Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Before:
The Hon’ble Justice Anuj Singh.
W.P.A. No. 25798 of 2023
Trina Halder& Ors.
v.
The State of West Bengal & Ors.
For the Petitioner : Mr. Arka Pratim Chowdhury
Ms. Puja Rajbhor
Mr. Swattik Batabyal
……… Advocate.
For the State
: Mr. Goutam Misra
……… Advocate
Heard on
: 28.09.2026
Judgement on
: 09.10.2026
Anuj Singh, J:.
1. The instant writ petition has been filed by the writ petitioners
inter
alia,
praying
for
expunging
their
names
from
the
Bidhannagar North Police Station Case No. 169 of 2021,
registered for investigation into the offences punishable under
sections 143/341/269/270 and 188 of Indian Penal Code, along
with Section 51 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005.
2. The Petitioners herein are a group of persons, who at all material
times, were aggrieved by the manner of recruitment by School
Service Commission. The writ petitioners contend that in order to
express their grievances against improper recruitment procedure
adopted by the School Service Commission, the Petitioners
started peaceful protest on 28.09.2021.
3. The said petitioners further contend that they wanted to express
their grievances in front of Sri Bratya Basu, the Hon’ble
Education Minister of Government of West Bengal, and thus went
in front of his house, to protest against hunger, unemployment
and illegal recruitment. However, Bidhannagar North Police
Station Case No. 169 of 2021, registered for investigation into the
offences punishable under sections 143/341/269/270 and 188 of
Indian Penal Code, along with Section 51 of the Disaster
Management Act, 2005. The investigation of the case is said to be
pending.
4. The complaint was lodged by SI Suman Roy. A perusal of the
complaint, which led to registration of FIR, reveals that:
(a) On 05.08.2021, the complainant found the candidates of SLST
assembled near Mayukh Bhawan, Salt Lake, heading towards
Bikash Bhawan to demonstrate by raising slogans and halla to
fulfil their demands.
(b) It was stated that the same violated COVID protocols and
order under Section 144 Cr.P.C. It is mentioned that they did
not disperse on being asked and tried to obstruct the way of
public navigation and restrained the officials from discharging
their duties.
(c) Thirteen persons, including the six petitioners were arrested
and the above acts constituted the offense punishable under
sections 143/341/269/270 and188 of Indian Penal Code,
along with Section 51 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005.
5. By way of the instant writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution, the writ petitioners have prayed for Writ in nature of
mandamus to strike off the names of petitioner from Bidhannagar
North Police Station Case No. 169 of 2021 registered for
investigation
into
the
offences
punishable
under
sections
143/341/269/270 and 188 of Indian Penal Code, along with
Section 51 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005.
6. Ld. Advocate for the Petitioners submits that the Petitioners were
exercising their right to assemble peacefully and voice their
grievances under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution
of India. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance
upon the decision of the Madras High Court in J. Jayaraj v. The
Chief Educational Officer, W.P.(MD) Nos. 13409 to 13415 of 2022,
in support of the arguments that petitioners have a right to
protest peacefully. It is further submitted that the police
authorities were not authorised by Respondent No. 1 to take
action against the Petitioners, as no notification/notice was
issued in 2021 authorising such action against peaceful assembly
and protest.
7. Reliance has been also placed on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Re: Ramlila Maidan Incident v. Home Secretary, Union of India,
2012 AIR SCW 2660, to contend that an order under Section 144
Cr.P.C. requires urgency necessitating immediate and speedy
intervention and must disclose the material facts warranting such
intervention, whereas no grave or severe offence was made out
from the Petitioners’ protest.
8. It is further submitted that this Court, in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, may prevent
abuse of process and quash proceedings where the allegations do
not disclose a prima facie offence. The Learned counsel for the
petitioner has placed reliance on State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga
Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522 and State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal,
1992 AIR 604.
9. It is further submitted that the Petitioners have sought quashing
of the investigation arising out of Bidhannagar North Police
Station Case No. 169 of 2021 registered for investigation into the
offences punishable under sections 143/341/269/270 and 188 of
Indian Penal Code, along with Section 51 of the Disaster
Management Act, 2005, as continuation thereof would amount to
an abuse of process of law and cause serious prejudice to the
Petitioners by saddling them with a criminal record and adversely
affecting their prospects of employment.
10.
Learned Advocate representing the State has opposed the
instant writ petition. Ld. Advocate has argued that the petition is
not maintainable and deserves to be dismissed.
11.
I have heard the learned advocates representing the
petitioner and the State.
12.
The power of the High Court to quash an FIR may be
exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as well as
under its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. In
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, which
itself arose from a proceeding under Article 226, the Supreme
Court, after considering R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960
SC 866, laid down in paragraph 102 the following categories of
cases in which such power may be exercised either to prevent
abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends
of justice:
“(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they
are taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence
or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying
the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers under
Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order
of a Magistrate within the purview of Section
155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in
the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
support
of
the
same
do
not
disclose
the
commission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only
a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is
permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2)
of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint
are
so
absurd
and
inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that there
is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted
in any of the provisions of the Code or the
concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding
is instituted) to the institution and continuance of
the proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of
the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge.”
13.
In Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful
Haque, (2005) 1 SCC 122 (paragraphs 8 to 11), the Court
reiterated that the inherent power is to be exercised ex debito
justitiae to do real and substantial justice. The Court would be
justified in quashing a proceeding if its initiation or continuance
amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court; and that, when
a proceeding is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into
the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and
whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are
accepted in toto. At the same time, the Court cautioned that the
High Court ought not to embark upon an enquiry into the
reliability of the allegations, nor analyse the case in the light of
probabilities to determine whether a conviction would be
sustainable.
14.
In
Neeharika
Maharashtra,
(2021)
Infrastructure
SCC
(P)
401,
Ltd.
the
v.
State
Supreme
of
Court
summarised the position in paragraph 33. The police have the
statutory right and duty to investigate a cognizable offence and
courts would not thwart any investigation into cognizable
offences. It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence
of any kind is disclosed in the FIR that the Court will not permit
the investigation to go on. The Court, having regard to the
parameters in R.P. Kapur and Bhajan Lal, has the jurisdiction to
quash the FIR but, while examining an FIR, it has to consider
only whether the allegations disclose the commission of a
cognizable offence, and not the merits of the allegations.
15.
It is a well-settled principle of law that if the FIR does not
disclose the commission of an offence, the Court would be
justified in quashing the proceedings to prevent the abuse of
process of law (Geeta Mehrotra v. State of U.P., (2012) 10 SCC
741).
16.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chanchalpati Das v. State
of West Bengal, 2023 INSC 554, in paras 12, 13, observed that
except for bald allegations made in the complaint, no material
was produced by the complainant to substantiate the allegations
and considered it rightly to quash the proceedings to prevent the
abuse of process of law and to secure ends of justice.
17.
Further, when it is alleged that the proceedings are
vexatious or frivolous or instituted with an ulterior motive, then it
is the duty of the court to look at the attending circumstances
and read between the lines with due care and circumspection,
and not confine itself merely to the bare words of the FIR
(Mohammad Wajid v. State of UP, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 951,
paras 36-38; Mahmood Ali v. State of UP, (2023) 15 SCC 488,
paras 12, 13).
18.
In Kumaresam v. The State, Crl. O.P (MD) No. 17218 of
2023, the Petitioners were situated in a similar factual position,
wherein they assembled together and protested during the
COVID-19 lockdown period, and were charged with Sections 143,
341, 269 and 270 of IPC. Madras High Court, vide Order dated
26.09.2023, quashed the proceedings, holding that the FIR does
not contain averments to attract the aforesaid provisions and no
ingredients of any offence alleged against the Petitioners were
sustained by the FIR.
19.
Thus, this Court is empowered under Article 226 to quash
the proceedings in cases where there are mere bald allegations,
which do not disclose the commission of an offence. It is the duty
of this Court to have a meaningful reading of the FIR as a whole,
and the Court must be able to find who is alleged to have
committed the act, what was the act, and how it satisfies each
ingredient of the offence charged.
20.
In light of the above settled position of law with regard to
quashing of investigation of a case, it is necessary to examine the
allegations which are forming the subject matter of Bidhannagar
North Police Station Case No. 169 of 2021 registered for
investigation
into
the
offences
punishable
under
sections
143/341/269/270 and 188 of Indian Penal Code, along with
Section 51 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005. The allegations
contained in the FIR must be examined and accepted on their
face value and believed to be true. This court is not required to
look into the defense of the petitioners. The limited question that
may be looked into is whether the conduct attributed to the
petitioners discloses the essential ingredients of the offences
charged.
21.
The FIR proceeds on the allegations that on 05.08.2021, the
candidates of SLST assembled near Mayukh Bhawan, Salt Lake,
heading towards Bikash Bhawan to demonstrate by raising
slogans and halla to fulfil their demands. It was alleged that the
same was in violation of COVID protocols and order under
Section 144 Cr.P.C. It is further alleged that on being asked, the
candidates did not disperse and tried to obstruct the way of
public navigation and restrained the officials from discharging
their duties. On such allegations Sections 143, 188, 341, 269 and
270 of IPC and Section 51 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005
have been invoked.
22.
In order to attract the penal provision of Section 143 of the
Indian Penal Code, it must be alleged that the accused was a
member of an unlawful assembly. An unlawful assembly is
defined under Section 141 IPC as an assembly of five or more
persons only if its common object is one of the five objects
enumerated therein, namely, to overawe by criminal force, or
show of criminal force, the Government or any public servant in
the exercise of his lawful power, to resist the execution of any law
or legal process, to commit any mischief, criminal trespass or
other offence, to take or obtain possession of property by criminal
force, or to compel any person by criminal force to do what he is
not legally bound to do.
23.
Even if the allegations in the present FIR are accepted in
their entirety, they fall short of the requirements to be considered
as an unlawful assembly. The FIR does not disclose the common
object with which the assembly was formed, and unless the
common object is one of the five objects enumerated under
section 141, it cannot be held as an unlawful assembly. In
Association for Protection of Democratic Rights v. State of West
Bengal, 2007 (4) CHN 842, in para 82, the Calcutta High Court
observed that:-
“82. … Article 19(1)(b) of the Constitution of India confers upon all
citizens of India to right to assemble peaceably. Therefore, any
large assembly of demonstrator would not per se be either illegal or
unconstitutional…”
Thus, mere protest and raising slogans cannot be said to be an
unlawful common object under section 141. Hence, the conduct
described, therefore, does not attract section 143.
24.
It is a well-settled position of law that right to assemble
peaceably and without arms, and to express their voice, is
guaranteed by Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b), subject to reasonable
restrictions. In plethora of judgements, including the decision of
the Madras High Court in J. Jayaraj (supra) and the Supreme
Court in Javed Ahmad Hajam v. State of Maharashtra, (2024)
4 SCC 156, it was held that the right to dissent, criticise and
peacefully protest against the Government, in a legitimate and
lawful manner is integral and essential part of democracy in view
of
Articles
19(1)
and
of
the
Constitution.
Thus,
a
demonstration does not become an offence merely because it was
unwelcome to those in authority.
25.
In order to attract the penal provisions of Section 188 of the
Indian Penal Code, it must be alleged that the accused, being in
knowledge that there exists an order promulgated by a public
servant which directs him to abstain from certain acts, disobeyed
such promulgation, causing or tend to cause obstruction,
annoyance, injury to any person lawfully employed, or danger to
human life. The FIR alleges the petitioners conduct as obstruction
and violation of Memo No. 743/CP/BDN/C dated 14.07.2021,
promulgated under Section 144 Cr.P.C. to attract the offence
under Section 188 IPC. However, it does not place the order on
record and does not describe how the conduct of the petitioners
caused or tend to cause obstruction any person lawfully employed
or danger to human life. It is merely alleged that the petitioners
did not pay heed to officer’s request, causing obstruction of public
navigation and restraining officers from discharging their duties,
but does not describe how their conduct caused obstruction of
public navigation or restrained the officers in discharging their
duties. Further, in Re: Ramlila Maidan Incident (supra), the
Supreme Court held that an order under Section 144 Cr.P.C.
must set out the material facts and may be used only in grave
circumstances. The FIR does not describe whether the present
case was a grave situation where the said order under section 144
Cr.P.C. could be applied. Thus, the essential ingredients of
section 188 IPC are not satisfied.
26.
In order to attract the penal provisions of Section 341 of the
Indian Penal Code, it must be alleged that the accused voluntarily
obstructed a person so as to prevent that person from proceeding
in any direction in which he had a right to proceed. In Keki
Hormusji Gharda v. Mehervan Rustom Irani, (2009) 6 SCC
475, the Supreme Court, held that for an offence of wrong
restraint, the word “voluntary” is essential and the obstruction
should be restriction on the normal movement of a person.
Further, there must be an identifiable person who was so
obstructed. In Arjun v. State of Tamil Nadu, Crl. O.P.(MD) No.
21582 of 2025, the Madras High Court observed that there was
no specific allegation as to who was restrained, in what manner,
and for what duration, thus offence of wrongful restraint was not
attracted. The FIR merely alleges that the group "tried to obstruct
the way of public navigation". It does not name any person who
was prevented from proceeding in any direction, in what manner,
or for what duration, thus the conduct described does not attract
Section 341.
27.
It is further necessary to examine whether the essential
ingredients of Sections 269 and 270 IPC is attracted. In order to
attract Sections 269 and 270, the accused must do an unlawful
or negligent act (Section 269), or a malignant act (Section 270),
which he knows or has reason to believe is likely to spread the
infection of a disease dangerous to life.
28.
The allegations in the FIR do not disclose any specific act
that was likely to spread infection, and nothing is alleged from
which malignity as under Section 270 IPC could be inferred. The
Delhi High Court, in Anupam Shahu v. State, 2026 SCC
OnLineDel 5275, held that to attract the provisions of Section
269 and 270, it must be shown that the accused was infected or
had had reason to believe that he was carrying the disease.
Relevant portion of the judgement is reproduced herein under:
“27. Section 269 IPC punishes one who “unlawfully or
negligently does any act which is, and which he knows or
has reason to believe to be, likely to spread the infection of
any disease dangerous to life”. Section 270 IPC punishes
the same act when done “malignantly”.
28. Applying these provisions in the context of COVID-19,
they presuppose, at the very least, an allegation that the
accused was infected, knew or had reason to believe that he
was so infected, and nonetheless committed an act likely to
spread the infection.
29. The present case stands on an even weaker footing. The
petitioner was never tested for COVID-19 — neither at the
picket, nor at the police station, nor at any point thereafter.
The prosecution does not even allege that he was infected,
suspected of being infected, or symptomatic. The only act
attributed to the petitioner is that he was walking alone on
a public road. In the absence of any material or allegation
to establish that the petitioner was carrying an infectious
disease, the very foundation for involving Sections 269 and
270 IPC is absent.”
In the present case as well, the FIR does not disclose whether
there was any reason to believe that the petitioners were carrying
any disease or were infected with COVID-19.
29.
Further, in K. Naina Mohamed v. The State, Crl. O.P.
(MD) No. 13798 of 2023, the Madras High Court, vide Order
dated 26.09.2023, observed that no specific act was shown to
demonstrate the possibility of spreading COVID-19 disease by the
Petitioners, nor was it mentioned that the Petitioners were
infected with COVID-19 disease, thus not attracting Sections
269/270.
30.
To attract the penal provision of section 51 of the Disaster
Management Act, 2005, it has to be alleged that the accused,
without reasonable cause, obstructed an officer or employee
acting under the Act, or refuse to comply with a direction given
under the Act by the Central or State Government or an authority
constituted under it.
31.
In this respect, the FIR alleges that the Petitioners
assembled “by completely violating the rules of COVID Protocol”.
The FIR merely states that Order No. 753/IV-ISS/2M-22/2020
dated 29.07.2021 of the Health & Family Welfare Department was
violated, but it does not disclose whether which particular
protocol was violated, the manner in which it was violated, and by
whom it was violated. In a plethora of cases, the High Courts have
quashed the proceedings when the specific guideline of the
COVID protocols, which was violated by the Petitioners were not
prescribed. In decisions of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in
Pawan Giri v. State of Haryana, CRM-M-51595-2021, and
Telangana High Court in Gurram Venkat Ramana v. State of
Telangana, Crl. Petition No. 8550 of 2024, it was observed that
in the absence of the exact guideline alleged to have been
violated, there can be no presumption that the act of the
Petitioners was unlawful. Further, when there is no specific
mention that the Petitioners obstructed any officer or refused to
comply with the directions of the Government, the offence under
Section 51 of Disaster Management Act, 2005, is not attracted as
has been held by this Court in Amit Chouhan v. State of West
Bengal, in C.R.R. 3023 of 2022, vide Order dated 08.08.2024.
32.
Thus, a bare reading of FIR does not disclose the
ingredients of any of the offences invoked in the FIR, and no
prima facie case is made out against the Petitioners. It is an
unavoidable inference that the Petitioners are being punished for
the protest, making it a vexatious and frivolous proceeding. Thus,
the present case clearly falls within the category (1), (3) and (7) of
Bhajan Lal (supra).
33.
In view of the settled principle of law that when commission
of any offence is not disclosed on a careful and constructive
reading of the FIR as a whole, the court is empowered to quash
such proceedings to prevent any further abuse of process of law
and in order to meet the ends of justice.
34.
In view of the foregoing, Bidhannagar North Police Station
Case No. 169 of 2021 dated 5th August 2021, registered under
Sections 143, 188, 341, 269 and 270 IPC and Section 51 of the
Disaster
Management
Act,
2005,
and
all
consequential
proceedings arising therefrom, including G.R. Case No. 901 of
2021 pending before the learned Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Bidhannagar, are quashed.
35.
the
Let a copy of this judgement be communicated forthwith to
concerned
criminal
court
and
the
Officer-in-Charge,
Bidhannagar North Police Station.
36.
W.P.A. 25798 of 2023 is allowed. There shall be no order as
to costs.
37.
Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgement, if applied
for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite
formalities.
(Anuj Singh J.)
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review