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THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM : GANGTOK
(Civil Extraordinary Jurisdiction)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------SINGLE BENCH : THE HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE MEENAKSHI MADAN RAI, JUDGE
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WP(C) No.68 of 2025
Petitioner
:
TT Energy Private Limited
versus
Respondents :
The Principal Chief Engineer-cum-Secretary,
Energy and Power Department,
Government of Sikkim and Another
Application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Appearance
Mr. M. G. Ramachandran, Senior Advocate with Ms. Mani Gupta, Ms.
Srishti Khindaria and Ms. Parvin Manger, Advocates for the
Petitioner.
Mr. Aarohi Bhalla, Additional Advocate General with Mr. Sujan
Sunwar, Assistant Government Advocate for the Respondents.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Date of hearing
:
31-03-2026
Judgment reserved
:
31-03-2026
Judgment pronounced & uploaded
:
09-04-2026
JUDGMENT
Meenakshi Madan Rai, J.
1.
The Petitioner is a Company incorporated under the
Companies Act, 1956 and claims to be a Special Purpose Vehicle,
incorporated for the sole purpose of developing the Ting-Ting
Hydroelectric Project, on river Rathong Chu, in West Sikkim. The
Company identified the Project site in 2005 and accordingly
approached
the
Respondents.
Respondent
No.2
accepted
the
proposal vide letter dated 05-12-2005 and the Respondent No.1
issued a Letter of Intent (LoI), dated 12-01-2006, entrusting the
promoters of the Petitioner with the development of the Project. The
Implementation Agreement (IA)/ Deed of Agreement, dated 03-092008, was executed between the Petitioner and the Respondent No.
1, for the said Project, along with a Supplementary Agreement/Deed
WP(C) No.68 of 2025
TT Energy Private Limited
vs. The Principal Chief Engineer-cum-Secretary, Energy & Power Department and Another
of Agreement, dated 11-03-2010, for a period of thirty-five years,
ending on 03-09-2043.
2.
The Petitioner Company now alleges that, during the
subsistence of the IA (supra) between the Petitioner and the
Respondents, the Respondent No.1 has arbitrarily and illegally
issued
a
Request
for
Proposal
(RFP),
bearing
No.022/
Power/IPP/2025-26/03, dated 19-09-2025, for development of the
Ting-Ting Hydroelectric Project, on Build, Own, Operate and Transfer
(BOOT) basis, in Gyalshing District of Sikkim.
3.
The Petitioner seeks the following reliefs;
(a)
Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ,
order, or direction quashing and setting aside the
Request for Proposal (RFP) No.022/Power/ IPP/202526/03, dated 19-09-2025, issued by the Respondent
No.1,
for
development
of
the
MW
Ting-Ting
Hydroelectric Project;
(b)
Direct the Respondents to implement the Project as per
the Existing Implementation Agreement, dated 03-092008, with the Petitioner;
(c)
Pending final disposal of the present Petition, stay the
operation, implementation, and effect of the Request for
Proposal (RFP) No.022/Power/IPP/2025-26/03, dated
19-09-2025 issued by the Respondent No.1;
(d)
Till the disposal of the instant Writ Petition, restrain the
Respondents from creating any third-party interests in
the Project including (without limitation) by way of
awarding the Project to any other entity or taking any
further steps pursuant to the said RFP which would
render the present proceedings infructuous;
(e)
Pass such other or further orders as this Hon’ble Court
may deem just, necessary and proper and in the interest
of justice in the facts and circumstances of the case.
WP(C) No.68 of 2025
TT Energy Private Limited
4.
vs. The Principal Chief Engineer-cum-Secretary, Energy & Power Department and Another
As per Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner, an
amount of ₹ 30,00,00,000/- (Rupees thirty crores) only, has been
invested in the Project and non-refundable processing fees of ₹
9,00,000/- (Rupees nine lakhs) only, as stipulated in the IA (supra)
has also been paid. Necessary clearances were obtained from
various authorities from 2007 to 2012. The State Government
however on 08-02-2012 abruptly communicated to the Petitioner
about the closure of the Project, by Notification of the Governor, on
grounds of Public Interest (Religious Sentiments), sans formal
termination of the IA. Approximately fifteen letters were exchanged
between the Petitioner and the Respondents pertaining to the
closure of the Project. Without any response to the correspondence,
the State Government issued a communication dated 05-05-2014,
requesting the Petitioner to appoint an Arbitrator as per Article 9 of
the IA, invoked by the Petitioner vide notice dated 03-03-2014. It is
contended that the Petitioner did not pursue the arbitration
proceedings as the sole reason stated for the closure of the Project
was “public interest”.
(i)
In late 2024, the Petitioner came to learn that the
concerns relating to public interest had been addressed and both the
public and the State were receptive to the development of the
Project. On 28-03-2025, the Petitioner proposed to implement the
existing IA, on the basis of the previous preparations made.
Pursuant thereto, vide letter dated 26-06-2025, the Petitioner
sought permission to commence the Project.
The Government,
instead, issued a fresh RFP on 19-09-2025 as already described
hereinabove, in breach of the existing IA.
WP(C) No.68 of 2025
TT Energy Private Limited
(ii)
vs. The Principal Chief Engineer-cum-Secretary, Energy & Power Department and Another
It was urged that the
Implementation Agreement
between the Petitioner and the State Government is a binding and
legally enforceable contract which sets out the rights and obligations
of the parties. Besides, the IA cannot be terminated by either party
except on grounds as expressly provided in Article 5 of the IA and
there is no allegation of default or breach by the Petitioner, for
terminating the Contact. That, the force majeure clause does not
confer any right to terminate the IA, which merely stands
suspended for the duration of such event. The Respondents cannot
unilaterally treat the IA as non-existent or abandoned and proceed
to invite fresh bids for implementation of the same Project by any
other person.
There has been no overt act on the part of the
Petitioner, at any time, constituting waiver or an intention to
abandon. Moreover, no permanent decision was taken by the
Respondents at any stage not to implement the Project. The action
of the Respondents is patently arbitrary and unjust and as there is
no efficacious alternate remedy, the writ jurisdiction of this Court is
being invoked. To fortify his submissions, reliance was placed on M.
P. Power Management Company Limited, Jabalpur
vs. Sky Power
Southeast Solar India Private Limited and Others ; Subodh Kumar Singh
Rathour vs. Chief Executive Officer and Others
Whirlpool Corporation
vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others3; S.J.S. Business
Enterprises (P) Ltd.
vs. State of Bihar and Others4 and Gujarat State
Financial Corporation
vs. M/s. Lotus Hotels Pvt. Ltd.5. That, in the
circumstances of the Petitioner’s case, the matter falls squarely
within the recognized exception to the general rule that the
(2023) 2 SCC 703
(2024) 15 SCC 461
(1998) 8 SCC 1
(2004) 7 SCC 166
(1983) 3 SCC 379
WP(C) No.68 of 2025
TT Energy Private Limited
vs. The Principal Chief Engineer-cum-Secretary, Energy & Power Department and Another
existence of an efficacious alternate remedy bars continuation of a
Writ Petition.
5.
Opposing the case of the Petitioner and the arguments
advanced by Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner, Learned
Additional Advocate General sought to clarify at the outset that, a
preliminary
objection
was
being
raised
with
regard
to
the
maintainability of the Writ Petition. That, no arguments were being
advanced on the merits of the matter, as admittedly, an arbitration
clause exists between the parties in terms of Article 9 of the
Implementation Agreement, dated 03-09-2008, in view of which if
any dispute arises between the parties, it is to be referred to
arbitration. That, it is an admitted position that the Project which
was to be implemented by the Petitioner was closed and the
arbitration clause invoked after the Notification of closure was
served on the Petitioner.
The Notification of closure was however
not challenged at any point of time by the Petitioner nor was a
Petition under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996, filed for appointment of an Arbitrator.
(i)
The Records with the Respondents in fact reveal that the
Petitioner purchased the RFP, dated 19-09-2025 and on discovering
that they would not be able to meet the requirements, lacking in
economic resources, decided to agitate the issue of the previous
Project. Their conduct deserves to be taken into consideration. They
also abandoned the claim for more than ten years from May, 2014
till 28-03-2025 and now seek to raise the issue belatedly to foil the
development plans of the Respondents.
(ii)
That, vide Prayer (b) of the Writ Petition, the Petitioner
seeks specific performance of the IA, dated 03-09-2008, which
WP(C) No.68 of 2025
vs. The Principal Chief Engineer-cum-Secretary, Energy & Power Department and Another
TT Energy Private Limited
cannot be granted in exercise of the Writ Jurisdiction by this Court
as the dispute, if any, between the parties, is a contractual dispute
which can be adjudicated by arbitration.
Even after invocation of
the arbitration clause, vide Notice dated 03-03-2014, the Petitioner
did not take any steps for adjudication of the alleged dispute and
requested the Respondents after a period of more than one year,
vide letter dated 06-07-2015, to finalise the name of the Learned
Arbitrator. This letter was suppressed by the Petitioner and has not
been brought to the notice of this Court.
(iii)
The Petitioner, as per Learned Additional Advocate
General, has also suppressed letter dated 22-08-2015, issued by the
Respondent No.1, vide which the Respondent had agreed to the
appointment of the Arbitrator from the list of Hon’ble Judges as
suggested by the Petitioner, vide its letter dated 06-07-2015.
Learned Additional Advocate General invited the attention of this
Court to various decisions of the Supreme Court to buttress his
submissions, viz., Reva Electric Car Company Private Limited vs. Green
Mobil ; Linkwell Telesystems Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Sikkim and Others ;
and Swadhi Health Management LLP and Another vs. State of Sikkim and
Others .
In light of the above facts and circumstances the Writ
Petition not being maintainable deserves a dismissal.
6.
Due consideration has been afforded to the rival
contentions canvassed by Learned Counsel for the parties. I have
also carefully perused the averments and documents relied upon
and the citations made at the Bar.
(2012) 2 SCC 93
2021 SCC OnLine Sikk 69
2025 SCC OnLine Sikk 89
WP(C) No.68 of 2025
TT Energy Private Limited
7.
vs. The Principal Chief Engineer-cum-Secretary, Energy & Power Department and Another
This Court is now called upon to examine and determine
firstly the maintainability of the Writ Petition, in light of the
existence of the arbitration clause in the IA.
8.
Admittedly, the IA was executed between the opposing
parties on 03-09-2008 followed by a Supplementary Agreement
(SA) dated 11-03-2010. Article 9 of the SA provides at 9.1 inter alia
that all matter, questions, disputes or difference whatsoever arising
between the parties in respect of construction, meaning, operation
or effect of the contract or relating to the Contract of breach
thereof, shall be settled by way of arbitration, in accordance with
the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which
would include any statutory modification or variation thereof.
Reference in case of such disputes would be to a Single Arbitrator in
case the parties agreed upon one and in the absence of such
agreement, by reference to three Arbitrators, one to be appointed
by the first party and one to be appointed by the second party. The
two Arbitrators then would appoint the third Arbitrator.
Records
also reveal (Annexures R1 and R2) that the Petitioner had suggested
three names for selection of Arbitrator on 06-07-2015. Vide letter
dated
22-08-2015,
the
Respondent
No.1
had
proposed
the
appointment of Justice Malay Sengupta, former Judge of this High
Court as the sole Arbitrator. This choice was duly confirmed by the
Petitioner vide letter dated 03-09-2008 (Annexure R3).
(i)
Relevantly, reference at this juncture can be made to
Section 2(b) of the Arbitration Act which defines an arbitration
agreement to mean the agreement referred to in Section 7. As per
Section 7, an arbitration agreement is an agreement by the parties
to submit to arbitration, all or certain disputes, which have arisen or
WP(C) No.68 of 2025
TT Energy Private Limited
vs. The Principal Chief Engineer-cum-Secretary, Energy & Power Department and Another
which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal
relationship whether contractual or not. It further provides that an
arbitration agreement would be in the form of an arbitration clause
in a contract, or in the form of a separate agreement.
The
arbitration agreement is necessarily to be in writing.
9.
It is pertinent to notice that the object of Business
entities opting for arbitration is to obviate cumbersome judicial
processes. In Bihar State Mineral Development Corporation and Another
vs. Encon Builders (I) (P) Ltd.9
the Supreme Court enlisted the
essential elements of an arbitration agreement viz., (a) There must
be
a present or
future
difference
in connection with some
contemplated affair; (b) There must be the intention of the parties
to settle such disputes by a private tribunal; (c) The parties must
agree in writing to be bound by the decision of such tribunal; and
(d) The parties must be ad idem.
(i)
There is no dispute with regard to the inclusion of the
arbitration clause in the IA which indubitably is a written agreement.
That having been said, it is essential to consider the provisions of
Section 16 of the Arbitration Act which provides as follows;
“16. Competence of arbitral tribunal to rule on
its jurisdiction.—(1) The arbitral tribunal may rule on
its own jurisdiction, including ruling on any objections
with respect to the existence or validity of the
arbitration agreement, and for that purpose,—
(a)
an arbitration agreement which forms
part of a contract shall be treated as
an agreement independent of the
other terms of the contract; and
(b)
a decision by the arbitral tribunal that
the contract is null and void shall not
entail ipso jure the invalidity of the
arbitration clause.”
[emphasis supplied]
(2003) 7 SCC 418
WP(C) No.68 of 2025
TT Energy Private Limited
(ii)
vs. The Principal Chief Engineer-cum-Secretary, Energy & Power Department and Another
In
Interplay
between
Arbitration
Agreements
under
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Stamp Act, 1899, In Re
the
Supreme Court had been called upon to resolve an issue which
arose in the context of three Statutes.
During the discussions, it
was held that a plain reading of the Section may suggest that
Section 16 has incorporated the separability presumption only for
the particular purpose of allocation of competence over jurisdictional
disputes. However, the Digest of Case Laws on UNCITRAL Model Law
states that the language used in the second sentence does not
prevent the application of the separability presumption when a
jurisdictional question is raised before a Court.
The separability
presumption contained in Article 16(1) states a general rule of
contractual validity which is applicable for all purposes. That, the
judicial view that emerges from the Indian Courts also seems to
suggest that an arbitration agreement is treated as distinct and
separate from the underlying contract as a general rule of
substantive validity. Section 16(1)(b) provides that, a decision by
the Arbitral Tribunal that the contract is null and void, shall not
entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause.
It thus
concludes that, even if the underlying contract is declared null and
void it would not result in the invalidity of the arbitration agreement.
The Supreme Court detailed as extracted hereinbelow;
“120. In view of the above discussion, we
formulate our conclusions on this aspect. First, the
separability presumption contained in Section 16 is
applicable not only for the purpose of determining the
jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal. It encapsulates the
general rule on the substantive independence of an
arbitration agreement. Second, parties to an arbitration
agreement mutually intend to confer jurisdiction on the
Arbitral Tribunal to determine questions as to
jurisdiction as well as substantive contractual disputes
between them. The separability presumption gives
(2024) 6 SCC 1
WP(C) No.68 of 2025
TT Energy Private Limited
vs. The Principal Chief Engineer-cum-Secretary, Energy & Power Department and Another
effect to this by ensuring the validity of an arbitration
agreement contained in an underlying contract,
notwithstanding the invalidity, illegality, or termination
of such contract. Third, when the parties append their
signatures to a contract containing an arbitration
agreement,
they
are
regarded
in
effect
as
independently appending their signatures to the
arbitration agreement. The reason is that the parties
intend to treat an arbitration agreement contained in
an underlying contract as distinct from the other terms
of the contract; and Fourth, the validity of an
arbitration agreement, in the face of the invalidity of
the underlying contract, allows the Arbitral Tribunal to
assume jurisdiction and decide on its own jurisdiction
by determining the existence and validity of the
arbitration agreement. In the process, the separability
presumption gives effect to the doctrine of
competence-competence.”
(iii)
Undeniably the legal position is that, the concept of
‘separability’ or ‘severability’ of an arbitration agreement from the
underlying contract is a legal fiction, which acknowledges the
separate nature of an arbitration agreement. The concept of
separability reflects the presumptive intention of the parties to
distinguish the underlying contract, which captures the substantive
rights and obligations of the parties, from an arbitration agreement
which provides a procedural framework to resolve the disputes
arising out of the underlying contract. This presumption has various
consequences in theory and practice, the most important being that
an arbitration agreement survives the invalidity or termination of
the underlying contract.
(iv)
In National Agricultural Coop. Marketing Federation India
Ltd. vs. Gains Trading Ltd.
the Court was considering an application
under Section 11 and whether an Arbitration clause would come to
an end if the Contract containing such clause in repudiated.
The
Court was of the view that even if the underlying Contract comes to
an end, the arbitration agreement contained in such Contract
(2007) 5 SCC 692
WP(C) No.68 of 2025
TT Energy Private Limited
vs. The Principal Chief Engineer-cum-Secretary, Energy & Power Department and Another
survives for the purpose of resolution of disputes between the
parties.
(v)
The concept of separability having been clarified it may
be pointed out that regardless of the Contract existing or not if an
arbitration clause is embedded in the Contract, such remedy is to be
exhausted first.
(vi)
In this context, this Court in Linkwell Telesystems (supra)
had referred to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court wherein it
was inter alia held as follows;
“6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, recently
in Bhaven Construction through Authorised Signatory
Premjibhai K. Shah v. Executive Engineer Sardar
Sarovar Narmada Nigam Ltd. [2021 SCC OnLine SC 8]
referred to the ratio in Nivedita Sharma v. Cellular
Operators Association of India [(2011) 14 SCC 337] and
inter alia observed as follows;
“17. In any case, the hierarchy in our
legal framework, mandates that a legislative
enactment cannot curtail a Constitutional right.
In Nivedita
Sharma v. Cellular
Operators
Association of India, (2011) 14 SCC 337, this
Court referred to several judgments and held:
“11. We have considered the
respective arguments/submissions. There
cannot be any dispute that the power of
the High Courts to issue directions, orders
or writs including writs in the nature
of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus,
quo warranto and prohibition under Article
226 of the Constitution is a basic feature
of the Constitution and cannot be curtailed
by parliamentary legislation - L. Chandra
Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC
261. However, it is one thing to say that
in exercise of the power vested in it
under Article 226 of the Constitution, the
High Court can entertain a writ petition
against any order passed by or action
taken by the State and/or its agency/
instrumentality or any public authority or
order
passed
by
a
quasi-judicial
body/authority, and it is an altogether
different thing to say that each and every
petition filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution must be entertained by the
High Court as a matter of course ignoring
the fact that the aggrieved person has an
effective alternative remedy. Rather, it is
settled law that when a statutory forum is
created by law for redressal of grievances,
WP(C) No.68 of 2025
TT Energy Private Limited
vs. The Principal Chief Engineer-cum-Secretary, Energy & Power Department and Another
a writ petition should not be entertained
ignoring the statutory dispensation.”
(emphasis supplied)
18. It is therefore, prudent for a Judge to
not exercise discretion to allow judicial
interference beyond the procedure established
under the enactment. This power needs to be
exercised in exceptional rarity, wherein one
party is left remediless under the statute or a
clear 'bad faith' shown by one of the parties.
This high standard set by this Court is in terms
of the legislative intention to make the
arbitration fair and efficient.”
In the above extracted matter, the RFP contained an “arbitration
agreement” as defined under Section 7 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996.
Consequently, the Court opined that the
Petitioner had failed to put forth any exceptional circumstances for
invoking the Writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India when an arbitration clause was existing in the
contract between the parties.
(vii)
In Swadhi Health Management (supra) this Court was
again considering a contract between parties into
which an
arbitration clause was embedded. Reference was made to a plethora
of Judgments of the Supreme Court including that of Union of India
vs. Parmar Construction Company12, where a dispute had arisen
between the Contractors and the Railway Establishment in the
context of payment of escalated cost as demanded by the
Respondent Contractors. An arbitration clause existed in the
agreement. The Supreme Court observed inter alia in Paragraph 39
that, it is advisable for the Court to ensure that the remedy provided
as agreed between the parties in terms of the Contract is first
exhausted.
This exact same view was also posited in Northern
(2019) 15 SCC 682
WP(C) No.68 of 2025
TT Energy Private Limited
Railways
vs. The Principal Chief Engineer-cum-Secretary, Energy & Power Department and Another
Administration,
Ministry
Engineering Company Limited
10.
of
Railway,
New
Delhi vs. Patel
.
It is therefore no more res integra that the arbitration
clause cannot be ousted merely on the ground that the Court has
powers to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution.
11.
In light of the foregoing discussions, it needs no
reiteration that an arbitration clause was inserted in the IA and an
Arbitrator selected by the contending parties.
Be that as it may,
regardless of the IA subsisting or not (as the dispute between the
parties pivots on this point), the arbitration clause, which as already
discussed, if it is embedded in the contract survives for the purpose
of resolution of disputes between the parties, in view of the concept
of separability which is therefore applicable to the instant case.
12.
It may be noted that no discussions on the merits of the
matter have ensued.
13.
In conclusion, the Writ Petition is not maintainable and
is disposed of accordingly.
14.
Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
( Meenakshi Madan Rai )
Judge
09-04-2026
Approved for reporting : Yes
ds/sdl
(2008) 10 SCC 240
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