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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
ARB. A. No.14 of 2022
1. The State of Tripura,
represented by the Secretary
cum Commissioner Public Works Department(Rig Division),
PN Complex, Gurkhabasti, Agartala, West Tripura.
2. The Executive Engineer, PWD(Rig Division),
PN Complex, Gurkhabasti, Agartala, West Tripura.
.......Appellant(s)
Versus
Sri Ratan Datta, Contractor
Ramnagar Road No.8,
PO: Ramnagar, West Tripura, 799002.
....... Contractor-Respondent(s)
For the applicant-appellant(s)
:
Mr. K. De, Addl. G.A.
For the contractor- respondent (s)
:
Mr. A. Sengupta, Advocate
Date of hearing and delivery of
Judgment & Order
:
03-04-2024
Whether fit for reporting
:
Yes
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. APARESH KUMAR SINGH
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARINDAM LODH
JUDGMENT & ORDER(ORAL)
(Arindam Lodh, J)
This is an appeal filed under Section 37(1)(c) of Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 read with Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts
Act, 2015 against the impugned judgment and order dated 05.04.2022,
passed by the Ld. District Commercial Court, West Tripura, Agartala in Civil
Misc.(Arbitration) 16 of 2018 along with Arbitral award dated 20.04.2018
passed by the Ld. Arbitral Tribunal in Arbitral Case No. ARB/SC/RD/DWSRIG/01/2016, whereby and whereunder the learned District Commercial
Court has upheld the Arbitral award passed by the Arbitrator and dismissed
the application filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996.
2. FACTUAL MATRIX:
2.1.
The factual background of the controversy between the parties
that is necessary for the adjudication of the disputes before this Court is
delineated hereunder:
The contractor-respondent had entered into an agreement
bearing No. 11/ACE/EE/RIG/2012-13, dated 30.07.2012 with the Executive
Engineer, PWD (Rig Division) Agartala for drilling and development of
25(twenty five) numbers of Small Bore Deep Tube-wells(SBDTW) with
Departmental direct Rotary (hydraulically operated) MINI rig & other
machineries and equipments in different locations of West Tripura District
during the year 2011-2012 under NRDWP Scheme in Tripura. The value of
the work was Rs.80,82,294/-. The contractor-respondent started the work
with due diligence and performed the contract for an amount of
Rs.23,58,055/- out of the total contract amount of Rs.80,82,294/- and the
amount was paid to the contractor- respondent as per bill prepared by the
appellants/State. The Assistant Engineer under the appellants/State handed
over the site in such a place where suitable water bearing strata was not
available and in the process, the boring of pilot hole became unsuccessful
and the contractor-respondent abandoned all such works awarded by the
appellant due to non-availability of suitable water bearing strata. The
contractor-respondent suffered enormous financial loss and it became
impossible on the part of them to go ahead with further drilling work. At this
juncture, the contractor- respondent by letter dated 21.03.2013, requested the
appellants to close the contract and take back the departmental plants and
machineries supplied to execute the work. After a series of actions, including
extension of time for the completion of work, ultimately contract was
rescinded and the appellants had imposed levy of compensation under Clause
2 of the agreement for an amount of Rs.3,74,180/- stating that extension of
time for the completion of the work was granted by the Engineer-in-Charge
upto 31-05-2014 without prejudice to the right of the Government to recover
liquidated damages in accordance with the provision of Clause 2 of the
agreement.
2.2.
The learned Arbitrator after considering the pleadings and
documents of the parties had framed the following issues:
“i. Whether the Clause 2 of the conditions of contract agreement as
per details of the PWD Works Manual, 2007 has vested any power to show
cause notice intending to take action against the petitioner in imposing levy
of compensation and weather the said Clauses has vested any power on the
Superintendent Engineer of the concerned circle to impose levy of
compensation on the show cause notice issued by the Engineer-in-charge
(Respondent)?
ii. Whether the Clause 3 of the conditions of Contract agreement as
per details of PWD Work Manual, 2007 has vested any power on the
Engineer-in-Charge to rescind the contract?
iii. Whether the petitioner is entitled to get damages for loss on
account of loss of profit on the balance contract amount of Rs. 57,24,213/@ 10% due to breach of contract committed by the Respondent (Engineerin- Charge) by illegally rescinding the contract in wrongful exercise of
power under a non-existing Clause?
iv. Whether the petitioner is entitled to get refund of the security
deposit illegally forfeited in wrongful exercise of power by the Engineer-inCharge under a non- existing Clause?
V. Whether the petitioner is entitled to get interest @ 18% per
annum on the demanded sum with effect from 10/09/2015?
vi. Whether the Petitioner is entitled to get the cost of arbitration
proceedings and incidental thereto and if so up to what extent?
vii. Whether the Petitioner caused damage to the Respondent for
which the Respondent had to suffer a loss of amount of Rs. 3,74,180/-.”
2.3.
On going through the documentary evidence furnished by both
the parties with their respective statement of claims, defence and having
heard the learned counsel of the parties, the learned Arbitrator by the
Judgment dated 20.04.2018, declared the award in the following manner:
“In view of the findings and decisions arrived at Issue-wise in the
preceding paragraphs of the Award it is hereby declare that the Petitioner
is entitled to get in total Rs 8,98,226/-(Rupees eight lakhs ninety eight
thousand two hundred and twenty six) only from the Respondent. In
addition to the aforesaid amount he is also entitled to get interest at the
rate of 9% per annum over the awarded amount with effect from the date
of Prayer before the Respondent for settling the dispute, i.e.10-09-2015
within three months from today failing which the Respondent shall have to
pay at the rate of 12% per annum with effect from 10-09-2015 till the date
of payment. Interest over the awarded amount under Issue No 'F' will not
carry interest.
The Stamp duty is charged Rs.75/- only in respect of this
award have been borne by the Petitioner. As the Stamp paper of Rs.75/- is
not available the Petitioner filed Stamp Paper of Rs. 100/-only.”
3.
Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the award of
Arbitrator, the appellants herein, had preferred an appeal under Section 34 of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996 before the District Commercial
Court, West Tripura, Agartala, for setting aside the arbitral award passed by
the Arbitrator dated 20.04.2018.
3.1.
Accordingly, the learned District Commercial Court (District
Judge), West Tripura, Agartala, after consideration of the pleadings and
submissions of the parties by an order dated 05.04.2022, in Civil Misc
(Arbitration) 16 of 2018 upheld the arbitral award passed by the learned
Arbitrator and dismissed the application filed under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
3. 2
Feeling aggrieved, the appellants filed the instant appeal under
Section 37(1)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 read with
Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 inter alia praying for
the following relief(s):
“i. Admit this application
ii. Issue notice upon the respondent;
iii. Call for the LC records;
iv. After hearing the parties, set aside the judgment and order
dated 05.04.2022 passed in Civil Misc (Arbitration) 16 of 2018 by the Ld
District Commercial Court, Agartala, West Tripura, along with arbitral
Award passed by the Ld. Arbitral Tribunal on 20.04.2018 in Arbitration
ARB/SC/RD/DWS-RIG/01/2016;Case No.ARB/SC/RD/DWS-RIG/01/2016;
Any other order/order(s) may pass as Your Lordship may deem fit and
proper.
AND
For this act of kindness the Appellant as in duty bound shall ever pray.”
4.
On the above factual background, we have heard Mr. K. De,
learned Addl. GA appearing for the appellants as well as Mr. Abhijit
Sengupta, learned counsel appearing for the contractor-respondent.
5.
Submissions on behalf of the appellants:
5.1
At the outset, Mr. De, learned Addl. G.A. appearing for the
appellants contended that the judgment and order dated 05.04.2022, passed
by the learned District Commercial Court, West Tripura, Agartala, suffers
from perversity as the learned District Commercial Court, as well as the
learned Arbitrator have failed to consider the Hindrance Register, the
Schedules of work programmes and the Site-Order book. Learned Court
below also has not considered the entries in the measurement book to find
out as to who was responsible for delay of the completion of the work as per
Clause 2 and Clause 3 of the agreement.
5.2
The next argument advanced by learned Addl. GA was that the
learned Commercial Court has failed to consider that the final contract period
was provisionally extended firstly upto 31.01.2014 and secondly upto
31.05.2014. Since the contractor accepted the extension of time and carried
out the work beyond the stipulated period without any protest, as such, the
extension became final by mutual consent. The learned District Commercial
Court has failed to consider that the learned Arbitrator had failed to explain
as to whether the PWD Form No.7 is a part of the agreement or not. Having
not relied upon the evidence led by the appellants in support of the pleadings,
the learned Arbitrator had misconstrued the evidence on record in passing the
impugned award and, therefore, the impugned award is liable to be set aside
and quashed.
5.3
In addition, Mr. De, learned Addl. G.A. argued that the learned
District Commercial Court as well as the learned Arbitrator have failed to
consider that awarding of contract by inviting tender is a technical process
depending on the nature, speciality and technicality of work to be performed
by the contractor. For this purpose, different set of forms containing different
conditions have been worked out in CPWD Manual or Tripura PWD Manual,
2007. The learned District Commercial Court also failed to consider that
even after making of full payment for value of the work done in time and
during extended period of time on two occasions, the contractor had
completed only 7 (seven) productive and 1 (one) non-productive deep tubewells out of 25 deep tube-wells scheduled to be completed as per agreement.
5.4
Proceeding further, it was submitted that learned District
Commercial Court failed to consider one of the important factors that levy of
compensation can be imposed in the extended period of contract when the
contractor failed to achieve milestone as stipulated in Clause 2 of PWD Form
No.7 and performance of work was delayed due to the fault attributable to
the contractor. It was reiterated that before levying compensation by the
Superintending Engineer, show-cause notice was served, extension of time
was granted without prejudice to the right of the Government to recover
liquidated damage under Clause 2. The contractor had accepted the time
extension granted by the appellants unconditionally and also carried out the
work. The learned District Commercial Court has failed to consider that the
Superintending Engineer had imposed levy of compensation for an amount
of Rs. 3,74,180/- in exercise of his power under clause 2 of Tripura PWD
Form No.7 which was a part of the agreement. The contractor failed to
achieve the milestone. The work was delayed due to the fault of the
contractor as would be evident from the hindrance register and
correspondence on record. Show-cause notice was issued by the Executive
Engineer after getting approval from the higher authority. So, every action
was impliedly taken on behalf of the Government or the Governor as head of
the State. Therefore, according to Mr. De, learned Addl. GA, the observation
of the learned Arbitrator that the order of imposition of levy of compensation
by the Superintending Engineer was not a valid legal order and is totally
wrong, misinterpreted and a result of non-application of judicious mind and
thus cannot sustain in law.
6.
Submissions on behalf of the contractor-respondent:
6.1
On the other hand, Mr. Sengupta, learned counsel appearing for
the contractor-respondent submitted that the appellant-Department issued
Work Order for Drilling of 25 Nos. small bore deep tube-wells to the
contractor-respondent without conducting any survey at sites as to the
availability of suitable water bearing strata underneath the soil. Allegedly,
the contractor was asked to install small bore deep tube-wells in the site. The
respondent started the work with great zeal, but most of the sites, selected by
the Department, after being bored found that the water was not available.
Owing to that a good number of bore holes were abandoned due to nonavailability of suitable water bearing strata. In such situation, the delay was
occurred beyond the power and control of the contractor. The contractor
suffered huge losses for such unsuccessful drilling as the bore holes are
abandoned due to non-availability of suitable water and for this, the
Contractor cannot claim bill from the Department.
6.2
Moreover, Mr. Sengupta, learned counsel appearing for the
contractor submitted that the learned Arbitrator interpreting the declaration of
the Agreement rightly came to the conclusion that PWD Works Manual,
2007, adopted by the Government of Tripura, which are in complete form,
would be applicable to the contract between the parties.
6.3
Mr. Sengupta, learned counsel in support of his claim has relied
upon the decision in the case of A.T. Brij Paul Singh vs State of Gujarat,
(1984) 4 SCC 59 wherein the Apex Court held that “Ordinarily, when a
contractor submits his tender in response to an invitation to tender for a
works contract, a reasonable expectation of profit is implicit in it and its loss
has to be compensated by way of damages if the other party to the contract is
guilty of breach of contract. Where, therefore, the party entrusting the work
commits breach of the contract, the contractor would be entitled to claim
damages for loss of profit which he expected to earn by undertaking the
works contract. What would be the measure of profit would, however, depend
upon facts and circumstances of each case. While estimating the loss of profit
for the breach of contract it would be unnecessary to go into the minutest
details of the work executed in relation to the value of the works contract. A
broad evaluation would be sufficient”.
6.4
Further, Mr. Sengupta, learned counsel placed reliance upon the
judgment passed in Dwaraka Das vs State of M.P., (1999) 3 SCC 500
wherein the Apex Court at para 9 held thus:
"9………What would be the measure of profit would depend upon
facts and circumstances of each case. But that there shall be a reasonable
expectation of profit is implicit in a works contract and its loss has to be
compensated by way of damages if the other party to the contract is guilty
of breach of contract cannot be gainsaid. In this case we have the
additional reason for rejecting the contention that for the same type of
work, the work site being in the vicinity of each other and for identical
type of work between the same parties, a Division Bench of the same High
Court has accepted 15 per cent of the value of the balance of the works
contract would not be an unreasonable measure of damages for loss of
profit.
Now if it is well established that the respondent was guilty of breach
of contract inasmuch as the rescission of contract by the respondent is
held to be unjustified, and the plaintiff-contractor had executed a part of
the works contract, the contractor would be entitled to damages by way of
loss of profit. Adopting the measure accepted by the High Court in the
facts and circumstances of the case between the same parties and for the
same type of work at 15 per cent of the value of the remaining parts of the
works contract, the damages for loss of profit can be measured………"
6.5
We may gainfully recapitulate hereunder the reasoning of the
Arbitrator in favour of the award and the interpretation of Clause 2 and 3
which reads thus:
“34)
Issue No-"A" -Whether the Clause-2 of the Conditions of
Contract agreement as per details of the PWD Works Manual, 2007has
vested the any Power to show cause notice intending to take action
against the Petitioner in imposing Levy of Compensation and whether
the said Clause has vested any power on the Superintending Engineer of
the Concerned Circle to impose Levy of Compensation based on the show
cause notice issued by the Engineer-in-Charge (Respondent)?
It is an admitted fact that all power lies with the Governor of
Tripura. His Excellency was / is the supreme authority of the work in
question. He delegated his power to the Engineer in charge (Respondent).
After such delegation of power the Respondent stepped into the shoe of the
Governor. So in between the Governor and the Respondent there was / is
none who can poke his nose to the affairs of the execution of the work in
question.
Admittedly the Superintending Engineer of the concerning section
of the PWD is the higher authority of the Respondent. He can direct the
Respondent in every matter, if it is necessary for the better administration
and smooth and effective administration, but he had no power to poke his
nose to the affairs of instant execution of work. His Excellency the
Governor did never delegate his power to the Superintending Engineer. So
it can safely be said that he crossed his limit and interfere with the works
of the Respondent. His steps are not tenable according to law and thus it
can be said his order of imposition of levy of compensation is illegal and
void.
The counsel for the Petitioner R.N. Kanjilal raised other legal
contentions also in support of his submission. The learned counsel for the
Respondent S.R. Bhattacharjee did not speak anything regarding the power
of the Superintending Engineer. He remained busy with the other
allegations including the legal contentions relating to the agreement.
The legal aspect involved of decision under this issue is highlighted as
follow:a)
Clause 2 of the agreement as applicable at the instant
contract is not the clause empowering to impose liquidated damages by the
Engineer- in- charge on behalf of the Governor of Tripura rather the
clause incorporated in the PWD Works Manual, 2007 which shall be
applicable in this agreement and it runs as follows:b)
"Engineer-in-charge's Decision:-Except where otherwise
specifically stated, the Engineer-in-charge will decide the contractual
matters between the Department and the Contractor (Petitioner) in the role
representing the Department."
While implementing an y provision of the agreement, the
same must be for and on behalf of the Governor of Tripura. In this case
also the Respondent while issuing show cause Notice' purportedly under
clause 3, issued the same for and on behalf of the Governor of Tripura but
while issuing the show cause 'Notice' on the basis of a non-existing Clause
2 the same was not issued for and on behalf of the Governor of Tripura
and has, therefore, no legal value.
c)
The counsel for the Petitioner Kanjilal submitted before the
Tribunal that no show cause 'Notice' under Clause 2 of the agreement was
issued for and on behalf of the Governor of Tripura before imposition of
compensation by the Superintending Engineer on 03- 01-2014 (Exhibit-C /
8) was nether under Clause 2 nor was issued on behalf of the Governor of
Tripura, which was which was / is legal requirement and thus it had no leg
to stand upon. Moreover no actions, on the basis of, the said show cause
'Notice' had been taken by the Engineer-in-charge.
d)
He further submitted that the action of imposition of levy of
compensation by the Superintending Engineer on 31- 03-2014 (Exhibit
C/14) stating that extension of time was granted on 31- 05-2014 was/is
materially in correct as only provisional extension and not extension of
time was granted, the extension had / has also no value in the eye of law as
the first extension was granted on 03-01-2014 when the stipulated period
of compensation elapsed on 08-08-2013,i.e. the contract already became
dead and inoperative.
e)
The counsel for the Petitioner Kanjilal also raised some
other legal contentions for which the action taken by the Superintendant
Engineer was not valid and legal one. The learned Counsel for the
Respondent did not categorically denied the above mentioned legal
contentions. He was of the view the Superintending Engineer being the
superior authority of the Respondent had right to take step over the matter.
As I opined in the preceding paragraphs of the judgment
that the order of imposition of levy of compensation by the Superintending
Engineer was not a valid legal order and it was exercised by the
Superintending Engineer without any proper authority I do not like to
discuss more about the Issue No- 1. But I do not reject the other legal
contentions of the counsel for the Petitioner for the rejection of the order of
the Superintending Engineer for imposition of levy of fine as mentioned
above.
Thus, from the discussion made above I am left with no
other choice than to opine that the Issue No-1 is answered in favour of the
Petitioner.
44).
Issue No-(B) whether the Clause-3 of the Conditions of Contract
agreement as per details of PWD Works Manual, 2007 has vested any
power on the Engineer-in Charge to rescind the Contract?
49)
On hearing the learned counsel for both the sides it
appears to me that, according to the Petitioner, the Clause-3 of the
Conditions of Contract agreement as per details of the PWD Works
Manual, 2007 does not vest any power on the Engineer-in-charge to
rescind the contract. The learned Counsel for the Respondent did not deny
it specifically. According to him the bi-lateral agreement/declaration
between the Engineer-in-charge and the Petitioner empowered the
Respondent to rescind the work if the Petitioner failed to comply with the
terms and conditions of the agreement.
50)
On careful scrutiny of the Clause-3 of the Conditions of
Contract of the PWD Works Manual, 2007 as applicable to this agreement
does not provide for rescinding the contract rather speaks otherwise. So
the action of rescission of the contract by the Respondent on 20-03-2015
under Clause-3 of the agreement is not tenable according to law. It has no
legal footings.
51) I am satisfied with the submission of the counsel for the Petitioner
R.N. Kanjilal in this respect. From the record it appears that the
Respondent amalgamated the PWD Form No-7 and the PWD Works
Manual, 2007 together and took action against the Petitioner according to
their need and requirements.
52)
For the arguments sake let us consider that the claim of the
Respondent is genuine and applicable to the instant case. If we consider
the action of the Respondent genuine how he would be escaped from the
major wrong/fault of the Respondent's side. The following are the reasons
for which the Respondent is crippled to take any action against the
Petitioner.
The stipulated date of completion of the work was 08-08-2013 as per
agreement and not on 07-08-2013. It was wrongly quoted. The extension
was granted to keep the contract alive from 09-08-2013 and thereby the
contract became dead and in operative on 08-08-2013.
The first extension was granted on 31-01- 2014 vide letter dated 03-012014 (Exhibit C/8) was also not a valid extension in the eye of law as there
is / was no bridge in between 09-08- 2013 to 02-01-2014. The contract
which already became dead and inoperative on expiry of the stipulated
period on 08-08-2013 could not be legally revived by granting provisional
extension almost after elapse of more than 4 (four) months. That apart the
extension granted was/is a provisional one and not a regular extension. So
the second extension granted on 30-01-2014 up to 31-05-2014 (Exhibit C
/11) is unsustainable in law.
The show cause 'Notice' intending to rescind the contract was issued on
01-04-2014 (Exhibit C /17) on the allegation of the failure of the Petitioner
to complete the work within the stipulated period and the same was duly
replied by the Petitioner On 16- 04-2014 (Exhibit C/18) explaining as to
why no action was warranted against the Petitioner.
A bare perusal of the Petitioner's letter dated 16-04-2014 would reveal
the truth that he had also referred his earlier correspondences dated 2401-2014 (Exhibit C/9) and 05-02-2014 (Exhibit C/12) and apprising the
Respondent the impossibility to execute the work due to abnormal price
rise for no fault on the part of the Petitioner requested the Respondent to
drop the show cause 'Notice instead of taking any action against the
Petitioner.
That on receipt of the reply of show cause 'Notice' on 16-04-2014 the
Respondent did not take any action against the Petitioner for a
considerable period of time of more than 13 months. It appears to me when
the Petitioner was expecting a reasonable decision from the Respondent,
all of a sudden the Respondent on 20-05-2015 issued the rescission order,
which is also after 13 months 20 days from the date of issuing the show
cause 'Notice' and after 13 months of the reply furnished by the Petitioner.
But he did not explain as to why he could not consider the
claim/submission of the Petitioner in his any letters.
The learned counsel for the Respondent failed to explain the aforenoted
legal contentions and other questions raised by the Tribunal at the time of
hearing case. He took time verbally but ultimately failed give proper
explanation.
It also appears from the case record that the Respondent blew hot and
cold at the same breadth by exercising the provisions of the PWD Form
No-7 and the PWD Works Manual, 2007 in the instant case and it is not
tenable according to law.
Thus from the discussion made above I am of the opinion that the
Clause-3 of the Conditions of Contract agreement as per details of PWD
Works Manual, 2007 has not vested any power on the Engineer-in Charge
to rescind the Contract.
Hence the Issue No 'B' is answered in favour of the petitioner.”
7.
Analysis and Conclusions:
Now, the core question before us is whether the award passed by
the learned Arbitrator, which was upheld by the learned District Commercial
Court, can be interfered in an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration &
Conciliation Act, 1996 in the facts and circumstances of the case on hand.
7.1.
The scope of interference in an appeal under Section 37 of the
Act of 1996 has been delineated in the several decisions rendered by the
Apex Court. We are inclined to refer to the latest decision of the Apex Court
in this regard rendered in the case of S.V. Samudram vs State of Karnataka
and Anr. reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 19. Paragraphs 62 to 73 are
extracted here-under:
“62. Moving further, we now consider the judgment impugned before
us, i.e., the order of the High Court upholding such modification, under the
jurisdiction of Section 37 of the A&C Act.
63. It has been observed by this Court in MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd.
“14. As far as interference with an order made under
Section 34, as per Section 37, is concerned, it cannot be disputed that such
interference under Section 37 cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid
down under Section 34. In other words, the court cannot undertake an
independent assessment of the merits of the award, and must only ascertain
that the exercise of power by the court under Section 34 has not exceeded
the scope of the provision. Thus, it is evident that in case an arbitral award
has been confirmed by the court under Section 34 and by the court in an
appeal under Section 37, this Court must be extremely cautious and slow to
disturb such concurrent findings.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
64. This view has been referred to with approval by a bench of three
learned Judges in UHL Power Company Ltd v. State of Himachal Pradesh.
In respect of Section 37, this court observed:—
“16. As it is, the jurisdiction conferred on courts under Section 34 of
the Arbitration Act is fairly narrow, when it comes to the scope of an
appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, the jurisdiction of an
appellate court in examining an order, setting aside or refusing to set aside
an award, is all the more circumscribed.”
65. This Court has not lost sight of the fact that, as a consequence to
our discussion as aforesaid, holding that the judgment and order under
Section 34 of the A&C Act does not stand judicial scrutiny, an independent
evaluation of the impugned judgment may not be required in view of the
holding referred to supra in MMTC Ltd. However, we proceed to examine
the same.
66. We may also notice that the circumscribed nature of the exercise of
power under Sections 34 and 37 i.e., interference with an arbitral award,
is clearly demonstrated by legislative intent. The Arbitration Act of 1940
had a provision (Section 15) which allowed for a court to interfere in
awards, however, under the current legislation, that provision has been
omitted.
67. The learned Single Judge, similar to the learned Civil Judge under
Section 34, appears to have not concerned themselves with the contours of
Section 37 of the A&C Act. The impugned judgment reads like a judgment
rendered by an appellate court, for whom re-examination of merits is open
to be taken as the course of action.
68. We find the Court to have held the award to be perverse and
contrary to public policy. The basis for such a finding being the delay on
the part of the contractor in completion of the work which “could have
been avoided”. Significantly, as we have observed earlier such a finding is
not backed by any material on record.
69. What appears to have weighed with the court is that the factoring of
the cost escalation between the years 1989-1990 and 1992 by 100% was
exaggerated. But then equally, there is no justification in granting lump
sum escalation by 25% of the contract value. Well, this cannot be a reason
to modify the award for the parties are governed by the terms and
conditions and the price escalation stood justified by the petitioner based
on cogent and reliable material as was so counted by the Arbitrator in
partly accepting and/or rejecting the claims.
70. In our considered opinion, the court while confirming the
modification of the award committed the very same mistake which the
Court under Section 34 of the A&C Act, made.
71. The Court under Section 37 had only three options:—
(a) Confirming the award of the Arbitrator;
(b) Setting aside the award as modified under Section 34; and
(c) Rejecting the application(s) under Section 34 and 37.
72. The learned single Judge has examined the reasoning adopted by
the learned Arbitrator in respect of certain claims (claims 3 and 7,
particularly) and held that allowing a claim for escalation of cost, was
without satisfactory material having been placed on record and is
“perverse and contrary to the public policy”. However, it appears that
such a holding on part of the Judge is without giving reasons therefore. It
has not been discussed as to what the evidence was before the learned
single Judge to arrive at such conclusion. This is of course, entirely
without reference to the scope delineated by various judgments of this
Court as also, the statutory scheme of the A & C Act.
73. Having referred to J.G Engineers (P) Ltd. v. UOI and more
particularly para 27 thereof, it has been held that the award passed by the
learned Arbitrator is “patently illegal, unreasonable, contrary to public
policy.” There is no reason forthcoming as to how the holding of the
learned Arbitrator flies in the face of public policy.”
7.2
In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, there cannot be any
quarrel that the learned Arbitrator is the sole judge for construction of the
terms and conditions of the agreement. But, what we find in the instant case
is that the learned Commercial Court has not made any reference to the
grounds of challenge relating to Clause-2 or Clause-3 of the Agreement.
Moreover, the learned Judge, District Commercial Court as well as the
learned Arbitrator have failed to consider whether the contractor-respondent
is entitled to get payment relating to all the issues raised in the Arbitral
proceedings.
8.
We may profitably recapitulate hereunder the findings of the
District Commercial Court, which reads thus:
“….The award sought to be set aside mainly on the ground
that the Arbitrator has traveled beyond the jurisdiction and passed
the award without proper appreciation of the materials placed before
him. The grounds as enumerated in the application for setting aside
the award require appreciation of the evidence/materials placed
before the Arbitrator which is not at all permissible. In this
connection we are supported by the view taken by the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court in the judgments as referred to above and also the
provision of section 34(2-A) of the Arbitration Act.
6. The scheme and scope of the provisions of Section 34 of
Arbitration Act aims at keeping the supervisory roles of the court at
minimum level, therefore, we cannot correct the errors so done by the
arbitrator by sitting as a Appellate Court, it can only be quashed
leaving the parties to begin the arbitration again if it is desired. Since
the case at hand, as stated earlier above, the grounds put forward for
setting aside the award require appreciation of materials placed
before the Arbitrator, the application under consideration merits
rejection….”
The findings of the learned District Commercial Court extracted
here-in-above would unambiguously show that there has been a complete
non-consideration of the reasons assigned in the Award.
9.
The learned Commercial Court also has failed to test the
correctness of the award within the contours of the grounds available under
Section 34(2) and 34(2-A) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
without referring to the relevant Clauses of the Agreement. Nonconsideration of any of the grounds raised under Section 34 of the Act makes
the judgment of the learned Commercial Court unsustainable.
10.
Recently, a three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
(Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, CJI, B. R. Gavai, J. and Surya Kant, J.) while
entertaining a Curative Petition[Ref: Curative Petition(C) Nos.108-109 of
2022 in Review Petition(C) Nos.1158-1159 of 2021 arising out of Civil
Appeal Nos.5627-5628 of 2021] in Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. vs.
Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd. disposed on 10.04.2024 has
summarized the law as regards the scope of interference of courts with
Arbitral Awards in the manner as under:“II. Scope of interference of courts with arbitral awards
36. Section 34 of the Arbitration Act delineates the grounds for
setting aside an arbitral award. The provision, as amended by
the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 reads
as follows:
"34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.…..
(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court
only if….
(b) the Court finds that-(i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of
settlement by arbitration under the law for the time
being in force, or
(ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public
policy of India.
Explanation 1. -For the avoidance of any doubt, it is
clarified that an award is in conflict with the public
policy of India, only if,(i) the making of the award was induced or affected by
fraud or corruption or was in violation of section 75 or
section 81; or
(ii) it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of
Indian law; or
(iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions of
morality or justice.
Explanation 2. --For the avoidance of doubt, the test as
to whether there is a contravention with the
fundamental policy of Indian law shall not entail a
review on the merits of the dispute.
(2A) An arbitral award arising out of arbitrations
other than international commercial arbitrations, may
also be set aside by the Court, if the Court finds that
the award is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on
the face of the award:
Provided that an award shall not be set aside merely on
the ground of an erroneous application of the law or by
reappreciation of evidence."
(emphasis supplied)
37. The contours of the power of the competent court to set aside an
award under Section 34 has been explored in several decisions of
this Court. In addition to the grounds on which an arbitral award
can be assailed laid down in Section 34(2), there is another ground
for challenge against domestic awards, such as the award in the
present case. Under Section 34(2-A) of the Arbitration Act, a
domestic award may be set aside if the Court finds that it is vitiated
by 'patent illegality' appearing on the face of the award.
38. In Associate Builders vs. Delhi Development Authority, a twojudge Bench of this Court held that although the interpretation of a
contract is exclusively within the domain of the arbitrator,
construction of a contract in a manner that no fair-minded or
reasonable person would take, is impermissible. A patent illegality
arises where the arbitrator adopts a view which is not a possible
view. A view can be regarded as not even a possible view where no
reasonable body of persons could possibly have taken it. This Court
held with reference to Sections 28(1)(a) and 28(3), that the arbitrator
must take into account the terms of the contract and the usages of
trade applicable to the transaction. The decision or award should not
be perverse or irrational. An award is rendered perverse or
irrational where the findings are (i) based on no evidence; (ii) based
on irrelevant material; or (iii) ignores vital evidence. Patent
illegality may also arise where the award is in breach of the
provisions of the arbitration statute, as when for instance the award
contains no reasons at all, so as to be described as unreasoned. A
fundamental breach of the principles of natural justice will result in a
patent illegality, where for instance the arbitrator has let in evidence
behind the back of a party. In the above decision, this Court
observed:
"31. The third juristic principle is that a decision which
is perverse or so irrational that no reasonable person
would have arrived at the same is important and
requires some degree of explanation. It is settled law
that where:
(i) a finding is based on no evidence, or
(ii) an Arbitral Tribunal takes into account something
irrelevant to the decision which it arrives at; or
(iii) ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision,
such decision would necessarily be perverse.
….
42.2. (b) A contravention of the Arbitration Act itself
would be regarded as a patent illegality for example if
an arbitrator gives no reasons for an award in
contravention of Section 31(3) of the Act, such award
will be liable to be set aside."
(emphasis supplied)
39. In Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. vs. NHAI, a
two-judge bench of this Court endorsed the position in Associate
Builders (supra), on the scope for interference with domestic awards,
even after the 2015 Amendment:
"40. The change made in Section 28(3) by the
Amendment Act really follows what is stated in paras
42.3 to 45 in Associate Builders, namely, that the
construction of the terms of a contract is primarily for
an arbitrator to decide, unless the arbitrator construes
the contract in a manner that no fair-minded or
reasonable person would; in short, that the
arbitrator's view is not even a possible view to take.
Also, if the arbitrator wanders outside the contract
and deals with matters not allotted to him, he commits
an error of jurisdiction. This ground of challenge will
now fall within the new ground added under Section
34(2-A).
41.... Thus, a finding based on no evidence at all or an
award which ignores vital evidence in arriving at its
decision would be perverse and liable to be set aside
on the ground of patent illegality. Additionally, a
finding based on documents taken behind the back of
the parties by the arbitrator would also qualify as a
decision based on no evidence inasmuch as such
decision is not based on evidence led by the parties,
and therefore, would also have to be characterised as
perverse."
(emphasis supplied)
40.
In essence, the ground of patent illegality is available for
setting aside a domestic award, if the decision of the arbitrator is
found to be perverse, or so irrational that no reasonable person
would have arrived at it; or the construction of the contract is such
that no fair or reasonable person would take; or, that the view of the
arbitrator is not even a possible view. A 'finding based on no
evidence at all or an award which ignores vital evidence in arriving
at its decision would be perverse and liable to be set aside under the
head of 'patent illegality'. An award without reasons would suffer
from patent illegality. The arbitrator commits a patent illegality by
deciding a matter not within his jurisdiction or violating a
fundamental principle of natural justice.
41.
A judgment setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral
award under Section 34 is appealable in the exercise of the
jurisdiction of the court under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. It
has been clarified by this Court, in a line of precedent, that the
jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act is akin to the
jurisdiction of the Court under Section 34 and restricted to the same
grounds of challenge as Section 34.
42. In the statutory scheme of the Arbitration Act, a recourse to
Section 37 is the only appellate remedy available against a decision
under Section 34. The Constitution, however, provides the parties
with a remedy under Article 136 against a decision rendered in
appeal under Section 37. This is the discretionary and exceptional
jurisdiction of this Court to grant Special Leave to Appeal. In fact,
Section 37(3) of the Arbitration Act expressly clarifies that no second
appeal shall lie from an order passed under Section 37, but nothing
in the section takes away the constitutional right under Article 136.
Therefore, in a sense, there is a third stage at which this court tests
the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts acting under Section 34 and
Section 37 of the Arbitration Act.
47. Interference with an arbitral award cannot frustrate the „commercial
wisdom behind opting for alternate dispute resolution‟, merely because an
alternate view exists.29 However, the interpretation of a contract cannot
be unreasonable, such that no person of ordinary prudence would take it.
The contract, which is a culmination of the parties‟ agency, should be
given full effect. If the interpretation of the terms of the contract as adopted
by the tribunal was not even a possible view, the award is perverse.30
48. Clause 29.5.1(i) entitles the concessionaire to terminate the agreement
if DMRC “failed to cure such breach or take effective steps for curing such
breach” within the cure period. Pertinently, the clause uses two separate
phrases, “cure” and “effective steps to cure”. The clause reads as follows:
“29.5.1 The Concessionaire may after giving 90 (ninety) days‟
notice in writing to DMRC terminate this Agreement upon the occurrence
and continuation of any of the following events (each a “DMRC Event of
Default”), unless any such DMRC Event of Default has occurred as a
result of Concessionaire Event of Default or due to a Force Majeure Event.
(i)
11.
DMRC is in breach of this Agreement and such breach
has a Material Adverse Effect on the Concessionaire
and DMRC has failed to cure such breach or take
effective steps for curing such breach within 90
(ninety) days of receipt of notice in this behalf from
the Concessionaire.”
Keeping in view the aforesaid enunciation of law, we have
scanned the relevant clauses of the agreement entered into between the
appellant and the contractor-respondent as well as the tender document and
Form No.7.
12.
PWD Form No.7 lays down “General Rules and Directions for
the guidance of the contractors” (for short, “General Rules”), which consists
of various sub-heads on different subjects as regards the execution of the
contract work. “Brief Technical Specifications and Terms & Conditions” is
one of those sub-heads under Form No.-7.
Under Clause 5 of “Brief technical specifications and terms and
conditions” it is stipulated that “the successful tenderer will have to enter
into an agreement in PWD Form No.7(seven) with the Executive Engineer,
Rig Division, Agartala. It is also stipulated therein that, “where the
conditions of PWD Form No-7(seven) are repugnant to the special
conditions given in this tender document, the latter shall prevail and will
form a part of said agreement.”
13.
In the instant case, the respondent-contractor was requested by
the Executive Engineer to execute the formal agreement in PWD Form No.7
vide letter dated 25.07.2012.
14.
On conjoint reading of clause nos. 8, 9, 11, 12, 16, 17, 20, 21,
etc. of the General Conditions, it comes to fore that the Contractor is under
obligation to execute the works at the direction of the Engineer-in-charge.
Clause 40 stipulates that an order book shall be kept at the site of the work
and as far as practicable, all orders regarding the work are to be entered in
the said order book which are necessary to be signed by Department officer
who is in direct charge of the work and by the contractor or by his
representative. It is further stipulated that in important cases the Executive
Engineer or the Superintendant Engineer will countersign the entries. Under
clause 8 and 11 ample power has been given to the Engineer-in-charge and it
is clearly stated that Contractor has to execute the work as per direction of
the Engineer-in-Charge.
15.
There is another important sub-head dealing with “Settlement
of Disputes”. Clause 1.b. under the said sub-head of “Settlement of
disputes”, stipulates that “if the Engineer-in-Charge fails to give notice of his
decision in writing within a period of twenty days after being requested or if
the Contractor is dissatisfied with the notice of the decision of the Engineerin-Charge, the Contractor may within fifteen days after receiving the notice
of decision appeal to the concerned Superintending Engineer of Department
who shall after affording opportunity of being heard shall give notice of his
decision within a period of thirty days. After Superintending Engineer has
given written notice of his decision to the Contractor and no claim to
arbitration, has been communicated to him by the Contractor within a period
of fifteen days from receipt of such notice the said decision shall remain final
and binding on both side.
Thus, conditionality under the “Settlement of disputes” clarifies
that Superintending Engineer has ample power to take any decision subject to
issuance of a notice of his decision. So, views of the Arbitrator that the
Superintending Engineer has illegally poked his nose and interfered with the
affairs and crossed his limits and violated the clause of agreement in levying
compensation was not valid and illegal are not the one possible views.
16.
Moreso, the contractor in his declaration embodied in PWD
Form No.-6A of the tender document stated that “he had gone through the
details of both the latest pamphlets as well as the details mentioned in PWD
Works Manual, 2007 adopted by the Government of Tripura which are in
complete form will be applicable to this contract. It was further declared that
calculation
in
respect
of
rates
of
all
statement
about
Extra/Deviated/Substitute items will be worked out as per relevant Clause(s)
of PWD Form No.7(seven) for this contract which will be final and binding”.
17.
Now, on perusal of the award together with the relevant clauses
in the agreement and the tender document, we find that the Arbitrator has not
assigned any reasons before arriving at a finding that the Superintending
Engineer had no power to poke his nose into the affairs of the performance of
the contract work.
Again, the finding of the Arbitrator that the notice issued by the
Engineer-in-Charge was illegal and arbitrary as because it was not issued for
and on behalf of the Governor of Tripura and his finding that while
implementing any provision of the agreement the same must be for and on
behalf of the Governor of Tripura is perverse and patently illegal.
18.
It is clearly stated under Clause 2 of the conditions of contract
available in the tender document as well as in PWD Works Manual, 2007
that the Engineer-in-charge will decide the contractual matters between the
Department and the Contractor in the role representing the Department
except where such power of the Engineer-in-charge is specifically excluded.
In view of the aforesaid clause 2(2.1), the view of the Arbitrator that under
Clause 2(2.1) he is not empowered to rescind the contract, is not a possible
view and suffers from patent error of law. Again, the view of the Arbitrator
in interpreting the delegation clause under Clause 3 of the conditions of
contract is also not a possible view. The Clause 3 stipulates that the
Engineer-in-charge may delegate any of his duties and responsibilities to
other officers and may cancel any delegation by an official order issued.
(emphasis supplied)
19.
On plain reading of the aforesaid Clause 3, it becomes crystal
clear that Engineer-in-Charge may delegate his power to any officers to act
for and on his behalf. In no way it can be interpreted that the Engineer-inCharge is curtailed or excluded from exercising any of the powers he is
vested with under the conditions of the contract. Further, nowhere in the
PWD Works Manual, 2007, it is stated that Engineer-in-Charge is a delegatee
and he exercises his power as a delegatee of the Governor.
20.
There is yet another important feature in the award passed by
the Arbitrator is that the notification dated 30.05.2007 relating to “Adoption
of Works Manual in PWD, Tripura” whereby it was notified that all
conditions including general conditions of contract as incorporated in the
Model Standard Bid Document(SBD) will be considered to be a part of the
said notification and be in force in the Department for tenders costing above
Rupees Fifty Lakhs or for any specialized works project. So, the adherence to
different conditions in the SBD is also mandatory between the parties to the
contract, which the Arbitrator should have taken into account while deciding
the issues/claims.
21.
In the light of the above, the award made by the Arbitrator is not
sustainable in law as it is against the public policy doctrine and suffers from
patent illegality. The learned Commercial Court in exercise of its power
under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has not
properly dealt with the finding and views expressed by the Arbitrator in his
award.
22.
Pertinently, it is noticed that the Arbitrator has decided the
disputes/claims raised by the parties most mechanically without assigning
any reasons.
23.
It is settled proposition that recording of reasons is principle of
natural justice and every judicial order must be supported by reasons
recorded in writing. It ensures transparency and fairness in decision making.
Opinion of the Court alone can explain the cause which led to passing of the
final order. The person who is adversely affected may know, as to why his
application has been rejected. The Court cannot lose sight of the fact that a
losing litigant has a cause to plead and a right to challenge the order if it is
adverse to him. Whether an argument was rejected validly or otherwise,
reasoning of the order alone can show. To evaluate the submissions is an
obligation of the authority and to know the reasons for rejection of its
contention is a legitimate expectation on the part of the litigant. When
reasons are announced and can be weighed, the public can have assurance
that the correcting process is working. Announcing reasons can also provide
public understanding of how the numerous decisions of the system are
integrated.
24.
Hence, non-assigning of reasons amounts to fundamental breach
of natural justice under Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996,
and is contrary to basic notion of morality and justice which renders the
award perverse and liable to be set aside on the ground of patent illegality.
There is no vital evidence as to how the learned Arbitrator had interpreted the
provisions relating to Clause-2 and Clause-3 of the PWD Work Manual,
2007.
25.
The upshot of the aforesaid discussions and for the reasons
recorded, according to us, the matter should be remitted back to the learned
Arbitrator to decide all the issues and the claims raised by the parties afresh.
Accordingly, it is remitted back to the Arbitrator for fresh decision by
assigning reasons.
The arbitrator shall decide and settle the disputes raised by the
parties within 6(six) months from the date he receives the copy of this
judgment.
The appeal stands disposed with the aforesaid directions.
(ARINDAM LODH, J)
Snigdha
SAIKAT
KAR
Digitally signed
by SAIKAT KAR
Date: 2024.06.01
10:28:58 +05'30'
(APARESH KUMAR SINGH, CJ)
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