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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
Central Ex.App.No.01 of 2024
along with
Central Ex.App.No.02 of 2024
Central Ex.App.No.03 of 2024
Central Ex.App.No.01 of 2024
1. Union of India,
represented by the Commissioner of Central Excise,
CGST, CGST Bhawan, 1st Floor, Mantribari Road,
Netaji Chowmuhani, Agartala, Tripura West-799001
2. Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise,
CGST, CGST Bhawan, 1st Floor, Mantribari Road,
Netaji Chowmuhani, Agartala, Tripura West-799001
---- Appellant(s)
Versus
M/S Dharampal Premchand Ltd.,
Shed No.13, Khatian No.4325, Arundhutinagar
Industrial Estate, P.O. & P.S. A.D. Nagar, Agartala,
Tripura-799003
---- Respondent(s)
in Central Ex.App.No.02 of 2024
1. Union of India,
represented by the Commissioner of Central Excise,
CGST, CGST Bhawan, 1st Floor, Mantribari Road,
Netaji Chowmuhani, Agartala, Tripura West-799001
2. Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise,
CGST, CGST Bhawan, 1st Floor, Mantribari Road,
Netaji Chowmuhani, Agartala, Tripura West-799001
---- Appellant(s)
Versus
M/S Dharampal Satyapal Ltd.,
Shed Nos.14 & 15, Arundhutinagar Industrial Estate,
P.O. & P.S. A.D. Nagar, Agartala, Tripura-799003
---- Respondent(s)
in Central Ex.App.No.03 of 2024
1. Union of India,
represented by the Commissioner of Central Excise,
CGST, CGST Bhawan, 1st Floor, Mantribari Road,
Netaji Chowmuhani, Agartala, Tripura West-799001
2. Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise,
CGST, CGST Bhawan, 1st Floor, Mantribari Road,
Netaji Chowmuhani, Agartala, Tripura West-799001
---- Appellant(s)
Versus
M/S Satyapal Shivkumar Ltd.,
Shed No.26B, Arundhutinagar Industrial Estate,
P.O. & P.S. A.D. Nagar, Agartala,
Tripura-799003
---- Respondent(s)
For Appellant(s)
:
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Paramartha Datta, Adv.
Mr. Soumya Chaudhury, Adv.
Dr. A. Saraf, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Kousik Roy, Adv.
Mr. Pritam Baruah, Adv.
Date of Hearing
Date of Judgment
& Order
Whether fit for
reporting
:
26.11.2024
:
27.11.2024
:
YES.
[[
HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE T. AMARNATH GOUD
HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Judgment & Order
[T. Amarnath Goud, J]
Heard Mr. Paramartha Datta, Learned counsel assisted by
Mr. Soumya Chaudhury, Learned counsel appearing for the appellants
as well as Dr. A. Saraf, Learned senior counsel assisted by Mr.
Koushik Roy, Learned counsel and Mr. Pritam Baruah, Learned counsel
appearing for the respondent.
[2]
All these appeals being Central Ex.App.No.01 of 2024,
Central Ex.App.No.02 of 2024 and Central Ex.App.No.03 of 2024 are
combined together for a common judgment and order.
[3]
The genesis of the case in short is that M/S Dharampal
Premchand Ltd., the respondent in this case has obtained central
excise registration No.AACD1952BXM004 for manufacture of flavoured
chewing tobacco. On the basis of an intelligence to the effect that the
respondent has suppressed the fact of manufacture of an excisable
commodity described by them as ‘compound’. They cleared the said
compound for captive consumption without payment of the duties of
excise, additional duties of excise leviable under the said Central
Excise Tariff Act, the additional duties of excise (Goods of Special
Importance) Act and National Calamity Contingent Duty leviable
thereon under sub-section (1) of Section 136 of the said Finance Act
with the intent to evade duty leviable thereon, as they had full
knowledge that they were availing benefit of exemption from the
payment of whole of the duties as mentioned above under notification
No.8/2004-CE, dated 21.01.2004 as amended, in respect of final
product namely branded flavored chewing tobacco/jarda scented
tobacco wherein the said compound has been used as an input and
they were not eligible for exemption from excise duty under
notification No.52/2002-CE, dated 17.10.2002 in respect of compound
manufactured by them and captively consume.
[4]
Show cause notice dated 14.01.2009 was issued against
the respondent and subsequently on 31.05.2012 the order in original
was passed directing the respondent to pay the duty amount due.
Subsequently, the respondent preferred an appeal before the CESTAT,
Kolkata and accordingly, the appellate tribunal in excise appeal
No.553 of 2012 dated 30.07.2015 remanded the matter back to the
adjudicating authority. The adjudicating authority conducted a denovo
adjudication in pursuance to the order dated 30.07.2015 and on
28.01.2016 passed an order demanding payment of the due amount
from the respondent.
[5]
Aggrieved by the order dated 28.01.2016, the respondent
in this case once again preferred an appeal before the Hon’ble
CESTAT, Kolkata and by a common order dated 03.08.2023 the
Hon’ble CESTAT set aside the order in original dated 28.01.2016 and
rolled in favour of the respondent and therefore, the appellant herein
challenged the said order by filing an appeal under Section 35G of the
Central Excise Act, 1944.
[6]
Taking part in hearing, Mr. P. Datta, Learned counsel
appearing for the appellants first of all drawn the attention of the
Court that there was suppression of fact by the respondent to evade
excise duty for which the show cause notice was rightly issued by the
authority concerned but the Learned Appellate Tribunal did not
consider the grievances of the appellants for which being dissatisfied
with the judgment and findings of the Learned Appellate Tribunal, the
present appellant has preferred this appeal. Learned counsel for the
appellants further submitted that the Learned Appellate Tribunal came
to the observation that the demand of duty was not sustainable on the
ground of limitation and as such, the demand of interest and penalty
was also not sustainable. Learned Appellate Tribunal further came to
the observation that all though, the audit was conducted in the past
but discrepancy was not pointed out. So, according to Learned
counsel, the judgment of the Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate
Tribunal suffers from perversity and the interference of the Court is
required. Learned counsel for the appellants also referred the
notification No.8/2004-CE dated 21.01.2004, notification No.52/2002CE dated 17.10.2002 issued by the Central Excise Department. At the
time of hearing, in support of his submission Learned counsel for the
appellants also filed one written argument and in the written
arguments, the following assertions were made :
“1. The intelligence was collected by the Officers of
Central Excise, Shillong to the effect that the said
respondents had suppressed the fact of manufacture of
an accessible commodity, described by them as
“compound”. They cleared the said “compound” for
captive consumption without payment of the duties of
excise, additional duties of excise liable under the Central
Excise Tariff Act, the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of
special importance) Act and National Calamity Contingent
duty leviable there on under sub-section (1) of Section
136 of the Finance Act with the intent to evade duty
leviable there on, as they had full knowledge that they
were availing benefit of exemption from the payment of
whole of the duties of excise, additional duties of excise
liable under the Central Excise Tariff Act, the Additional
Duties of Excise (Goods of special importance) Act and
National Calamity Contingent duty leviable there on under
sub-section (1) of Section 136 of the Finance Act under
Notification
No.8/2004-CE
dated
21.01.2004,
as
amended, in respect of final product, namely, branded
Flavoured Chewing Tobacco/Jarda Scented Tobacco
where in the said compound has been used as an input
and they were not eligible for exemption from excise duty
under Notification No.52/2002-CE dated 17.10.2002 in
respect of „compound‟ manufactured by them and
captively consumed.
2. The thorough investigation lead by the investigating
Officers of Central Excise, Shillong came to know that
there are two goods manufactured at Agartala Unit viz.,
1) Flavoured Chewing Tobacco and 2) Quiman
Composition of Flavoured Chewing Tobacco: Compound,
Silver Leaves and Raw Tobacco.
Composition of Quimam: Compound, Lakhnoi Kuimam
(Lakhnawi Kimam) and Silver Leaves.
3. The major raw materials used for manufacturing of
Compound were Sandalwood Oil, Sada Kimam and
Menthol.
4. The sample of compound which was sent to the Joint
Director, Chemical Laboratory, Customs House, 15/1,
Strand Road, Kolkata and the compound responded to the
test for nicotine.
5. From the SCN it can be noted that the Baltis in which
the Compound was kept were used as an item of Plant &
Machinery for manufacturing the final product.
6. The said compound may appropriately may be termed
as Chewing Tobacco Kimam which was manufactured by
the respondents and used as an input for manufacturing
chewing tobacco which indeed a marketable product,
hence, excisable.
7. In terms of Notification No. 8/2004-CE dated
21.01.2004 (enclosed as Annexure-A) the final product
manufactured by the respondents is exempt from whole
of the duties of excise, additional duties of excise liable
under the Central Excise Tariff Act, the Additional Duties
of Excise (Goods of special importance)Act and National
Calamity Contingent duty leviable there on under subsection (1) of Section 136 of the Finance Act subject to
certain conditions laid down in the said notification.
8. As discussed in the above notification, the exemption is
subject to certain conditions which are not deniable for
the final products, but in the instant cases, the
respondents have enjoyed the benefits of the Notification
No.
52/2002-CE
dated
17.10.2002
(enclosed
as
Annexure-B) on the product called as Compound, which
was described as an intermediate product by the
respondents
to
take
advantage
of
notification
no.52/2002-CE dated 17.10.2002. Whereas the said
product compound is a finished good used as an input for
manufacturing their final product. Hence, notification no.
52/2002-CE is not available for the same. The relevant
portion of the notification is reproduced below:
Provided that nothing contained in this notification
shall apply to inputs used in or in relation to the
manufacture of final products (other than those
cleared either to a unit in a Free Trade Zone or to a
100% Export Oriented Undertaking or to a unit in
an Electronic Hardware technology Park or
Software Technology Parks), which are exempt
from the whole of the duty of excise leviable
thereon or are chargeable to "Nil" rate of duty.
9. The benefits of Notification No. 52/2002-CE dated
17.10.2002 cannot be denied on the Compound
manufactured and captively consumed in manufacture of
Chewing Tobacco which would have satisfied the
conditions laid down in the notification no. 52/2002-CE
but it failed to satisfy the conditions because they have
not manufactured it in their factory and, as per available
records, they have not manufactured "Raw Kimam" but
they have purchased it as their purchase registers prove
the same. If they had manufactured it in their factory,
they would have intimated to the department as per the
provisions prescribed under Rule 9 of the Central Excise
Rules, 2002, which was not done by the respondents.
Instead, they have submitted that their units were
audited by the department. Generally, the auditing is to
examine the records and documents maintained by the
respondents in a statutory manner. No activities of
preventive
nature
including
examination
of
manufacturing process can be carried out by auditing
officers. Hence, auditing has no significance in relation to
the question of knowing to the department.
10. As per provisions under Rule 173B of the Central
Excise Rules, 1944, the list of raw materials,
manufacturing process and flow chart of the process of
chewing tobacco was not declared by the respondents. In
the list of critical raw materials, the respondents have not
shown whether a compound is also a raw material or an
intermediary product. This does not indicate whether the
compound was manufactured in their factory or
purchased from outside.
11. It may also be noted that the respondents have never
given the cost of production of compound nor have they
given the details of the proportion of raw materials mixed
for the production of compound.
12. Reference of para no. 5.15.5 of Order-In-Original
dated 31.05.2012 may be taken where the adjudicating
authority has categorically mentioned about the malafide
intentions of the respondent in the case of Dharampal
Satyapal (supra) as mentioned in para no. 5.12.3 of the
above mentioned Order-In-Original. From the available
records, it may also be noted that the respondents or
their respective representatives never the produced the
required documents nor attended for the Summons and
Personal Hearings at first instance, they kept on delaying
in attending.
13. Relevant Definitions:
Intermediate Product: Intermediate goods are
products that are used in the production process to make
other goods, which are ultimately sold to consumers.
Intermediate goods are sold industry-to-industry for
resale or to produce other products.
Input: Input means all goods used in the factory by
the manufacturer of the final product;
Captive Consumption: Captive Consumption means
the consumption of goods manufactured by one division
and consumed by another division(s) of the same
organization or related undertaking for manufacturing
another product(s).
14. In the present cases the respondents tried to picturize
the compound as intermediate product as their mere
intention is to avail the benefits of Notification No.
52/2002-CE and thus can evade the tax. If they have not
mentioned it as intermediate product then they have to
clear it as finished/final product where the duty is
leviable which indeed is exempted under notification no.
8/2004-CE. The main malafide intention of the
respondents arises here, when the goods that are to be
cleared as finished/final product, the event of levy of duty
starts. For the payment of this duty, the respondents
should have to utilize the Modvat/Cenvat they have got
on their inputs used for manufacturing the finished/final
product first and the rest of the duty is to be paid, but
here it is exempted through notification no.8/2004-CE
subjected to certain conditions.
15. If they have cleared the said compound as final
product,
then
they
should
have
utilized
the
Modvat/Cenvat Credit got from their inputs and the rest
of the duty should be paid. Here in the present cases if it
is done so then the respondents have to invest very less
amount in plant and machinery in a manufacturing unit
which is located in the States of North East or can be
invested in infrastructure or civil works or social projects
in the States of North East and under the conditions laid
down under point F of the notification no.8/2004-CE
there will be a loss to the respondents.
16. In order to avoid all this, the respondents with
malafide intentions shown the compound as intermediate
product and have availed the benefits of notification
no.52/2002-CE and have cleared the same compound as
final product by enjoying the benefits of notification
no.8/2004-CE which might be called as double bonanza
for the same product. The CESTAT, Kolkata while passing
the judgment has wrongly appreciated the said
notifications and gave double bonanza to the tax evaders.
17. It may also be noted that the respondents have filed
number of cases in this Hon'ble Court. In one such case,
they tried to nullify a notification which was issued to
withdraw all the exemption notifications which they had
enjoyed. The Hon'ble Court may be observed how
malafide the intentions of the respondents are. M/s
Dharampal Premchand & another filed an appeal with
WPC No. 144/2010 which was registered on 03.04.2010
in the Hon'ble High Court of Tripura to strike down the
notification no. 11/2007-CE dated 01.03.2007. The
Hon'ble High Court of Tripura has set aside the
notification no. 11/2007- CE dated 01.03.2007 through
Judgment/Order dated 08.01.2016. Upon aggrieved by
the Order dated 08.01.2016 the department has filed an
appeal with WA No.10/2016 in the Hon‟ble High Court of
Tripura. The Hon‟ble High Court of Tripura has allowed
the appeal and reversed the Order dated 08.01.2016 by
passing an Order dated 10.02.2020. Further, M/s
Dharampal
Premchand
filed
a
Review
Petition
No.57/2022 in the Hon‟ble High Court of Tripura on
28.10.2022 as per the Order of the Supreme Court passed
on 14.07.2022. The Hon‟ble High Court has passed an
Order dated 21.09.2023 by ordering that they do not find
grounds made out to review the impugned judgment.
Again, M/s Dharampal Premchand and another have filed
SLP before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court.”
Finally, the counsel for the appellants prayed to allow the
appeal.
[7]
Per
contra,
Mr.
A.
Saraf,
Learned
senior
counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondent first of all drawn the attention
of this Court that these present appeals are not maintainable in the
eye of law and furthermore, the substantial questions of law as
framed by this Court does not links in favour of the present appellants
and as such, the appellants are not entitled to any relief in this appeal
and as such, these appeals are liable to be dismissed with costs. He
also referred different provisions of law and also few citations of the
Hon’ble Apex Court and referred the written argument submitted on
behalf of the respondent. The Hon’ble Court vide order dated
03.04.2024 admitted the appeals and framed the following substantial
questions of law which provides as under:
“(i) Whether CESTAT has misinterpreted the
Notification No.52/2002-CE dated 17.10.2002
under which the respondent claimed exemption for
the intermediate product as the respondent has
also again claimed exemption under Notification
No.08/2004 dated 21.01.2004 and whether such
exemption are permissible as per said two
notifications ?
(ii) Whether the respondent can avail exemption
benefit under Notification No.8/2004-CE, dated
21.01.2004
and
also
simultaneously
avail
exemption benefit under Notification No.52/2002CE dated 17.10.2002 i.e. „double benefit‟ for the
same product in question ?
(iii) Whether the Hon‟ble CESTAT committed gross
error and illegality that the compound which was
manufactured
by
the
respondent
was
an
intermediate product and is eligible for availing the
benefit under Notification No.52/2002-CE dated
17.10.2002 which is not permissible as the
compound is a marketable commodity and hence
excisable ?
(iv) Whether the order of the learned CESTAT
suffers from perversity in the eye of law and on
facts ?
[8]
It was further submitted that the Central Excise Act of
1944 had not exempted the said product namely chewing tobacco
from whole of the duty of excise leviable thereon nor the said product
was chargeable to "Nil" rate of duty. In fact, in the Notification No.
08/2004-CE dated 21.01.2004, there was no exemption from the levy
of the excise duty and the same only provided for that the eligible
industrial units manufacturing specified tobacco products instead of
making payment of the Central Excise leviable to the chewing
tobacco, could utilize the entire amount of duty benefit for investment
in plant and machinery or in infrastructure or civil works or social
projects in any of North-Eastern States. Subsequently, the said
Scheme was further amended vide Notification No. 28/2004-CE dated
09.07.2004 providing for that the beneficiary was required to deposit
an amount equivalent to the duty payable in an escrow bank account
and operation of such bank account, including withdrawal for
investment in specified categories, was allowed only with prior
permission of jurisdictional Commissioner of Central Excise.
[9]
It was further submitted that the Act of 1944 had not
exempted chewing tobacco from the levy of the Central Excise duty
nor the chewing tobacco was chargeable to Nil rate of duty. It is only
because of the
Notification No.
69/2003-CE dated 25.08.2003
superseded by Notification No. 8/2004-CE dated 21.01.2004 read with
amended by Notification No. 28/2004-CE dated 09.07.2004, which
were issued to give effect to the Industrial Policy Resolution of the
Government of India, 1997 which exempts all industrial activities from
excise duty (irrespective of intermediate or final goods) of certain
eligible industries located in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam,
Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura who had
commenced commercial production on or after the 24th day of
December, 1997, but not later than the 28th day of February, 2001
and had availed of the benefit under the Notification of the
Government of India, Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue)
No. 32/99-Central Excise dated 8th July, 1997 and had continued its
manufacturing activities after the 28th day of February, 2001 were
granted the exemption from payment of the excise duty equal to the
difference between the sum of basic excise duty, special excise duty
and additional excise duty, payable, but for the exemption in the said
Notification and the sum of basic excise duty, special excise duty and
additional excise duty, paid, was to be utilized by the manufacturer
only for investment in plant and machinery in a manufacturing unit
which is located in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur,
Meghalaya,
Mizoram,
Nagaland
or
Tripura
a
investment
in
infrastructure or civil works or social projects in the aforesaid states.
The Notification clearly provided that the investment made in the said
Notification shall not be allowed to be withdrawn before the expiry of
ten years from the date on which the investment is made except in a
case where the investment withdrawn is reinvested in the same
manner as specified in the said notification, in any one of the States
mentioned in the said Notification.
[10]
The Notification No.8/2004-CE dated 21.01.2004 read
with amended Notification No.28/2004-CE dated 09.07.2004 further
provided that if the investment made under the said Notification is
withdrawn before the expiry of ten years and is not reinvested as
mentioned above, the duty which is equal to the amount so withdrawn
and not so reinvested, shall be paid by the manufacturer on the date
on which the investment is withdrawn. As such, it is very clear from
the Notification itself that the amount of the excise duty payable but
for the exemption could be utilized for investment in the plant and
machinery in a manufacturing unit which is located in the State of
Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland
or Tripura. Excise Duty can become payable only when there is a levy.
The industries availing the benefits under the Notification No. 8/2004CE dated 21.01.2004 read with amended by Notification No. 28/2004CE dated 09.07.2004 were required to charge the excise duty in the
invoices while clearing the goods from the factory and only the said
excise duty instead of paying to the Government could have been
utilised in plant and machinery in a manufacturing unit which was
located
in
Meghalaya,
the
State
Mizoram,
of
Arunachal
Nagaland
or
Pradesh,
Tripura
Assam,
or
Manipur,
investment
in
infrastructure or civil works or social projects in the aforesaid states
that was also amended vide Notification No. 28/2004-CE dated
09.07.2004 and by the said Notification, it was provided that the
beneficiary were required to deposit an amount equal to the duty
payable in an escrow bank account and operation of such bank
account, including withdrawal for investment in specified categories,
was allowed with prior permission of jurisdictional Commissioner of
Central Excise.
[11]
It is respectfully submitted that the duty was payable but
for the Notification No. 8/2004-CE dated 21.01.2004 and in fact as
per the amended Notification No. 28/2004-CE dated 09.07.2004,, the
said duty has also to be deposited in the escrow account and the
same could have been withdrawn only for the purpose of making
investment in specified category and that too on the prior permission
of the jurisdictional authorities of the Central Excise. The Respondent
submits that the Notification No. 8/2004-CE dated 21.01.2004 and the
amended Notification No. 28/2004-CE dated 09.07.2004 nowhere
reveals that the finished products manufactured namely 'chewing
tobacco' manufactured by the Respondent was exempt from whole of
the duty leviable thereon or were chargeable to "Nil" rate of duty. In
fact, the similar product if manufactured by other manufacturers, who
were not eligible to avail the benefit of Notification No. 8/2004-CE
dated 21.01.2004 and the amended Notification No. 28/2004-CE
dated 09.07.2004 would have been liable to pay the duty on the same
product and thereby it cannot be said by any stretch of imagination
that the product chewing tobacco manufactured by the Respondent
was exempted from the whole of the duty of excise leviable thereon or
are chargeable to "Nil" rate of duty. Rather, can be said that certain
eligible manufacturing units are exempted from excise duty.
[12]
The Notification No. 52/2002-CE dated 17.10.2002 issued
in exercise of the powers conferred under sub-Section (1) of Section
5A of the Act of 1944 read with sub-Section (3) of Section 3 of the
Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957
and sub-Section (3) of Section 136 of the Finance Act, 2001.
However, the proviso to the said Notification provided that the
exemption was in respect of all goods falling under sub-heading No.
2106.00 and Chapter 24 of the First Schedule to the Central Excise
Tariff Act, 1985 manufactured in a factory and used within the factory
of production in or in relation to the manufacture of final products all
goods falling under Chapter 24 of the first Schedule to the said Tariff
Act, from the whole of the duty of excise and additional duty of excise
and national calamity contingent duty leviable thereon, which was
specified in the respective Schedules to the said Tariff Act and the said
Special Importance Act and the said Finance Act. Nothing contained in
the notification was to apply to inputs used in or in relation to the
manufacture of final products (others than those cleared either to a
unit in a Free Trade Zone or to a 100% Export Oriented Undertaking
or to a unit in an Electronic Hardware technology Park or Software
Technology Parks), which are exempt from the whole of the duty of
excise leviable thereon or are chargeable to "Nil" rate of duty.
[13]
The Respondent further submit that the present Appeals
are based on incorrect appreciation of the Notification No. 52/2002
Central Excise dated 07.10.2002) inasmuch as the Respondent's final
product i.e. Chewing Tobacco did not fall in the category of "exempt
from the whole of the duty of excise leviable thereon or are
chargeable to "Nil" rate of duty.
[14]
It was further submitted that there are three stages in
the imposition of a tax, there is the declaration of liability, that is, the
part of the statute which determines what persons in respect of what
property are liable. Next, there is the assessment. Liability does not
depend on assessment. That, ex hypothesis, has already been fixed.
But assessment particularizes the exact sum which a person liable has
to pay. Lastly comes the methods of recovery, if the person taxed
does not voluntarily pay. In fact, the charge is made in consequence
of the Act, upon the subject the assessment is only for the purpose of
quantifying it. The Respondent submits that there is a distinction and
difference between the two expressions "liable to pay duty" and "duty
shall be payable", for, a manufacturer may be liable for payment of
duty but on account of exemption, duty may not be payable by him.
The expression "liable to pay duty" does not mean that tax is payable
by a manufacturer under the Act. The expression "exempt from the
whole of the duty of excise leviable thereon or are chargeable to "Nil"
rate of duty" would man that a manufacture is not liable to duty at all
and in such case, no duty can be levied or imposed and the
manufacturer does not come within the purview at all.
[15]
The Respondent further submits that the liability to pay
duty and actual payment of duty are conceptually different inasmuch
as for the exemption an assesse would be required to pay duty in
terms of the provision of the Act of 1944. Exemption presupposes a
liability and unless there is liability, the question of exemption does
not arise. Only when there is a levy, the question of payment of any
duty would arise.
[16]
In course of his submission, Learned senior counsel for
the respondent referred few citations. The Apex Court in the case of
CCE Vs. National Tobacco Co. of India Ltd. reported in (1972)2
SCC 560 in paragraph 19 held as under:
"19. The term 'levy' appears to us to be wider
in its import than the term 'assessment. It
may include both 'imposition' of a tax as well
as 'assessment'. The term 'imposition' is gene
rally used for the, levy of a tax or duty by
legislative provision indicating the subject
matter of the tax and the rates at which it has
to be taxed. The term 'assessment', on the
other hand, is generally used in this country
for the actual procedure adopted in fixing the
liability to pay a tax on account of particular
goods or property or whatever may be the
object of the tax in a particular case and
determining its amount. The Division Bench
appeared
to
equate
'levy'
with
an
'assessment' as well as with the collection of a
tax when it. held that 'when the payment of
tax is enforced, there is a levy'. We think that,
although the connotation of the term 'levy'
seems wider than that of 'assessment', which
it includes, yet, it does not seem to us to
extend to 'collection'. Article 265 of the
Constitution makes a distinction between
"levy" and "collection".
[17]
The Apex Court again in the case of Somaiya Organics
(India) Ltd. Vs. State of U.P., reported in (2001)5 SCC 519 at
paragraph 29 held as under:
"The words used in Article 265 are 'levy' and
'collect'. In taxing statute the words 'levy' and
'collect are not synonymous terms while 'levy'
would mean the assessment or charging or
imposing tax, 'collect' in Article 265 would
mean the physical realization of the tax which
is levied or imposed. Collection of tax is
normally a stage subsequent to the levy of the
same"
[18]
In the case of Peekay Re-Rolling Mills (P) Ltd. Vs.
Asstt. Commissioner & Anr, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 30, the
Apex Court held that :
“……….the collection and levy are distinct and
that collection is not an essential facet of levy.
The Apex Court held that absence of collection
does not logically follow the absence of
liability. The Apex Court in Peekay Re-Rolling
Mills (P) Ltd.(supra) at paragraph 35 clearly
held that exemption can only operate when
there has been a valid levy, for if there was no
levy at all, there would be nothing to exempt.
The Apex Court in Associate Cement Companies Ltd.
v. State of Bihar (2004) 7 SCC 642 was examining a case
which involved an exemption notification issued by the
State Government which reduced the liability to tax under
the Bihar Finances Act, 1981 to the extent of tax paid
under an earlier Ordinance in respect of entry of goods.
The appellant claimed that it was entitled to adjust the
entry tax paid under the Entry Tax Act while computing
the tax payable under the Bihar Finances Act.
The
respondent
however
argued
that
such
adjustment could not be made since the same was
exempted, which meant that there was no liability to tax.
The Apex Court rejected the argument of Respondent by
holding in para 17.
"17. Crucial question, therefore, is whether
the appellant had any 'liability' under the
Act.... The question of exemption arises only
when there is a liability. Exigibility to tax is
not the same as liability to pay tax. The former
depends on charge created by the statute and
the latter on computation in accordance with
the provisions of the statute and rules framed
thereunder, if any. It is to be noted that
liability to pay tax chargeable under Section 3
of the Act is different from quantification of
tax payable on assessment. Liability to pay tax
and actual payment of tax are conceptually
different. But for the exemption the dealer
would be required to pay tax in terms of
Section 3. In other words, exemption
presupposes a liability. Unless there is
liability, question of exemption does not arise.
Liability arises in terms of Section 3 and tax
becomes payable at the rate as provided in
Section 12. Section 11 deals with the point of
levy and rate and concessional rate."
In CCE v. National Tobacco case reported in (1972) 2
SCC 560, the Apex Court was faced with certain questions
relating to the refund of excise duty on the manufacture
of cigarettes. In this context, the Court examined the
scope of the term "levy" and made the following
observations: (SCC p. 572, para 19)
"19. The term 'levy' appears to us to be wider
in its import than the term 'assessment'. It
may include both 'imposition' of a tax as well
as 'assessment'. The term 'imposition' is
generally used for the levy of a tax or duty by
legislative provisions indicating the subjectmatter of the tax and the rates at which it has
to be taxed. The term 'assessment', on the
other hand, is generally used in this country
for the actual procedure adopted in fixing the
liability to pay a tax on account of particular
goods or property or whatever may be the
object of the tax in a particular case and
determining its amount. The Division Bench
appeared
to
equate
'levy'
with
an
'assessment' as well as with the collection of a
tax when it held that 'when the payment of
tax is enforced, there is a levy'. We think that,
although the connotation of the term 'levy'
seems wider than that of 'assessment', which
it includes, yet, it does not seem to us to
extend to 'collection'. Article 265 of the
Constitution makes a distinction between
'levy' and 'collection'."
Referring the same it was submitted that the above
judgments makes it amply clear that exemption does (sic not) negate
a levy of tax altogether. Despite an exemption, the liability to tax
remains unaffected, only the subsequent requirement of payment of
tax to fulfill the liability is done away with.
[19]
The Respondent further submit that Compound is also
covered by exemption under NEIP, 1997, which exempts all industrial
activities irrespective of intermediate goods or final goods, of an
eligible units from excise duty as followed by Notification No.
69/2003-CE superseded by 8/2004-CE and therefore question of
demanding duty on 'Compound' under Notification 52/2002-CE does
not arise. Even if, for argument's sake, duty is demanded under
52/2002-CE, the amount payable
would be ZERO. Notification
No.8/2004-CE exempts all goods falling under sub-heading 2401.90,
2402.00, 2402.00, 2404.41, 2404.42, 2404.49, 2404.50 or 2404.99
of the Tariff from basic duty, additional duty and NCCD. Since
'Compound' falling under Heading No. 2404.41 during 2003-04 and
2004-05 (up to 28/2/2005) and under heading 24039990 with effect
from 28.02.2005, it is eligible for the benefit of exemption Notification
8/2004-CE. The Respondent submits that the exemption under
8/2004-CE is applicable to compound as well. However, compound is
not removed or cleared as such its identity gets merged in chewing
tobacco. Thus, the compound gets cleared along with chewing
tobacco. In fact Compound is classifiable as chewing tobacco and falls
in the category of products specified under notification No.8/2004-CE.
The
Respondent
further
submit
that
the
exemption
of
the
intermediatory product has been provided in Notification No. 52/2002CE subject to the condition that the finished product is not exempted
from whole of the duty of excise leviable thereon or are chargeable to
"Nil" rate of duty. Since the finished products manufactured by the
Respondent Company was not exempted from whole of the duty of
excise leviable thereon or are chargeable to "Nil" rate of duty, the
Respondent Company is entitled the benefit of Section 52 of the Act of
1944. The exemption in any case was a conditional exemption and
thereby finished product namely chewing tobacco cannot be said to be
by any stretch of imagination said to be whole of the duty of excise
leviable thereon or are chargeable to "Nil" rate of duty.
[20]
It is respectfully submitted that the substantive condition
for exemption under Notification specified amount should be invested
in the North East for any of the notified purposes through the
mechanism of Escrow Account deposit and withdrawal and this aspect
of deposition of exempted duty amount into designated bank account,
its withdrawal and investment is not disputed. Other conditions are
purely procedural. It is also not disputed that the Respondent
Company used the compound only for captive consumption and
nothing was cleared from the factory as such, once the condition of
deposit of an amount equal to the duty payable, but for exemption
under Notification No. 8/2004-CE stands satisfied for chewing tobacco,
the
same
condition
gets
automatically
satisfied
for
compound
captively consumed as well. This is for the reason that the amount of
duty payable on compound, but for the exemption contained in
Notification No. 8/2004-CE, is nothing but ZERO. When the amount to
be invested for availing of exemption under Notification No. 8/2004CE, is calculated, the amount is to be calculated as if compound and
chewing tobacco are both taxable in a regime where Notification No.
8/2004-CE is not in existence. This follows quite clearly from the use
of the words, "but for the exemption in this notification" used in
Notification
No.
8/2004-CE.
Thus,
the
amount
to
be
deposited/invested for compound keeping this in mind, comes to be
ZERO because in a tax regime in which 8/2004-CE is non- existent,
the intermediate-compound having been used captively in dutiable,
chewing tobacco gets the benefit of duty exemption under Notification
No. 52/2002-CE and thus no amount of duty is payable on compound.
Thus, the exemption to chewing tobacco under Notification No.
8/2004-CE automatically accompanies with it the exemption to
captively used compound under the same very notification. In other
words, exemption to compound travels along with exemption on
chewing tobacco.
[21]
The Respondent submit that there was no exemption as
per Notification 8/2004-CE dated 21.01.2004 as amended inasmuch
as duty on the finished product was leviable had with a condition that
the same can be withdrawn for the purpose of investment in the
specified categories. The Notification No. 8/2004-CE dated 21.01.2004
as amended cannot be said to be by any stretch of imagination to
have exempted the finished product manufactured by the Respondent
Companies from whole of the duty of excise leviable thereon nor the
finished product was chargeable to Nil rate of duty and thereby the
Notification No. 52/2002-CE dated 17.10.2002 is not applicable in the
present case.
[22]
The Respondent submit that the issues involved in the
present case are squarely covered by the decision of the Division
Bench of this Hon'ble Court in Union of India Vs. M/s Dharampal
Satyapal Ltd. (Central Excise Appeal No. 1/2019), decided on
22.03.2021
wherein
this
Hon'ble
Court
after
examining
the
Notification No. 8/2004-CE dated 21.01.2004 clearly held that the said
exemption was a conditional exemption and that the Notification No.
8/2004-CE dated 21.01.2004 as amended cannot be seen as the
Notification granting full exemption for payment of duty. This Hon'ble
Court held that the said exemption was conditional on various
requirements which limited the scope of the assesse to utilize the duty
element so exempted, for any purpose at all and such exemption did
not directly increase the profitability of the product since the assesse
could not retain the sum equivalent to the duty payable and utilized it
at will. The said finding was arrived at vide examining Rule 2(d) of the
CENVAT Credit Rules which defined that "exempted goods" to mean
excisable form of duty of excise leviable thereon or the goods which
are chargeable nil rate of duty. The exact expression as utilized in
Rule 2(d) of the CENVAT Credit Rules have been used in the
Notification No. 52/2002 Central Excise dated 07.10.2002.
[23]
The issues involved in the present Appeals centre around
the question as to whether the Notification No. 8/2004-CE dated
21.01.2004 and the amended Notification, No. 28/2004-CE dated
09.07.2004, the whole of the duty of excise leviable on the finished
product was exempt or the same was chargeable Nil rate of duty and
thereby the Judgment of this Hon'ble Court is squarely applicable in
the present case. The Respondent submits that since the issue has
already been settled by this Hon'ble Court, no substantial question of
law can be said to have been arisen on the same issue and thereby
the present Appeal is liable to be dismissed.
[24]
The
Respondent
further
submit
that
as
per
the
Notification, though the excise duty, additional duty of excise leviable
under the said Central Excise Tariff Act, were exempted but the
educational cess, which was payable by the Respondent was not
exempted by the Notification No. 8/2004-CE dated 21.01.2004 and
the amended Notification No. 28/2004-CE dated 09.07.2004. Having
regard to the nature of duty or cess, which is an addition to duty of
excise leviable under the Act of 1944 or additional duty of excise
leviable under Section 85 of the Finance Act, 1985, which were
nothing but levy of excise. The expression "exempt from whole of the
duty of excise leviable thereon" would also include other levies. It
does not matter these additional duties or cesses are not to be traced
to the Act or they are provided for by other enactments such as
Finance Act or that they are levied as an increment, or are expressed
as a proportion to an existing duty namely, basic duty of excise
inasmuch as taxing power of the Union for these levies namely the
additional duties of excise and/or education cess can traced only to
Entry 84 of Schedule -VII to the Constitution of India which is 'tax on
manufacture of goods', i.e. excise duty. Further the phrase "duties of
excise" and "duty of excise" were used originally in the Act interchangeably, namely, sometimes in plural and sometimes in singular.
When the new term "CENVAT" came to substitute these terms as on
12 May 2000, in order to overcome the difficulty of replacing these
words in the entire Act, Section 2A was introduced in the Act with
effect from 12 May 2000 by Finance Act 10/2000, whereunder he
expressions "duty", "duties", "duty of excise" and "duties of excise"
were to be construed to include a reference to "Central Value Added
Tax (CENVAT)" and as such the same clearly indicated that there
could be no distinction between the phrases "duty", "duties", "duty of
excise" and "duties of excise". Section 2A of the Central Excise Act,
1944 that was inserted by Finance Act 10/2000 w.e.f. 12th May 2000
is reproduced below:
"24. Reference of certain expressions. In this
Act, save as otherwise expressly provided and
unless
the
context
otherwise
requires,
references
to
the
expressions
"duty",
"duties", "duty of excise" and "duties of
excise" shall be construed to include a
reference to "Central Value Added Tax
(CENVAT)".
[25]
It was respectfully submitted that the singular use of the
word "duty" cannot be considered as a decisive basis for construing
the expression "exempt" from the whole of duty of excise" in Rule
2(d) of the CENVAT Credit Rules. The Respondent further states that
the expression "duty of excise" is used in CENVAT Credit Rules, which
itself includes the various duties and cesses referred to therein,
including the education cess and auto cess, etc. as part of "CENVAT",
which is an equivalent expression to "duty of excise" after the Act was
amended by introducing Section 2A therein. The expression "duty of
excise" used in CENVAT Credit Rules, thus, does not, by its own force
or on its own logic, lend to a distinction between basic duty of excise
under the Act and special excise duties or cesses or other duties
leviable under other enactments. In this regard, it is pertinent to note
the observation of the Hon'ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana in
the case of Commissioner, Central Excise Commissionerate Vs.
M/s Malwa Industries, Etc. (2010)2 GSTR 413 (P&H) decided
on 30.04.2009 wherein the High Court observed as under:
"We are further of the view that the
amendment, which has been made in Rule 57
(AB) of the Rules by using the expression of
'any duty of excise' is significant and
intentional. IN the earlier Notification No.
5/94-CE(NT),
dated
1.3.1994,
it
was
specifically provided that credit can be utilized
only for payment of duty of excise leviable
under the Excise Act. The amendment has
been made with an intention to allow the
dealer-assessee to utilize the credit of basic
excise duty for payment of additional excise
duty. The aforesaid view is supported by the
Division Bench judgment of the Gujarat High
Court rendered in the case of Maheshwari
Mills Limited Vs. Union of India, (1992) 58 LT
9. It has been held that the narrow
construction on the expression duty occurring
in Rule 2(v) cannot be accepted to mean only
'duty' of excise leviable under the Excise Act
because the language of Section 3 of Textile &
Textile Article Act, is clear to include the
additional duty. The Division Bench has
further held that the word 'additional duty'
embraces the idea of joining one thing to
another, which means that the additional duty
gets itself assessed."
That the Bombay High Court in Mahindra & Mahindra
Ltd.& Ors. Vs. The Commissioner of Central Excise,
Mumbai [(2020) 11 GSTR-OL 60 Bom) decided on
04.12.2019 while examining the issue as to whether the
Tribunal was justified in holding that though auto cess
and education cess were duties of excise, yet the goods
on which they were paid, continued to be exempted
goods as basic excise duty was not payable thereon held
that the expression "duty of excise" as used in CENVAT
Credit Rules itself includes the various duties and cesses
including the education cess and auto cess, etc. as part of
"Cenvat", which is an equivalent expression to "duty of
excise" after the Central Excise Act was amended by
introducing Section 2A therein. The Bombay High Court
held that the expression "duty of excise" used in CENVAT
Credit Rules does not, by its own force or on its own logic,
lend to a distinction between basic duty of excise under
the Act and special excise duties or cesses or other duties
leviable under other enactments.
IMPUGNED SHOW CAUSE NOTICE AND THE ORDER IN
ORIGINAL ARE BARRED BY LIMITATION:
The Respondents submit that the impugned show
cause notice and the order in original are barred by
limitation. The extension of period of limitation cannot be
invoked in the present case as there was no suppression
of facts with an intention to evade duty. The Respondent
states that the process of manufacture was duly declared
to the Department and the compound emerging as an
intermediate product was fully within the knowledge of
the Department. The records were duly maintained by the
Appellants for the manufacture of Compound which was
consumed captively and Audit was conducted in 2001,
2003, 2004, 2005 and 2007 and no objections were raised
so all the facts were in the knowledge of the Department
and thereby the extended period of limitation cannot be
invoked on the ground that there was a suppression of
facts with the intention to evade duty. The Respondent
states that neither in the show cause notice nor in the
order of original was stated as to how there was a
suppression of facts with an intention to evade duty and
the authority merely sated that there was a suppression
of facts involved in the case, which cannot empower the
authorities to invoke the extended period of limitation as
provided under Section 11A of the Act of 1944. The
Respondents state that as per proviso to Section 11A, for
invoking extended period of limitation, the Department
has necessarily to allege and prove that there was fraud,
suppression etc. on the part of the assesse with an
intention to evade payment of duty. The Respondent
further submit that it is settled legal position that for the
Excise Department to invoke extended period of
limitation, the Department has to allege and prove that
there was fraud, suppression etc. on the part of the
assesse with an intention to evade payment of excise
duty. In the show cause notice there was no allegation of
any fraud, suppression etc. with an intention to evade
payment of duty on the part of the Respondent Company
and thereby the extended period of limitation is not
invokable in the present case.
The contention of the Appellants that while chewing
tobacco is exempted under Notification No. 8/2004-CE,
compound was not, even though both are products
specified under the same Notification No. 8/2004-CE the
Respondent Specifically submit that the substantive
condition for exemption under Notification specified
product should be invested in the North East for any of
the notified purposes through the mechanism of Escrow
Account deposit and withdrawal. Other conditions are
purely procedural. It is not in dispute that the
Respondent Companies used the compound only for
captive consumption and nothing was cleared from the
factory as such, once the condition of deposit of an
amount equal to the duty payable, but for exemption
under Notification No. 8/2004-CE stands satisfied for
chewing tobacco, the same condition gets automatically
satisfied for compound captively consumed as well. This
is for the reason that the amount of duty payable on
compound, but for the exemption contained in
Notification No. 8/2004-CE, is nothing but ZERO, When
the amount to be invested for availing of exemption
under Notification No. 8/2004-CE, is calculated the
amount is to be calculated as if compound and chewing
tobacco are both taxable in a regime where Notification
No. 8/2004-CE is not in existence. This follows quite
clearly from the use of the words, "but for the exemption
in this notification" used in Notification No. 8/2004-CE.
Thus, the amount to be deposited/invested for compound
keeping this in mind, comes to be ZERO because in a tax
regime in which 8/2004- CE is non-existent, the
intermediate compound having been used captively in
dutiable chewing tobacco gets he benefit of duty
exemption under Notification No. 52/2002-CE and thus
no amount of duty is payable on compound. Thus, the
exemption to chewing tobacco under Notification No.
8/2004-CE automatically accompanies with it the
exemption to captively used compound under the same
very notification. In other words, exemption to compound
travels along with exemption on chewing tobacco.
It is further submitted that exemption granted in
Notification No. 8/2004-CE dated 21.01.2004 was a
conditional exemption and the same has not exempted
finished product of the Respondent Company, from whole
of the duty of excise leviable thereon or are chargeable to
"Nil" rate of duty and thereby applicability of Notification
52/2002 in instant case is not attracted and Appellants
were legally entitled to exemption under Notification No.
52/2002- CE dated 07.10.2002. The Respondent denies
the statements contrary to the above, maid in paragraph
9 of the Memorandum of Appeal.
The statements and contentions made by the
Appellant on the basis of the pleadings of the Respondent
Companies at the time of adjudication has no relevance in
the Appeal filed under Section 35G of the Act of 1944
inasmuch as the Appeal has to be decided on the basis of
the substantial question of law arising out of the order of
the Tribunal. The pleading and submissions made before
the adjudicating authority has no relevance in deciding
the proposed substantial question of law inasmuch as the
Tribunal is the final authority finding a fact and the fact
as found by the Tribunal are final.
The Respondents submit that an Appeal to High
Court under Section 35G of the Act of 1944, is not
automatic. The condition precedent for entertaining an
Appeal is satisfaction of the High Court that the Appeal
involves a substantial question of law.
Finally, it was submitted that as no substantial
questions of law arises in the present Appeal, the issues
involved in the present Appeal are fully covered by the
Judgment of the Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court in
Union of India Vs. M/s Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. (Central
Excise Appeal No. 1/2019), and thereby no substantial
question can said to have been arises on the same issue
and thereby the present Appeals are liable to be
dismissed.”
We have heard both the sides at length and gone through
the relevant notifications and the citations referred by Learned senior
counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents and also perused the
written arguments.
[26]
Here in the case at hand though substantial questions of
law has been framed on the issue of exemption of excise duty or
suppression of material facts before the assessing authorities looking
the
matter
from
the
question
of
limitation
or
of
any
other
technicalities, this Court feels that for whatever the reasons the
inspecting
or
audit
authorities
who
are
supposed
to
conduct
periodical/regular audits and inspections could have raised the
demand and also issued show cause notice on yearly basis but not
acting upon for years together and to the surprise of the respondent,
notices are issued and demand is raised before a concern to this Court
and a huge amount of excise duty is important. This Court on the
ground of technicalities and for certain laches committed by the
department officials as pointed out by the respondent counsel is not
inclined to decide the case in favour of the respondent. But keeping in
mind, the quantum of excise duty and its ancillary duties which are in
total of Rs.98,03,22,312/- approx., this Court feels that the matter
needs consideration as to where the things are properly attended or
not.
[27]
Considering the argument of the respondent Learned
senior counsel that ‘compound’ i.e. kimam is purchased from the
suppliers and the duty is paid and second time the duty is not payabe
appears to be logical and thus, it becomes immense necessary for
enquiry into the matter and thus, the particulars of the supplier and
the documents related to the transaction needs to be examined and
accordingly, the duty has to be levied.
[28]
For the reasons stated above, this Court feels that it is a
case to remand back the matter to the Commissioner of Central
Excise, Morellow Compound M.G. Road, Shillong-793001 in the
respective cases for reconsidering the issue of purchase of the
‘compound’ i.e. kimam and the records relating to the same and make
an enquiry as to who is the supplier and in the event if the supplier
has already paid the sufficient excess due, the same need not be
collected earlier from the respondent herein. The respondent is at
liberty to place relevant records, if not already placed to the
satisfaction of the Officers and the consequential duties raised in the
show cause notice needs to be dropped in the light of payment, if
already paid for the ‘compound’ i.e. kimam failing which the
respondent herein is accountable for the excess duty payable in
accordance with law.
[29]
In view of the above, this Court is of the opinion that the
issue of levy of excise duty and considering the exemption is
concerned for the discussions made above, an opportunity needs to
be given for ascertaining whether any due has been already paid by
the
supplier
and
the
same
needs
to
be
considered
by
the
Commissioner of Central Excise, Morellow Compound M.G. Road,
Shillong-793001. Thus, this Court feels that the order passed by the
order dated 28.01.2016 and the consequential order in appeal dated
03.08.2023 needs to be set aside and the matter be remanded back
to the Commissioner of Central Excise, Shillong with the above
observation.
[30]
Accordingly, the present appeal stands disposed of. The
order of the appeal dated 03.08.2023 and the orders of the
Commissioner of Central Excise, Morellow Compound M.G. Road,
Shillong-793001 dated 28.01.2016 are set aside and the matter is
remanded back to the Commissioner of Central Excise, Shillong.
Note : Mark a copy to the Department of Revenue, Office
of the Commissioner of Central Excise, Morellow
Compound M.G. Road, Shillong-793001.
JUDGE
SABYASACHI
BHATTACHARJEE
Sabyasachi B
JUDGE
SABYASACHI
BHATTACHARJEE
Date: 2024.12.02 14:00:36
+05'30'
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