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Serial No.01
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WP (C) No.70/2022 with
MC (WPC) No.32/2022
Date of Order: 05.07.2022
Union of India & anr
Coram:
Vs.
M. Balakrishna Reddy
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjib Banerjee, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioners
: Mr. R. Debnath, CGC
For the Respondent
: Mr. M.K. Choudhury, Sr.Adv with
Mr. P. Bharadwaj, Adv
i) Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii) Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes
Yes/No
JUDGMENT: (per the Hon’ble, the Chief Justice) (Oral)
This is a case where an officer of the State appears to have toyed
with the legal system to remain in service and thwart attempts at
suspending him or initiating disciplinary action against him after obtaining
an unreasoned order of suspension of a sentence of imprisonment that was
endorsed in appeal.
2.
The present writ petition is directed against an order of the
Central Administrative Tribunal, Guwahati Bench by which the
respondent’s petition challenging a show-cause notice dated May 3, 2017
by the Central Government has been allowed on the ground that in terms
of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, the Central
Government had no authority to issue the notice.
3.
Notwithstanding the limited challenge by the Union in the
present proceedings, the larger picture cannot be lost sight of.
4.
According to a list of dates furnished by the respondent
employee, such respondent joined the Indian Forest Service in May, 1994
and was taken into the Assam and Meghalaya joint cadre in 1995. In
respect of the Civil Services Examination of 1996, the respondent herein
was found guilty of having committed offences, inter alia, under Sections
468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 by the court of Special Judicial
Magistrate, CBI and Economic Offences, Indore. In short, he was found
guilty of having adopted unfair means in course of the relevant Civil
Services Examination. An appeal preferred by the respondent against the
judgment of conviction and consequent order was dismissed by the Special
Judge, CBI, Indore on July 8, 2013. The respondent preferred a criminal
revision petition before the Madhya Pradesh High Court and, by an order
of October 8, 2013 that does not go into the grounds of conviction or the
fallibility thereof, the sentence was suspended. The respondent had
suffered some detention during the interregnum.
5.
It is of significance that the respondent may not have taken
appropriate steps to prosecute Criminal Revision No.966 of 2013 pending
for nearly nine years in the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The respondent
has taken advantage of the pendency of such proceedings, not only to play
the State Government in Meghalaya against the Central Government, but
also to override orders of suspension and attempts at initiating disciplinary
proceedings against him for his proven criminal conduct.
6.
An order of suspension was issued against the respondent in
2013 which was challenged before the Guwahati Bench of CAT. The
petition resulted in the impugned order of suspension imposed on
December 9, 2013 to be found to be legally unsustainable. At the same
time, the Tribunal issued certain directions under paragraph 39 of its
judgment of November 18, 2014.
7.
The State of Meghalaya challenged the order of November 18,
2014 before this Court. In course of the judgment of this Court rendered
on the matter on November 5, 2015, this Court noticed the legal issues that
arose at paragraph 6 of the judgment:
“6. After hearing the submissions advanced by the learned
counsel for the petitioners Mr. S. Sen Gupta, as well as senior
counsel for the respondent Mr. HS Thangkhiew, we find that
three issues are involved to be answered in this writ petition.
Firstly, whether suspension order dated 9.12.2013 at Annexure 6
of the Counter Affidavit is in accordance with law? Secondly,
whether suspension is an alteration of service? And thirdly,
whether Government can pass a selective suspension order
against its employees?”
8.
Upon referring to the relevant notice, the said Rules of 1969 and
the general law pertaining to the suspension of a government employee,
this Court read Rule 3(8)(a) of the said Rules of 1969 to imply that the
maximum period of suspension may only be of 180 days. It may be noticed
in this context that Rule 3(8)(a) of the said Rules stipulates that an order
of suspension made under such rule which has not been extended shall be
valid for a period not exceeding 90 days and an order of suspension which
has been extended shall remain valid for a further period not exceeding
180 days, at a time, unless revoked earlier. Thus, it is evident that an order
of suspension may be continued even after the expiry of 180 days upon it
being expressly extended. Even though there are high authorities that
instruct that an order of suspension should not continue for an indefinite
period because the suspended employee gets a substantial part of his salary
while the employer gets no work done in return, when it comes to serious
cases of graft or criminal conduct pertaining to moral turpitude, for reasons
which are to be indicated in the extension of the order of suspension, the
period of suspension may be continued further.
9.
In the present case, it must be observed that only by the thin
thread of the order of the Madhya Pradesh High Court that suspends the
sentence that the respondent suffered in the criminal proceedings and
which was upheld in the appeal by the Special Court, the respondent clings
on to his position. In the meantime, as the correspondence appended to the
petition reveals, the State and the Union have been bickering over who has
the authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the respondent
herein. It may also be observed in this context that the State took a
conscious decision not to challenge this Court’s order of November 5,
2015 on its appreciation that there was no apparent ground to question the
propriety thereof. The State also took no further steps to suspend the
respondent prospectively.
10.
As a consequence, here is a civil servant who was convicted by
an appropriate criminal court in the year 2011 for commission of offences
under the Penal Code in the year 1996 – offences as grave as indulging in
corrupt practice in course of a Civil Services Examination – and yet he
continues to hold a position of authority as an Additional Principal Chief
Conservator of Forests in the State.
11.
It is possible that upon the criminal revision petition pending
before the Madhya Pradesh High Court being heard on merits, the
respondent may be successful in the appellate order impugned therein and,
as a consequence, his order of conviction being annulled. It is equally
possible that in course of the criminal revision being allowed in favour of
the respondent, he may be found not to have been involved in the
commission of the offence. But till such time that the respondent is
honourably acquitted by an appropriate forum in accordance with law, the
order of conviction and the appellate order upholding the same cannot be
wished away.
12.
There is no doubt that the order of suspension issued in
December, 2013 was improper inasmuch as it was made with retrospective
effect. Orders of suspension and dismissal or removal from service cannot,
ordinarily, be made with retrospective effect. However, merely because
the order of suspension had been made with retrospective effect and, as a
consequence, it was quashed, it did not imply that a further order of
suspension could not be issued or that disciplinary proceedings against the
respondent could not have been initiated. Several years have passed in the
interregnum with a few letters exchanged between the State Government
and the Central Government as to which authority would be appropriate
under Rule 7 of the said Rules of 1969. In one of the letters issued by the
State Government, it required the Union to take up the role as the
disciplinary authority. However, in a later letter the State Government
called upon the Union to revoke its notice dated May 3, 2017.
13.
It is such letter of May 3, 2017 that was carried by the respondent
to the Tribunal. The principal ground for assailing the notice was that the
Union or the Central Government did not have the authority under the said
Rules of 1969 to issue the same. Quite appropriately, the Tribunal found
that the Union did not have the authority to institute proceedings or impose
any penalty under Rule 7 of the said Rules of 1969.
14.
It may be noticed in this context that Rule 7(1)(b) of the said
Rules of 1969 provides as follows:
7. Authority to institute proceedings and to impost penalty. –
(1) Where a member of the Service has committed any act or
omission which renders him liable to any penalty specified in
Rule 6, –
(a)
…
(b) If such act or omission was committed after his
appointment to the Service, –
(i)
while he was serving in connection with the affairs of a
State, or is deputed for service under any company, association
or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, which is
wholly or substantially owned or controlled by the Government
of a State, or in a local authority set up by an Act of the
Legislature of that State, the Government of that State;
….”
15.
It is an undeniable position in the present case that the respondent
was serving in the Assam and Meghalaya joint cadre in the year 1996 since
he was allocated to such joint cadre on or about August 31, 1995 as per the
respondent’s admission. In such a scenario, since the respondent is now
posted in Meghalaya, it is the State of Meghalaya which can exercise
authority under Rule 7 of the said Rules of 1969 and initiate disciplinary
proceedings against the respondent and even impose an appropriate
penalty, subject to the concurrence of the Union in accordance with Rule
7(2) of the said Rules.
16.
Accordingly, the judgment and order impugned dated January 2,
2020 passed by the Tribunal in this case calls for no interference and the
same is upheld. However, since the larger picture cannot be missed out by
a High Court, it is necessary that the State of Meghalaya be directed to take
appropriate steps to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the
respondent under Rule 7 of the said Rules of 1969 within a month from
date.
17.
It is made clear that nothing in this judgment will prejudice the
respondent herein in any proposed disciplinary proceedings or in the
adjudication thereof in accordance with law.
18.
WP (C) No.70 of 2022 and MC (WPC) No.32 of 2022 are
disposed of.
19.
There will be no order as to costs.
20.
Let a copy of this judgment and order be forwarded to learned
Advocate-General for the State of Meghalaya in course of this week.
(W. Diengdoh)
Judge
(Sanjib Banerjee)
Chief Justice
Meghalaya
05.07.2022
“Lam DR-PS”
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