P. 1975 of 2011, seeking withdrawal of the amount
awarded under Claim Nos. 1 to 5. The said petition was allowed,
pursuant to which Respondent No. 3 withdrew the amount after
opening a separate bank account by furnishing false and misleading
information in SBI, Maredpally branch, allegedly with the help of
Branch Manager, and deposited Cheque No. 012179 dated 19.10.2015
for Rs. 12,20,248/-. Thus, the actual owners lodged a police complaint
and an FIR was registered vide FIR No. 68 of 2018 dated 07.04.2018.
Upon investigation, Respondent No. 3 was arrested and was
subsequently released on bail. A case in CC No. 495 of 2018 is
pending on the file of X Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,
Secunderabad. Therefore, Respondent No. 1 firm prays this Court to
pass appropriate orders against Respondent No. 3 and direct him to
return the amount of Rs. 12,20,248/- withdrawn along with an interest
@24%.
11. Perusal of the grounds of appeal would reveal that the
Appellant has preferred the present appeal against the judgment
passed in A.O.P No. 466 of 2003, confirming the arbitral award dated
31.12.2002, whereby claims of Respondent No. 1 were partly allowed.
However, in the course of oral submissions, Learned Deputy Solicitor
General of India largely confined his submissions to Claim No. 6.
12. Before we delve into the submissions made by both the
learned counsel, it is pertinent to examine the scope of interference by
this Court in an appeal filed under Section 37 of the Act, 1996. In this
regard, reference is made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Jan De Nul Dredging India Private Limited v. Tuticorin
Port Trust5, wherein it was held that the jurisdiction of the Court
under Section 37 of the Act, 1996 is akin to the jurisdiction of the
Court under Section 34 of the Act, 1996. Thus, the Court in appeal
under Section 37 of the Act, 1996 cannot go beyond the grounds of
challenge under Section 34 of the Act, 1996. The powers of the
Appellate Court are even more restricted, whereby it can only
examine if the Court under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 acted within
its limits as prescribed or failed to exercise the power conferred
thereunder. As the Appellate Court under Section 37 of the Act, 1996
is not an ordinary court of appeal, it cannot go into the merits of the
case or reappraise evidence. The relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid
judgment are extracted hereunder:
(2026) 3 SCC 186.
35. The gist of the aforesaid decisions is that the jurisdiction of the
court under Section 37 of the Act is akin to the jurisdiction of the
court under Section 34 of the Act, and, therefore, the scope of
interference by the court in appeal under Section 37 cannot go
beyond the grounds on which challenge can be made to the award
under Section 34 of the Act. Moreover, the courts exercising powers
under Sections 34 and 37, do not act as a normal court, and
therefore, ought not to interfere with the arbitral award on a mere
possibility of an alternative view.
36. In other words, the scope of interference of the court with the
arbitral matters is virtually prohibited, if not absolutely barred. The
powers of the appellate court are even more restricted than the
powers conferred by Section 34 of the Act. The appellate power
under Section 37 of the Act is exercisable only to find out if the
court exercising power under Section 34 of the Act, has acted within
its limits as prescribed thereunder or has exceeded or failed to
exercise the power so conferred. The appellate court exercising
powers under Section 37 of the Act has no authority of law to
consider the matter in dispute before the Arbitral Tribunal on merits
so as to hold as to whether the award of the Arbitral Tribunal is right
or wrong. The appellate court in exercise of such power cannot sit
as an ordinary court of appeal and reappraise the evidence to record
a contrary finding. The award of the Arbitral Tribunal cannot be
touched by the court unless it is contrary to the substantive
provision of law or any provision of the Act or the terms of the
agreement.
13. In the light of the same, we confine our examination to see
if the Learned Judge in A.O.P. No. 466 of 2003 acted within
prescribed limits or failed to exercise the power conferred under
Section 34 of the Act, 1996. In exercise of the limited power conferred
under Section 37 of the Act, 1996; we would examine the contentions
of the Appellant.
14. The Appellant submits that the arbitral award is an
unreasoned award and is vitiated by patent illegality. The learned
arbitrator partly allowed the claims of Respondent No. 1 in
contravention to the terms and conditions of the contract. Further, two
similar claims, Claim Nos. 6 and 9, pertaining to “damages due to
prolongation of contract”, were dealt with in an inconsistent manner.
Thus, the arbitral award is illegal and perverse and bound to be set
aside.
15. Perusal of the arbitral award dated 31.12.2002 would reveal
that the learned arbitrator conducted an independent assessment of
each of the 14 claims put forth by Respondent No. 1. It is pertinent to
note that an award can be set aside on the ground of patent illegality
appearing on the face of the award and which goes to the roots of the
matter. When an arbitrator does not give any reasons while passing an
award, the same would amount to patent illegality. On ex facie
examination of the arbitral award, we are unable to conclude that the
award is vitiated by patent illegality. Furthermore, the Appellant’s
contention that the award is an unreasoned award is untenable. The
Learned Arbitrator has passed a speaking award with findings for each
claim, substantiated with reasons.
16. Further, the Appellant contends that the learned arbitrator
exceeded the scope of reference by adjudicating the disputes and
allowing the claims of Respondent No. 1 in contravention to the terms
and conditions of the contract. We are unable to accept the said
contention. It is pertinent to note that the learned arbitrator, in the
present case, is a Chief Engineer and, therefore possesses the requisite
technical expertise in terms of subject-matter of the dispute. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Somdatt Builders-NCC-NEC (JV) v.
National Highways Authority of India & Ors.6, has held that the
Courts exercising jurisdiction under Sections 34 or 37 of the Act, 1996
should refrain from interfering with the findings of an Arbitral
Tribunal, particularly when the arbitrator has taken a plausible view
and comprises technical experts. In the present case, Respondent No.
(2025) 6 SCC 757.
2 being a Chief Engineer and a technical expert, was well-versed with
the subject-matter of dispute and the terms and conditions in the
contract. Thus, the findings given by the arbitrator cannot be said to
travel beyond the scope of reference or the terms of the contract.
17. With respect to the Appellant’s contention that the Learned
Arbitrator rendered an inconsistent decision pertaining to two similar
claims, i.e., Claim Nos. 6 and 9, by allowing the former while
dismissing the latter, we are of the opinion that the said contention
cannot be accepted. Although, the heads of both the aforesaid claims
read as “Damages due to prolongation of contract”, the substance of
both the claims is materially different. While dealing with Claim No.
9, the Learned Arbitrator, in paragraph no. 63 of the arbitral award,
categorically mentioned that the claim of Respondent No.1 contractor
pertained to payment of extra escalation on account of the unilateral
freezing of escalation index by the Appellant. However, as
Respondent No. 1 had given an undertaking for freezing the index, the
learned arbitrator concluded that the claim was not sustainable. In
view thereof, merely because both Claim Nos. 6 and 9 bear the same
heading, the same cannot, by itself, establish any inconsistency in the
award passed by the learned arbitrator, and at best, appears to be an
erroneous description of the claim heading, on account of
inadvertence.
18. The Appellant also contends that the learned arbitrator
failed to appreciate and enquire into the counter-claims made by the
Appellant. We are unable to accept the said contention. It is evident
from the arbitral award that the learned arbitrator duly considered the
four (4) counter-claims put forth by the Appellant. It was the
Appellant who had withdrawn Claim Nos. 1 and 2. In respect of
Claim No. 3, the learned arbitrator awarded Rs. 5,970/-, whereas no
amount was awarded against Claim No. 4.
19. Coming to the submissions made by Respondent No. 1, we
find merit in the contention that the learned arbitrator passed the
award after considering all the claims in detail and in accordance with
the terms of the contract. Thereafter, even the Learned Judge, while
exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 was justified
in affirming the said award. Further, Respondent No. 1 has claimed
interest @12% p.a. on the amount of Rs. 6,24,500/- awarded in Claim
No. 6, in respect of which an interim stay was granted by this Court
vide order dated 28.10.2011. It is apt to note that by virtue of the
interim stay, Respondent No. 1 has been deprived of the award
amount for nearly 15 years. The dispute has been pending for
approximately 28 years. In view of the same, we are inclined to award
interest @10% p.a. on the amount of Rs. 6,24,500/- awarded under
Claim No. 6, from the date of passing the arbitral award till the date of
realization.
20. Respondent No. 1 also prays that this Court may pass
appropriate order against Respondent No. 3 for filing C.M.A. M.P.
No. 1277 of 2015 in a fraudulent and unauthorized manner. Further,
Respondent No. 1 firm seeks direction to Learned X Additional Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate, Secunderabad to complete the trial in CC
No. 495 of 2018 within three (3) months. Also, a direction to
Respondent No. 3 to return the amount of Rs. 12,20,248/- along with
24% interest thereon. We have duly considered the submission and
prayer of Respondent No. 1. It appears that there are disputes between
the partners of Respondent No. 1 firm, which this Court while
exercising its power under Section 37 of the Act, 1996, cannot
consider or decide, that too, during pendency of CC No. 495 of 2018
on the file of X Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,
Secunderabad.
21. Having given due consideration to the submissions
advanced, we find it pertinent to reiterate that the Appellate Court
must show a great deal of restraint while examining the validity of an
arbitral award when such an award has been upheld, wholly or
substantially, under Section 34 of the Act, 1996. The scope of
intervention is quite narrow and the matter in dispute cannot be
considered on merits. In the present case, the learned arbitrator has
duly considered the submissions advanced by both the parties and
rendered findings based on the evidence on record, which are
reasoned. The arbitral award was affirmed by the Learned Judge
exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act, 1996. Therefore,
while exercising limited jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Act,
1996; we are not inclined to interfere with the findings in the arbitral
award.
22. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view
that the judgment dated 30.06.2011 passed in A.O.P. No. 466 of 2003
by the Learned Principal District Judge, Ranga Reddy District, at L.B.
Nagar, does not warrant any interference. Therefore, this appeal is
liable to dismissed, and is accordingly dismissed. The Appellant is
permitted to withdraw the amount of Rs. 6,24,500/- along with an
interest @10% p.a. from the date of passing the arbitral award till the
date of realization. No costs.
Consequently, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, in this
appeal shall stand closed.
________________________
JUSTICE K. LAKSHMAN
_______________________
JUSTICE K. SUJANA
Date:10.09.2026.
Vvr.
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