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CGHC010339762022
2026:CGHC:35224
NAFR
Digitally
RAGHVENDRA signed by
RAGHVENDRA
JAT
JAT
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPC No. 4462 of 2022
1 - Tulsidas Markam S/o Shri Ramchandra Singh Aged About 43 Years
Presently Posted As Tahsildar Tahsil Office Gourela, District : GaurelaPendra-Marwahi, Chhattisgarh.
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary Revenue And Disaster
Management Department Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan Nawa Raipur,
Chhattisgarh.
-
The
Chief
Information
Commissioner
Chhattisgarh
State
Informantion Commission, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District : Raipur,
Chhattisgarh.
3 - The Sub - Divisional Officer (Revenue) Marwahi (First Appellate
Authority Under Rti Act), New, District : Gaurela-Pendra-Marwahi,
Chhattisgarh.
4 - Harihar Prasad Gupta R/o 27 Kholi, Vikas Nagar, Near Gurudwara,
Bilaspur, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh
... Respondent(s)
For Petitioner(s)
: Ms. Pranoti Das, Advocate on behalf
of Mr. Goutam Khetrapal, Advocate.
For Respondent(s)/State
: Mr. Abhyudhay Tripathi, Panel Lawyer.
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
Order on Board
11/08/2026
1. By way of this petition, the petitioner has prayed for following
reliefs:“10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to
issue an appropriate writ, thereby setting-aside/quashing
the impugned order dated 21.09.2022 (Annexure P/1) so
far it relates to the imposition of cost of Rs. 25,000/- upon
the petitioner.
10.2 That, any other relief/order which may deem fit and
just in the facts and circumstances of the case including
award of the costs of the petition may be given.”
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned
order dated 21.09.2022, whereby a penalty of Rs.25,000/- has
been imposed upon the petitioner for the alleged delay in
furnishing information under the Right to Information Act, is
arbitrary, unreasonable, illegal, unjust and contrary to the
principles of natural justice and is, therefore, liable to be set aside.
It is contended that the show-cause notice issued to the petitioner
did not propose imposition of any cost or penalty and,
consequently, the petitioner was not afforded an effective
opportunity to explain why such penalty should not be imposed.
Learned counsel further submits that the RTI application
submitted by respondent No.4 was received by the Clerk of the
petitioner on 24.09.2019; however, owing to the illness of the
concerned Clerk, the application was not placed before the
petitioner. It is further submitted that, prior to the filing of the RTI
application, the petitioner had already been transferred from Tahsil
Marwahi to Tahsil Jashpur, District Jashpur, vide order dated
23.08.2019 and was ultimately relieved from Tahsil Marwahi on
18.10.2019, before expiry of the prescribed period of 30 days for
furnishing the information. Learned counsel submits that these
facts were specifically brought to the notice of respondent No.2 in
the petitioner's reply to the show-cause notice, but the same were
not duly considered. It is, therefore, contended that the delay in
furnishing the information was neither deliberate nor attributable to
any wilful omission on the part of the petitioner. Learned counsel
further submits that respondent No.2, without properly considering
the petitioner's explanation and without recording any finding of
deliberate or wilful default, mechanically imposed a penalty of
Rs.25,000/-, which is unsustainable in law. It is lastly submitted
that an order imposing penalty carries serious civil and stigmatic
consequences and, therefore, could not have been passed
without affording the petitioner a proper and meaningful
opportunity of hearing. Accordingly, learned counsel prays that the
impugned order dated 21.09.2022 be quashed and set aside.
3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes the
same.
4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused
the material available on record.
5. It is noted that the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court, while
considering a similar issue in Nitin Singhvi (supra), has
elaborately examined the scope and ambit of imposition of penalty
under Section 20(1) of the RTI Act. The Division Bench has held
that the power to impose penalty is not automatic or mechanical,
but is conditioned upon the existence of cogent material
demonstrating that the Public Information Officer has, without
reasonable cause, either refused to furnish information, caused
undue delay, or acted in a malafide manner. It has been further
held that mere delay or inability to furnish certain information,
particularly when such information is not available on record or
lies with another authority, would not ipso facto attract penal
consequences. The Court has emphasized that before imposing
penalty, the Information Commission is under a statutory
obligation to record a clear and reasoned finding with respect to
the existence of malafide intent or lack of reasonable cause, and
must also afford an effective opportunity of hearing to the
concerned officer. The burden cast upon the Public Information
Officer under the proviso to Section 20(1) is to establish that he
acted reasonably and diligently; however, once such explanation
is furnished and remains uncontroverted, the Commission cannot
proceed to impose penalty in a routine manner.
6. It has further been observed that where the Public Information
Officer has taken steps in compliance with the provisions of the
Act, such as transferring the application to the concerned
department under Section 6(3) of the RTI Act or furnishing such
information as is available on record, the same would constitute a
reasonable and sufficient cause, insulating him from penal action.
The Division Bench has cautioned that the penal provisions under
the Act, being quasi-criminal in nature, must be invoked with due
care and only in cases where the conduct of the officer is found to
be contumacious or deliberately obstructive. In light of the
aforesaid principles, the Division Bench set aside the penalty
imposed therein, holding that in the absence of any finding of
malafide or deliberate lapse, the order of penalty could not be
sustained by observing as follows :“12. The Supreme Court in the matter of Manohar v. State
of Maharashtra, (2012) 13 SCC 14 has held that the State
Information Commission has been vested with wide
powers including imposition of penalty or taking of
disciplinary action against the employees and the
provisions relating to penalty or to penal consequences
have to be construed strictly. While dealing with Section
20(2) of the Act of 2005, their Lordships have observed in
paragraph 16 as under :-
“16. The State Information Commission has been
vested with wide powers including imposition of
penalty or taking of disciplinary action against the
employees. Exercise of such power is bound to
adversely affect or bring civil consequences to the
delinquent. Thus, the provisions relating to penalty
or to penal consequences have to be construed
strictly. It will not be open to the Court to give them
such liberal construction that it would be beyond
the specific language of the statute or would be in
violation to the principles of natural justice.”
13. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have further held while
dealing with initiation of departmental proceeding that the case of
default must strictly fall within the specified grounds of the
provisions of Section 20(2). This provision has to be construed
and applied strictly. Its ambit cannot be permitted to be enlarged
at the whims of the Commission. It has also been held that
“negligence” per se is not a ground on which proceedings under
Section 20(2) of the Act can be invoked and the Commission must
return a finding that such negligence, delay or default is persistent
(meaning: continuing for a long time or happening often,
especially in a way that is unpleasant or annoying) and without
reasonable cause. Paragraphs 31 and 33 of the report state as
under:“31. It appears that the facts have not been correctly
noticed and, in any case, not in their entirety by the State
Information Commission. It had formed an opinion that the
appellant was negligent and had not performed the duty
cast upon him. The Commission noticed that there was 73
days delay in informing the applicant and, thus, there was
negligence while performing duties. If one examines the
provisions of Section 20(2) in their entirety then it becomes
obvious that every default on the part of the concerned
officer may not result in issuance of a recommendation for
disciplinary action. The case must fall in any of the
specified defaults and reasoned finding has to be recorded
by the Commission while making such recommendations.
‘Negligence’ per se is not a ground on which proceedings
under Section 20(2) of the Act can be invoked. The
Commission must return a finding that such negligence,
delay or default is persistent and without reasonable cause.
In our considered view, the Commission, in the present
case, has erred in not recording such definite finding. The
appellant herein had not failed to receive any application,
had not failed to act within the period of 30 days (as he had
written a letter calling for information), had not malafidely
denied the request for information, had not furnished any
incorrect or misleading information, had not destroyed any
information and had not obstructed the furnishing of the
information. On the contrary, he had taken steps to facilitate
the providing of information by writing the stated letters.
May be the letter dated 11th April, 2007 was not written
within the period of 30 days requiring respondent No.2 to
furnish details of the period for which such information was
required but the fact remained that such letter was written
and respondent No.2 did not even bother to respond to the
said enquiry. He just kept on filing appeal after appeal. After
April 4, 2007, the date when the appellant was transferred
to Akola, he was not responsible for the acts of omissions
and/or commission of the office at Nanded.
14. Their Lordships further held that the word “shall” appearing in
Section 20(2) of the Act of 2005 before 'recommend' has to be
read as “may” and their Lordships observed as under :33. All the attributable defaults of a Central or State Public
Information Officer have to be without any reasonable
cause and persistently. In other words, besides finding
that any of the stated defaults have been committed by
such officer, the Commission has to further record its
opinion that such default in relation to receiving of an
application or not furnishing the information within the
specified time was committed persistently and without a
reasonable cause. Use of such language by the
Legislature clearly shows that the expression ‘shall’
appearing before ‘recommend’ has to be read and
construed as ‘may’. There could be cases where there is
reasonable cause shown and the officer is able to
demonstrate that there was no persistent default on his
part either in receiving the application or furnishing the
requested information. In such circumstances, the law
does
not
require
recommendation
for
disciplinary
proceedings to be made. It is not the legislative mandate
that irrespective of the facts and circumstances of a given
case, whether reasonable cause is shown or not, the
Commission must recommend disciplinary action merely
because the application was not responded to within 30
days. Every case has to be examined on its own facts.
We would hasten to add here that wherever reasonable
cause is not shown to the satisfaction of the Commission
and the Commission is of the opinion that there is default
in terms of the Section it must send the recommendation
for disciplinary action in accordance with law to the
concerned authority. In such circumstances, it will have no
choice but to send recommendatory report. The burden of
forming an opinion in accordance with the provisions of
Section 20(2) and principles of natural justice lies upon
the Commission.”
7. Reverting to the facts of the present case, this Court finds that the
impugned order dated 21.9.2022 passed by respondent No. 2
cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.
8. In light of the law laid down by the Division Bench in Nitin
Singhvi (supra), as well as the principles enunciated by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manohar (supra), it is manifest that
imposition of penalty under Section 20(1) of the RTI Act is not
automatic and must be preceded by a clear and reasoned finding
of malafide denial of information or delay without reasonable
cause. In the present case, no such finding has been recorded by
the State Information Commission. The impugned order proceeds
in a mechanical manner, without adverting to the explanation
furnished by the petitioner or the factual position that the
information, to the extent available, had already been supplied.
9. This Court is of the considered opinion that the conduct of the
petitioner does not fall within the mischief contemplated under
Section 20(1) of the RTI Act. There is nothing on record to suggest
that the petitioner had either deliberately withheld information,
furnished misleading information, or acted in a contumacious
manner so as to warrant imposition of penalty. On the contrary,
the steps taken by the petitioner in transferring the application and
facilitating supply of available information clearly demonstrate due
diligence and bona fide discharge of his duties.
10.
The State Information Commission, while exercising quasi-judicial
powers entailing civil consequences, was under an obligation to
record specific findings with regard to absence of reasonable
cause and existence of malafide intent. The failure to do so
vitiates the impugned order. The penalty imposed, therefore,
appears to be punitive without any legal foundation and is liable to
be interfered with in exercise of writ jurisdiction.
11.
Consequently, the writ petition deserves to be and is hereby
allowed. The impugned order dated 21.9.2022 passed by
respondent No. 2 is quashed and set aside, including any
consequential recovery proceedings initiated pursuant thereto.
Sd/(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Raghu Jat
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