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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
Reserved on:
24.09.2026
Pronounced on: 22.10.2026
Uploaded on:
23.10.2026
Whether the operative part or full
judgment pronounced:
Full.
LPA No.107/2022
1. Unon of India through Ministry of Home Affairs, New
Delhi.
2. Inspector General Border Security Force.
3. Director General Border Security Force, BSF HQ,
New Delhi.
4. General Security Force Court at Panthachowk,
Srinagar, through its Presiding Officer.
5. Law Officer, General Security Force Court at
Panthachowk, Srinagar.
6. Rupesh Kumar, 21C 129 Bn BSF.
7. Munish Gupta 21C, Officiating Commandant ARTY
1055 BSF (ARTY).
…Appellants.
Through:
Mr. Hakim Aman Ali, Dy.AG.
Vs.
1. Rovinder Singh S/o Shri Chatar Singh R/o Village
Dildar, Post Tangdhar, P/S Tangdhar District
Kupwara, Constable Sweeper No.041520020.
….Respondent
2. SHO Police Station Bandipora.
3. Mohammad Iqbal Sub Inspector J&K Police,
Police Station Bandipora PID No.116208/EX-SI.
Through:
…Proforma
Resondents
Mr. Mushtaq Ahmad Dar, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE M. A. CHOWDHARY, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
Dr. Pushpendra Singh Bhati, CJ
01.
This Letters Patent Appeal challenges the judgment and order dated
28.04.2022 passed by the learned Single Judge in WP(C) No. 255/2020 titled
Rovinder Singh v. Union of India and others. By virtue of the impugned
judgment, while allowing the writ petition, the learned Single Judge struck
LPASW No.107/2022
down Rule 129 of the Border Security Force Rules, 1969 as ultra vires Part III
of the Constitution, particularly Article 21 of the Constitution and quashed the
proceedings concluded by the General Security Force Court (GSFC) from the
stage of leading defence evidence. The Writ Court further directed that the
GSFC shall take up the matter from the stage of conclusion of the prosecution
evidence and the petitioner, respondent no.1, shall be provided certified copies
of the proceedings as also the copies of the statements of prosecution
witnesses recorded during trial against or in favour of the petitioner before
asking the petitioner to enter his defence and conclude the proceedings with
reasonable dispatch, as per the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed
thereunder.
02.
Before adverting to the rival contentions of the parties, it would be apt
to give a brief factual background of the case.
The respondent was a member of the Border Security Force and while
being posted with the Force, on 27.11.2017, an incident occurred in the BSF
campus at Bandipora, in which Head Constable Chander Bhan was shot dead.
Accordingly, FIR No. 163/2017 came to be registered under Section 302 RPC.
The police investigated the matter and presented the charge-sheet before the
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bandpora, who in turn committed it to the Court of
Sessions. Since the respondent was a member of the Border Security Force,
the competent authority exercised the statutory option for trial before a
General Security Force Court (GSFC) and the criminal case was
accordingly transferred for trial under the BSF Act.
The Record of Evidence was prepared and the competent authorityInspector General, Kashmir Frontier, BSF, directed that the matter to be placed
before the GSFC. The respondent was tried for commission of offences
punishable under Section 302 RPC read with Section 46 of the BSF Act, as
also on the charge arising from leaving his picket without orders from his
superior officers.
The trial before the GSFC commenced on 13.11.2019 and was
concluded on 07.03.2020. The Court found the respondent guilty and awarded
imprisonment for life and dismissal from service. Since the finding and
sentence of the GSFC required confirmation under Section 107 of the BSF
Act, the proceedings remained subject to the statutory confirmation process.
LPASW No.107/2022
The statutory scheme thus deliberately distinguishes between the conclusion of
the trial by the Security Force Court and the stage at which the finding and
sentence acquire validity upon confirmation. The BSF Act itself provides that
no finding or sentence of a General Security Force Court shall be valid except
insofar as it is confirmed in accordance with the Act.
During the trial, the respondent/petitioner sought certified copy of the
challan along with allied documents as also the certified copies of the
statements of prosecution witnesses recorded during the trial. The request was
opposed on the basis of Rule 129. It was, however, not the case that the
respondent was excluded from the proceedings or deprived of the opportunity
to inspect the record in terms of Rule 120 of the Rules and, accordingly, the
request so made was declined.
4.
The respondent/petitioner feeling aggrieved approached the Writ Court
challenging inter alia the constitutional validity of Rule 129 by contending
that denial of certified copies before confirmation deprived him of an effective
opportunity to prepare and conduct his defence and thereby infringed the
guarantee of fair trial under Article 21.
5.
Accepting the challenge of the respondent/ petitioner, the learned Writ
Court allowed the writ petition primarily for the reason that although Rule 120
confers upon an accused the right to inspect the proceedings, inspection could
not be equated with furnishing certified copies of the proceedings and
statements of witnesses. The learned Single Judge further held that
postponement of the supply of copies until confirmation of the finding and
sentence prejudiced the accused in preparing his defence and therefore
offended Article 21 and that Article 33 could not save Rule 129 because, no
sufficient nexus had been demonstrated between the restriction imposed by
Rule 129 and the maintenance of discipline or proper discharge of duties of the
Border Security Force.
6.
The aforesaid conclusions arrived at by the learned Writ Court have
been put to challenge by the appellants through the medium of appeal at hand.
7.
Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the learned Single
Judge while dealing with the matter has fallen in error in treating the right to
obtain copies of the proceedings as an absolute and indispensable component
of the constitutional guarantee of fair trial. The first submission is that the
LPASW No.107/2022
GSFC is a statutory Security Force Court constituted under a special
parliamentary enactment, namely, the Border Security Force Act, 1968.
Section 64 creates three kinds of Security Force Courts, including the General
Security Force Court; Section 68 prescribes its composition; Section 72
confers upon its jurisdiction to try persons subject to the Act; Section 87 deals
specifically with the applicability of the law of evidence; and Sections 107 and
108 prescribe the confirmation mechanism. The entire procedure is thus
governed by a self-contained statutory scheme designed for a disciplined
armed force.
8.
It is submitted that the learned Single Judge gave insufficient effect to
the words used in Section 87, namely that the Indian Evidence Act applies to
proceedings before a Security Force Court “subject to the provisions of this
Act.” Consequently, where the BSF Act or the Rules validly framed
thereunder make a special provision concerning access to proceedings, that
special provision must prevail over the general provisions of the Evidence Act.
It is contended that Rule 120 expressly provides an accused with the right to
inspect the proceedings at all reasonable times before the Court is closed to
consider the finding. The statutory scheme therefore does not shut the accused
out from the evidence against him. He is entitled to inspect the proceedings
and, through his defending officer, counsel or other permissible representative,
prepare his defence. The distinction between inspection and obtaining a
physical or certified copy cannot, by itself, be elevated into a constitutional
requirement that copies must necessarily be supplied during the trial. Further,
the learned counsel for the appellants submits that Rule 129 does not abolish
the accused's right to access the proceedings. It regulates the time and manner
in which a copy of the proceedings may be demanded. The Rule provides that
every person tried by a Security Force Court shall be entitled to obtain a copy
after confirmation of the finding and sentence, when confirmation is required,
and before the proceedings are destroyed. The Rule is therefore a procedural
provision forming part of a larger statutory scheme which includes inspection
during trial and access to the proceedings after confirmation.
9.
Learned counsel for the appellants to support his arguments placed
reliance on Union of India v. Ex. Flt. Lt. G.S. Bajwa, (2003) 9 SCC 630, where
the Supreme Court considered a substantially analogous military procedural
LPASW No.107/2022
scheme and examined the provisions under which copies of court-martial
proceedings were made available after confirmation while the accused was
permitted to inspect the proceedings during the trial. The Supreme Court held
that the right of inspection at reasonable times was sufficient to meet the
requirements of natural justice and that the accused was not entitled to insist
upon day-to-day copies of the proceedings. Reliance is also placed upon the
judgments rendered in Ex. Major General M.S. Jaswal v. Union of India &
Ors., W.P.(C) No. 1864/2025 & 1865/2025, decided on 06.12.2025 and
Mushtaq Ahmad Malik v. Union of India & Ors., W.P.(C) No. 1945/2024,
decided on 14.05.2026.
10.
It is contended that the principle laid down in G.S. Bajwa (supra) is
directly relevant. The question is not whether possession of a copy might be
more convenient to an accused, but whether the Constitution mandates
physical copies of the proceedings at every stage of a special military trial.
According to the appellants, the answer must be in the negative when the
statutory scheme expressly provides an effective right of inspection.
11.
Learned counsel further contends that the learned Single Judge erred in
treating Article 21 as requiring the same procedural regime for an ordinary
criminal court and a Security Force Court. Article 33 specifically recognises
the special constitutional position of members of the Armed Forces charged
with maintenance of public order. Parliament is empowered to determine by
law the extent to which fundamental rights may be restricted or abrogated in
their application to such forces so as to ensure proper discharge of duties and
maintenance of discipline. The BSF Act is a parliamentary enactment
expressly made for the constitution and regulation of an armed force of the
Union for ensuring the security of the borders of India. The special rules
framed thereunder, therefore, cannot be tested as though they were ordinary
subordinate procedural rules divorced from the statutory purpose of the parent
enactment.
12.
It is further submitted that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate
the significance of the confirmation mechanism. A General Security Force
Court's finding and sentence do not become valid merely upon pronouncement
by the Court. Section 107 expressly makes confirmation a condition of
validity. Rule 129 correspondingly postpones the right to obtain copies until
LPASW No.107/2022
confirmation. The restriction is thus integrated with the statutory process of
review, confirmation and revision and cannot be characterised as an arbitrary
denial of access. It is submitted that Rule 130 itself demonstrates that the rulemaking scheme has been
carefully calibrated to
address security
considerations. It deals with circumstances where supply of copies may
prejudice State security or friendly relations with foreign States and provides a
controlled mechanism for inspection even in such circumstances.
13.
Lastly, the learned counsel for the appellants submits that Rule 129 is
neither manifestly arbitrary nor disproportionate. It is a special procedural rule
applicable to a special class of proceedings and must be read with Rules 119,
120, 121, 122 and 130 and the relevant provisions of the BSF Act as an
integrated scheme.
14.
Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent supports the judgment
of the learned Single Judge by contending that the respondent was facing a
criminal charge carrying punishment of imprisonment for life and dismissal
from service and that the proceedings before the GSFC, though conducted
under a special statute, nevertheless attracted the constitutional guarantee of a
fair trial under Article 21. It is contended that the statements of prosecution
witnesses are essential material for preparing cross-examination and defence
and merely allowing inspection, it is argued, is not equivalent to providing
copies, particularly where the defence is required to compare the testimony of
different witnesses, identify contradictions and prepare an effective defence.
To substantiate his argument, learned counsel for the respondent placed
reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Nahar Singh
Yadav v. Union of India : AIR 2011 SC 1549 as also the judgment in Mohd.
Hussain v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi):(2012) 2 SCC 584, to emphasise
that the requirement of a fair and just trial is fundamental to Article 21.
15.
It is further contended that Article 33 does not confer an unrestricted
power to abrogate fundamental rights. It is submitted that any restriction must
bear a rational and demonstrable nexus with the constitutional purpose of
ensuring proper discharge of duties and maintenance of discipline and in this
regard reliance is placed on judgment of the Supreme Court in Secretary,
Ministry of Defence v. Babita Puniya, (2020) 7 SCC 469.
LPASW No.107/2022
16.
It is submitted that the appellants have not established how allowing
the respondent to obtain copies of statements already recorded would
adversely affect discipline, operational preparedness or security. It is,
therefore, urged that Rule 129 cannot be saved merely by invoking the special
status of the BSF.
17.
Learned counsel for the respondent contends that Rule 130 itself shows
that the rule-making authority knew how to deal with genuinely sensitive
material. Therefore, according to the respondent, a blanket prohibition on
supplying copies until confirmation is excessive. Lastly, the counsel contends
that the proceedings conducted before the General Security Force Court were
rendered defective because the defence was deprived of copies of prosecution
evidence and seeks that the trial be commenced afresh from the stage of
framing of charges rather than merely from the stage of leading defence
evidence.
18.
Upon consideration of the rival submissions and the material placed
before the Court, the following issues arise for determination:
i. Whether Section 87 of the Border Security Force Act, read with
the scheme of the Act and Rules, permits Rule 129 to regulate and
postpone the supply of copies of Security Force Court proceedings
until confirmation of the finding and sentence?
ii. Whether Rule 129 of the Border Security Force Rules, 1969 is
ultra vires Part III of the Constitution?
iii. Whether denial of certified copies during the pendency of trial,
when the accused is afforded inspection of the proceedings under
Rule 120, amounts to violation of the fundamental right to a fair
trial?
iv.What relief, if any, is the respondent entitled to?
19.
The first issue which requires consideration by this Court reads as
under:
(i)
20.
Whether Section 87 of the Border Security Force Act, read
with the scheme of the Act and Rules, permits Rule 129 to
regulate and postpone the supply of copies of Security Force
Court proceedings until confirmation of the finding and
sentence?
Section 87 of the BSF Act being of central importance, reads as under:
LPASW No.107/2022
“The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, shall, subject to the provisions of
this Act, apply to all proceedings before a Security Force Court.”
21.
The words “subject to the provisions of this Act” cannot be treated as
surplusage and it provides that the Evidence Act applies to proceedings before
a Security Force Court but does so within the framework established by the
BSF Act. The learned Single Judge correctly noticed that, ordinarily, Sections
74 and 76 of the Evidence Act would have relevance to public documents and
certified copies. However, the conclusion that Rule 129 must consequently
yield to Section 76 does not follow once Section 87 is read as a whole with the
special provisions of the BSF Act. The principle generalia specialibus non
derogant has application here. The BSF Act is a special parliamentary
enactment regulating the constitution, discipline, offences, trial, evidence,
confirmation and execution of sentences concerning members of the Force.
Section 87 of the Act, itself incorporates the general law of evidence only
subject to that special enactment. Further, the Rule 129 of the Act neither
destroys the evidentiary value of the proceedings nor does it declare that the
accused has no right to know or inspect the evidence. Instead, it regulates the
time at which the person tried becomes entitled to obtain a copy of the
proceedings. Rule 120 separately grants the accused a right of inspection at all
reasonable times before the Court is closed to consider the finding. Rule 121
provides for review of the proceedings; Rule 128 provides for their
preservation; Rule 129 deals with copies; and Rule 130 creates a further
security exception.
22.
Viewed together, the above provisions reveal a carefully structured
statutory scheme. The right of inspection operates during the trial. The
proceedings are reviewed and transmitted through the statutory mechanism
and the finding and the sentence are thereafter subject to confirmation.
Following confirmation, the person tried becomes entitled to obtain a copy
under Rule 129. There is consequently no absolute denial of access. What the
Rule postpones is the right to obtain copies.
23.
The Supreme Court in Union of India v. Ex. Flt. Lt. G.S. Bajwa,
(2003) 9 SCC 630, while considering a substantially similar military
procedural scheme, examined a rule which permitted inspection of
proceedings during trial but provided for copies after confirmation. The
LPASW No.107/2022
Supreme Court held that the right of inspection at reasonable times enabled the
accused to go through the proceedings and prepare his defence and that the
non-supply of day-to-day copies did not, by itself, violate natural justice. It is
relavant to quote the relevant paras of this judgment:
37. The next grievance of the respondent which found favour with
the High Court is that he was not supplied copies of the
proceedings everyday, though he had repeatedly asked for the
same. The appellant pointed out that neither under the Air Force
Act, 1950 nor the Air Force Rules, 1969 is there any provision for
supply of copies of the evidence and the proceedings everyday. But
there is a provision which permits the charged officer to inspect
the record of proceedings. Therefore, the request for supply of
copies everyday was not tenable. The High Court held that merely
because there are no provisions in the Act and the Rules to supply
copies, the court cannot deny the copies of evidence and the
record of proceedings to the accused and such denial amounts to
denial of reasonable opportunity to defend himself, as it was in
violation of the principles of natural justice.
38. Rule 125 of the Air Force Rules, 1969 provides as follows:
“125. Right of person tried to copies of proceedings. —
Every person tried by a Court Martial shall be entitled on
demand, at any time after the confirmation of the finding
and sentence and before the proceedings are destroyed,
to obtain free of cost from the officer or person having
the custody of the proceedings, a copy thereof, including
the proceedings upon revision, if any.”
39. Rule 100 is as follows:
“100. Custody and inspection of proceedings. —The
proceedings shall be deemed to be in the custody of the
Judge Advocate (if any), or, if there is none, of the
presiding officer, but may, with proper precaution for
their safety, be inspected by the members of the court, the
prosecutor and accused, respectively, at all reasonable
times before the court is closed, to consider the finding.”
40. It will thus be seen that there is a specific provision in the
Rules which provides for copies of the proceedings to the person
tried by the Court Martial free of cost at any time after the
confirmation of the finding and sentence and before the
proceedings are destroyed. Clearly, therefore, the respondent was
not entitled to a copy of the proceedings day to day as claimed by
him. However, Rule 100 in terms provides that the proceedings
may be inspected by the accused at all reasonable times before the
court is closed to consider the finding. Nothing, therefore,
prevented the respondent from inspecting the proceedings and
preparing his defence. Rule 100 itself incorporates the principle of
LPASW No.107/2022
natural justice by giving to the respondent an opportunity to go
through the proceedings and for this purpose to inspect the same
at all reasonable times. This meets the requirement of the
principles of natural justice and the respondent cannot complain
on the ground that he was not given a copy of the proceedings day
to day. The High Court was, therefore, clearly wrong in coming to
the conclusion that the principles of natural justice were violated
by non-supply of copies of proceedings day to day.”
The principle laid down by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court squarely
answers the central proposition advanced by the respondent.
24.
The constitutional question cannot be framed as whether copies are
more convenient or even more desirable for the defence. The question is
whether the Constitution requires the legislature or rule-making authority to
provide physical copies of the proceedings during the trial notwithstanding a
statutory scheme that provides meaningful inspection. We find no such
absolute constitutional requirement. Accordingly, we hold that Section 87 of
the Act, read with the special statutory scheme of the BSF Act and the Rules,
is sufficient to sustain the operation of Rule 129. The postponement of copies
until confirmation does not amount to overriding the Evidence Act in a manner
prohibited by law; rather, it constitutes a special procedural rule operating
within the qualification expressly incorporated by Section 87.
(ii) Whether Rule 129 of the Border Security Force Rules, 1969
is ultra vires Part III of the Constitution?
25.
The learned Single Judge proceeded on the premise that Rule 129 takes
away a fundamental right guaranteed by Article 21 and therefore must be
justified under Article 33. There can be no quarrel with the broad proposition
that Article 21 applies to proceedings before a Security Force Court. A
member of the BSF does not cease to be a constitutional person merely
because he is subject to a special disciplinary and penal jurisdiction. But the
further conclusion that Rule 129 necessarily violates Article 21 does not
follow. Article 21 guarantees life and personal liberty except according to
procedure established by law. Following Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India :
AIR 1978 SC 597, the procedure affecting life and liberty must satisfy
constitutional standards of fairness, reasonableness and non-arbitrariness. That
LPASW No.107/2022
proposition is unexceptionable. The question here, however, is whether the
procedure established by the BSF Act and Rules, taken as a whole, is unfair. It
is relevant to quote the Article 33 of the Constitution which is reproduced
below:
33. Power of Parliament to modify the rights conferred by this
Part in their application to Forces, etc. Parliament may, by law,
determine to what extent any of the rights conferred by this Part
shall, in their application to,-(a)the members of the Armed Forces;
or(b)the members of the Forces charged with the maintenance of
public order; or(c)persons employed in any bureau or other
organisation established by the State for purposes of intelligence
or counter intelligence; or(d)persons employed in, or in
connection with, the telecommunication systems set up for the
purposes of any Force, bureau or organisation referred to in
clauses (a) to (c), be restricted or abrogated so as to ensure the
proper discharge of their duties and the maintenance of discipline
among them.”
In Union of India v. G.S. Bajwa (Ex. Flt. Lt.), (2003) 9 SCC 630 the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court at paragraph 19 has held that:
19. It is indeed surprising that while considering the submissions
urged on behalf of the respondent alleging the breach of his
fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, the
High Court neither noticed the provisions of Article 33 of the
Constitution of India nor does it appear to have been brought to
its notice. Article 33 of the Constitution of India expressly
empowers Parliament to determine by law the extent to which any
of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution, in their
application, inter alia, to the members of the armed forces, shall
be restricted or abrogated to ensure the proper discharge of their
duties and the maintenance of discipline among them. Parliament
can, therefore, in exercise of powers conferred by Article 33 of the
Constitution of India restrict or abrogate the fundamental rights
guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution in their application
to the members of the armed forces. It, therefore, follows that if
any provision of the Act or the Rules restricts or abrogates any
right guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of India, it
cannot be challenged on the ground that it is violative of the
fundamental rights as guaranteed under Part III. It is no doubt
true that the restriction or abrogation is dependent on
parliamentary legislation and only a law passed by virtue of
Article 33 can override Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of
India. The law on the subject is fairly well settled and we may only
refer to some of the authorities on the subject. In Ram Sarup v.
Union of India [AIR 1965 SC 247 : (1965) 1 Cri LJ 236] a
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Constitution Bench of this Court upholding the submission urged
by the learned Attorney-General observed: (AIR p. 251, para 16)
“The learned Attorney-General has urged that the entire
Act has been enacted by Parliament and if any of the
provisions of the Act is not consistent with the provisions
of any of the articles in Part III of the Constitution, it
must be taken that to the extent of the inconsistency
Parliament had modified the fundamental rights under
those articles in their application to the person subject to
that Act. Any such provision in the Act is as much law as
the entire Act. We agree that each and every provision of
the Act is a law made by Parliament and that if any such
provision tends to affect the fundamental right under Part
III of the Constitution, that provision does not, on that
account, become void, as it must be taken that Parliament
has thereby, in the exercise of its power under Article 33
of the Constitution, made the requisite modification to
affect the respective fundamental right. We are however
of opinion that the provisions of Section 125 of the Act
are not discriminatory and do not infringe the provisions
of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is not disputed that the
persons to whom the provisions of Section 125 apply do
form a distinct class. They apply to all those persons who
are subject to the Act and such persons are specified in
Section 2 of the Act.”
26.
To ensure compliance with the principles of natural justice, the Border
Security Force Act, 1968, (hereinafter referred to as „BSF Act‟ for brevity)
provides efficacious remedies enabling the person to prepare a proper defence
through inspection of documents, whereby he is in a position to challenge the
sentence by way of a dual-tiered statutory mechanism, ensuring that the
military trial framework satisfies the constitutional guarantees of fairness
under Article 21. In this context, it is imperative to reproduce Section 117 of
the BSF Act hereinbelow:
“117. (1) Any person subject to this Act who considers himself
aggrieved by any order passed by any Security Force Court may
present a petition to the officer or authority empowered to confirm
any finding or sentence of such Security Force Court, and the
confirming authority may take such steps as may be considered
necessary to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or
propriety of the order passed or as to the regularity of any
proceeding to which the order relates. Remedy against order,
finding or sentence of Security Force Court. 54 BSF ACT
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(2) Any person subject to this Act who considers himself aggrieved
by a finding or sentence of any Security Force Court which has
been confirmed, may present a petition to the Central
Government, the Director-General, or any prescribed officer
superior in command to the one who confirmed such finding or
sentence, and the Central Government, the Director-General, or
the prescribed officer, as the case may be, may pass such order
thereon as it or he thinks fit.”
27.
From the plain reading of Section 117, it is evident that before the
trial's verdict is finalized, the aggrieved person can file a pre-confirmation
petition directly to the officer or authority empowered to confirm the court's
finding or sentence. Upon receiving this petition, the confirming authority is
authorized to take any necessary steps to satisfy itself regarding the
correctness, legality, and propriety of the order, as well as the overall
regularity of the trial proceedings.
28.
If the sentence is subsequently confirmed, the aggrieved person is not
left without recourse, as Section 117(2) provides a distinct second remedy in
the form of a post-confirmation petition. This subsequent petition can be
elevated to higher executive echelons, specifically the Central Government,
the Director-General, or a prescribed officer superior in command to the
original confirming authority, granting them broad discretion to pass any order
they deem fit.
29.
To further safeguard against miscarriages of justice, Section 118 vests
these superior authorities with the explicit power to completely annul the
proceedings of any Security Force Court on the ground of being illegal or
unjust. This comprehensive scheme of successive reviews, evaluating
substantive legality, procedural regularity, and fundamental justice at multiple
command levels, ensures that the deprivation of a force member's liberty is
never arbitrary. By embedding strict checks against illegality and providing
ample opportunities to correct errors, the statutory procedure established by
law remains inherently fair, just, and reasonable, firmly aligning with the
protective due process mandate enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution.
30.
It is pertinent to mention that the harmonious reading of the statutory
framework reveals that the phrase "after the confirmation" found in Rule 129
of the BSF Rules does not, in any manner, debar an aggrieved person from
preparing his defence or mounting a legal challenge against an adverse finding
LPASW No.107/2022
or sentence. While Rule 129 entitles a person to obtain a copy of the
proceedings on demand "at any time after the confirmation of the finding and
sentence", this temporal condition is merely procedural and does not
extinguish the fundamental right to contest the conviction. Even after a
sentence is definitively pronounced, the person retains a continuous right to
prepare a substantive legal defense, a principle that is forcefully protected by
the subsequent provisions of Rule 130.
31.
Rule 130 of the Rules, ensures that if the aggrieved intends to submit a
petition under the Act or institute an action in a court of law challenging the
finding or sentence, the Government is legally obligated to permit the person
or their legal advisor to inspect the proceedings. The core intent of the
provision is undeniably clear, i.e., it guarantees that an accused, regardless of
being sentenced, is guaranteed access to inspect the vital documents and trial
records necessary to formulate a comprehensive defence and challenge their
punishment in a court of law.
32.
The procedure, therefore, cannot be characterised as one which leaves
the accused without any meaningful access to the material against him. The
decision in Nahar Singh Yadav : AIR 2011 SC 1549 emphasises the
importance of sufficient time and facilities for the defence. It does not,
however, lay down an inflexible constitutional rule that every accused in every
specialised statutory jurisdiction must be supplied a physical copy of every
proceeding before the conclusion of the trial.
33.
Similarly, the principle of fair trial cannot be reduced to a particular
mode of documentary access divorced from the statutory scheme. Therefore,
we come to the conclusion that Rule 129 of BSF Rules is not ultra vires to the
constitution as discussed above.
Article 33 and the Special Constitutional Status of the BSF
34.
The significance of Article 33 assumes importance at this stage as it
empowers the Parliament to determine by law the extent to which the rights
conferred by Part III may be restricted or abrogated in their application to
members of the Armed Forces and forces charged with maintenance of public
order, so as to ensure proper discharge of their duties and maintenance of
discipline among them. The BSF is an armed force of the Union of India
LPASW No.107/2022
constituted under Item 2 of List I of Schedule 7 of the Constitution of India
and is primarily connected with the defence of the country. The preamble
states that the Act is to provide for the constitution and regulation of an Armed
Force of the Union for ensuring the security of the borders of India and for
matters connected therewith. Section 4 provides for constitution of an Armed
Force of the Union called the Border Security Force for ensuring the security
of the borders of India and subject to the provisions of the Act, the Force shall
be constituted in such manner as may be prescribed and the conditions of
service of the members of the Force shall be such as may be prescribed.
Chapter III deals with offences and Chapter IV with punishments that can be
awarded by the Security Force Court. Chapter VI deals with the constitution of
the Security Force Courts and their powers to try the offences punishable
under the Act. Chapter VII contains the procedure; the witnesses can be
summoned and examined. Section 87 lays down that the Evidence Act, shall,
subject to the provisions of the Act, apply to all proceedings before the
Security Force Courts. For the purpose of this appeal, it may not be necessary
to go into the details of this procedure.
35.
Article 33 selects only a few services for special treatment such as,
military and para-military forces, police forces and analogous forces. Article
33 does not exclude any other category of civil servants from the purview of
fundamental rights by reason of being Government Servants. In the case of
Kameshwar Prasad Versus State of Bihar1960 SCC OnLine SC 30: 1962
Supp (3) SCR 369: (1966) 13 FLR 194: AIR 1962 SC 1166: (1962) 1 LLJ
294; the apex court at paragraph 12 has said that:
“12. In our opinion, this argument even if otherwise possible, has
to be repelled in view of the terms of Article 33. That article
selects two of the Services under the State members of the armed
forces and forces charged with the maintenance of public order
and saves the rules prescribing the conditions of service in regard
to them — from invalidity on the ground of violation of any of the
fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III and also defines the
purpose for which such abrogation or restriction might take place,
this being limited to ensure the proper discharge of duties and the
maintenance of discipline among them. The Article having thus
selected the Services members of which might be deprived of the
benefit of the fundamental rights guaranteed to other persons and
citizens and also having prescribed the limits within which such
restrictions or abrogation might take place, we consider that other
classes of servants of Government in common with other persons
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and other citizens of the country cannot be excluded from the
protection of the rights guaranteed by Part III by reason merely of
their being government servants and the nature and incidents of
the duties which they have to discharge in that capacity might
necessarily involve restrictions of certain freedoms as we have
pointed out in relation to Article 19(1)(e) and (g).”
36.
Hon‟ble the Supreme Court in Ous KutilingalAchudan Nair v. Union
of India, (1976) 2 SCC 780 has held that:
“8. The main contention of Mr K.R. Nambiyar, appearing for the
appellants is that the members of the unions represented by the
appellants, though attached to the defence establishments, are
“civilians”, designated as “non-combatants unenrolled”. They
include cooks, chowkidars, laskars, barbers, carpenters,
mechanics, bootmakers, tailors, etc. They are governed by the
Civil Service Regulations for purposes of discipline, leave, pay,
etc. and are also eligible to serve upto the age of 60 years unlike
that of the members of the armed forces. In view of these admitted
facts, proceeds the argument, these categories of civilian
employees, attached to the defence establishments, could not be
validly called “members of the armed forces” covered by Article
33 of the Constitution. The points sought to be made out are, that
the members of the appellants' unions are not subject to the Army
Act as they do not fall under any of the categories enumerated in
sub-clauses (a) to (i) of Section 2(1) of the Army Act, 1950, and
that the impugned notifications are ultra vires the Army Act and
are struck by Articles 19(1)(c) and 33 of the Constitution.
9. For reasons that follow, the contentions must be repelled.
10. Article 33 of the Constitution provides an exception to the
preceding articles in Part III including Article 19(1)(c). By Article
33, Parliament is empowered to enact law determining to what
extent any of the rights conferred by Part III shall, in their
application, to the members of the armed forces or forces charged
with the maintenance of public order, be restricted or abrogated
so as to ensure the proper discharge of their duties and the
maintenance of discipline among them.
11. In enacting the Army Act, 1950, insofar as it restricts or
abrogates any of the fundamental rights of the members of the
armed forces, Parliament derives its competence from Article 33
of the Constitution. Section 2(1) of the Act enumerates the persons
who are subject to the operation of this Act. According to subclause (i) of this section, persons governed by the Act, include
“persons not otherwise subject to military law who, on active
service, in camp, on the march or at any frontier post specified by
the Central Government by notification in this behalf, are
employed by, or are in the service of, or are followers of, or
accompany any portion of the regular army.”
12. The members of the unions represented by the appellants
obviously fall within this category. It is their duty to follow or
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accompany the armed personnel on active service or in camp or
on the march. Although they are non-combatants and are in some
matters governed by the Civil Service Regulations, yet they are
integral to the armed forces. They answer the description of the
“members of the armed forces” within the contemplation of
Article 33. Consequently, by virtue of Section 21 of the Army Act,
the Central Government was competent by notification to make
rules restricting or curtailing their fundamental rights under
Article 19(1)(c).”
37.
The expression “member of armed forces” used in (a) covers such
civilian employees of the armed forces as barbers, carpenters, mechanics, etc.
Although these persons are non-combatants, nevertheless, they are integral to
the armed forces and, therefore, their fundamental rights can also be curtailed
under Article 33
38.
Hon‟ble the Supreme Court in Secretary, Ministry of Defence v.
Babita Puniya, (2020) 7 SCC 469, has explained the constitutional
architecture of Article 33. The power is not unlimited in the abstract; the
restriction must be by law and must have a connection with the
constitutionally recognised purposes of proper discharge of duties and
maintenance of discipline. The learned Single Judge relied upon this principle
to conclude that Rule 129 was not sufficiently connected with discipline. With
respect, this approach proceeds on an unduly narrow understanding of the
statutory purpose. The question is not whether the individual procedural
restriction considered in isolation constitutes a disciplinary measure in the
conventional sense. The relevant question is whether the procedural scheme
created by Parliament for adjudication of offences within a disciplined armed
force is reasonably connected with the proper functioning of that force and its
disciplinary system.
39.
The BSF Act is an enactment for the constitution and regulation of an
armed force of the Union for securing the security of the borders of India. The
statutory scheme creates special courts, special rules of procedure, special
modes of confirmation, review and revision, and special rules concerning
custody and disclosure of proceedings. The BSF Act itself expressly
recognises discipline as a central statutory consideration; indeed, Section 71
permits dissolution of a Security Force Court where exigencies of service or
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necessities of discipline render continuation of the proceedings impossible or
inexpedient.
40.
It cannot therefore be said that Rule 129 exists in a legal vacuum.The
postponement of copies until confirmation is embedded in the statutory
process governing Security Force Court proceedings. It preserves the integrity
of the proceedings during the period in which findings and sentence remain
subject to review and confirmation and forms part of a specialised system of
military justice.The rule is not a blanket prohibition upon inspection. It does
not prevent the accused from participating in the proceedings. It does not
prevent him from cross-examining witnesses. It does not prevent him from
presenting a defence. It does not permanently deny access to the proceedings.
It merely regulates the stage at which copies become obtainable.
41.
Another important aspect overlooked in the impugned judgment is that
Rule 129 cannot be examined in isolation. Rule 119 requires the transactions
of the Security Force Court to be recorded and provides safeguards regarding
the recording of evidence. Rule 120 provides inspection. Rule 121 provides
review of General and Petty Security Force Court proceedings. Rule 122
recognises the right to a defending officer, counsel or friend of the accused.
Rule 128 provides for preservation of proceedings. Rule 129 deals with copies.
Rule 130 provides an additional mechanism for withholding copies where
State security or friendly relations may be affected, while still permitting
inspection in specified circumstances. The legislative and rule-making policy
is therefore evident: the accused is given meaningful participation and access
to the proceedings while the integrity, confidentiality and security of the
proceedings are protected until the stage of confirmation.
42.
Such a scheme cannot be described as manifestly arbitrary. The
doctrine of manifest arbitrariness, relied upon by the respondent, cannot be
applied merely because the legislature or rule-making authority selected one
procedural stage rather than another for furnishing copies. The classification
between the stage before confirmation and the stage after confirmation has a
rational basis in the statutory structure, because Section 107 itself makes
confirmation a condition of validity of the finding and sentence. The
respondent has also suggested that persons tried before ordinary criminal
courts are treated differently because an accused before such courts may
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obtain copies of the proceedings.The submission cannot be accepted. The
classification is founded upon an intelligible differentia: persons tried under
the BSF Act before Security Force Courts constitute a distinct class governed
by a special statutory regime. The differentia bears a rational relation to the
object sought to be achieved, namely the regulation of trial and confirmation
proceedings within a disciplined armed force. The Constitution itself
recognises the special position of such forces through Article 33.Therefore, the
mere fact that an accused before an ordinary criminal court may enjoy a
different procedural mechanism does not render the special BSF procedure
discriminatory.
43.
In view of the foregoing constitutional provisions and judicial
pronouncements, we conclude that the respondent, being a member of the
Border Security Force, an armed force of the Union, falls within the special
constitutional framework contemplated by Article 33. His prosecution before a
General Security Force Court for the alleged fatal shooting of Head Constable
Chander Bhan within the BSF campus at Bandipora on 27.11.2017 attracts the
statutory system established for adjudicating offences and maintaining
discipline within the Force. Article 33 permits Parliament, by law, to restrict
fundamental rights, including rights under Article 21, to the extent necessary
to ensure the proper discharge of duties and the maintenance of discipline;
however, membership of the Force or the gravity of the accusation does not,
by itself, dispense with constitutional safeguards. The decisive consideration is
the connection between the impugned restriction and those constitutionally
recognised purposes. Read harmoniously with the provisions governing
inspection, defence, review and confirmation, Rule 129 regulates the stage at
which copies of proceedings become obtainable, while preserving the
safeguards available within the statutory scheme. Its distinction between
proceedings awaiting confirmation and proceedings that have been confirmed
bears a rational relationship to the orderly operation of that scheme. On this
construction, the requirements of Article 33—coverage of the person
concerned and a legally authorised restriction connected with duty and
discipline—stand satisfied. We accordingly hold that Rule 129 of the Border
Security Force Rules, 1969 is constitutionally valid, and that the regulated
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postponement of copies until confirmation cannot, without more, be treated as
an unconstitutional denial of the respondent‟s fundamental rights.
(iii) Whether denial of certified copies during the pendency of
trial, when the accused is afforded inspection of the proceedings
under Rule 120, amounts to violation of the fundamental right to a
fair trial?
44.
The answer must also be in the negative. Inspection is not a denial of
access. The statutory right of inspection is substantive. Rule 120 permits the
accused to inspect the proceedings at all reasonable times before the Court is
closed to consider the finding. The right of inspection, when read with the
right of representation, participation in trial, cross-examination and defence,
provides the accused with meaningful access to the material forming part of
the proceedings.
45.
The Constitution guarantees a fair opportunity to defend; it does not
prescribe that such opportunity must invariably take the form of possession of
certified copies. The distinction between access to proceedings and
possession of copies must therefore be maintained. The former is integral to
fairness. The latter is subject to legislative regulation. The respondent was
given the former. The latter was postponed by a rule forming part of a
constitutionally permissible special procedure. Hence, there is no violation of
Article 21.
46.
The statutory confirmation mechanism assumes particular significance.
Section 107 provides that no finding or sentence of a General Security Force
Court or Petty Security Force Court shall be valid except insofar as it is
confirmed in accordance with the Act. Section 108 identifies the authorities
competent to confirm the findings and sentences of General Security Force
Courts. Rule 129 is directly aligned with this statutory structure. It is therefore
incorrect to characterise the Rule as creating an arbitrary deprivation of the
accused's rights. The Rule corresponds with the legislative determination that
the proceedings remain subject to confirmation and review before the finding
and sentence acquire final statutory validity.
47.
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence concerning military courts also
recognises the distinctive nature of confirmation proceedings. In S.N.
Mukherjee v. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 594, a Constitution Bench
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considered the special statutory structure applicable to court-martial
proceedings and confirmed that the statutory scheme governing confirmation
could validly differ from ordinary administrative adjudication. While S.N.
Mukherjee (supra) concerned the requirement of reasons for confirmation and
not the precise issue of copies, the judgment reinforces the broader proposition
that court-martial and military justice procedures constitute a special statutory
field which must be considered within their own legislative framework.
Effect of Nahar Singh Yadav
48.
We have carefully considered the reliance placed upon Nahar Singh
Yadav v. Union of India, (2011) 1 SCC 307. The principle that a person
facing a criminal charge must be afforded a fair trial and sufficient time and
facilities for preparing his defence is undoubtedly binding. However, the
judgment cannot be read as prescribing a universal procedural formula
applicable irrespective of the statutory jurisdiction in which the trial takes
place. Fairness is contextual. The Court must examine the procedure as a
whole. Here, the accused was not denied representation, participation, crossexamination, inspection or the opportunity to lead defence. The statutory
framework expressly provided inspection of the proceedings. Therefore, the
essential safeguard identified in Nahar Singh Yadav was not extinguished.
The respondent seeks to convert a principle requiring an effective opportunity
to defend into an absolute right to possess a copy of the record at every stage.
That proposition finds no support in Nahar Singh Yadav.
The Learned Single Judge's Approach
49.
The learned Single Judge proceeded substantially on the reasoning that
a defence counsel cannot remember everything stated by prosecution
witnesses and that possession of copies would facilitate effective crossexamination and defence. With respect, this reasoning establishes the utility of
copies, but not their constitutional indispensability. Courts are required to
distinguish between a statutory entitlement, a procedural convenience and a
fundamental right. A physical copy may undoubtedly be useful. It may even be
preferable in many cases. But where Parliament has legislated a special
procedure and has authorised the accused to inspect the proceedings, the
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constitutional court cannot substitute its own preferred procedure unless the
statutory procedure crosses the constitutional threshold of manifest
unfairness.In the present case, that threshold has not been crossed.
No Violation of Article 21
50.
Article 21 does not prohibit reasonable procedural regulation. The
respondent's right under Article 21 is the right to a fair procedure. The
procedure prescribed by the BSF Act and Rules provides: (a) constitution of a
duly authorised Security Force Court; (b) representation and assistance of the
accused; (c) recording of proceedings; (d) opportunity to participate in the
trial; (e) opportunity to cross-examine prosecution witnesses; (f) inspection of
proceedings under Rule 120; (g) review of proceedings; (h) confirmation of
finding and sentence; (i) right to obtain copies after confirmation under Rule
129; and (j) further statutory remedies available under the Act.
51.
The existence of this comprehensive scheme militates against the
conclusion that Rule 129 produces an unfair trial. We are therefore unable to
agree with the learned Single Judge that postponement of copies, by itself,
violates Article 21.
Whether the Respondent Suffered Constitutional Prejudice
52.
It is equally important to distinguish between the possibility of
prejudice and established constitutional prejudice. The respondent asserts that
inspection was inadequate and that copies were necessary for an effective
defence. However, no material has been brought to our notice demonstrating
that the respondent was actually prevented from inspecting the proceedings,
prevented from cross-examining a material witness, prevented from putting a
material contradiction to a witness, or prevented from raising a specific
defence because inspection was denied. The constitutional validity of a
statutory rule cannot be determined merely on an assumption that every
accused would necessarily be prejudiced by its operation.The existence of a
possibility that a copy may assist a defence is not sufficient to invalidate a rule
which forms part of a special statutory procedure.
(iv)
What relief, if any, is the respondent entitled to?
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This issue stands already discussed and finding returned in paragraph
nos. 29 to 33 hereinabove.
Conclusion
53.
The controversy in the present case arises from a grave incident within
the BSF campus at Bandipora on 27.11.2017, in which respondent No. 1 is
alleged to have shot dead his colleague, Head Constable Chander Bhan,
resulting in his prosecution under Section 302 RPC before a General Security
Force Court. Against this backdrop, the appeal turns upon the proper balance
between the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial and the special statutory
procedure governing trials before Security Force Courts. The seriousness of
the accusation underscores the importance of lawful adjudication, without
diminishing the respondent‟s entitlement to procedural fairness or prejudging
his guilt. There can be no doubt that an accused tried before a General Security
Force Court is entitled to a fair trial. Article 21 does not cease to apply merely
because the accused is a member of the Border Security Force. Equally,
however, fairness under Article 21 does not require the Court to disregard the
special procedure which Parliament has created for a disciplined armed force.
The BSF Act constitutes Security Force Courts as special statutory courts.
Section 87 makes the Evidence Act applicable, subject to the provisions of the
BSF Act. Rule 120 provides for inspection of the proceedings, while Rule 129
regulates the supply of copies and postpones the entitlement thereto until
confirmation, where confirmation is required. Rule 130 addresses exceptional
cases involving security considerations, and Sections 107 and 108 establish the
confirmation mechanism. These provisions form an integrated statutory
scheme. The principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in G.S. Bajwa, that
inspection of proceedings at reasonable times may satisfy the requirements of
natural justice and that there is no absolute right to day-to-day copies of
proceedings, supports the validity of the impugned rule.
54.
The requirement that restrictions under Article 33 must be connected
with the proper discharge of duties and the maintenance of discipline is
equally applicable. Rule 129, however, forms part of the comprehensive
procedural framework governing Security Force Courts, including the
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confirmation and review of their proceedings, and cannot be isolated from that
statutory context. Article 33 therefore cannot be treated as irrelevant to the
special procedural framework created for members of the Force. The learned
Single Judge, in our view, placed excessive emphasis upon the utility of
possessing copies and insufficient emphasis upon the legal significance of the
statutory provision for inspection and the safeguards embedded in the overall
scheme.
55.
The allegation that the respondent wilfully abandoned his designated
picket while on active duty and fatally shot his colleague within the campus
bears directly upon the discipline and mutual trust essential to the functioning
of the Force. A member entrusted with arms for the discharge of official duties
assumes a solemn responsibility towards both the institution and those serving
alongside him. If established, the use of those arms to perpetrate a lethal
assault upon a colleague would constitute a profound betrayal of that
responsibility and a serious threat to unit cohesion and institutional order. Such
conduct calls for firm application of the law through the prescribed
adjudicatory process. Its gravity, however, cannot substitute for proof,
extinguish procedural safeguards, or foreclose consideration of any legally
relevant defence or mitigating circumstance. Our determination of the
constitutional validity of Rule 129 rests upon the statutory framework and its
safeguards, independently of the merits of the accusation.
56.
We are, therefore, unable to sustain the judgment under appeal. For the
foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and order dated
28.04.2022, passed by the learned Single Judge in WP(C) No. 255/2020, is,
therefore, set aside. Consequently, Rule 129 is held to be constitutionally
valid and not ultra vires Part III of the Constitution of India, particularly
Article 21 thereof, when read harmoniously with Sections 87, 107 and 108 of
the Border Security Force Act, 1968 and Rules 120, 121, 128 and 130 of the
Border Security Force Rules, 1969. It is further held that the opportunity
available to the accused under Rule 120 to inspect the proceedings at all
reasonable times before the Court is closed to consider its finding, read
with the other safeguards available under the Act and Rules, constitutes a
legally sufficient procedural safeguard. Non-supply of certified copies of the
proceedings before confirmation of the finding and sentence does not, by
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itself, amount to a violation of the fundamental right to a fair trial under
Article 21.
57.
The competent authorities shall proceed in the matter accordance with
the Border Security Force Act, 1968 and the Border Security Force Rules,
1969. It is made clear that nothing contained in this judgment shall be
construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case and it shall
have no bearing on the final adjudication of the respondent‟s guilt or
punishment.
58.
Record produced by learned counsel for the appellants is returned to
him in the open court.
(M. A. Chowdhary)
JUDGE
(DR. PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI)
CHIEF JUSTICE
Srinagar
22.10.2026
Abdul Qayoom, Secy.
Whether approved for reporting? : Yes.
Abdul Qayoom Lone
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this document
23.10.2026 16:36
LPASW No.107/2022
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