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Page No.# 1/18
GAHC010275222024
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THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WP(C)/6906/2024
UDIPTA MECH
S/O- BIPUL MECH,
R/O- BINA KUMARI MOHAN APARTMENT, 16TH NO. TINIALI,
KAMALABARI ROAD, DULIAJAN , DIBRUGARH, PIN-786602
VERSUS
THE UNION OF INDIA
REP. BY THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF
PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS, DR. RAJENDRA PRASAD ROAD, NEW
DELHI-01
2:OIL INDIA LIMITED
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT DULIAJAN
IN THE DISTRICT OF DIBRUGARH
ASSAM- 786602
REPRESENTED BY THE CHAIRMAN CUM MANAGING DIRECTOR
CORPORATE OFFICE AT PLOT NO-19
NEAR FILM CITY
SECTOR 16 A
NOIDA
201301
UTTAR PRADESH
3:THE RESIDENT CHIEF ENGINEER
OIL INDIA LIMITED
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT DULIAJAN
IN THE DISTRICT OF DIBRUGARH
ASSAM- 786602
Page No.# 2/18
4:THE CHIEF GENERAL MANAGER
HR ESTABLISHMENT
OIL INDIA LIMITED
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT DULIAJAN
IN THE DISTRICT OF DIBRUGARH
ASSAM- 786602
5:THE CHIEF GENERAL MANAGER
MEDICAL SERVICES
(HOD)
OIL INDIA LIMITED
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT DULIAJAN
IN THE DISTRICT OF DIBRUGARH
ASSAM- 786602
6:THE SENIOR MANGER
HR ESTABLISHMENT
OIL INDIA LIMITED
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT DULIAJAN
IN THE DISTRICT OF DIBRUGARH
ASSAM- 786602
7:THE OIL MEDICAL BOARD
HR ESTABLISHMENT
OIL INDIA LIMITED
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT DULIAJAN
IN THE DISTRICT OF DIBRUGARH
ASSAM- 786602
8:DR. TINKU MONI BORAH
SUPERINTENDING MEDICAL OFFICER (ENT)
ID-203517
OIL INDIA LIMITED
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT DULIAJAN
IN THE DISTRICT OF DIBRUGARH
Page No.# 3/18
ASSAM- 786602
9:DR. DIPANKAR BARUA
DOCTOR/PHYSICIAN
ID-202861
OIL INDIA LIMITED
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT DULIAJAN
IN THE DISTRICT OF DIBRUGARH
ASSAM- 78660
Advocate for the Petitioner
PETITIONER IN PERSON
: MR. K P PATHAK, AMICUS CURIAE, UDIPTA MECH,
Advocate for the Respondent : SC, OIL, MS G SWAMI(R-8,9),MR. K KALITA(R-8,9),MR. A
SARMA (R-8,9),MR. R K D CHOUDHURY,SC,DSGI.
BEFORE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN DEV CHOUDHURY
For the Petitioner
: Mr. K.P.Pathak, Amicus Curiae
Mr. U. Mech, petitioner-in-person
For the respondents
: Mr. P.K. Tiwari, Sr. standing counsel, OIL
Mr. K. Kalita, counsel
Date on which judgment was reserved : 09.02.2026
Date of pronouncement of judgment
Whether the pronouncement is of the
: 25.02.2026
Page No.# 4/18
operative part of the judgment?
: No
Whether the judgment has been pronounced?
: Yes
JUDGMENT & ORDER (CAV)
25-02-2026
1.
The grievance raised in this writ petition concerns the reimbursement of
medical expenses incurred abroad, the reimbursement of medical equipment
(a Tinnitus masker), and reimbursement for the petitioner’s future treatment
abroad. His further prayers are for award of damages and compensation from
the respondent employer and officers/company doctors for negligence in
medical services and an independent enquiry against the doctors and other
officers of Oil India Ltd. (for short, OIL), Duliajan.
2.
The petitioner specifically assails four communications; dated
02.08.2023, 09.11.2023, 04.03.2024, and 20.03.2024, which according to the
petitioner, violate the OIL Employees’ Medical Attendance Rules, 2018
(amended) (hereinafter referred to as the Rules, 2018) and the Central Services
(Medical Attendance) Rules, 1944 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules, 1944).
3.
By the communication dated 02.08.2023, the respondent employer
had rejected the prayer of the petitioner for obtaining financial grant for
Tinnitus Masking device; by the communication dated 09.11.2023, the
respondent employer had approved the purchase of hearing aid upto a
maximum amount of Rs. 50,000/- rejecting his financial assistance for purchase
of Tinnitus Masker; by the communications dated 04.03.2024 & dated
20.03.2024, the respondent employer rejected the petitioner’s prayer for his
Page No.# 5/18
referral treatment abroad.
4.
When the matter was taken up, the petitioner appeared in-person.
It was evident from the manner of presentation and submission that
though grievance projected was earnest and personal, the petitioner did
not possess the requisite familiarity with the contours of judicial review
under Article 226 of the Constitution, nor with the principles governing
interpretation of service rules and medical reimbursement scheme.
The issues involved questions of statutory construction,
precedential
analysis and limit of writ jurisdiction.
In order to ensure that the matter received proper assistance and that
the case of the petitioner was fairly and effectively presented, this Court
deemed it appropriate to appoint an Amicus Curiae to assist this Court.
Accordingly, Mr. K.P. Pathak, learned counsel was appointed as Amicus
Curiae.
5.
This Court places on record its deep appreciation for the assistance
rendered by the learned Amicus Curiae.
He has painstakingly examined the relevant rules, placed the governing
precedents including the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court and articulated the petitioner’s case with clarity and
fairness.
The Court acknowledges the industry, objectivity and erudition displayed
by the Amicus Curiae in his submissions, which have materially aided the
adjudicatory process.
6.
Heard Mr. Udipta Mech, petitioner-in-person; Mr. K.P. Pathak, learned
Amicus Curiae for the petitioner and also heard Mr. P.K. Tiwari, learned Sr.
Standing counsel assisted by Mr. K. Kalita, learned counsel for the
Page No.# 6/18
respondents.
7.
The facts essential for the determination of the present lis come to the
effect that the petitioner was offered an appointment on 16.11.2020 to
join
OIL,
and
he
accordingly
joined
on
17.11.2020
as
Senior
Engineer/Officer in Grade-B.
8.
Prior to joining, he underwent a pre-employment medical fitness test in
accordance with the appointment conditions and was assured of free
medical facilities in accordance with the company rules. He subsequently
signed the service agreement on 10.01.2022, which also provided free
medical facilities in accordance with company rules.
9.
On 08.02.2022, the petitioner approached the OIL Hospital, Duliajan,
with a complaint regarding his left ear. Thereafter, on 29.08.2022, he was
examined at Gauhati Medical College and Hospital (GMCH), where he
was diagnosed with Sensorineural Hearing Loss (SNHL).
10.
On 12.10.2022, OIL referred the petitioner to Apollo Hospital, Delhi, for his
treatment of right shoulder drop (L) and SNHL. The petitioner consulted
doctors at Apollo Hospital, Delhi, who confirmed the petitioner’s left ear
hearing loss and recommended him a change in his job profile, citing his
medical condition.
11.
By a communication dated 08.06.2023, OIL requested Indraprastha
Apollo Hospital, New Delhi to admit the petitioner for treatment. The
doctors at Apollo Hospital on 20.06.2023 advised the petitioner for Tinnitus
Retraining Therapy (TRT) along with the use of a Tinnitus Masking Device.
12.
Acting on such medical advice, the petitioner sought financial
assistance for a Tinnitus Masker on 21.07.2023, cost of which is Rs.
4,09,995/-.
Page No.# 7/18
13.
At that stage, he was again directed to appear before a medical board
on 02.08.2023. However, the Medical Board refused financial assistance
for the Tinnitus Masker, stating that there was no provision for
reimbursement of such a medical device.
14.
Thereafter, on 28.09.2023, the petitioner was again referred by OIL to Dr.
Gautam Khaund, Sr. ENT. Consultant, who, on 18.10.2023, further, referred
the petitioner to AIIMS, New Delhi or any other higher centre for advance
management. On 09.11.2023, the concerned committee had approved
the purchase of hearing aid upto maximum amount of Rs. 50,000/- for
each ear, but not for a Tinnitus Masker.
15.
On 14.12.2023, Indraprastha Apollo Hospital advised the petitioner for
treatment in a specialised Tinnitus clinic abroad for Neuro-Modulation
Therapy.
Pursuant
thereto,
the
petitioner
filed
representation
on
06.02.2024, seeking permission and financial support for treatment
abroad. However, his request was rejected on 04.03.2024 by the CGM
(Medical Services) HoD and again on 20.03.2024 by the CGM HR
Establishment. The petitioner went abroad for treatment, taking leave as
a personal visit.
16.
Subsequently, on a clarification sought by OIL, the doctor who treated
the petitioner at Indraprastha Apollo Hospital and advised him for
treatment abroad, intimated OIL that the referral for treatment abroad
was made at the patient/petitioner's insistence.
17.
Referring to Rule 8.0, Rule 9.0, Rule 15.0 of the OIL Employees’ Medical
Attendance Rules, 2018 (amended) (hereinafter referred to as the Rules,
2018) and Rule 11 of the Central Services (Medical Attendance), Rules,
1944 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules, 1944), the learned Amicus
Curiae argues that Rule 8.0 of the Rules, 2018 makes the medical benefits
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expansive.
18.
According to him, when the word “including” is applied, such a word
has to be interpreted “inclusively”. When the definition that employs the
words “means” and “includes” separately, as seen in Rule 8.0 of the Rules,
2018, it clearly indicates the intent to provide an inclusive, and not an
“exhaustive” definition.
19.
According to him, when “means” specifies the primary scope and
“includes” follows as a separate clause or phrase, it serves to enlarge the
ordinary meaning of the terms, by adding further elements without
restricting it solely to those enumerated under it. Such construction
suggests that the definition is intended to cover not only what is expressly
mentioned but also analogous cases, ensuring that the terms remain
broad and adaptable to varied circumstances, including foreign
treatment and Tinnitus Masker in the present case.
20.
In support, he places reliance on Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories Vs.
Deputy Labour Commissioner & Ors., reported in [(2007) 5 SCC 281], State
of Bombay Vs. Hospital Majdoor Sabha reported in [AIR 1960 SC 601] and
the Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P.Singh, 14 th Edition.
21.
Referring to Rule 9.0 of the Rules, 2018, Mr. Pathak, learned Amicus
Curiae, argues that said Rule clearly indicates the “exclusions” and the
said exclusion does not cover foreign treatment. Such a prescription,
according to him, further substantiates that there is no bar for
reimbursement of foreign treatment as per Rule 8.0 of the Rules, 2018
since the exclusion to the said clause is specifically provided in Rule 9.0.
22.
Referring to Rule 15.0, Mr. Pathak argues that it is an interpretation clause
providing that, where there is no provision in the Rules, 2018, regarding
Page No.# 9/18
certain issues related to medical benefits, the provisions contained under
the Central Government Medical Attendance Rules will be applicable
with the approval of the Director (HR & BD).
23.
In this context, the learned Amicus Curiae refers to Rule 11.0 of the Rules,
1944, and argues that said Rule makes a government servant eligible to
obtain medical treatment abroad or to claim reimbursement of the cost
of medical treatment inside or outside India, in accordance with the
provisions of said Rule. Accordingly, he argues that the grounds taken in
the impugned order dated 04.03.2024 and dated 20.03.2024 are
completely unfounded.
24.
The learned Amicus Curiae concludes his arguments by submitting that
the petitioner is eligible for consideration of reimbursement of expenses
incurred abroad, since Rule 8.0 of the Rules, 2018, employs an inclusive
definition, thereby extending the scope of medical benefits beyond those
expressly enumerated. Absence of specific exclusion for foreign treatment
under Rule 9.0 of the Rules, 2018, further supports the interpretation that
such claims are not barred, inasmuch as Rule 15.0 of the Rules, 2018,
expressly provides for the Central Government Medical Attendance Rules
in cases where the scheme is silent.
25.
Par contra, referring to Rule 8.0.(xi), Mr. Tiwari, learned Senior counsel for
the respondents, submits that only a Hearing Aid is permitted, that too
within a fixed ceiling of Rs. 50,000/-, which has already been approved to
the petitioner.
26.
The learned Senior Counsel further argues that, under Rule 8.0(xvi), the
list of reimbursable artificial appliances does not include the Tinnitus
Masker. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to a Tinnitus Masker device
under the Rule, and accordingly, the employer has rightly rejected his
Page No.# 10/18
claim.
27.
He further contends that under Rules 11.1. (i), 11.1(v) &11.1. (x), any
Medical treatment outside the OIL hospital is required to be preapproved. Such pre-authorisation of the company is a sine qua non for
availing treatment. However, the treatment of the petitioner abroad is
without any such approval.
28.
The medical expenses incurred in a foreign country are to be reimbursed
through insurance and are only available to those employees while
travelling abroad on an official tour/training programme, which is not
applicable in the case of the petitioner, the learned Senior counsel
argues.
29.
Referring to Rule 11.1 (x), Mr. Tiwari, learned Senior counsel argues that
the referral is permissible only within the country and, therefore, even if
referred, the petitioner is not entitled to reimbursement of medical
expenses incurred in a foreign country.
30.
Countering the arguments of Mr. Pathak, learned Amicus Curiae as
regards an expansive definition of Rule 8.0, Mr. Tiwari, learned Sr. counsel
for the respondents, argues that when the words “means” and “includes”
are used, the same indicate an exhaustive explanation of the meaning,
which, for the purpose of the act, must invariably be attached to those
words and expressions. In support, he relies on P. Kasilingam and Ors. Vs.
P.S.G. College of Technology and Ors. reported in [1995 Supp (2) SCC
348].
31.
Referring to Hamdard (supra), the learned Senior counsel for the
respondents, argues that the Apex Court, with no ambiguity, held that
when an interpretation clause uses, “means and includes”, it will afford an
exhaustive explanation to the meaning. In this context, he further relies on
Page No.# 11/18
the ratio laid down in Bharat Co-operative Bank (Mumbai) Ltd. Vs. Cooperative Bank Employees Union reported in [(2007) 4 SCC 685].
32.
The facts, more or less, are not in dispute; it relates to the entitlement of
medical benefits claimed by the petitioner, exclusions urged by the
respondents, and therefore, interpretation of the Rules, 2018, as well as
the Central Civil Services Medical Attendance framework.
33.
In the aforesaid backdrop, let this Court now deal with the relevant Rules
pressed into service by the learned Amicus Curiae as well as by the
learned Sr. counsel for the respondents.
34.
The relevant portions of Rule 8.0, Rule 9.0, Rule 11.0, Rule 13.2 and Rule
15.0 of the Rules, 2018 are quoted hereinbelow:
“8.0 Scope of Medical Benefits:
(i) Medical attendance and treatment in illness and injury. Treatment means the use of
all medical and surgical facilities available in a Hospital/Nursing Home and includes:
a) The employment of pathological, bacteriological, radiological or other methods as
considered necessary by the AMA/treating doctor.
b) The supply and use of such medicines, vaccines, blood and blood products or other
therapeutic substances and consultation with a specialist as prescribed by the
AMA/treating doctor(s).
xi)Procuring hearing aid, if recommended by the attending doctor/ AMA, is permissible
within the ceiling as started in Annexure-V, subject to approval of the Competent
Authority.
xvi) Artificial appliances as per Annexure-VI.
9.0
Exclusion:
i)
Cosmetic surgery and other special treatment or appliances not essential
for recovery or maintenance of general health and ability unless necessitated due to
work accident.
ii)
All medical attendance and hospital treatment received without the
recommendation of AMA and prior approval of the competent authority, if necessary,
except in cases of emergencies for minimum days required to be certified by the Head of
Page No.# 12/18
Medical/ AMA as the case may be.
iii)
Orthodontic treatment and artificial dentures unless necessitated due to
work accident.
11.0
Referral treatment in outside hospitals:
11.1
Referral system:
v)
Recommended cases for outside treatment should avail treatment at the referred
hospital/specialist only. But in special circumstances the same may be availed in any
other hospital authorized by the Company at the same place with prior permission, failing
which no reimbursement will be made.
vii)
Referral Credit letters to hospitals (both within and outside the state of Assam) in respect
of employees of Fields will be issued by the Head of Medical, Duliajan. In respect of
other spheres, the referral credit letter will be issued by the respective Head of
Administration for the employees of the said sphere only. However, credit letters to the
referred hospitals in Delhi, Gurgaon etc. in National Capital Region (NCR) will be issued
by Corporate Office, Noida on getting intimation from the office of the Head of Medical,
Duliajan or Head of Administration from other spheres.
x)
The referral of a patient from an authorized hospital to any other hospital in the country
is to be decided by the Competent Authority as mentioned in 7.0.
13.2
Medical expenses incurred in foreign country while on tour abroad:
i)
Employees going abroad on official tour/training programmes will be
required to obtain Medical Insurance for the period covered. Premium payable will be
reimbursable by the Company.
ii)
The Medical insurance will be limited to the official tour/training period
including the time spent in transit from India to the place of tour abroad and back to
India. Medical care/treatment taken abroad will be reimbursed by the insurance
Company as per the Medical Insurance Policy.
15.0
Interpretation:
ii)
Whether there is no provision in this scheme regarding certain issues for medical
benefits, the provisions contained under the Central Govt. Medical Attendance Rules
will be applicable with the approval of the Director (HR &BD).”
35.
From the facts of the case, the arguments advanced; the provisions of
Rules, 2018, this Court is now called upon to decide as to whether, under the
governing regime, a legally enforceable right exists for reimbursement of (i) a
Tinnitus Masker, (ii) medical treatment undertaken abroad and (iii) prospective
Page No.# 13/18
foreign treatment; and whether the action of the respondent employer is
arbitrary, irrational or ultra vires.
36.
The Rules, 2018 is codified with finite entitlement. Such Rules, 2018 is not
advisory guidelines. The same is codified benefits scheme forming part of
service conditions.
37.
A medical reimbursement scheme is, by its very designation, fiscally
calibrated. It distributes a definite pool of corporate resources amongst
employees according to structured categories, ceilings and conditions. In such
schemes, entitlement does not flow solely from medical desirability. It flows
from textual authorisation.
38.
Courts have repeatedly cautioned that in matters of financial and
policy allocation, judicial review must be confined to legality and not venture
into policy substitution.
39.
Having regard to the aforesaid settled principles of law, let this Court
examine the arguments advanced, based on the issues formulated.
40.
Rule 8.0 defines “the scope of medical benefits”. The expression used is
“treatment means the use of all medical and surgical facilities available in a
hospital/nursing home, and includes......”
41.
The argument of the Amicus Curiae hinges on the semantics of
“means” and “includes” as are used separately and is argued that the word
“includes” renders the definition elastic and capable of embracing modalities
not enumerated in that textual content.
42.
However, jurisprudence does not support such a sweeping reading.
43.
In Hamdard (supra), the Supreme Court clarified that where a definition
employs both 'means' and 'includes', the intention is ordinarily to provide an
exhaustive explanation. Similarly, in P.Kasilingam (Supra), it was held that the
Page No.# 14/18
use of both expressions indicates that the definition is intended to be complete
and not illustrative. The same principle was reiterated in Bharat Cooperative
Bank (Mumbai) (supra).
44.
The structure of Rule 8.0 reinforces this interpretation. It first defines
treatment as the use of facilities in a hospital/nursing home; then, it enumerates
specific components, pathological tests, medicines, specialist consultation,
etc. It specifically and separately addresses hearing aids under Rule 8.0. (xi),
with a fixed ceiling. It restricts reimbursement for artificial appliances to those
listed in Annexure-VI, under Rule 8.0. (xvi).
45.
In the opinion of
this Court, this layered drafting indicates
categorisation, not expansion. When a specific device, a hearing aid, is
expressly recognised and capped at Rs. 50,000/-, the Rule demonstrates a
conscious intention to treat Auditory Assistance devices differently. The
omission of Tinnitus Masker from Annexure-VI or from the enumerated list is,
therefore, in the opinion of this Court, not accidental but it is deliberate.
46.
The maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius”, in the opinion of this
Court, applies in the given facts of the present case. In Latin, it means “the
mention of one thing implies the exclusion of others”
47.
This maxim plays a vital role in assisting Courts in determining intention
by specifying particular items or conditions, particularly in contracts. Though
such a maxim should be applied cautiously, in the case in hand, when certain
items are expressly provided, others of the same genus are impliedly excluded
unless expressly incorporated.
48.
Therefore, accepting the petitioner's construction could render
Annexure-VI otiose. This Court cannot adopt an interpretation that undermines
the Rule's internal architecture.
Page No.# 15/18
49.
Now, let this Court address arguments on Rule 9.0.
50.
The learned Amicus Curiae argues that since foreign treatment is not
expressly excluded under Rule 9.0, it must be deemed permissible.
51.
Statutory logic does not support such reasoning.
52.
Rule 9.0 removes certain items from a domain that would otherwise be
granted. This Rule does not enlarge the scope of Rule 8.0, inasmuch as, an
exclusion clause presupposes an existing entitlement and carves out an
exception. It cannot be used or interpreted as a vehicle for creating new
entitlements. The absence of prohibition is not equivalent to the existence of a
right. The service benefits must trace their origin to a prescribed affirmative
position and not to silence.
53.
Rule 11.1. (xi) expressly states that the referral to any other hospital in
the country is to be decided by the competent authority. No separate referral
procedure for treatment abroad for employees employed in India is
prescribed under the Rules. The referral is required when the treatment is
outside Oil hospital, Duliajan and in any hospital in the country. Moreover,
when the Rule maker intended to address foreign treatment, it did so
separately under Rule 13.2. Even there, it is admissible only in the context of
official tours/training abroad, subject to mandatory reimbursable medical
insurance.
54.
Thus, the phrase “in the country” is territorial and restrictive. In this
Court's opinion, it is a conscious limitation.
55.
The structural segregation under the Rules, 2018 demonstrates the Rule
maker's intent: domestic referral is permissible with prior approval, and foreign
treatment is permissible only during official foreign travel under insurance.
56.
The petitioner does not fall within the second category. He travelled
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abroad on personal leave after being refused permission.
57.
The absence of prior approval is fatal under Rule 9.0. (ii), which
excludes treatment received without recommendation and prior approval,
except for emergencies, from any reimbursement. No emergency is pleaded
in this case.
58.
Now, addressing Rule 15.0, the same is an interpretative clause. It states
that where there is no provision in the scheme, the Central Government
Medical Attendance Rules may apply, subject to the approval of the Director
(HR and BD).
59.
Three features are very important under this Rule: it operates only when
the scheme is silent; it requires approval, and it is discretionary, not automatic.
60.
Thus, it does not create a vested right to invoke Rule 11.0 of the Rules,
1944. Even under Rule 11.0 of the Rules, 1944, foreign treatment requires prior
sanction. This Court cannot convert a conditional administrative power into a
mandatory obligation.
61.
The respondents' argument that doctors at Apollo Hospital clarified that
the foreign referral was based on the petitioner's insistence, in the opinion of
this Court, is not at all relevant for the determination of the present lis, in the
backdrop of the determinations made hereinabove.
62.
Therefore, a claim for treatment at a foreign specialised clinic or
reimbursement of medical equipment, not permitted under the medical
scheme of the employer, cannot be constitutionalised into an enforceable
fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution, based on a prescription
made in the Rules, 2018.
63.
In conclusion, the architecture of Rules, 2018 reflects a closed,
structured entitlement system. The Tinnitus Masker is not enumerated. Foreign
Page No.# 17/18
treatment outside official travel is not contemplated. For any referral, prior
approval is mandatory. Rule 15.0 does not automatically import the Rules,1944
to the Rules, 2018.
64.
For the aforesaid reasons, the petitioner's claim for reimbursement of
the Tinnitus Masker, treatment abroad and future follow-up treatment abroad
is held to be not sustainable under the Rules, 2018.
65.
The sympathy of this Court with the petitioner cannot substitute for
statutory authorisation. This Court must resist the temptation to rewrite policy
under the guise of interpretation and be influenced by sympathy.
66.
Now, coming to the prayer for damages and enquiries, the pleadings
of the parties, without any doubt, raise disputed questions of fact, i.e., whether
negligence occurred, whether there was a breach of duty, and whether
causation is established. These are evidentiary matters requiring expert
testimony.
67.
A Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a forum for
adjudicating tortious liability in the absence of admitted or incontrovertible
facts.
68.
It is important to record that the petitioner's right to health under Article
21 of the Constitution is not an issue. The employer claims that it had provided
medical facilities, referrals, and reimbursement within the scheme; the
petitioner alleges that he was wrongly denied his rightful claim under the Rules,
2018. However, the aforesaid contentions have already been addressed in the
foregoing paragraphs.
69.
Accordingly, the damages claimed, and the enquiry sought, cannot
be sustained within the contours of Article 226 of the Constitution.
70.
Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed. Parties to bear their own
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costs.
71.
While parting with the record, it is made clear that the petitioner shall
be at liberty to approach the appropriate forum for damages and
compensation, if so advised.
JUDGE
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