The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
16. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, this Court finds no illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error in the order dated 22.12.2012 passed by the Joint Agrarian Reforms Commissioner, Jammu, or in the judgment dated
31. 12.2014 passed by the J&K Special Tribunal, Jammu, warranting interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed, along with all connected application(s), if any. The interim direction(s), if any, shall stand vacated. It is, however, clarified that this judgment shall not prejudice the adjudication of any independent proceedings concerning any other mutations, stated to be pending before the competent authority, which shall be decided on its own merits and in accordance with law. (Sanjay Parihar) Judge Jammu
Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
Sr. No. 12
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
ATJAMMU
Pronounced on 18.08.2026
Uploaded on 27.08.2026.
WP(C) No. 1623/2020
Tirath Ram
.....Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s)
Through :- Mr. O. P. Thakur, Sr. Advocate
with
Ms. Neha Abrol, Advocate.
v/s
J&K Special Tribunal Jammu and
Ors.
.....Respondent(s)
Through :- Ms. Nisha Kangotra, Advocate vice
Mrs. Monika Kohli, Sr. AAG
Mr. Vikram Sharma, Sr. Advocate
with
Mr. Sachin Dev Singh, Advocate &
Mr. Rameez Khan, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PARIHAR, JUDGE
ORDER
18.08.2026
01. The petitioner, by invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article
226 of the Constitution of India, has called in question Mutation Nos. 2819 and
2842 dated 09.08.1990, attested by the Tehsildar, Jammu, in respect of land
measuring 15 Kanals and 08 Marlas, comprising Khasra No. 14 (3 Kanals 19
Marlas), Khasra No. 14 Min (5 Kanals 18 Marlas) and Khasra No. 60 Min (5
Kanals 11 Marlas), situated at Toph Sherkhania, Hazuri Bagh, Bohri, Tehsil and
District Jammu.
2. The petitioner also seeks quashing, by issuance of a writ of certiorari, of the
order dated 22.12.2012 passed by the Joint Agrarian Reforms Commissioner,
Jammu, as also the judgment dated 31.12.2014 passed by the J&K Special
WP(C) No. 1623/2020
Tribunal, Jammu, whereby the mutations in question came to be upheld. A
consequential writ of mandamus directing the official respondents to reconsider
and pass fresh orders in respect of the aforesaid mutations has also been sought.
3. The controversy has its genesis in a dispute amongst three brothers, namely,
the petitioner, late Prem Chand, predecessor-in-interest of respondent Nos. 3/4
to 8, and respondent No. 12. The dispute pertained to mutations recorded under
Sections 4 and 8 of the Agrarian Reforms Act in favour of late Prem Chand on
the basis of his cultivating possession during Kharif 1971.The case set up by the
petitioner is that the father of the three brothers had died prior to 1971 and that
the brothers constituted a joint family. Consequently, according to the petitioner,
cultivation by one brother ought to have been treated as cultivation on behalf of
all three brothers, thereby entitling each of them to an equal share in the land.
4. The record, however, reveals that the dispute amongst the parties was taken
before the Civil Court in a suit titled “Prem Chand v. Tirath Ram & Ors.” The
parties entered into a compromise, pursuant where to a compromise decree was
passed on 07.05.1988, followed by a final decree dated 10.06. 1988. On the
strength of the said decree and settlement, Mutation Nos. 2819, 2842 and 3391
came to be attested by the Tehsildar, Jammu, in August 1990. The mutations
were subsequently upheld by the Joint Agrarian Reforms Commissioner,
Jammu, vide order dated 22.12.2012, and the said order was affirmed by the
J&K Special Tribunal, Jammu, vide judgment dated 31.12. 2014. Significantly,
the compromise decree dated 10.06.1988 has admittedly never been challenged
by the petitioner or otherwise set aside by any competent Court.
5. The record further indicates that, subsequent to the compromise decree, late
Prem Chand instituted another suit in the year 1995 seeking injunction against
Tirath Kumar and Shanti Devi, mother of the parties, in respect of his claimed
share in Khasra Nos. 14 and 14 Min. The said suit is stated to have been decreed
ex parte by the Court of Munsiff, Jammu, vide judgment dated 28.03.1995.
6. The principal contention of the petitioner is that the compromise decree was a
nullity in the eyes of law, as the Civil Court could not have determined rights in
respect of land which was the subject matter of proceedings under the Agrarian
Reforms Act. It is accordingly urged that the mutations subsequently attested on
the basis of such decree are equally unsustainable. The petitioner asserts that
each of the three brothers was entitled to a 1/3rd share in the total land
measuring 15 Kanals and 08 Marlas and that the mutations in question, insofar
as they recognise rights contrary thereto, are liable to be set aside.
7. The petitioner has further relied upon proceedings in OWP No. 94/2015,
earlier instituted by respondent No. 12. According to the petitioner, although he
was arrayed as a respondent therein, the proceedings were being pursued with
his consent and support. He alleges that respondent No. 12 subsequently
withdrew the writ petition without his knowledge. It is also alleged that
respondent Nos. 3 to 8 entered into an arrangement with respondent No. 12
whereby an amount of approximately ₹48 lakhs was paid to respondent No. 12
in lieu of his share. According to the petitioner, such arrangement constitutes an
admission that the three brothers had equal rights in the property. The petitioner
further pleads that, being in the Army, he could not independently and
effectively pursue the litigation earlier and had, therefore, supported respondent
No. 12. It was only after his retirement that he started pursuing the matter
independently and allegedly discovered collusion between respondent Nos. 3 to
8 and respondent No. 12 intended to deprive him of his lawful share.
08. The respondents have resisted the petition primarily on the ground that the
rights of the parties had already been conclusively settled by the compromise
decree dated 10.06.1988, to which the petitioner was himself a party. According
to the respondents, the petitioner has selectively questioned the consequential
mutations while deliberately avoiding a challenge to the foundational
compromise decree. The decree having attained finality, it is contended that the
petitioner cannot indirectly reopen the settlement by invoking the extraordinary
writ jurisdiction of this Court.
09. The respondents further submit that, under the compromise, out of 5 Kanals
and 10 Marlas, late Prem Chand agreed to give 2 Kanals and 10 Marlas to the
petitioner, 2 Kanals to respondent No. 12 and 1 Kanal to their mother, Shanti
Devi. The settlement was acted upon, possession was delivered accordingly and
the mutations were subsequently attested in implementation thereof. It is further
contended that Mutation No. 8643 dated 29.11.2003, pertaining to inheritance in
favour of respondent Nos. 3 to 8, has no direct bearing upon the validity of the
mutations presently under challenge.
10. Having considered the pleadings and the material placed on record, the
central question that arises for determination is whether the petitioner can, in
exercise of writ jurisdiction, challenge the mutations and the orders passed by
the revenue authorities without first successfully assailing the compromise
decree which constitutes the foundation of the subsequent arrangement between
the parties. There is no dispute that the petitioner was a party to the civil
proceedings culminating in the compromise decree dated 10.06.1988. Equally
undisputed is the fact that the said decree has neither been set aside nor modified
by any competent Court and continues to hold the field. A party to a
compromise decree cannot ordinarily accept the decree for decades and
thereafter seek to avoid its consequences by challenging only the consequential
revenue entries. So long as the foundational decree subsists, the consequential
actions taken in implementation thereof cannot ordinarily be invalidated merely
by questioning them independently of the decree.
11. The contention that the compromise decree was inherently without
jurisdiction and, therefore, a nullity does not, in the facts and circumstances of
the present case, persuade this Court to exercise its extraordinary writ
jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner. A mere assertion that a decree is void or
without jurisdiction does not, by itself, efface a decree which continues to
subsist and has never been set aside, recalled or otherwise annulled in
proceedings known to law. So long as such decree remains operative, its legal
consequences cannot be ignored merely on the basis of a collateral challenge
raised at a considerably belated stage. Of significance is the fact that the
petitioner was himself a party to the compromise pursuant to which the decree
came to be passed. The settlement is also stated to have been acted upon by the
parties. The consequential mutations effected on its basis remained in operation
for a substantial period and were thereafter subjected to scrutiny before the
competent revenue authorities. These circumstances assume particular
importance while considering whether discretionary relief under Article 226 of
the Constitution ought to be granted at this distance of time.
12. In Triloki Nath Singh v. Anirudh Singh (D) through LRs.(2020) 6 SCC
629, the Supreme Court, while examining the statutory scheme governing
challenges to compromise decrees, emphasised the finality attaching to
settlements recorded by courts and the bar created by Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC
against a separate suit questioning a decree on the ground that the underlying
compromise was unlawful. The Court observed that the object of the 1976
amendment was to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and to ensure that disputes
concerning the validity of a compromise are raised in the manner contemplated
by Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC. It further recognised finality of adjudication as an
underlying principle governing judicial proceedings. The principle assumes still
greater relevance in the present case, where the petitioner was not a stranger to
the compromise but a party thereto. Having participated in the settlement and
allowed the decree, as well as the consequential revenue entries, to operate for a
considerable period, the petitioner cannot ordinarily circumvent the remedies
prescribed by law by seeking, in collateral writ proceedings, to have the decree
treated as non-existent.
13. The further contention that, since the parties constituted a joint family,
cultivation by one brother during Kharif 1971 must necessarily be treated as
cultivation on behalf of all three brothers is equally incapable of determination
in the present writ proceedings. The plea rests upon factual assumptions
concerning the nature of possession, cultivation and the inter se arrangement
between the parties and, therefore, raises disputed questions of fact requiring
evidence. Such issues cannot appropriately be reopened in exercise of writ
jurisdiction, particularly when the rights of the parties had earlier been dealt
with under a compromise decree and consequential revenue proceedings which
were allowed to attain finality. The petitioner's plea that he was unable to pursue
the matter independently because he was serving in the Army does not
materially alter the position. While such circumstance may explain his physical
absence for certain periods, it does not satisfactorily account for the failure to
question the compromise decree itself through an appropriate remedy. The
petitioner was admittedly aware of the dispute and, more importantly, was a
party to the proceedings culminating in the compromise. In as much as was all
along defending the mutations before authorities below.
14. His subsequent retirement from service cannot revive a challenge to a
settlement which had already been entered into, acted upon and followed by
consequential proceedings. Nor can retirement, by itself, furnish a legal ground
for unsettling rights which have remained crystallised for a considerable period
under proceedings that have attained finality. To permit such a challenge in writ
jurisdiction at this stage would amount to reopening concluded matters on
disputed questions of fact and would defeat the salutary principle of finality
attaching to judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. Accordingly, neither the
plea that the compromise decree was a nullity nor the assertion founded upon
joint-family cultivation furnishes, in the peculiar facts of the case, sufficient
ground for this Court to exercise its extraordinary and discretionary jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution.
15. Likewise, the alleged payment of approximately ₹48 lakhs by respondent
Nos. 3 to 8 to respondent No. 12 cannot, by itself, invalidate the earlier
compromise decree or the mutations attested pursuant thereto. Any subsequent
arrangement between some of the parties must be examined on its own terms
and cannot automatically be treated as an admission sufficient to extinguish or
vary rights flowing from an existing decree. The petitioner has also referred to
the inheritance mutation bearing No. 8643 dated 29.11.2003 and the revision
petition allegedly pending before the Financial Commissioner. The legality or
otherwise of that mutation must necessarily be determined in the proceedings in
which it has been specifically challenged. The pendency of such proceedings
does not furnish sufficient ground to invalidate Mutation Nos. 2819 and 2842 or
the orders presently impugned. Unless the foundational decree is displaced in
accordance with law, this Court finds no sufficient ground to interfere with the
consequential revenue orders merely on the basis of the pleas urged in the
present petition.
16. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, this Court finds no illegality,
perversity or jurisdictional error in the order dated 22.12.2012 passed by the
Joint Agrarian Reforms Commissioner, Jammu, or in the judgment dated
31.12.2014 passed by the J&K Special Tribunal, Jammu, warranting
interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed, along with all connected
application(s), if any. The interim direction(s), if any, shall stand vacated. It is,
however, clarified that this judgment shall not prejudice the adjudication of any
independent proceedings concerning any other mutations, stated to be pending
before the competent authority, which shall be decided on its own merits and in
accordance with law.
(Sanjay Parihar)
Judge
Jammu
18.08.2026
Javid Iqbal.
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review