The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
16. “54. This Court has consistently rejected the contention that a petition should be considered ignoring the delay and laches in case the petitioner approaches the Court after coming to know of the relief granted by the Court in a similar case as the same cannot furnish a proper explanation for delay and laches. A litigant cannot wake up from deep slumber and claim impetus from the judgment in cases where some diligent person had approached the Court within a reasonable time.” For these cumulative reasons, in our considered opinion, the Tribunal erred in entertaining the O.A. and granting relief. Resultantly, the impugned order of Tribunal dated 02.05.2025 passed in O.A. No.350/1138/2016 is set aside.
17. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed.
Full Judgment Text
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The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
Form No. J.(2)
Item No.11
Court No. 1
KS
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
HEARD ON: 27.01.2026
DELIVERED ON: 27.01.2026
CORAM:
THE HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SUJOY PAUL
AND
THE HON’BLE JUSTICE PARTHA SARATHI SEN
WP.CT 259 of 2025
Union of India & Ors.
Vs.
Debojyoti Ghosal
Appearance:Mr. Suman Chattopadhyay
Ms. Tapasi Sinha Palit
…..For the Petitioners
Mr. Yatindra Nath Gupta
Mr. Chandan Prakash
…..For the Respondent
JUDGMENT (ORAL):
Per, Sujoy Paul, CJ.:1.
Parties are represented through their respective learned counsel. With the consent,
matter is finally heard.
2.
This petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India assails the order of
Central Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal) dated 02.05.2025 passed in O.A.
No.350/1138/2016 whereby the original application filed by the respondent/applicant
has been disposed of by granting him partial relief.
3.
The admitted facts between the parties are that the Department issued a Notification
for selection of certain Group – D Posts pursuant to which, the candidatures were
required to be submitted up to 31st October, 2005. The Department gave appointment
to 10 candidates out of 303 selected candidates from the select list.
4.
Certain candidates alleging that the Railway Administration has adopted a pick and
chose policy and did not appoint similarly situated persons, filed O.A. No.935 of 2008
(A. Tulsi Das & 104 Others. Vs. Union of India & Ors.). The Tribunal by order dated
26.03.2010 dismissed the said O.A.
Aggrieved, 80 candidates out of 105 original
applicants before Tribunal filed WP.CT 100 of 2010 (Sk. Fakruddin & Ors. Vs. Union of
India & Ors.). This Court clubbed certain similar petitions and passed a detailed order
in WP.CT 100 of 2010, relevant part of which is reproduced by the Tribunal in the
impugned order.
5.
The present respondent/applicant approached the Tribunal seeking similar benefits by
contending that his name also finds place in the select list of 2008 and similarly situated
persons have succeeded from the High Court.
The Tribunal by impugned order
opined that in service jurisprudence, it is important to grant similar benefits to
similarly situated person. Accordingly, it was directed that the present respondent be
granted similar benefit as granted to the petitioners in WP.CT 100 of 2010
notwithstanding the fact that the present respondent was not a party in O.A. No.935 of
2008 (A. Tulsi Das & 104 Others. Vs. Union of India & Ors.).
CONTENTION OF THE DEPARTMENT
6.
Learned counsel for the Department submits that the order of Tribunal is erroneous
mainly for three reasons. Firstly, the respondent is claiming himself to be a “substitute’
but, he does not fall within the definition of “substitute”. Secondly, the selection
Notification was issued way back in 2005 and select list was drawn in 2005. The
applicant did not file any original application or petition claiming similar benefits
before this Court and was sitting tight over the matter till the outcome of WP.CT 100 of
2010. In the said case, this Court opined that the order is based on a concession given
by Railway Administration and such concession shall not create any precedent. For
this reason alone, the order passed by this Court in WP.CT 100 of 2010 cannot be
extended in favour of present respondent.
Lastly, it is urged that Section 21 of
Administration Tribunals Act prescribes a statutory period of limitation.
The
respondent did not approach the Court within limitation and Tribunal ignored this
aspect and mechanically followed the order passed by the High Court.
STAND OF THE RESPONDENT/APPLICANT
7.
Learned counsel for the respondent submits that respondent is similarly situated
candidate qua Sk. Fakruddin & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. and was not a party in
WP.CT 100 of 2010 and hence, Tribunal has not committed any error in extending the
similar benefits. He submits that after the pronouncement of judgment of this Court in
Sk. Fakruddin & Ors. (supra), the present respondent preferred series of
representations followed by a legal notice. The Department did not decide either of
them and, therefore, it is delay on the part of the Department, which should not come
in the way of present respondent in approaching the Tribunal. He places reliance on
another judgment of this Court in WP.CT 49 of 2017 (Bipul Kumar Biswas & Ors. Vs.
Union of India & Ors.) and other connected matters decided on 24th April, 2020. It is
urged that although in the above case, the selection Notification and selection is
different, the nature of selection and legal questions are similar in nature.
8.
He further urged that the present petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India and such petition filed under the said Article is not maintainable.
9.
We have heard the parties at length and perused the record.
FINDINGS
10.
We deem it proper to take the last objection of learned counsel for respondent as the
first objection because it goes to the root of the matter and related with the
maintainability of petition. No doubt, the petitioner, in the petition mentioned that it is
filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, but in our opinion, this will not
make any difference because in view of a Constitution Bench Judgment of Supreme
Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in (1997) 3
SCC 261: 1997 SCC (L&S) 577 : (1997) 105 STC 618, it was held that the High Court can
undertake the judicial review over the orders/judgments passed by the Tribunal
constituted under Article 323-A of the Constitution, which includes the present
Tribunal.
11.
It was clearly held in the said judgment that the High Court although cannot act as a
Court of first instance in relation to ‘service matters’ of State/Central Government
Employees, it can exercise the power of judicial review under Article 226/227 of the
Constitution of India. Thus, indisputably, the power of judicial review exists under the
Constitution.
Mere non-mentioning of enabling provision i.e. Article 227 of the
Constitution of India will not denude this Court to exercise the jurisdiction [See AIR
1977 SC 857 (Hansa Singh Vs. State of Punjab) and (2006) 5 SCC 789 (K. K. Parmar Vs.
High Court of Gujarat & Ors.)]. Thus, we overrule this hyper-technical objection.
12.
The principal argument of Department is based on the observation of Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court in WP.CT 100 of 2010 wherein it was recorded that concession
given in the peculiarity of that case must not create any precedent. The Tribunal has
failed to take note of this finding. The Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab & Anr.
Vs. Rajesh Syal reported in (2002) 8 SCC 158 opined that when the Court rules that the
order/judgment shall not be treated as a precedent, it shows that the order is not passed
in accordance with law. The Tribunal, in our judgment, ought to have considered the
said specific finding of Co-ordinate Bench of this Court and should not have treated
that order as a precedent.
13.
In the case of present respondent, the limitation flowing from Section 21 of
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 is also coming in the way of the present
respondent. Admittedly, the selection Notification was issued in the year 2005 and
select list was drawn in the same year. Although, certain similarly situated persons
approached the Tribunal, they approached it with quite promptitude because their
matter even travelled to this Court in 2010 in WP.CT 100 of 2010.
The present
respondent came out of his deep slumber in the year 2016 (after 11 years) and filed the
instant O.A. The O.A. was hopelessly barred by time. This is trite that continuous
representations will not extend the period of statutory limitation.
14.
So far judgment of this Court in WP.CT 49 of 2017 is concerned, suffice it to say that
this judgment is arising out of a different selection and the question of ‘fence-sitter’ and
delay were not there in the said case. The amount of delay, in the instant case, is
enormous and cannot be ignored.
15.
Apart from this, in our considered opinion, the petitioner is a fence-sitter. The Apex
Court deprecated the practice of entertaining the similarly situated persons if that they
do not approach the Court with quite promptitude and within limitation. The Apex
Court in the case of State of Orissa Vs. Mamata Mohanty reported in (2011) 3 SCC 436
opined as under:
16.
“54. This Court has consistently rejected the contention that a
petition should be considered ignoring the delay and laches in case
the petitioner approaches the Court after coming to know of the
relief granted by the Court in a similar case as the same cannot
furnish a proper explanation for delay and laches. A litigant cannot
wake up from deep slumber and claim impetus from the judgment
in cases where some diligent person had approached the Court
within a reasonable time.”
For these cumulative reasons, in our considered opinion, the Tribunal erred in
entertaining the O.A. and granting relief. Resultantly, the impugned order of Tribunal
dated 02.05.2025 passed in O.A. No.350/1138/2016 is set aside.
17.
Accordingly, writ petition is allowed.
18.
Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be furnished to the parties
expeditiously upon compliance of all legal formalities.
(SUJOY PAUL, CJ.)
(PARTHA SARATHI SEN, J.)
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