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Serial No. 01
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WP(C) No. 75 of 2020
Date of Decision: 06.07.2023
Shri. Thuanguangpou Kamei
Vs.
State of Meghalaya & Ors.
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice H. S. Thangkhiew, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) :
Mr. S. Thapa, Adv. with
Mr. D. Thaimei, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
Mr. B. Bhattacharjee, AAG with
Ms. Z.E.Nongkynrih, GA(For R 1-4)
Mr. H. Abraham, Adv. (For R 5)
Dr. N. Mozika, DSGI with
Ms. S. Rumthao, Adv. (For R 6).
:
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
1.
This writ application has been filed seeking action against the
respondents for malicious persecution on the allegation that the
petitioner had been inflicted with wrongful arrest and kept in custody,
apart from custodial torture for a period of nearly 6(six) months, which
has infringed upon his right to life and liberty guaranteed under Article
21 of the Constitution of India. The prayer made is for compensation to
be paid to the petitioner for the humiliation and loss suffered by the
petitioner, apart from directions to initiate appropriate action against the
concerned officials.
2.
The facts necessary for consideration of the matter are that, the
petitioner an Ex-Army Serviceman was arrested on 13.05.2018, on the
basis of an FIR and the case registered thereon, being Jowai P.S Case
No. 105(5) 18 u/s 121/121A/120B/384 IPC read with Section 10/13 of
the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The allegation
contained therein was that, a banned outfit namely NSCN (K) Finance
Cell, had carried out illegal activities including extortion, wherein the
petitioner was allegedly involved. The investigation was then handed
over to the National Investigation Agency (NIA) and the case was reregistered. In due course of investigation, it was discovered that the
evidence was not sufficient to prosecute the petitioner at that stage, and
as such, the Special Judge NIA, Shillong, discharged the petitioner as
per the charge-sheet, as no evidence was found against him.
3.
Mr. S. Thapa, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted
that, the petitioner was made to languish for 6(six) months in custody
for no fault of his, and on release, he has lost face and respect in
society, for which the respondents are liable to make good by way of
adequately compensating him for the wrongful arrest. In support of his
case, the learned counsel has referred to the case of S. Nambi
Narayanan vs. Siby Mathews & Ors. reported in (2018) 10 SCC 804,
on the point of compensation being awarded on account of unlawful
arrest. Reliance has also been placed on the case of Sohan Lal & Ors.
vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (1990) 4 SCC 580, in the context of
the applicability of Section 319 of the CrPC. The learned counsel has
also referred to Paragraphs – 11 and 12 of the affidavit filed by the
respondent No. 6 (NIA) to buttress his case that, the arrest of the
petitioner was a case of mistaken identity. He therefore submits that,
the petitioner having been discharged on not being charged sheeted, it
was a clear case of malicious persecution, for which the respondents
were liable to pay compensation.
4.
Mr. S. Thapa, learned counsel has also placed judgments, that
notwithstanding Section 49(a) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Act, 1967 and Section 18 of the National Investigation Agency Act,
2008, this Court has ample jurisdiction in exercise of powers under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to award compensation, and in
support of his submissions, the learned counsel has cited the following
cases.
i)
Union of India & Ors. vs. Major General Shri. Kant
Sharma & Anr. reported in (2015) 6 SCC 773.
ii)
AIR 1962 Manipur 28, Oinam Apabi Singh vs. Imphal
Municipal Board.
He lastly submits that, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, as well as
various High Courts have viewed and taken serious exception to cases
involving an individual’s right to life and liberty guaranteed under
Article 21 of the Constitution, especially when such right is taken away
in a most casual and perfunctory manner, and in such cases, awarded
compensation to the victim under public law remedy by holding that,
compensation can be awarded by Constitutional Courts, for violation of
fundamental rights. Reference has been made by the learned counsel to
the following judgments.
i)
S. Nambi Narayanan vs. Siby Mathews & Ors. (supra)
ii)
Nilabati Behera (Smt) Alias Lalita Behera (Through
the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee) vs. State of
Orissa & Ors., (1993) 2 SCC 746
iii)
Rini Johar & Anr. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh &
Ors., (2016) 11 SCC 703
iv)
Judgment and Order dated 21.06.2023 passed in W.P.
(Cr.) No. 226 of 2014, Ajit Kumar vs. State of
Jharkhand by the Hon’ble High Court of Jharkhand
at Ranchi.
5.
Mr. B. Bhattacharjee, learned AAG assisted by Ms. Z.E.
Nongkynrih, learned GA for the State respondents No. 1-4 submits that
the petitioner was not yet an accused and infact was only a suspect, at
the time of his arrest and subsequent discharge. He submits that the
petitioner was in the company of the other accused persons on many
occasions, and as such, there was a prima facie ground for his
detention. The learned AAG, has taken this Court to the charge sheet
filed by the NIA, wherein at Para – 17.30, he submits, after the arrest of
the petitioner for his alleged complicity in connection with the case, no
charge sheet was filed against him due to insufficiency of evidence at
that stage, but that nevertheless, liberty was kept reserved to prosecute
the petitioner, if in the further course of investigation prosecutable
evidence was found. The petitioner he submits, was not charged
sheeted nor made an accused, and as such, there was no reason or
occasion for the learned Special Judge, NIA Court to pass an order of
discharge.
6.
The learned AAG on the point of Section 319 CrPC submits
that, the decision Sohan Lal & Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan (supra),
relied upon by the petitioner will have no application. To substantiate
this contention, the learned AAG has referred to Paragraphs – 14, 20,
21 and 27, to demonstrate that there was no legal bar for proceeding
against the petitioner under Section 319 CrPC. Further submission has
been made that, the other decision i.e., S. Nambi Narayanan vs. Siby
Mathews & Ors. (supra), will have no bearing in the instant case, as
the facts are totally dissimilar, inasmuch as, the allegation of espionage
against the scientists at ISRO, including the appellant (S. Nambi
Narayanan), were found to be false.
7.
The learned AAG has then referred to Section 49(a) of the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, which provides for
protection against prosecution or other legal proceedings for action
taken in good faith. He submits that, the petitioner being in the
company of the accused, had given rise to the necessity for his arrest in
connection with the investigation. The action by the Investigating
Agencies he submits, cannot be said to be unlawful, and it is not that a
false case had been made up against the petitioner, for which he was
taken into custody.
8.
Mr. H. Abraham, learned counsel appearing for the
Investigating Officer has relied upon his affidavit, and submits that on
the facts of the case and situation of the petitioner, the arrest of the
petitioner cannot be said to be wrongful, inasmuch as, he was
apprehended with another person, who was later, along with other
persons found to belong to the NSCN-K, a banned outfit, and further
that incriminating materials had also been discovered. Moreover, he
submits on preliminary investigation, it was also revealed that, the
petitioner had been facilitating the travel of the NSCN-K members on
two different occasions in his vehicle, and as such, materials were
present that warranted investigation, as the petitioner’s name was
mentioned and he was in association with the other accused.
9.
Dr. N. Mozika, learned Senior counsel assisted by Ms. S.
Rumthao, learned counsel for the respondent No. 6 apart from
supporting the submissions made by the learned AAG, has submitted
that no case of malicious persecution has been made out. The learned
Senior counsel has referred to Annexure – J to the affidavit of the NIA,
which contains the Call detail reports and analysis of the mobile
numbers of the petitioner and the accused No. 1, which established that
the petitioner was in regular contact with the main accused. The learned
Senior counsel further submits that, the NIA has been very fair in its
conduct and moreover for action taken in good faith, protection is
provided under Section 18 of the NIA Act, as well as, Section 49(a) of
the UAPA. He finally submits that, the entire action being done in good
faith, no case of malicious persecution or for consideration of any
compensation has been made out by the petitioner.
10.
I have heard learned counsels for the parties.
11.
The petitioner has founded his case on the premise that, as he
was not charge sheeted and had been discharged, his arrest and custody
were illegal and that, it was a case of malicious persecution, for which
the State was liable to compensate him for loss of liberty and also the
damage that had been caused to his character and reputation. This Court
is therefore, to examine as to whether the facts and circumstances, will
warrant the consideration for award of compensation as claimed under
public law remedy.
12.
As has been noted, the writ petitioner an Ex-Army Serviceman
was arrested on 13.05.2018, on the basis of an FIR and the case
registered thereon being Jowai P.S Case No. 105(5) 18 u/s
121/121A/120B/384 IPC read with Section 10/13 of the UAPA Act,
1967. The events that unfolded thereafter, was that, the petitioner was
then taken into custody, as there was a strong suspicion that he was
involved, as he was seen to be associated with the other accused
persons. In this connection, this Court also cannot ignore the fact that,
the petitioner’s car No. ML 04C 6036 was hired by the main
conspirator, before commission of crime, during and even after its
commission. The fact that, the main conspirator used the car of the
petitioner was also revealed during the investigation. However, it was
found from the records, in the form of oral, documentary and technical
evidence, that the evidence was not sufficient to prosecute the
petitioner at that stage, but however, liberty was reserved to prosecute
him, whenever prosecutable evidence was found during further
investigation. As such, the ground as sought to be made out by the
petitioner that, his arrest was wrongful and illegal and that, the
petitioner was totally unconnected or that the case against him was
entirely made up cannot be said to be correct.
13.
On the other contention put up by the petitioner, that Section
319 CrPC cannot be used to proceed against him, as he has been
discharged of all or some of the charges and was an ‘accused’, also
does not seem to be the correct legal position, inasmuch as, the
petitioner was neither made an ‘accused’ in the true sense, nor was he
charge sheeted. Section 319 CrPC, for the sake of convenience is
reproduced hereinbelow.
“319. Power to proceed against other persons
appearing to be guilty of offence.- (1) Where, in
the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an
offence, it appears from the evidence that any
person not being the accused has committed any
offence for which such person could be tried
together with the accused, the Court may
proceed against such person for the offence
which he appears to have committed.
(2) Where such person is not attending the
Court, he may be arrested or summoned, as the
circumstances of the case may require, for the
purpose aforesaid.
(3) Any person attending the Court although not
under arrest or upon a summons, may be
detained by such Court for the purpose of the
inquiry into, or trial of, the offence which he
appears to have committed.
(4) Where the Court proceeds against any
person under sub-section (1) then(a) the proceedings in respect of such
person shall be commenced afresh, and the
witnesses re-heard;
(b) subject to the provisions of clause (a),
the case may proceed as if such person had been
an accused person when the Court took
cognizance of the offence upon which the
inquiry or trial was commenced.”
14.
In this context, the judgment of Sohan Lal & Ors. vs. State of
Rajasthan (supra), on this point is of extreme relevance and though the
counsel for the petitioner has cited this, in support of his case, however,
it is of no assistance and instead endorses the stand of the respondent,
as to the petitioner being liable to be proceeded with under Section 319
by the Special Court. Paragraphs 14, 20, 21 and 27 which are relevant
are reproduced hereinbelow.
“14. The crucial words in the section are, 'any person
not being the accused.' This section empowers the
court to proceed against persons not being the accused
appearing to be guilty of offence. Sub-sections (1) and
(2) of this section provide for a situation when a court
hearing a case against certain accused person finds
from the evidence that some person or persons, other
than the accused before it is or are also connected in
this very offence or any connected offence; and it
empowers the court to proceed against such person or
persons for the offence which he or they appears or
appear to have committed and issue process for the
purpose. It provides that the cognizance against newly
added accused is deemed to have been taken in the
same manner in which cognizance was first taken of
the offence against the earlier accused. It naturally
deals with a matter arising from the course of the
proceeding already initiated. The scope of the section
is wide enough to include cases instituted on private
complaint.
20. Chapter XV deals with complaints to Magistrates.
Section
provides
for
examination
of
complainant. Section 202 deals with postponement of
issue of process and says in sub-section (1) that any
Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint of an offence
which he is authorised to take cognizance or which
has been made over to him under Section 192, may, if
he thinks fit, postpone the issue of process against the
accused, and either inquire into the case himself or
direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or
by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose
of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground
for proceeding. Thus we find that the expression "the
accused" has been used in relation to a complaint case
under this section even before issue of process. It also
appears that in the Code the expression "the accused"
is used after cognizance is taken by the Magistrate.
[Emphasis supplied]
21.
Chapter
XVI
commencement
of
of
the
Code
proceedings
deals
with
before
Magistrates. Section 204 dealing with issue of process
uses the expression "the accused". Under sub-section
(1) thereof if in the opinion of a Magistrate taking
cognizance of an offence there is sufficient ground for
proceeding and the case appears to be (a) a summons
case, he shall issue his summons for the attendance of
the accused, or (b) a warrant case, he may issue a
warrant, or, if he thinks fit, a summons, for causing
the accused to be brought or to appear at a certain
time before such Magistrate or (if he has no
jurisdiction himself) some other Magistrate having
jurisdiction. Under sub-section (2), no summons or
warrant shall be issued against the accused under subsection (1) until a list of the prosecution witnesses has
been filed. Thereafter the expression 'the accused' has
been used in subsequent sections. Thus one is referred
to as 'the accused' even before issue of process.
[Emphasis supplied]
27. In S.S. Khanna v. Chief Secretary, Patna this
Court had to consider whether a person against whom
a complaint was filed along with some other persons
and who after an enquiry under Section 202 of the
Code was not proceeded against by the court, could be
summoned at a later stage under Section 319 of the
latter Code to stand trial for the same or a connected
offence or offences along with the other persons
against whom process had been issued earlier by the
court. It was held that having regard to the nature of
the proceedings under Section 202 of the CrPC it may
be difficult to hold that there is a legal bar based on
the
principle
of
issue
estoppel
to
proceed
under Section 319 against a person complained
against on the same material, if the court has
dismissed a complaint under Section 203. But the
court did not express any final opinion on the
question. In that case, however, the Magistrate decided
to take action under Section 319 of the Code on the
basis of fresh evidence which was brought on record
in the course of proceedings that took place after the
enquiry contemplated under Section 202 of the Code
was over. It was further held that even when an order
of the Magistrate declining to issue process under
Section 202 was confirmed by a higher court the
jurisdiction
of
the
Magistrate
under Section
319 remained unaffected, if other conditions were
satisfied and the autre fois principle adumbrated in
Section 300 of the Code could not, however, apply to
such a case.”
15.
Another important aspect is the statutory protection provided
under Section 18 of the NIA Act, as well as, Section 49(a) of the
UAPA, for acts taken in ‘good faith’, which are reproduced
hereinbelow.
“18. Sanction for prosecution.- No prosecution, suit or
other legal proceedings shall be instituted in any court
of law, except with the previous sanction of the
Central Government, against any member of the
Agency or any person acting on his behalf in respect
of anything done or purported to be done in exercise
of the powers conferred by this Act.”
“49. Protection of action taken in good faith.- No suit,
prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against(a) the Central Government or a State Government or
any officer or authority of the Central Government
or State Government or District Magistrate or any
officer
authorized
in
this
behalf
by
the
Government or the District Magistrate or any
other authority on whom powers have been
conferred under this Act, for anything which is in
good faith done or purported to be done in
pursuance of this Act or any rule or order made
thereunder.”
The scheme of the above quoted provisions provides
protection to the respondents or any other authority, on whom powers
have been conferred under these Acts, for anything which is done in
good faith or purported to be done in exercise of these powers.
16.
In the case of General Officer Commanding, Rashtriya Rifles
vs. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr. reported in (2012) 6 SCC
228, the Hon’ble Supreme Court at Paragraphs 69-74, has elucidated
the meaning of good faith, where it has been held that, it is a duty being
performed founded on genuine belief and commands of loyal
performance. A duty performed in ‘good faith’ as defined in Section
3(22) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, means a thing which is, infact
done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not.
17.
In conclusion therefore, the discharge of the petitioner
therefore, cannot be said to be absolute, as the respondent NIA has
reserved its right to proceed against him, should the need arise on
further investigation. Further, there was prima facie grounds for
detention of the petitioner, and the arrest cannot be said to be wrongful,
or the presence of any element of malicious persecution in the conduct
of the respondents. This Court therefore, for the reasons stated above,
in consideration of the entire case in its totality, especially the facts and
circumstances surrounding the arrest of the petitioner, finds that no case
has been made out for grant of any compensation under Public Law
Remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
18.
The judgments placed by the writ petitioner, especially S.
Nambi Narayanan vs. Siby Mathews & Ors. (supra) and Ajit Kumar
vs. State of Jharkhand (supra), are not applicable, inasmuch as, the
petitioners implicated therein, were in cases, which were found to be
patently false.
19.
The writ petition accordingly stands dismissed.
20.
However, there shall be no order as to costs.
Judge
Meghalaya
06.07.2023
“D.Thabah-PS”
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