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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
ARB. A. NO.12 OF 2022
1. The State of Tripura, represented by the
Commissioner & Secretary to the
Government of Tripura,
Urban Development Department,
P.S. New Capital Complex,
P.O. Kunjaban, Agartala, West Tripura.
2. The Director,
Urban Development Department,
Pandit Nehru Complex,
P.O. Kunjaban, P.S. New Capital Complex,
Agartala, Pin-799 001, District-West Tripura.
.......Applicant-Appellant(s)
Versus
Hindustan Steel works Construction Ltd.
A Government of India Undertakings,
Represented by its Head(Projects) Sri Tanmoy Bhowmik,
having its local office at Banik Kuthir,
Sankar Chowmuhani, Krishnanagar,
P.O. Agartala, P.S. West Agartala,
District-West Tripura.
....... Contractor-respondent (s)
For the applicant-appellant(s)
:
Mr. Karnajit De, Addl. GA
For the respondent(s)
:
Mr. S.M. Chakraborty, Sr. Advocate
Ms. Mampi Chakraborty, Advocate
Date of hearing and
delivery of Judgment & Order
:
13. 02.2024
Whether fit for reporting
:
YES
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. APARESH KUMAR SINGH
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARINDAM LODH
JUDGMENT & ORDER(ORAL)
By way of filing the instant appeal under Section 37(1)(c) of the
Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, read with Section 13(1A) of the
Commercial Act 2015, the appellants have challenged the impugned
judgment and order dated 24.06.2022, passed by the learned Judge, District
Commercial Court, West Tripura, Agartala in Civil Misc.(Arbitration) No.10
of 2018, whereby and whereunder the application filed by the applicantappellants for setting aside the arbitral award dated 31.05.2018, passed by the
learned Arbitrator in Arbitration Proceeding No.1 of 2017, arising out of
Arbitration Petition No.40 of 2016, was rejected.
2.
Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts giving rise to filing of the
instant appeal may be stated thus:
2.1.
Pursuant to a Notice Inviting Tender(NIT, for short) floated by
the appellants for construction of the work, namely „Drainage system of
Agartala Municipal area/SH: Construction of RCC covered drain in Central
Zone‟, the respondent-contractor had entered into a contract by way of
agreement vide No.F.16(27)/UDD/DUD/CON.WKS/2011/1779-1805 dated
11.06.2012 with the appellants. The estimated value of the contract work was
Rs.29,61,15,323/- and in terms of the agreement being executed on
24.09.2012, the work ought to have been completed within 18(eighteen)
months from the date of agreement, i.e. on or before 23.03.2014.
2.2.
However, the work could not be completed within the stipulated
period and the respondent-contractor only could able to complete the work to
the extent of 15.06%. The appellants, however, on the prayer of the
respondent, extended time twice for completion of the work. But, the
contractor-respondent suspended the work since October, 2015 without
acceptable reasons. The appellants, therefore, terminated the contract on
20.05.2016 invoking the provision of Clause 54 of the agreement.
2.3.
It is the claim of the appellants that the respondent miserably
failed to complete the work not only within the stipulated period as
contracted for but also within the extended period of contract, in spite of
providing all sorts of cooperation from their end. The appellants had to
terminate the contract as per provisions contained in the contract agreement
finding no other alternative, since the respondent could not complete more
than 15.6% of the agreement work even after extending the contract period
on two occasions.
2.4.
To the contrary, it is the claim of the respondent/contractor that
though the work entrusted to the respondent was stipulated to be completed
within 18 months but due to failure of the appellants in making available free
and workable work front, the work could not be completed within the
stipulated period of 18 months. The contractor being faced with various
obstacles applied for granting extension of time mentioning various reasons
of delay and also prayed for the benefit of price escalation as per provision
prescribed in Clause 44 of the conditions of the contract. However, within
the extended period also, the appellants failed to provide clear work front and
finally the appellants could be able to provide only about 25.80% of the total
scope of the work. For non-grant of extension with benefit of Clause 44.1 of
the conditions of the contract and also for not providing further work front
free from all encumbrances, the respondent could not proceed with further
work after March, 2015. Ultimately, the appellants on 20.05.2016 on the
allegation that the respondent failed to complete the work rescinded the
agreement. The respondent, therefore, laid his claim to the tune of
Rs.3,93,07,799/-.
2.5.
Ultimately, on an application at the instance of the respondent
under Section 11(6) read with 11(8) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
2015, the matter came to be referred for settlement and adjudication of the
disputes to the arbitral mechanism and resultantly in Arb.P.No.40 of 2016,
Mr. D.K. Das Choudhury, TJS Gr-I(Retd.) stood appointed as the Arbitrator
in terms of order dated 30.03.2017 passed by this Court.
2.6.
In the arbitration proceedings, the claims/disputes put forth by
the claimant-contractor/ respondent herein before the learned sole Arbitrator,
are as under:
“1. The claimants challenged the legality of termination of the
contract issued under letter dated 20.05.2016 of the Executive
Engineer of the Urban Development Department(for short UDD(Exbt.C/103);
2. The claimant demanded payment of balance due for the works
done basing upon the bill prepared by the respondents amounting to
Rs.30,87,669/- only;
3. The claimant demanded payment on account of extra works
executed and claims submitted vide letter no.HSCL/Drains/Tripura/
915 dated 07.08.2014 amounting to Rs.3,36,713/-(Exbt.C/107);
4. The claimant demanded refund of security deposit including EMD
amounting to Rs.51,82,338/- only;
5. The claimant demanded compensation of Rs.2,38,83,073/- only on
account of loss of expected profit on the balance work to be executed
@ 10% of estimated at Rs.23,88,30,725/-;
6. The claimant demanded price escalation as per Sub-clause 44.1 of
the Agreement on the value of the works done after the stipulated
period estimated at Rs.28,43,213/- only;
7. The claimant demanded interest @12% per annum on the sum
demanded with effect from 20.06.2016 for the pre-reference period,
pendent lite period and also for post award period;
8. The claimant also demanded cost of arbitration proceeding
including fees of the arbitrator by way of reimbursement being the
injured party.”
2.7.
On the other hand, the State, appellants herein by filing counter
statement of defense pleaded against each of the claims/disputes, in the
following manner:
“1. Termination of the contract under order dated 20.05.2016 of the
Executive Engineer of UDD was done validly exercising the
jurisdiction vested upon him;
2. The respondent admitted that an amount of Rs.23,83,383/- only
remains to be paid to the claimant and not Rs.30,87,669/-, as
claimed, and for the said amount of Rs.23,83,383/- final bill has been
prepared but payment has not been made;
3. The account of extra works executed is varied by the respondent,
balance of which, according to them is Rs.9,91,100/- only against the
claim of Rs.3,36,713/-. However, they expressed their readiness to
reconcile the account to arrive at a correct decision;
4. The respondent admitted that security deposit including EMD
amounting to Rs.51,82,340/- is lying with them, but said amount is to
be forfeited in consequence of rightful rescission of the contract as
per clause 25.2 of the Agreement;
5. In view of rightful rescission of the contract the claimant is not
entitled to any compensation on account of loss of expected profit on
the balance work;
6. Considering the tender amount and the stipulated time for
completion, the provision of the Clause 44 of the Agreement is not
applicable in the present case and the claimant is not entitled to any
price variation;
7. The question of award of interest is left within the domain of the
Arbitrator and the relevant provisions of law. However, the rate of
interest as claimed by the claimant is considered to be exorbitant;
8. The claim for cost of arbitration proceeding including fees of the
arbitrator by way of reimbursement is denied by the respondent for
the reason that it is the claimant who dragged the respondent to
arbitration”
2.8.
The State/appellants also disputing the claims of the claimant-
respondent on the above mentioned terms further advanced the following two
counter claims:
“1. Damages from the claimant for the loss suffered on account of
extra expenditure amounting to Rs.4,27,98,769/- incurred for
completing the balance work done by other agency @18% of the
extra-expenditure.
2. Liquidated damages for delay cause in completion of the
contracted work @10% of the contract value from the claimant.”
2.9.
Considering the controversies transpired from the respective
statement of claims and defense and the documents filed by the parties, the
learned Arbitrator framed the following issues:“i. Whether the termination of the contract No. F.16(27)/UDD/ DUD
/CON.WKS/2011/1779-1805 dated 24.09.2012 by the respondent as
made by its letter dated 20.05.2016 amounted breach of contract on
the part of the respondent.
ii. Whether the claimant is entitled to compensation from the
respondent for breach of contract by the respondent and, if so, what
shall be the quantum of the compensation?
iii. Whether the claimant is entitled to balance payment of
Rs.30,87,339/- due for value of works done on the basis of bill
prepared by the respondent from the latter?
iv. Whether the claimant is entitled to payment of Rs.3,36,713/- from
the respondent on account of extra works executed and claim
submitted to the respondent vide letter No.HSCL/Drains/Tripura/915
dated 07.08.2014 of the claimant?
v. Whether the claimant is entitled to refund of security deposit
including EMD amounting to Rs.51,82,338/- as forfeited by the
respondent?
vi. Whether the claimant is entitled to Rs.28,43,213.00 being the
value of the work done after stipulated period on account of price
escalation from the respondent?
vii. Whether the claimant is entitled to interest with effect from
20.06.2016 for preference period, pendente lite period and post
award period to be paid by the respondent? If so what shall be the
rate?
viii. Who is to bear the cost of arbitration?
ix. Whether the respondent is entitled to damages for the loss
suffered on account of extra expenditure of Rs.4,27,98,769.00
incurred for completing the balance work done by other agency left
by the claimant from the claimant?
x. Whether the respondent is entitled to recover liquidated damages
for delay caused in completion of the contracted work @10% of the
contract value from the claimant?
2.10.
On 31.05.2018, after consideration of the respective claims of
the parties and on going through the pleadings and documents adduced by
them, the learned Arbitrator returned the award in the following manner:
“(1) It is declared that the rescission of the contract done under
letter dated 20.05.2016(Exbt.C/102) by the Executive Engineer, UDD
is wrong and unjustified and it amounted breach of contract on the
part of the respondent.
(2) The two counter-claims of the respondent for damages etc. are
disallowed.
(3) the claimant is entitled to the sum of Rs.3,53,28,338/- with cost of
Rs.4,09,266/-, in total Rs.3,57,37,604/-(Rupees three crore fifty seven
lakh thirty four thousand six hundred and four only) including
interest as detailed below to be paid by the respondent:
(i) Rs.2,38,83,073/- being compensation for loss of expected
profit;
(ii) Rs.30,82,999/- being balance of the value of the works done;
(iii) Rs.3,36,713/- being cost of extra items of works done;
(iv) Rs.51,82,340/- only being refund of security deposit;
(v) Rs.28,43,213/- only towards price adjustment;
(vi) Simple Interest @6.5% on the amount of Rs.3,53,28,338/(excluding the amount of cost awarded) for the pendente lite
period from 06.08.2016 to 31.05.2018; and simple interest
@8.5% per annum on the whole awarded amount of
Rs.3,57,34,604/- from 01.06.2018 till payment;
(vii) Cost of arbitration amounting to Rs.4,09,266/- only;”
2.11.
The appellants being aggrieved by the award dated 31.05.2018
passed by the learned Arbitrator filed a petition under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the learned District
Commercial Court, West Tripura, Agartala, for setting aside the arbitral
award passed by the learned Arbitrator.
2.12.
Upon hearing the learned counsel appearing for the parties,
learned Judge, District Commercial Court, West Tripura rejected the petition
for setting aside the award dated 31.05.2018 vide judgment and order dated
24.06.2022 passed in Civil Misc.(Arbitration) No.10 of 2018 and upheld the
arbitral award passed by the learned Arbitrator.
2.13.
Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and order
passed by the learned Judge, District Commercial Court, West Tripura,
Agartala, the appellants filed the instant appeal inter alia praying for the
following relief(s):
“i. Admit this application;
ii. Issue notice upon the respondent;
iii. Call for the LC records;
iv. After hearing the parties, set aside the judgment and order
dated 24.06.2022 passed in Civil Misc.(Arbitration) 10 of 2018
by the Ld District Commercial Court, Agartala, West Tripura,
along with arbitral Award passed by the Ld. Arbitral Tribunal
on 31.05.2018 in Arbitration Case No.1 of 2017;”
3.
On the above factual background, we have heard Mr. K. De,
learned Addl. GA appearing for the appellants as well as Mr. S.M.
Chakraborty, learned senior counsel assisted by Ms. Mampi Chakraborty,
learned counsel appearing for the respondent.
4.
At the outset, Mr. De, learned Addl. G.A. appearing on behalf of
the appellants contended that the judgment and order dated 24.06.2022
passed by the learned District Commercial Court suffered from
misinterpretation of law, as the learned Court below as well as the learned
Arbitrator failed to consider that there was a fundamental breach of contract
by the respondent since the contractor-respondent miserably failed to
complete the work not only within the stipulated time but also within the
extended period of time. Much emphasis was led on behalf of the appellantsState that Clause 44 of the agreement is not applicable to the facts of the
instant case, and the contractor is not entitled to any price escalation since the
contractor miserably failed to complete the work even within the extended
period of time, but, the learned Arbitrator without considering the fact
awarded Rs.28,43,213/- towards price escalation/adjustment and these
aspects have not been considered by the learned Court below. Learned Addl.
G.A. therefore prayed for allowing the appeal.
4.1.
The next argument advanced by Mr. De, learned Addl. G.A. is
that the learned District Commercial Court as well as the learned Arbitrator
also failed to consider that the rescission of the contract is rightful and the
appellants are entitled to the damages due to the rightful rescission of
contract and further the learned Court below as well as the learned Arbitrator
also failed to consider that as per Clause 25.2 security money and EMD had
to be forfeited if there is rightful rescission.
5.
Per contra, Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel appearing
on behalf of the respondent refuting the submissions advanced on behalf of
the appellants has argued that the findings of the learned Arbitrator are sound
and well supported by reasoning and therefore they do not suffer from any
such patent illegality which could have been set aside and the learned
Commercial Court after consideration of the reasonings given by the
Arbitrator in the award had confirmed the award.
5.1.
Relying on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of
Hindustan Tea Co. vs. K. Sashikant Co. & Anr. reported in AIR 1987 SC
81, Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel has contended that it is settled
proposition of law that the Arbitrator is made the final arbiter of the dispute
between the parties. The Award is not open to challenge on the ground that
the Arbitrator has reached a wrong conclusion or has failed to appreciate
facts. Learned senior counsel further relying on the decision of the Apex
Court in the case of Associated Construction vs. Pawanhans Helicopters
Ltd. reported in (2008) 16 SCC 128 has contended that a court does not sit as
one in appeal over the award of the learned arbitrator and if the view taken
by the arbitrator is permissible no interference is called for on the premise
that the different view was also possible. Learned senior counsel therefore
has prayed for dismissing the appeal.
6.
We have considered the rival submissions of learned counsel
for the parties and also gone through the relevant materials placed on record.
We have also gone through the award returned by the learned Arbitrator as
well as the judgment of the learned District Commercial Court.
The core question before us is whether the award passed by the
learned Arbitrator, which was upheld by the learned District Commercial
Court, can be interfered in appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration &
Conciliation Act, in the facts and circumstances of the case on hand.
7.
To begin with we are not oblivious of the legislative intendment
the legislatures wanted to achieve in bringing out the amendment to Section
34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by the Arbitration and
Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 which was aimed at speedy disposal of
arbitration proceeding and to curb the complexities palpably and apparently
manifest in other ordinary judicial proceedings. We are also mindful of the
principles laid down in various authoritative pronouncements of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court wherein it was observed that there is disturbing trends of
courts to unnecessary intervene with the award on the ground of perversity or
patent illegality without keeping in mind the minimal supervisory role of the
courts and the grounds available for annulment of the award.
8.
It comes to fore that the learned District Commercial Court
while rejecting the application for setting aside the arbitral award has referred
to the decisions of National Highways Authority of India vs. M. Hakeem &
Anr. reported in (2021) 9 SCC 1 and Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd.
vs. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. reported in (2022) 1 SCC 131
wherein and whereunder the Apex Court relying on its earlier judgments had
elaborately discussed the powers of a court under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act. Relying on the aforementioned judgment
the learned District Commercial Court while passing the impugned judgment
in paras 4, 5, 6 and 7 has observed thus:
“4.
The Arbitration Act has been enacted to consolidate and
amend the law relating to domestic arbitration as well as international
commercial arbitration in India after taking into account the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) model
law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985. Section 34 of the
Arbitration Act stipulates that any person aggrieved by an arbitral
award may take recourse by filing an application in terms of section
34(2), (2-A) and 3 of the Arbitration Act on the grounds enumerated
therein. There was divergence of judicial opinion in India on the scope
of the powers of a court exercise in jurisdiction under section 34 of the
Arbitration Act. Recently, Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of
National Highways Authority of India VS M.N Hakeem & Another
decided on 20.07.2021 has held in para 40 as under:
“It can therefore be said that this question has now been settled
finally by at least 3 decisions of this Court. Even otherwise, to state
that the judicial trend appears to favour an interpretation that would
read into Section 34 a power to modify, revise or vary the award
would be to ignore the previous law contained in the 1940 Act; as also
to ignore the fact that the 1996 Act was enacted based on the
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,
1985 which, as has been pointed out in Redfern and Hunter on
International Arbitration, makes it clear that, given the limited judicial
interference on extremely limited grounds not dealing with the merits
of an award, the „limited remedy‟ under Section 34 is co-terminus with
the „limited right‟, namely, either to set aside an award or remand the
matter under the circumstances mentioned in Section 34 of the
Arbitration Act, 1996.”
5.
At this juncture we may also gainfully refer to a judgment of
Hon‟ble Supreme Court rendered in Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt.
Ltd. VS Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. decided on 09.09.2021
wherein at para 26 held as under:
“Section 34 (2) (b) refers to the other grounds on which a court can
set aside an arbitral award. If a dispute which is not capable of
settlement by arbitration is the subject-matter of the award or if the
award is in conflict with public policy of India, the award is liable to be
set aside. Explanation (1), amended by the 2015 Amendment Act,
clarified the expression „public policy of India‟ and its connotations for
the purposes of reviewing arbitral awards. It has been made clear that
an award would be in conflict with public policy of India only when it is
induced or affected by fraud or corruption or is in violation of Section
75 or Section 81 of the 1996 Act, if it is in contravention with the
fundamental policy of Indian law or if it is in conflict with the most basic
notions of morality or justice. In Ssangyong (supra), Court held that the
meaning of the expression „fundamental policy of Indian law‟ would be
in accordance with the understanding of this Court in Renusagar Power
Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co. In Renusagar (supra), this Court
observed that violation of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, a
statute enacted for the „national economic interest‟, and disregarding
the superior courts in India would be antithetical to the fundamental
policy of Indian law. Contravention of a statute not linked to public
policy or public interest cannot be a ground to set at naught an arbitral
award as being discordant with the fundamental policy of Indian law
and neither can it be brought within the confines of „patent illegality‟ as
discussed above. In other words, contravention of a statute only if it is
linked to public policy or public interest is cause for setting aside the
award as being at odds with the fundamental policy of Indian law. If an
arbitral award shocks the conscience of the court, it can be set aside as
being in conflict with the most basic notions of justice. The ground of
morality in this context has been interpreted by this Court to encompass
awards involving elements of sexual morality, such as prostitution, or
awards seeking to validate agreements which are not illegal but would
not be enforced given the prevailing mores of the day.”
6.
On perusal of the application for setting aside the award it
appears that all the grounds placed for setting aside the award
requires appreciation of evidence so placed before the sole Arbitrator.
In view of the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court as referred to
above, we cannot reappreciate the evidence on record sitting as a court
of appeal.
7.
The scheme and scope of the provisions of Section 34 of
Arbitration Act aims at keeping the supervisory roles of the court at
minimum level, therefore, we cannot correct the errors, if any, done by
the arbitrator by sitting as an Appellate Court, it can only be quashed
leaving the parties to begin the arbitration again if it is desired. Since
in the case at hand, the grounds as taken by the petitioner for setting
aside the award do not attracts any of the provisions as enumerated in
section 34(2) or 34(2A) of the Arbitration Act, we declined to set aside
the award as proposed.”
[emphasis added]
9.
On a bare perusal of the above authoritative views as enunciated
by the Apex Court, and quoted by the learned District Commercial Court, we
may gainfully refer to the recent decision of this Court rendered in the case
of Bhartia Infra Projects Limited vs. State of Tripura & Ors. decided on
10.01.2024 presided over by both of us, wherein this Court while addressing
the scope of interference in an appeal under Section 37 of the Act of 1996
had relied upon the latest judgment of the Apex Court rendered in S.V.
Samudram vs. State of Karnataka & Anr. reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC
19 dated 04.01.2024[Civil Appeal No.8067 of 2019], wherein it was held that
under Section 37 the High Court cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid
down under Section 34. In other words, the court cannot undertake an
independent
assessment
of
the
merits
of
the
award.
In
S.V.
Samudram(supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court further held thus: [SCC
OnLine p.16 para 71]
“71. The Court under Section 37 had only three options:(a) Confirming the award of the Arbitrator;
(b) Setting aside the award as modified under Section 34; and
(c) Rejecting the application(s) under Section 34 and 37.”
10.
In view of the above settled proposition of law it can safely be
held that the minimum judicial interference is the ultimate bottomline of the
arbitration, that has to be maintained and this can only be achieved if there is
minimal interference from the courts. The court has the power to set aside or
uphold the award under some specified conditions that are stipulated under
the statute, but cannot modify and correct the errors made in the arbitral
award. The High court cannot decide the appeal by entering into the merits of
the claim proposed and so the scope of deciding the appeal under Section 37
is limited and should be enforced within the prescribed limit. The only
rationale behind not giving much authority to the court to interfere in the
awards made by the arbitrator is to reduce the supervisory of the court on the
disputes. If courts shall be given the power to reconsider the award then the
arbitration proceedings would be useless as parties adopted an alternate form
of dispute resolution thus wanting to keep the disputes outside the
jurisdiction of the court and want convenience and finality.
11.
We have gone through the arbitral award passed by the learned
Arbitrator and the grounds as agitated by the appellants for setting aside the
arbitral award by filing application before the Commercial Court under
Section 34 as well before this Court in appeal under Section 37 of the
Arbitration & Conciliation Act read with Section 13(1) of the Commercial
Courts Act. We have also gone through the written brief submitted on behalf
of the respective parties. On careful perusal of the arbitral award we find that
the learned Arbitrator in the arbitration proceedings before it had dealt with
all the issues so framed, elaborately considering the claims and counter
claims supported by documents adduced by both the parties.
11.1.
In the instant appeal, firstly, the main challenge posed by Mr.
De, learned Addl. G.A. appearing on behalf of the State-appellants is that
Clause 44 of the Agreement will not be applicable in the instant case as the
tender value is more than Rs.1.00 crore and time of completion is
18(eighteen) months, i.e. less than 24(twenty) months and in view of this, the
learned sole Arbitrator by allowing the price escalation had acted beyond the
terms of the Agreement. Secondly, the learned District Commercial Court
without discussing on any of the issues raised by the State-appellants had
rejected the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation
Act, 1996.
11.2.
The above submissions have led us to first peruse Clause 44 and
Clause 44.1 of the Agreement, which are reproduced here-in-below:
“44. Price Adjustment: (Not applicable for works for which estimated cost
put to tender is less than Rs.1.00 Crore & stipulated time for completion is
less than or equal to twenty-four months.
44.1. Price adjustment shall be granted where administered prices are
enforced and that too for works estimated at more than Rs.1.00 Crore and
having completion period of more than 24(twenty four) months. This
should be applicable within the original contract period or extended
period owing to departmental delays. This will not apply to cases
attributed to contractors fault.”
11.3.
We have minutely perused the entire award passed by the
learned sole Arbitrator. We find that the learned sole Arbitrator had
discussed all the referred disputes as raised by the parties to the arbitration.
We have noticed that the learned Arbitrator had recorded in his findings that
from the reply to the show-cause notice issued by the appellants-State upon
the contractor-respondent that there were lapses on the part of the Stateappellants in prosecuting the work. It was found that out of total work front
over a length of 8079 meters, work front for 2289.68 meters(28.27%) only
was made available by the appellants-State to the respondent-contractor.
Furthermore, as regards the charge levelled against the respondent-contractor
by the appellants-State that the former failed to mobilize adequate men and
materials to complete the work was found not sustainable. In the light of the
above, the sole Arbitrator held that the termination of the contract on the
ground of delay and non-mobilization of materials, etc. by the respondentcontractor as raised by the appellants-State was not sustainable and the State
action was absolutely wrong and unjustified and amounted to breach of
contract. Finally, according to the sole Arbitrator, the reasons of termination
of the contract could not be attributed to the respondent-contractor.
11.4.
The question relating to applicability of Clause 44 along with
Sub-Clause 44.1 of the Agreement has been dealt with by the sole Arbitrator
in deciding the issue/dispute No.6. Here we find, the respondent-contractor
raised a claim of Rs.28,43,213/- on account of price escalation on value of
works done after stipulated period @10% of Rs.3,43,31,647/- in terms of the
provision of Clause 44.1 of the Agreement. The sole Arbitrator had not lost
his sight to the counter claim filed by the appellants-State where it was stated
that as per terms of Clause 44 of the Agreement, the price variation clause is
not applicable to the respondent-contractor where the estimated cost is less
than Rs.1.00 crore and stipulated time for completion of the work is less than
or equal to twenty four months. In reply to the counter statement of defense,
the respondent-contractor stated that it is the appellants-State who delayed
the execution of the work. On consideration of the statements made in the
counter claim of defense by the appellants-State and the reply to such counter
claim by the respondent-contractor, the sole Arbitrator found that the
appellants-State could not controvert the correctness of the account placed by
the respondent-contractor.
11.5.
While discussing the price adjustment clause, as stated above, it
is found that the sole Arbitrator had extracted the relevant clause in his
award. Thereafter, on consideration and interpretation of the relevant Clause
44 of the Agreement, the sole Arbitrator came to a finding that though the
original contract period for completion of the work was 18(eighteen) months,
but, the said period for completion of the work was extended upto
30.06.2016 vide letter dated 19.04.2016(Exbt.C/96) issued by the appellantsState. The sole Arbitrator extracted the relevant portion of the said letter,
which is reproduced here-under from the award itself:
“Sir,
Reference your letter No.HSCL/Tripura/UDD/drain/2015/933 dt. 08.09.15
in connection with the grant of extension of time for completion of the work
Construction of RCC covered drain in Central zone.
The date of completion for the above mentioned work is 23.03.2014 as
stipulated in the Agreement dated the 24.09.2012.
Extension of time for completion of the above mentioned work is granted
up to 30.06.2016 without prejudice to the right of the Government to recover
liquidated damages in accordance with the provision of related clauses of the
said Agreement.
Provided that notwithstanding the extension hereby granted, time is and
shall still continue to be the essence of the said Agreement.
Please note that Clause 44.1 mentioned in your letter under reference is
not applicable for this contract agreement.”
11.6.
The learned Arbitrator had taken into account the response of
the respondent-contractor vide letter 07.05.2016(Exbt.C/97) narrating all the
bottlenecks created by the appellants-State to execute the work including
failure to issue work order and delivery of work front for remaining
15(fifteen) drains under the Agreement and the delay caused in extending the
time of completion, etc., finally made a request to the appellants-State in the
following terms:
“If you feel that it is not possible to facilitate execution of further work, we
would request you to close the agreement, finalize our payment followed by
release of our all deposits without fixing any liability against us as we never
defaulted in executing the work.”.
While analyzing the above situations, the sole Arbitrator had
observed thus:
“17.7. There is nothing in the statement of defense of the respondent in
reply to the said letter. Thereafter, the respondent under his letter dated
20.05.2016(Exbt.C/102), before expiry of the extended time(30.06.2016),
terminated the contract without issuing any further written work order or
delivering work front for executing the remaining work under the Agreement.
17.8. After careful appreciation of the facts narrated herein above, the
condition, unilaterally, imposed by the respondent in his letter of extension
dated 19.04.2016(Exbt.C/96) stating that „Please note that Clause 44.1
mentioned in your letter under reference is not applicable for this contract
agreement‟ cannot be held to be justified and tenable. Besides, in view of the
objection raised by the claimant under his letter 07.05.2016(Exbt.C/97) the
responsibility for extending the period for completion of work also cannot be
shifted to the claimant unilaterally by the respondent. Taking into account all
facts and circumstances, it can be held that the period of completion of the
work had been extended up to 30.06.2016 by the respondent not for fault of
the claimant. So, the terms of the agreement relating to entitlement of the
claimant to price adjustment is applicable to the present case.”
11.7.
Next, while determining the quantum of compensation towards
price escalation, it transpires that the sole Arbitrator had relied upon the price
index of the relevant period published by the office of the Economic Advisor,
Government of India for materials and that of labour published by the Labour
Bureau, Government of India(Exbt.C/110), which remained unchallenged by
the appellants-State. Accordingly, it was held by the Arbitrator that the
respondent-contractor was entitled to award for the sum of Rs.28,43,213/only.
11.8.
On perusal of the entire arbitral award it comes to light that the
other issues were decided by learned Commercial Court on the basis of the
decision arrived at by the Arbitrator in deciding the issue/dispute No.6
related to Clause 44 and Clause 44.1 as narrated here-in-above.
11.9.
In the light of the above narration of facts and the interpretation
of Clause 44 along with its Sub-clause 44.1 as regards its applicability, it
cannot be said that the sole Arbitrator had not dealt with all the issues,
particularly the issue relating to applicability of Clause 44 and Clause 44.1.
The State authorities participating in the proceedings had availed enough
opportunity to convince the sole Arbitrator as per their own understanding on
the applicability of Clause 44, i.e. the State-appellants had been able to place
their own case before the sole Arbitrator on the scope of applicability of
Clause 44 in the context of the disputes raised before the Arbitrator.
11.10.
It is, by now well settled that the courts in exercise of
jurisdiction under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 will not sit in appeal to examine the legality and validity of an arbitral
award on the ground that the arbitrator has reached to a wrong conclusion
and has failed to appreciate the facts. It is also equally settled that the
interpretation of different provisions of the work agreement, if made by an
arbitrator as an adjudicating authority to declare an award would not call for
interference by the Courts under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, if such interpretation is found to be a possible and plausible
view, and not on the premise that a different view was also possible.
11.11.
In the case in hand, on careful perusal of the award, we are of
firm opinion that the learned sole Arbitrator while deciding the disputes
raised in the proceedings never travelled beyond the disputes under
reference. It is hard to digest the argument advanced by the learned Addl.
G.A. appearing on behalf of the appellants-State that the learned Arbitrator
had committed error in exercise of its jurisdiction conferred upon him under
the concept of “un-reasonability” and “patent illegality” and does not
appear to be shocking to the conscience of the court to set aside the award or
to leave the parties to begin the arbitration again since we do not find the
appreciation of facts and law by the arbitrator is in conflict with the most
basic notions of justice, calling for interference of the court.
12.
Now, coming to the next question raised by the appellants-State
that the learned Commercial Court has committed a serious error in exercise
of its jurisdiction conferred under Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act since he has confirmed the award without considering the
grounds raised by the appellants-State relating to price adjustment and
escalation of price as envisaged in Clause 44 of the Agreement. We have
perused and considered the judgment of the learned Commercial Court. It is
true that the learned Commercial Court has not dealt with the issues raised by
the appellants-State relating to applicability of Clause 44 of the Agreement.
However, in our opinion, it cannot be a ground to interfere with the award
made by the arbitrator, if the Arbitrator himself deals with the disputes
referred before him during the course of arbitration proceedings. The
exercise of jurisdiction conferred on Courts under Section 34 and Section 37
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is almost same. The principles of reappreciation and re-assessment of the award made by the Arbitrator under
both Section 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act are narrow
and circumscribed. In view of the enunciation of law in the above authorities
we can come to a definite conclusion that interference of an award by the
High Court under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act cannot
travel beyond the restrictions and limitations provided under Section 34 of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. This Court in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Section 37 will only ascertain that the exercise of power by the
Commercial Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 has not exceeded
to the scope of the provision.
13.
We reiterate that merits of an arbitral award made by an
arbitrator cannot be held to be vitiated only on the ground that the
Commercial Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act has not dealt with the disputes referred to
before the Arbitrator because neither the High Court under Section 37 or the
Commercial Court under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act
can undertake an independent assessment on the merits of the award. On
meticulous consideration of the arbitral award it comes to fore that the said
award does not suffer from any internal contradictions or inconsistency
which may be a ground for interference. Even for argument sake, if it is
considered to be an error of law committed by the Arbitrator it would not fall
within the expression “patent illegality”. Even the Courts in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
are inhibited to interfere with an arbitral award on the ground that the
arbitrator erroneously applied the law in question as it cannot be categorized
as ‘patent illegality‟.
14.
In view of the aforesaid discussions and analysis on both law
and facts, we do not find any ground to interfere with the judgment passed by
the learned Judge, District Commercial Court, West Tripura vis-à-vis the
arbitral award returned by the sole Arbitrator.
15.
Resultantly, the instant appeal preferred by the appellants-State
stands dismissed.
(ARINDAM LODH, J)
Rohit/Nihar
(APARESH KUMAR SINGH, CJ)
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