The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
27. 11.2020. This is not merely an addition but a deliberate re-statement and re-definition of certain terms, including the age limit. [22] The specific prescription of a "fresh" age limit of "18 to 41 years as on 12-03-2021" in the notification dated 12.02.2021 clearly demonstrates the intention to replace the earlier age criterion. The saving clause in the revised notification pertains only to the applications already submitted for LDC posts, indicating that the intention was to carry forward those applications under the new conditions, not to preserve all conditions of the prior advertisement, particularly those expressly revised. It is also submitted before this Court that no post is lying vacant as of today, further reinforcing the need for finality and adherence to the terms established by the governing notification, which is the revised one. [23] Furthermore, it is a fundamental aspect of legal proceedings that a document or notification, if it is to be challenged, must be done so in appropriate proceedings. In the present case, the respondent-petitioner did not initiate any challenge to the notification dated 12.02.2021. Consequently, its provisions, including the revised age limit, are binding and applicable. The writ court’s judgment, by relying solely on the earlier notification without considering the subsequent operative one, has unfortunately overlooked this crucial a…
01. 10.2024 passed by the writ court in W.P.(C) No. 95 of 2024. As a sequel, stay, if any, stands vacated. Pending application(s), if any, also stands closed. B.Palit, J Dipak 16:43:07 +05'30' Dr. T. Amarnath Goud, J
Full Judgment Text
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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
WA 5 of 2025
The State of Tripura And Others
---Appellant(s)
Versus
Shri Sushanta Deb
---Respondent(s)
For Appellant(s)
:
For Respondent(s)
:
Date of hearing
:
Date of pronouncement :
Whether fit for reporting :
Mr. S. M. Chakraborty, Advocate General.
Mr. Kohinoor N. Bhattacharjee, GA.
Ms. P. Chakraborty, Advocate.
Mr. P Roy Barman, Sr. Advocate.
Mr. S. Bhattacharjee, Advocate.
Mr. K. Nath, Advocate.
Ms. A. Debbarma, Advocate.
Mr. D. Paul, Advocate.
30.07.2025
05.08.2025
Yes.
HON’BLE JUSTICE DR. T. AMARNATH GOUD
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Judgment & Order
Dr. T.Amarnath Goud, J
[1]
This is an appeal under Chapter VIII, Rule-B(A) of the High
Court of Tripura Rules, 2023 preferred against the Judgment & Order dated
01.10.2024 passed in WP(C) 95 of 2024 passed by the learned Single
Judge.
[2]
It is the case of the appellants that in the instant Writ Petition,
the petitioner has prayed for necessary directions from the this Court to republish the Merit List, dated 13.09.2023, in c/w Advt. No. 01/2020 and
Notification, dated 12.02.2021, for the posts of Group-C, [Lower Division
Clerk (LDC), Agriculture Assistant (Except TAFS Grade-III), Agriculture
Assistant (TAFS Grade-III), Junior Operator Junior Multi-Tasking Operator
(Uncommon)], after including the name of the petitioner therein, as the
petitioner's name has been excluded even after securing 119.75 marks,
whereas many candidates were recommended even after scoring lesser
marks than the petitioner, viz., candidates vide S1. Nos. 706 & 1010 were
recommended for the post of Agri. Asstt. (TAFS Grade-III) & Lower
Division Clerk (LDC) against UR vacancies after scoring 117.5 & 114.25
respectively. The writ court allowed the writ petition, as the writ court fell
short in appreciating the fact of over age of petitioner, when calculated in
the light of Revised Adv. dated 12.02.2021. Hence, the State Respondents
are preferring this Appeal.
[3]
It is contended by learned Advocate General that writ court has
fallen in gross error in holding that since the earlier notification dated 2711-2020 was not cancelled by notification dated 12- 02-2021, hence the
date of age limit mentioned in notification dated 27-11-2020 should be
considered as the cutoff date of age limit of the petitioner. Notification
dated 12-02-2021 clearly mentions in the following manner:
"This is issued in Revision of advertisement No 01-2020 F vide No.
10(28)/DESMP/ESTT/2020/4295 dated 27-11-2020."
[4]
So, it is clear that the notification dated 12-02-2021 has been
revised and changed thereby mentioned in the notification dated 27-112020 to the extent. According to the appellants, this has escaped the
consideration of the Ld. Single Judge. The words and figures in notification
dated 12-02- 2021 that in revision of advertisement No. 01/2020 dated 2711-2020 means that the contents of earlier notification have been
revised/changed to the extent that the contents of earlier notification dated
27-11-2020, except those which has been specifically saved in notification
dated 12-02-2021, were cancelled. The Notification dated 12-02-2021 has
specifically saved only that those candidates who have already applied for
one of the 1500 Lower Division Clerks (LDC), Group C, Non- Gazetted
post(s), need not apply again for any of the added 910 other Group C posts
and their candidature for all 2410 Group C posts will be considered based
on their educational qualification etc. But regarding age limit a new specific
provision has been made at the bottom of the page 2 of notification dated
12-02-2021 "Age limit for direct recruitment has been prescribed afresh is
18 to 41 years i.e a general candidate should be within the age limit of 1841 years as on 12-03-2021, the last date of submission of application but the
Ld. Single Judge has failed to appreciate this.
[5]
This provision of the said notifications appears to have totally
escaped the notice of the writ court and the writ court has failed to consider
that notification dated 12.02.2021 has been issued in Revision of earlier
notification dated 27.11.2020 and age limit has been prescribed in the new
notification. The word "This is issued in Revision of advertisement
No.01/2020 dated 27.11.2020 and that Revision means change appears to
have totally escaped the notice and consideration of the writ court.
[6]
Most importantly, the respondent-petitioner has not challenged
the notification dated 12.02.2021. Their entire case rests on the premise that
the earlier notification's age limit should prevail, despite the express
revision. A revised notification, unless successfully challenged and struck
down, carries the force of law. By failing to challenge the validity or
applicability of the notification dated 12.02.2021, particularly its clear
prescription of the new age limit, the respondent-petitioner has implicitly
accepted its terms. It is not open to the respondent-petitioner to selectively
apply provisions from a superseded notification while ignoring the
superseding one, especially when the superseding notification explicitly
addresses the very point of contention.
[7]
Finally it is contended by learned Advocate General that for
these compelling reasons, it is clear that the writ court’s interpretation is
fundamentally flawed, ignoring the explicit language and legal effect of the
revised notification dated 12.02.2021. The respondent-petitioner's failure to
challenge the superseding notification further underscores the validity of the
revised age limit.
[8]
Therefore, the judgment of the writ court, being based on an
erroneous premise and a misinterpretation of the relevant notifications, is
unsustainable in law and ought to be set aside. It is humbly prayed that this
Court may be pleased to dismiss the judgment of the writ court by allowing
the instant appeal, thereby upholding the validity and applicability of the
age limit prescribed in the notification dated 12.02.2021. It is also submitted
before this Court that no posts are currently vacant, reinforcing the
necessity for finality and adherence to the terms established by the revised
notification.
[9]
On the contrary, it is contended by Mr. P Roy Barman, learned
senior counsel for the respondent herein that the judgment rendered by the
writ court is not only just and proper but also a well-reasoned application of
established legal principles, requiring no interference or re-interpretation by
this Court. The contentions of the learned Advocate General, seeking to
overturn this sound judgment, are based on a fallacious premise and an
attempt to introduce new facts at the appellate stage.
[10]
Firstly, the core of the State-Appellant's argument hinges on
the notification dated 12.02.2021, claiming it "revised" the age limit.
However, it is a crucial and undisputed fact that the notification dated
12.02.2021 was never brought to the notice of the writ court during the
proceedings. It is further contended that new facts or documents, not
presented before the writ court, cannot be introduced as a matter of right at
the appellate stage to rescue a party's case. The writ court’s decision was
rendered based on the materials and arguments presented before him at that
time. To now contend that the Single Judge "failed to appreciate" a
document that was not even placed on record is an attempt to create a
ground for appeal where none existed. The State-Appellants cannot be
permitted to benefit from its own omission or oversight in the original
proceedings.
[11]
Secondly, even assuming, without conceding, the existence
and tenor of the notification dated 12.02.2021, the writ court’s decision
aligns perfectly with the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court
regarding changes in recruitment rules. A fundamental principle of service
jurisprudence is that the rules of the game cannot be changed once the game
has begun. The initial notification dated 27.11.2020 clearly laid down the
conditions, including the age limit, at the time the recruitment process
commenced.
[12]
In Tej Prakash Pathak and Ors. vs. Rajasthan High Court
and Ors. reported in (2025) 2 SCC 1, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in
Paragraph 14, unequivocally stated:
14. The doctrine proscribing change of rules midway through the
game, or after the game is played, is predicated on the rule
against arbitrariness enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution.
Article 16 is only an instance of the application of the concept of
equality enshrined in Article 14. In other words Article 14 is the
genus while Article 16 is a species. Article 16 gives effect to the
concept of equality in all matters relating to public employment.
These two articles strike at arbitrariness in State action and
ensure fairness and equality of treatment. They require that State
action must be based on valid relevant principles alike to all
similarly situate and not to be guided by any extraneous or
irrelevant considerations. In all its actions, the State is bound to
act fairly, in a transparent manner. This is an elementary
requirement of the guarantee against arbitrary State action which
Article 14 of the Constitution adopts. A deprivation of the
entitlement of private citizens and private business must be
proportional to a requirement grounded in public interest.
[13]
Furthermore, in Paragraph 42of the same judgment, the Apex
Court reiterated this stance, observing:
42. We, therefore, answer the reference in the following terms:
(1) Recruitment process commences from the issuance of the
advertisement calling for applications and ends with filling up of
vacancies;
(2) Eligibility criteria for being placed in the Select List, notified
at the commencement of the recruitment process, cannot be
changed midway through the recruitment process unless the
extant Rules so permit, or the advertisement, which is not
contrary to the extant Rules, so permit. Even if such change is
permissible under the extant Rules or the advertisement, the
change would have to meet the requirement of Article 14 of the
Constitution and satisfy the test of non-arbitrariness;
(3) The decision in K. Manjusree (supra) lays down good law and
is not in conflict with the decision in Subash Chander Marwaha
(supra). Subash Chander Marwaha (supra) deals with the right to
be appointed from the Select List whereas K. Manjusree (supra)
deals with the right to be placed in the Select List. The two cases
therefore deal with altogether different issues;
(4) Recruiting bodies, subject to the extant Rules, may devise
appropriate procedure for bringing the recruitment process to its
logical end provided the procedure so adopted is transparent,
non-discriminatory/ non- arbitrary and has a rational nexus to the
object sought to be achieved.
(5) Extant Rules having statutory force are binding on the
recruiting body both in terms of procedure and eligibility.
However, where the Rules are non-existent, or silent,
administrative instructions may fill in the gaps;
(6) Placement in the select list gives no indefeasible right to
appointment. The State or its instrumentality for bona fide
reasons may choose not to fill up the vacancies. However, if
vacancies exist, the State or its instrumentality cannot arbitrarily
deny appointment to a person within the zone of consideration in
the select list.
[14]
Applying this binding dictum to the present case, the "game"
commenced with the notification dated 27.11.2020, which prescribed the
initial age limit. Any subsequent notification, even if purporting to "revise"
the age limit, cannot unilaterally alter a crucial eligibility criterion to the
detriment of candidates who applied or became eligible based on the
original advertisement, especially in the absence of explicit retrospective
application of such a change. The writ court, in upholding the age limit as
per the earlier notification, was therefore entirely consistent with this
established legal principle. The mere use of the word "revision" in a
subsequent notification, particularly when it was not even presented to the
original forum, cannot be used to retrospectively divest a candidate of their
accrued eligibility.
[15]
In light of the fact that the notification dated 12.02.2021 was
not before the writ court, and considering the well-settled legal position
enunciated by the Apex Court in Tej Prakash Pathak (supra), the judgment
of the writ court is not only unimpeachable but also reflects a correct
application of law to the facts as they were presented. The State-Appellants
cannot now introduce new documents and seek to discredit a judgment that
was meticulously rendered on the available record.
[16]
Therefore, the judgment of the writ court is just and proper and
needs no interference or re-interpretation by this Court. The instant appeal,
being based on subsequently introduced facts and a misapplication of legal
principles, ought to be dismissed.
[17]
We have heard learned Advocate General appearing for the
State-Appellants and learned senior counsel for the Respondent-Petitioner.
[18]
The core contention of the learned Advocate General is that the
writ court erred in appreciating the legal effect of the notification dated
12.02.2021, which explicitly stated that it was "issued in Revision of
advertisement No. 01-2020 F vide No. 10(28)/DESMP/ESTT/2020/4295
dated 27-11-2020." It was argued that the term "revision" unequivocally
implies a change or supersession of the earlier advertisement's contents to
the extent revised.
[19]
It is brought to our attention that the notification dated
12.02.2021 specifically prescribed a fresh age limit for direct recruitment,
stating: "Age limit for direct recruitment has been prescribed afresh is 18 to
41 years i.e a general candidate should be within the age limit of 18-41
years as on 12-03-2021, the last date of submission of application." This,
the State-Appellants contend, constitute a clear and specific revision of the
age limit, which was not merely an addition but a supersession of previous
provisions concerning age. While the revised notification saved the
applications of candidates who had already applied for LDC posts, it did not
save the prior age limit, instead, introducing a new one.
[20]
A crucial point emphasized by the State-Appellants is that the
respondent-petitioner did not challenge the validity or applicability of the
notification dated 12.02.2021. The absence of such a challenge implies an
acceptance of the terms contained therein, including the revised age limit. It
is a settled principle that a party cannot selectively rely on superseded
provisions while ignoring the operative ones.
[21]
Upon careful consideration of the submissions, we find
substantial merit in the arguments advanced by the learned Advocate
General. The phrase "in Revision of advertisement" unequivocally signifies
that the subsequent notification dated 12.02.2021 was intended to modify,
alter, and supersede the relevant provisions of the earlier notification dated
27.11.2020. This is not merely an addition but a deliberate re-statement and
re-definition of certain terms, including the age limit.
[22]
The specific prescription of a "fresh" age limit of "18 to 41
years as on 12-03-2021" in the notification dated 12.02.2021 clearly
demonstrates the intention to replace the earlier age criterion. The saving
clause in the revised notification pertains only to the applications already
submitted for LDC posts, indicating that the intention was to carry forward
those applications under the new conditions, not to preserve all conditions
of the prior advertisement, particularly those expressly revised. It is also
submitted before this Court that no post is lying vacant as of today, further
reinforcing the need for finality and adherence to the terms established by
the governing notification, which is the revised one.
[23]
Furthermore, it is a fundamental aspect of legal proceedings
that a document or notification, if it is to be challenged, must be done so in
appropriate proceedings. In the present case, the respondent-petitioner did
not initiate any challenge to the notification dated 12.02.2021.
Consequently, its provisions, including the revised age limit, are binding
and applicable. The writ court’s judgment, by relying solely on the earlier
notification without considering the subsequent operative one, has
unfortunately overlooked this crucial aspect.
[24]
Furthermore, the judgment of the Apex Court in Tej Prakash
Pathak (supra) as likely to be relied upon by the respondent-petitioner, is
distinguishable and not applicable to the facts of the present case.
[25]
Therefore, we are satisfied that the writ court is not correct in
holding that the age limit mentioned in the notification dated 27.11.2020
should be considered as the cut-off date. The notification dated 12.02.2021
effectively superseded the earlier provision regarding the age limit for direct
recruitment.
[26]
In light of the aforesaid detailed discussion and finding, the
instant appeal is allowed setting aside the judgment and order dated
01.10.2024 passed by the writ court in W.P.(C) No. 95 of 2024. As a
sequel, stay, if any, stands vacated. Pending application(s), if any, also
stands closed.
B.Palit, J
Dipak
DIPAK DAS
DIPAK DAS
Date: 2025.08.07
16:43:07 +05'30'
Dr. T. Amarnath Goud, J
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