Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
Page - 1 of 29
HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
WA No. 72 of 2018
1.
2.
3.
The State of Tripura,
To be represented by the Secretary, Department of Industries & Commerce,
Govt. of Tripura, New Capital Complex, Agartala, West Tripura, PIN 799010.
The Director,
Department of Industries & Commerce, New Capital Complex, Agartala, West
Tripura, PIN 799010.
The Secretary,
Finance Department, Government of Tripura, New Secretariat Complex, Agartala,
West Tripura, PIN 799010.
----- Appellant(s)
Versus
1.
Dr. Parimal Kanti Chakraborty,
Son of late Ananta Kumar Chakraborty, resident of A.D. Nagar, Road No.11,
Beltali, P.O. & P.S. A.D. Nagar, PIN 799003, District West Tripura.
-----Respondent(s)
2.
Tripura Jute Mills Ltd.
Government of Tripura Undertaking represented by the Managing Director TJML,
Hapania, Agartala, West Tripura, PIN 799006.
3.
The Managing Director,
Tripura Jute Mills Ltd., Hapania, Agartala, West Tripura, PIN 799006.
-----Proforma Respondent(s)
WA No. 73 of 2018
1.
2.
3.
The State of Tripura,
To be represented by the Secretary, Department of Industries & Commerce,
Govt. of Tripura, New Capital Complex, Agartala, West Tripura, PIN 799010.
The Director,
Department of Industries & Commerce, New Capital Complex, Agartala, West
Tripura, PIN 799010.
The Secretary,
Finance Department, Government of Tripura, New Secretariat Complex, Agartala,
West Tripura, PIN 799010.
----- Appellant(s)
Versus
1.
Tripura Chatkall Sramik Union,
To be represented by the Secretary, Tripura Chatkall Union Hapania, Agartala
West Tripura.
-----Respondent(s)
WA No.72 of 2018
WA No.73 of 2018
WA No.74 of 2018
Page - 2 of 29
2.
3.
Tripura Jute Mills Ltd.
Government of Tripura Undertaking represented by the Managing Director TJML,
Hapania, Agartala, West Tripura, PIN 799006.
The Managing Director,
Tripura Jute Mills Ltd., Hapania, Agartala, West Tripura, PIN 799006.
-----Proforma Respondent(s)
WA No. 74 of 2018
1.
2.
3.
The State of Tripura,
To be represented by the Secretary, Department of Industries & Commerce,
Govt. of Tripura, New Capital Complex, Agartala, West Tripura, PIN 799010.
The Director,
Department of Industries & Commerce, New Capital Complex, Agartala, West
Tripura, PIN 799010.
The Secretary,
Finance Department, Government of Tripura, New Secretariat Complex, Agartala,
West Tripura, PIN 799010.
----- Appellant(s)
Versus
1.
Tripura Jute Mill Karmachari Mancha,
To be represented by the Secretary, Tripura Jute Mill Karmachari Mancha,
Agartala, West Tripura.
-----Respondent(s)
2.
3.
Tripura Jute Mills Ltd.
Government of Tripura Undertaking represented by the Managing Director TJML,
Hapania, Agartala, West Tripura, PIN 799006.
The Managing Director,
Tripura Jute Mills Ltd., Hapania, Agartala, West Tripura, PIN 799006.
-----Proforma Respondent(s)
For Appellant(s)
:
Mr. S.S. Dey, Advocate General.
Mr. D. Sarma, Addl. GA.
Ms. A. Chakraborty, Adv.
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. P. Roy Barman, Sr. Adv.
Mr. D. Bhattacharya, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Samarjit Bhattacharjee, Adv.
Mr. K. Nath, Adv.
Ms. A. Debbarma, Adv.
Date of Hearing
:
25th July, 2022.
Date of Pronouncement
:
21st September, 2022.
Whether fit for reporting
:
YES
WA No.72 of 2018
WA No.73 of 2018
WA No.74 of 2018
Page - 3 of 29
B_E_F_O_R_E_
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. INDRAJIT MAHANTY
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G. CHATTOPADHYAY
JUDGMENT & ORDER
[Per S.G. Chattopadhyay], J
These appeals are directed against the common judgment & order
dated 04.09.2018 passed by the learned Single Judge in a batch of writ petitions
being WP(C) No.785 of 2017, WP(C) No.510 of 2017 and WP(C) No.525 of 2017
whereby the learned Single Judge allowed those petitions.
[2]
The facts and law involved in these writ appeals being identical,
they are taken up together for disposal by a common judgment.
[3]
Heard Mr. S.S. Dey, learned Advocate General appearing for the
appellants along with Ms. A. Chakraborty, learned advocate. Also heard Mr. P. Roy
Barman, learned senior advocate appearing for the respondents along with Mr. S.
Bhattacharjee, Mr. K. Nath and Ms. A. Debbarma, learned advocates.
[4]
The factual background of the case is as under:
Pursuant to the recommendations of the 4th Pay Commission,
Government of Tripura, in acceptance of the same, introduced the revised pay
scale for its officers and employees vide notification dated 06.02.1999 and
accordingly Tripura State Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 1999 was introduced
and it was published in the extra ordinary issue of Tripura Gazette on 06.02.1999.
The officers and employees of Tripura Jute Mills Ltd. (TJML for short) were also
included in the report of the 4th Pay Commission and recommendation was made
for revision of their pay scale and allowances. Therefore, the Government of
Tripura by issuing a separate notification on 05.07.1999 revised the pay of the
WA No.72 of 2018
WA No.73 of 2018
WA No.74 of 2018
Page - 4 of 29
officers and employees of TJML w.e.f. 01.04.1999 to give effect to the
recommendations of the 4th Pay Commission.
[5]
Aggrieved thereby, the officers and employees of TJML filed Civil
Rule No.139 of 1997 in the High Court contending that in other 32 Government
undertakings/statutory bodies in the State, the pay revision in terms of the
recommendations of the 4th Pay Commission was made effective from 01.01.1996
and there was no reason as to why the officers and employees of TJML which was
similarly situated would be treated differently.
[6]
It is in the aforesaid background coupled with the fact that the
officers and employees of TJML were not also provided with House Rent
Allowance, Career Advancement Scheme, Compensatory Allowance and Dearness
Allowance etc. approached the High Court by filing Civil Rule No.139 of 1997.
[7]
The learned Single Judge by his judgment & order dated
28.10.2003 in Civil Rule No.139 of 1997 held that the writ petitioners therein could
not make out any enforceable right. Keeping in view the economic condition of
TJML, the learned Single Judge held that it was a loss incurring unit and the
officers and employees of the unit were not entitled to similar treatment with that
of the officers and employees of other 32 PSUs/Government undertakings and
statutory bodies. The learned Single Judge having relied on the decision of the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of A.K. Bindal & Anr. vs. Union of India & Ors.
reported in (2003) 5 SCC 163 held as under:
“13…………………At this stage, I may also refer to the latest
decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Officers & Supervisors of
I.D.P.L. v. Chairman & M.D, I.D.P.L. reported in (2003) 6 SCC
490 in which the contentions raised by the petitioners in A.K.
Bindal’s case (Supra) was reiterated by the petitioners therein.
Relying upon the decision of A.K. Bindal's case, the Hon'ble
Apex Court dismissed the writ petition. In view of the above
decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court, the law is now well
WA No.72 of 2018
WA No.73 of 2018
WA No.74 of 2018
Page - 5 of 29
established that the employees of a Government Company have
no legal right to claim that the Government should pay their
salary or that the additional expenditure incurred on account of
revision of their pay scales should be met by the Government
and that the economic viability or the financial capacity of the
employer is an important factor which cannot be ignored while
fixing the wage structure and revision of pay scales of the
employees.
14. In the light of my findings that the T.J.M.L. is a lossincurring unit and cannot even pay regular salary to its
employees and that most of the looms of the units having been
out of order with the production level far below the optimum
level and the further fact that the Government is unwilling to
extend budgetary support to help the T.J.M.L. pay the revised
pay scale with effect from 1.1.1996 it is thus not permissible for
this Court to grant the reliefs claimed by the petitioners, and to
do so would be contrary to the law laid down by the Hon'ble
Apex Court in the aforesaid case, which, to my mind, is squarely
applicable to the facts of this case. The submission of the
learned counsel for the petitioners that the fact that the T.J.M.L.
being a loss incurring unit can be no ground for non-payment of
the revised scale of pay etc. has been completely answered by
the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid cases.
15. It is next contended by the learned counsel for the
petitioners that fixing 1.4.1999 as the cut-off date for revising
the pay-scale of the petitioners' Association is arbitrary and not
sustainable in law inasmuch as the employees of the other
public sector units were paid the revised pay scale with effect
from 1.1.1996, Choice of a date cannot always be dubbed as
arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the
choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the
circumstances', see Union of India Vs. Sudhir Kumar in (1994)
4 SCC 212. In this case, in view of the position taken by the
State Government that it could not provide budgetary support
for payment of enhanced/revised pay scale, it cannot be held
that fixing of different cut-off date for the petitioners'
Association is arbitrary or whimsical. In the State of Punjab v.
Ram Lubhaya Bagga (1998) 4 SCC 117, it was held by the
Hon'ble Apex Court that financial constraints are valid
considerations for framing or modifying a policy. Again, in Union
of India v. Lieut. E.Iacuts (1997) 7 SCC 334, the Hon'ble Apex
Court held that additional financial outlay required was a
relevant consideration for determination of cut-off date. It was
further held that if a benefit is conferred upon a given date
bearing in mind all relevant factors, it cannot be considered
arbitrary or unreasonable. Therefore, the petitioners'
Association has no legitimate grievance against the impugned
WA No.72 of 2018
WA No.73 of 2018
WA No.74 of 2018
Page - 6 of 29
action of the respondents. That apart to grant the reliefs
claimed by the Petitioners' Association on the facts and
circumstances of this case would be to shut the realities
highlighted by the respondents and will have disastrous
consequences leading to the closure of the unit itself to the
detriment of the employees of the T.J.M.L. including members of
the petitioners' Association. Therefore, I reluctantly agree with
the submission of the learned Advocate General that this writ
petition is a suicidal writ petition. I have gone through the
cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners in support
of the various submissions made by him but in the view that I
have taken I do not propose to discuss them in detail.
16. For what has been stated above, this writ petition is devoid
of merits, and is hereby dismissed. But there shall be no order
as to costs.”
[8]
Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed
by the learned Single Judge in Civil Rule No.139 of 1997, the officers and
employees of Tripura Jute Mills Ltd. filed WA No.74 of 2003 which was decided by
the Division Bench of the High Court on 08.04.2011.
[9]
The Division Bench reversed the judgment of the learned Single
Judge and held that if TJML was a loss incurring unit, it was the bounden duty of
the State Government to take remedial measures and the same could not be a
ground to deny the claim of revision of pay scales as per recommendations of the
4th Pay Commission to the officers and employees of TJML w.e.f. the date on
which officers and employees of other autonomous bodies were given the benefit.
The Division Bench of the High Court viewed that in many other PSUs which were
running at a loss, the State Government implemented the recommendations of 4th
Pay Commission by providing revised pay scales and allowances to their officers
and employees. As a consequence, the Division Bench allowed the appeal and
directed the State respondents to revise the pay and allowances of the officers
and employees of TJML at par with their counterparts in other 32 organizations
w.e.f. 01.01.1996 viewing as under:
WA No.72 of 2018
WA No.73 of 2018
WA No.74 of 2018
Page - 7 of 29
“49. The learned single Judge has held in the impugned
judgment and order dated 28.10.2003 that the officers and
employees of the TJM are not entitled to get similar treatment
with that of other 32 PSUs/Govt. undertakings/statutory
bodies. Such a finding has been recorded on the ground that the
economic condition of TJM is not viable and that the same is a
loss incurring unit. While answering the issue against the
petitioners-appellants, the learned single Judge primarily
proceeded with that notion in mind, without however, taking
into consideration the case of other 32 organizations, about
which mention has been made above. It has been held by the
learned single Judge that the petitioners do not have any
enforceable right to claim parity with the employees of other
PSUs of the State Govt. Deviating from the facts and issues
involved in the writ petition, the learned single Judge has gone
into the area of evaluation of jobs for the purpose of pay scales
with the observation that the same must be left to the expert
body. In the instant case we are not concerned with as to
whether the employees of TJM perform the same nature of job
like that of their counterparts in other PSUs. It was never the
pleaded case of the respondents that the distinction has been
made upon evaluation of the duties and responsibilities of the
employees.
50.
The learned single Judge has also held that there cannot
be any formation of opinion that the employees of TJM and the
employees of other PSUs belonged to and constitute the same
class. While holding so, the learned single Judge has taken note
of the aforementioned fact relating to the exclusion of TJM from
the purview of 3rd Pay Commission at the instance of the
Managing Director of TJM, unmindful of the fact that the Govt.
itself considered the recommendation of the 4th Pay
Commission in respect of TJM with the distinction of making the
effective date differently. The learned single Judge has also
held that the petitioners have failed to discharge their burden
to establish that they and for that matter the employees of TJM
and their counterparts in other PSUs belonged to the same class
and that the employees of TJM have been subjected to hostile
discrimination for non-payment of revised pay scale w.e.f. 1.1.
1996 or DA, CAS, HRA and CA to them.
51.
The petitioners-appellants have clearly demonstrated
that they have been discriminated in the matter of granting the
said benefits. They have also demonstrated that they stand on
equal footing like that of other PSUs. It was never the
contention of the respondents that the petitioners are a class
apart and cannot be equated with that of the other PSUs. Their
plea before the amendment of the writ petition and after the
amendment, has been noted above, from which it cannot be
WA No.72 of 2018
WA No.73 of 2018
WA No.74 of 2018
Page - 8 of 29
said that the petitioners failed to discharge their burden
relating to their claim of discrimination in the matter of pay and
allowances.
52.
The learned single Judge while shifting the burden to the
petitioners to prove that the payment of revised pay scales and
other allowances would be available from the income/profit
generated by operating the manufacturing units of TJM, failed
to take note of the fact that in respect of other PSUs, it is the
State Govt. which took the burden to provide additional fund
required for the said benefits. If the TJM is a loss incurring unit,
as has been held by the Apex Court in Harayana State Minor
Irrigation ( supra), it is the bounded duty of the State Govt. to
take remedial measures and the same cannot be a ground to
deny the claim of revision of pay scales.
53.
The petitioners having clearly demonstrated that if not
all, many PSUs are running at a loss and the Govt. has
implemented the recommendation of the 4th pay Commission
by providing revised pay scales to their employees and other
allowances, the learned single Judge ought to have considered
that aspect of the matter instead of singling out the petitioners
and for that matter the employees of TJM, shifting the burden
to them to prove that they are at par with their counterparts in
other organizations. The fact of the matter is that the
petitioners clearly demonstrated the disparity in the matter of
revision of pay and allowances, which the respondents tried to
defend with their shifting pleas in the original counter affidavit
and the subsequent affidavits filed after the amendment of the
writ petition.
54.
For all the aforesaid reasons, we are of the considered
opinion that writ appeal and for that matter the writ petition
deserves to be allowed and consequently we set aside and
quash the impugned judgment and order dated 28.10.2003
passed by the learned single Judge in Civil Rule No.139/1997.
As a consequence, direction is issued to the respondents to
treat the petitioners and for that matter the officers and
employees of the TJM at par with their counterparts in other 32
organizations, entitling them to the revised pay scales w.e.f.
01.01.1996 and other allowances, such as, HRA, CA, CAS and
DA etc.
55.
The writ appeal is allowed and consequently, the writ
petition also stand allowed, without however, any order as to
costs.”
[10]
It would appear from the judgment aforesaid passed by the
Division Bench that the question regarding applicability of the pay scale in terms
WA No.72 of 2018
WA No.73 of 2018
WA No.74 of 2018
Page - 9 of 29
of the recommendations of the 4th Pay Commission to officers and employees of
TJML w.e.f. 01.01.1996 instead of 01.04.1999 was examined by the Division
Bench and the Division Bench was of the view that the revised pay scale was
made
effective
from
01.01.1996
in
respect
of
all
the
other
PSUs/undertakings/statutory bodies in Tripura whereas an exception was made in
respect of TJML in whose case the revised pay scale was made effective from
01.04.1999. The High Court observed that no reason was discernible for doing so
except the plea of economic condition of TJML and the said plea was not
acceptable to the Division Bench because the Division Bench found that such plea
was belied by the own action of the State respondents in asking other PSUs to
work out the requirements of the additional funds and furnish proposals for
additional financial liability for implementing the recommendations of the 4th Pay
Commission in their organizations. High Court held that such conduct amounted to
discriminatory treatment in respect of the officers and employees of TJML which
called for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.
[11]
The State of Tripura challenged the judgment and order dated
08.04.2021 passed by the Division Bench in WA No.74 of 2003 before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court by way of preferring SLP(C) No.20837 of 2011. At that stage, the
workers’ union of TJML also filed their intervention application before the Hon’ble
Apex Court as a matter of precaution. But as they were not petitioners before the
High Court, the Apex Court rejected their intervention application by an order
dated 25.10.2016 while dismissing the Civil Appeal No(s).10411 of 2016 arising
out of said SLP(C) No.20837 of 2011 filed by the State against the Division Bench
judgment. The Hon’ble Apex Court confined the relief to the members of Tripura
Jute Mills Officers’ Association taking note of the fact that it was the association
WA No.72 of 2018
WA No.73 of 2018
WA No.74 of 2018
Page - 10 of 29
who had agitated the matter before the High Court. The Apex Court thus upheld
the judgment of the Division Bench granting benefit of the 4th Pay Commission to
Tripura Jute Mills Officers’ Association w.e.f. 01.01.1996 and allowed interest @
6% on the amount due to each of the officers/employees w.e.f. the date of the
Division Bench order i.e. from 08.04.2011. The Judgment of the Hon’ble Apex
Court reads as under:
“Application(s) for intervention and impleadment are dismissed.
Leave granted.
Upon hearing the learned counsels for the parties the appeal is
disposed of in the following terms:
1. The order of the Division Bench granting the benefit of the
Fourth Pay Commission to the respondent-Tripura Jute Mills
Officers Association w.e.f. 01.01.1996 is maintained.
2. Interest at the rate of 6% on the amount due to each of the
officers/employees with effect from the date of the Division
Bench Order i.e. 08.04.2011 be paid.
3. The amount due with interest, as aforesaid, be paid within a
period of four months to the concerned officers-employees
and/or to their legal heirs/representatives, as the case may be.
4. The above relief will be confined to the members of the
Tripura Jute Mills Officers Association as it is the said
Association who had agitated the matter before the High
Court.”
[12]
Thereafter, Dr. Parimal Kanti Chakraborty filed WP(C) No.785 of
2017 which was heard by the learned Single Judge along with WP(C) No.510 of
2017 and WP(C) No.525 of 2017 filed by the workers’ union of TJML. The matter
was disposed of by the common judgment impugned. Dr. Parimal Kanti
Chakraborty is an officer who stands superannuated. His claim was not accepted
by the State on the ground that he was not a member of the association. No
justification has been tendered by the respondents to distinguish his case for
fixation of pay in the revised scale w.e.f. 01.01.1996 as decided by the Division
Bench by judgment dated 08.04.2011 passed in WA No.74 of 2003. The workers’
WA No.72 of 2018
WA No.73 of 2018
WA No.74 of 2018
Page - 11 of 29
union in WP(C) No.510 of 2017 and WP(C) No.525 of 2017 agitated before the
learned
Single
Judge
that
there
were
public
sector/Government
undertakings/statutory bodies including Tripura Jute Mills Ltd. All the officers and
workers of 32 public sector/Government undertakings/statutory bodies were
extended the benefit of the 4th Pay Commission with other allowances such as
HRA, CA, CAS, DA etc. w.e.f. 01.01.1996 whereas the case of the officers and
workers of the Tripura Jute Mills Ltd. were treated differently and they were given
revised pay scale w.e.f. 01.04.1999 with no rational basis attached to it. The
workers’ union i.e. the writ petitioners contended before the learned Single Judge
that there was a hostile discrimination in the matter of pay and allowances
granted to them as a result of which they were getting much lesser pay than their
counterparts in other PSUs.
[13]
One of the objections raised by the State respondents before the
learned Single Judge was that after their intervention application in Civil Appeal
No(s).10411 of 2016 arising out of SLP(C) No. 20837 of 2011 was rejected by the
Hon’ble Apex Court, at least they could not prefer any writ petition. Learned Single
Judge by the judgment impugned held that the submission of the State
respondents (appellants herein) was without substance for the reason that the
Apex Court has not permitted the intervention at the stage of Special Leave to
Appeal for the reason that they were not parties to the proceedings before the
Division Bench of this Court, but that will not debar the workers’ union in filing
their separate petition and rejection to their intervention application by the Apex
Court would not non suit the claim of the petitioners, which they have raised in
the instant writ petitions.
WA No.72 of 2018
WA No.73 of 2018
WA No.74 of 2018
Page - 12 of 29
[14]
The other objections raised by the State respondents against the
claim of the workers’ union were dealt with by the learned Single Judge in the
judgment impugned in the following manner:
“17. As regards the counter affidavits filed by the State
respondents and also by the Tripura Jute Mills Ltd. in the cases
of Union are almost in the same footings just to non suit the
claim of the members of the Union who are indisputably the
employees of the Tripura Jute Mills Ltd. raising number of
preliminary objections which might appeal to the Court to non
suit their claim since on principles the issue has been
threadbare examined by the Division Bench of this court in its
judgment dt. 8th April, 2011 of which reference has been made
& finally held that the officers of Tripura Jute Mills Ltd. are
entitled for their fixation in the pay scales w.e.f. 01.01.1996
instead of 1st April, 1999 as sanctioned by the Govt. under its
notification dt. 5th July, 1999 keeping in view the parity with
other
officers
and
workers
of
Public
Sector
Undertakings/Statutory bodies etc. where the benefit of 4th
revision of pay has been extended consistently with no
discrimination w.e.f. 1st January, 1996 such action of the
respondents indeed was violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution.
18. The objection raised by the respondents is that the Tripura
Jute Mills Ltd. Workers Union earlier preferred Civil Rule
No.641/97 claiming pay revision along with DA, CA, HRA and
CAS but that came to be dismissed as withdrawn on 19.09.2017
and it was not agitated at least by the Union any further. But
this objection does not hold good for the simple reason that the
writ petition was filed by the workers Union in 1997 and the
State Govt. under its notification dt. 5th July, 1999 has granted
them the benefits of revision of pay scale w.e.f. 01.04.1999.
Thus the subsequent notification dt. 5th July,1999 was not the
subject matter of challenge and particularly its applicability
which was effected from 01.04.1999, rejection of the writ
petition may not be of any substance and would not deprive the
rights of the petitioners in claiming the reliefs what being
prayed in the writ petition.
19. Another objection raised by the respondents in the written
statement is that after their intervention application filed by the
petitioner-Union being rejected by the Apex Court at least they
could not prefer any writ petition. The submission is without
substance for the reason that the Apex Court has not permitted
the intervention at the stage of a special leave to appeal for the
reason that they were not parties to the proceedings before the
WA No.72 of 2018
WA No.73 of 2018
WA No.74 of 2018
Page - 13 of 29
Division Bench of this Court, but that will not debar the Union in
filing their separate petition and rejection of their intervention
application by the Apex court would not non suit the claim of
the petitioners, which they have raised in the instant writ
petitions.”
[15]
Having viewed thus, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ
petitions and directed the State respondents as under:
“22. The writ petitions succeed and are accordingly allowed.
The respondents are directed to revise the pay scales of the
members of the petitioners-Union including employees of
Tripura Jute Mills Ltd. which are covered under the notification
dt.5th July, 1999, at par with their counterparts in 32 Public
Sector Undertakings/Statutory Bodies/Govt. Undertakings etc.
entitling them to the revised pay scales w.e.f. 01.01.1996 and
other allowances such as HRA, CAS, CA, DA etc. as considered
by the Division Bench of this Court in Judgment dt. 8th April,
2011.”
[16]
The basic stand of the State appellants in the present appeal are
as under:
(i)
The learned Single Judge should not have entertained the claim of
the workers’ union after their intervention application was rejected by the Hon’ble
Apex Court and it was specifically stated in paragraph 4 of the Apex Court’s
judgment dated 25.10.2016 that the relief shall be confined to the members of
Tripura Jute Mills Officers’ Association as it is the said association who had
agitated the matter before the High Court.
(ii)
By a bipartite agreement between the management of TJML and
the recognized trade unions, the pay structures of the workers of TJML was
determined. Therefore, they were not entitled to claim revision of pay under the
recommendations of 4th Pay Commission.
(iii) Learned Single Judge did not appreciate the fact that there was
delay and latches on the part of the workers’ union to approach the High Court
seeking relief under Article 226 of the Constitution.
WA No.72 of 2018
WA No.73 of 2018
WA No.74 of 2018
Page - 14 of 29
(iv) Learned Single Judge did not consider the fact that payment of
the revised pay scale from 01.01.1996 to the officers and workers of TJML would
lead to a huge financial burden on the State exchequer which in turn will affect
implementation of other development and infrastructure schemes.
[17]
Learned Advocate General has further argued that economic
viability of the industrial unit or the financial capacity of the employer is a relevant
consideration in the matter of revision of pay scales of the employees. It is
contended by Mr. Dey, learned Advocate General that TJML has been out of order
over a long period of time and at the relevant time its production level was far
below the optimum level and the unit was not in a position to pay even the
monthly wages of its officers and employees. Considering the financial capacity of
the unit, the State Government fixed the cut off date for giving effect to the
revised pay scale from 01.04.1999 and the learned Single Judge has erroneously
fixed the cut off date from 01.01.1996 without taking into consideration the
financial capacity of the employer. It is argued by learned counsel that the
employees cannot claim any enforceable legal right for revision of pay scales if the
company is sustaining loss continuously over a period and does not have the
financial capacity to revise or enhance the pay scales. To nourish his contention,
learned Advocate General has relied on the decision of the Apex Court in State of
U.P. & Anr. vs. Uptron Employees’ Union, CMD & Ors. reported in (2006) 5
SCC 319 which has observed as under:
“13. This Court specifically held that the economic viability or
the financial capacity of the employer is an important factor
which cannot be ignored while fixing the wage structure,
otherwise the unit itself may not be able to function and may
have to close down which will inevitably have disastrous
consequences for the employees themselves.
WA No.72 of 2018
WA No.73 of 2018
WA No.74 of 2018
Page - 15 of 29
14. The same legal position has been reiterated by this Court in
the case of Officers & Supervisors of I.D.P.L. v. Chairman &
M.D., I.D.P.L. and Ors. (2003) 6 SCC 490 this Court observed in
paras 7 and 8 as under:"7. In the above background, the question which arises for
consideration is whether the employees of public sector
enterprises have any legal right to claim revision of wages that
though the industrial undertakings or the companies in which
they are working did not have the financial capacity to grant
revision in pay scale, yet the Government should give financial
support to meet the additional expenditure incurred in that
regard.
8. We have carefully gone through the pleadings, the annexures
filed by both sides and the orders passed by the BIFR and the
judgments cited by the counsel appearing on either side.
Learned counsel for the contesting respondent drew our
attention to a recent judgment of this Court in A.K. Bindal v.
Union of India (2003) 5 SCC 163 in support of her contention.
We have perused the said judgment. In our opinion, since the
employees of government companies are not government
servants, they have absolutely no legal right to claim that the
Government should pay their salary or that the additional
expenditure incurred on account of revision of their pay scales
should met by the Government. Being employees of the
companies, it is the responsibility of the companies to pay them
salary and if the company is sustaining losses continuously over
a period and does not have financial capacity to revise or
enhance the pay scale, the petitioners, in our view, cannot claim
any legal right to ask for a direction to the Central Government
to meet the additional expenditure which may be incurred on
account of revision of pay scales. We are unable to countenance
the submission made by Mr. Sanghi that economic viability of
the industrial unit or the financial capacity of the employer
cannot be taken into consideration in the matter of revision of
pay scales of the employees."
We may observe that in both these cases the earlier decision of
this Court in Heavy Engg. Mazdoor Union v. State of Bihar and
(1969) 1 SCC 765 was noticed and applied.”
[18]
Mr. Dey, learned Advocate General has also relied on the decision
of the Apex Court in the case of A.K. Bindal & Anr. (Supra) wherein two
relevant questions, namely whether the employees of a Government company are
civil servants having the right to claim that the Government should pay their salary
WA No.72 of 2018
WA No.73 of 2018
WA No.74 of 2018
Page - 16 of 29
or that the additional expenditure incurred on account of revision of their pay
scales should be made by the Government and whether the employees of public
sector enterprises have any legal right to claim that though such undertakings, in
which they are working did not have the financial capacity to grant revision in pay
scales, yet the Government should give financial support to meet the additional
expenditure incurred in that regard came up for consideration before the Hon’ble
Apex Court in which the Apex Court observed as under:
“17. The legal position is that identity of the Government
Company remains distinct from the government. The
Government Company is not identified with the Union but has
been placed under a special system of control and conferred
certain privileges by virtue of the provisions contained in
Sections 619 and 620 of the Companies Act. Merely because the
entire share holding is owned by the Central Government will
not make the incorporated company as Central Government. It
is also equally well settled that the employees of the
Government Company are not civil servants and so are not
entitled to the protection afforded by Article 311 of the
Constitution (Pyare Lal Sharma v. Managing Director, (1989) 3
SCC 448). Since employees of Government Companies are not
government servants, they have absolutely no legal right to
claim that government should pay their salary or that the
additional expenditure incurred on account of revision of their
pay scale should be met by the government. Being employees
of the companies it is the responsibility of the companies to pay
them salary and if the company is sustaining losses
continuously over a period and does not have the financial
capacity to revise or enhance the pay scale, the petitioners
cannot claim any legal right to ask for a direction to the Central
Government to meet the additional expenditure which may be
incurred on account of revision of pay scales. It appears that
prior to issuance of the Office Memorandum dated 12.4.1993
the Government had been providing the necessary funds for
the management of Public Sector Enterprises which had been
incurring losses. After the change in economic policy
introduced in early nineties, the Government took a decision
that the Public Sector Undertakings will have to generate their
own resources to meet the additional expenditure incurred on
account of increase in wages and that the Government will not
provide any funds for the same. Such of the Public Sector
Enterprises (Government Companies) which had become sick
WA No.72 of 2018
WA No.73 of 2018
WA No.74 of 2018
Page - 17 of 29
and had been referred to BIFR, were obviously running on huge
losses and did not have their own resources to meet the
financial liability which would have been incurred by revision of
pay scales. By the Office Memorandum dated 19.7.1995 the
Government merely reiterated its earlier stand and issued a
caution that till a decision was taken to revive the
undertakings, no revision in pay scale should be allowed. We,
therefore, do not find any infirmity, legal or constitutional in
the two Office Memorandums which have been challenged in
the writ petitions.”
[19]
Further in paragraph 22 of the judgment, the Apex Court held that
economic viability or financial capacity of the employer is an important factor
which cannot be ignored while fixing the pay structure. The Court observed as
under:
“22…………………..The
other
case,
All India
Regional Rural Bank Officers Federation v. Government of
India, (2002) 3 SCC 554 arose out of interlocutory
namely,
applications and contempt petitions which were filed for
implementation of the direction issued in the earlier case
namely, South Malabar Gramin Bank (2001) 4 SCC 101.
Any observation in these two cases to the effect that the
financial capacity of the employer cannot be held to be a
germane consideration for determination of the wage
structure of the employees must, therefore, be confined to
the facts of the aforesaid case and cannot be held to be of
general application in all situations. In Associate Banks
Officers' Assn. v. State Bank of India, (1998) 1 SCC 428 it
was observed that many ingredients go into the shaping of
the wage structure of any organisation which may have
been shaped by negotiated settlements with employees'
unions or through industrial adjudication or with the help
of expert committees. The economic capability of the
employer also plays a crucial part in it; as also its capacity
to expand business or earn more profits. It was also held
that a simplistic approach, granting higher remuneration
to workers in one organisation because another
organisation had granted them, may lead to undesirable
results and the application of the doctrine would be
fraught with danger and may seriously affect the
efficiency and at times, even the functioning of the
organisation. Therefore, it appears to be the consistent
view of this Court that the economic viability or the
financial capacity of the employer is an important factor
WA No.72 of 2018
WA No.73 of 2018
WA No.74 of 2018
Page - 18 of 29
which cannot be ignored while fixing the wage structure,
otherwise the unit itself may not be able to function and
may have to close down which will inevitably have
disastrous consequences for the employees themselves.
The material on record clearly shows that both FCI and
HFC had been suffering heavy losses for the last many
years and the Government had been giving considerable
amount for meeting the expenses of the organisations. In
such a situation, the employees cannot legitimately claim
that their pay scales should necessarily be revised and
enhanced even though the organisations in which they are
working are making continuous losses and are deeply in
the red.”
[20]
Learned Advocate General has further argued that financial
constraints of the employer is always a valid ground for introducing a cut off date
to limit the benefit to its employees after calculating the financial implications
which cannot be termed as irrational or arbitrary. Learned Advocate General,
therefore, argued that learned Single Judge erred in exercising power of Article
226 of the Constitution in the present case. Counsel has relied on the decision of
the Apex Court in Tamil Nadu Electricity Board represented by its
Chairman vs. TNEB-Thozhilalar Aykkiya Sangam by its General Secretary
reported in (2019) 15 SCC 235 wherein the Apex Court has observed as under:
“22. The main source of finance of the Electricity Board is the
State Government; the Board is run by the State Government.
Unless the funds are provided by the State Government, the
Electricity Board would not have sufficient funds of its own to
pay the wages and the revised Dearness Allowance to its
employees. Considering the financial difficulties which the
State Government was facing, the revision of the Dearness
Allowance from the above said dates at above said rate cannot
be said to be arbitrary or without any reason.
23. While considering the grievance of wage structure or
Dearness Allowance, the importance of considering the
financial implications while providing benefits to employees has
been noted by the Supreme Court in number of judgments. The
Supreme Court in Workmen v. Gujarat Electricity Board, (1969)
1 SCC 266 while dismissing the appeal preferred by the
workmen, has confirmed the view taken by the Tribunal which
rejected the demand of the employees of the Board for
WA No.72 of 2018
WA No.73 of 2018
WA No.74 of 2018
Page - 19 of 29
Dearness Allowance that it should be fixed with the scale
prescribed for the Ahmedabad Mill Owners’ Association on the
ground that the Board does not have the capacity to meet the
additional expenditure that would have to be incurred if such
demands are acceded to.
24. The Supreme Court in Bengal Chemical & Pharmaceutical
Works Ltd. v. Workmen, (1969) 2 SCR 113 after referring to
Kamani Metals & Alloys Ltd. v. Workmen, (1967) 2 SCR 463 has
laid down that one-hundred per cent neutralisation is not
advisable as it will lead to inflation and therefore, dearness
allowance is often a little less than one-hundred per cent
neutralisation. Explaining the purpose of Dearness Allowance
and that it should depend upon the ability of the employer to
bear such burden, the Supreme Court held as under:- (Bengal
Chemical case, (1969) 2 SCR 113)
“(1) Full neutralization is not normally given, except to the very
lowest class of employees.
(2) The purpose of dearness allowance being to neutralise a
portion of the increase in the cost of living, it should ordinarily
be on a sliding scale and provide for an increase on the rise in
the cost of living and a decrease on a fall in the cost of living.
(3) The basis of fixation of wages and dearness allowance is
industry-cum-region.
(4) Employees getting the same wages should get the same
dearness allowance, irrespective of whether they are working
as clerks or members of subordinate staff or factory workmen.
(5) The additional financial burden which a revision of the wage
structure or dearness allowance would impose upon an
employer, and his ability to bear such burden, are very material
and relevant factors to be taken into account.”
(emphasis supplied)
25. In T.N. Electricity Board v. R. Veerasamy , (1999) 3 SCC 414
which has been relied upon by the respondent, in which TNEB
itself was the appellant, the Supreme Court while dealing with
the prospective application of a pension scheme observed that
financial constraint is a valid ground for introducing a cut-off
date and took note of the financial burden that the Board will
have to borne if the scheme would be made effective
retrospectively.
26. In State of Punjab v. Amar Nath Goyal, (2005) 6 SCC 754,
the Supreme Court negatived the contention of the employees
that the decision of the Central Government/State
Governments to limit the benefit only to certain employees
WA No.72 of 2018
WA No.73 of 2018
WA No.74 of 2018
Page - 20 of 29
after calculating the financial implications thereon,
irrational or arbitrary and held as under:-
was
“28.………the final recommendations of the Pay Commission
were not ipso facto binding on the Government, as the
Government
had
to
accept
and
implement
the
recommendations of the Pay Commission consistent with its
financial position. This is precisely what the Government did.
Such an action on the part of the Government can neither be
characterised as irrational, nor as arbitrary so as to infringe
Article 14 of the Constitution.”
27. It is within the power of the Board to set a cut-off date for
payment of revised Dearness Allowance keeping in view its
financial constraints. Moreover, the settlement agreement and
the decisions taken by the Board in the Board Proceedings are
to be harmoniously construed. Having regard to the financial
difficulties which the State Government was facing, the
appellant-Board being a State Government undertaking,
decided to adopt the State Government’s revised Dearness
Allowance at the same rate and from the same date. In view of
extremely difficult financial situation, not only the State
Government employees but all the employees of various other
corporations were granted revised Dearness Allowance at the
rate of 49% only w.e.f. 01.10.2002 and 52% w.e.f. 01.07.2003.
The respondent(s) union cannot insist for revision of Dearness
Allowance at a higher rate than what was being paid to the
State Government employees.”
[21]
Finally, learned Advocate General argued that claim of the
petitioners was clearly barred by the doctrine of laches. Moreover, the Apex Court
by judgment & order dated 25.10.2016 in Civil Appeal No(s). 10411 of 2016
clearly limited the relief to the members of TJML Officers’ Association. The
judgment of the Court, therefore, was in personam which was expressly stated in
the said judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court. The workers’ union who wanted to
get similar benefit should have satisfied the Court that their petition did not suffer
from either laches and delays or acquiescence which they failed to satisfy. In
support of his contention, counsel has relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in
the case of State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava &
WA No.72 of 2018
WA No.73 of 2018
WA No.74 of 2018
Page - 21 of 29
Ors. reported in (2015) 1 SCC 347 in which the Apex Court has observed as
under:
“22.2 However, this principle is subject to well-recognized
exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as
acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the
wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same
and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that
their counterparts who had approached the Court earlier in
time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot
claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of
similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be
treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the
acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim.
22.3 However, this exception may not apply in those cases
where the judgment pronounced by the Court was judgment in
rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated
persons, whether they approached the Court or not. With such
a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to
itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated person.
Such a situation can occur when the subject-matter of the
decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of
regularisation and the like [see K.C. Sharma & Ors. v. Union of
India, (1997) 6 SCC 721]. On the other hand, if the judgment of
the Court was in personam holding that benefit of the said
judgment shall accrue to the parties before the Court and such
an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be
impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the
judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said
judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their
petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or
acquiescence.
23. Viewed from this angle, in the present case, we find that
the selection process took place in the year 1986. Appointment
orders were issued in the year 1987, but were also cancelled
vide orders dated June 22, 1987. The respondents before us did
not challenge these cancellation orders till the year 1996, i.e.
for a period of 9 years. It means that they had accepted the
cancellation of their appointments. They woke up in the year
1996 only after finding that some other persons whose
appointment orders were also cancelled got the relief. By that
time, nine years had passed. The earlier judgment had granted
the relief to the parties before the Court. It would also be
pertinent to highlight that these respondents have not joined
the service nor working like the employees who succeeded in
earlier case before the Tribunal. As of today, 27 years have
WA No.72 of 2018
WA No.73 of 2018
WA No.74 of 2018
Page - 22 of 29
passed after the issuance of cancellation orders. Therefore, not
only was there unexplained delay and laches in filing the claim
petition after period of 9 years, it would be totally unjust to
direct the appointment to give them the appointment as of
today, i.e. after a period of 27 years when most of these
respondents would be almost 50 years of age or above.
24. For all the foregoing reasons, we allow the appeal and set
aside the order of the High Court as well as that of the Tribunal.
There shall, however, be no order as to costs.”
Learned Advocate General has, therefore, argued that the
impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge is devoid of merit which
warrants interference in appeal.
[22]
Regarding the submission of the learned Advocate General that
the members of the workers’ union should be treated as fence-sitters and their
claim is defeated by laches and delays, Mr. P. Roy Barman, learned senior
advocate appearing for the respondents has contended that in the case of State
of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava & Ors. (Supra), the
Apex Court has succinctly held that the normal rule is that when a particular set of
employees is given relief by the Court, all other identically situated persons need
to be treated alike by extending that benefit and not doing so would amount to
discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
[23]
Mr. Roy Barman, learned senior advocate has further referred to
paragraph 21 of the judgment impugned wherein the learned Single Judge has
held that submission with regard to delay and laches is without substance for the
reason that the grievance agitated was pending in the High Court for a sufficient
long time and once the Division Bench of the Court on principle arrived at a
conclusion that the State action was in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution
and once the Court held that the officers of the TJML were entitled to pay revision
w.e.f. 01.01.1996, there is no reason for the Government to take a different stand
WA No.72 of 2018
WA No.73 of 2018
WA No.74 of 2018
Page - 23 of 29
against the workers of TJML and delay and laches may not come in their way,
moreso, when no third party right has accrued.
[24]
Counsel appearing for the respondents has further argued that
doctrine of laches has no application in the present context since denial of the
revised pay scales to the workers of TJML w.e.f. 01.01.1996 has resulted in a
successive or recurring wrong. In support of his contention, counsel has relied on
the decision of the Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. vs.
Yogendra Shrivastava reported in (2010) 12 SCC 538 wherein the Apex
Court in paragraph 18 of the judgment has held as under:
“18. We cannot agree. Where the issue relates to payment or
fixation of salary or any allowance, the challenge is not barred
by limitation or the doctrine of laches, as the denial of benefit
occurs every month when the salary is paid, thereby giving rise
to a fresh cause of action, based on continuing wrong. Though
the lesser payment may be a consequence of the error that was
committed at the time of appointment, the claim for a higher
allowance in accordance with the Rules (prospectively from the
date of application) cannot be rejected merely because it arises
from a wrong fixation made several years prior to the claim for
correct payment. But in respect of grant of consequential relief
of recovery of arrears for the past period, the principle relating
to recurring and successive wrongs would apply. Therefore the
consequential relief of payment of arrears will have to be
restricted to a period of three years prior to the date of the
original application. [See: M.R. Gupta v. Union of India, (1995)
5 SCC 628 and Tarsem Singh(2008) 8 SCC 648 ]”
[25]
Counsel also relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case
of Union of India & Ors. vs. Tarsem Singh reported in (2008) 8 SCC 648 to
contend that where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief
can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy. Observation of the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the said judgment is as under:
“6. In Shiv Dass vs. Union of India, (2007) 9 SCC 274 this Court
held:
WA No.72 of 2018
WA No.73 of 2018
WA No.74 of 2018
Page - 24 of 29
“8……The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated
resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause
confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new
injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after
unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only
hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties.
It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked,
unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party
rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs
with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such
jurisdiction.
*
*
*
10. In the case of pension the cause of action actually
continues from month to month. That, however, cannot be a
ground to overlook delay in filing the petition………. If petition
is filed beyond a reasonable period say three years normally the
Court would reject the same or restrict the relief which could be
granted to a reasonable period of about three years.”
7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will
be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is
sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is
sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of
the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing
wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing
wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in
seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the
continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates
a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the
exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or
administrative decision which related to or affected several
others also, and if the re-opening of the issue would affect the
settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be
entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of
delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the
claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion etc.,
affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and
doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. In so far as the
consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is
concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive
wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will
restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a
period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ
petition.
8. In this case, the delay of 16 years would affect the
consequential claim for arrears. The High Court was not
WA No.72 of 2018
WA No.73 of 2018
WA No.74 of 2018
Page - 25 of 29
justified in directing payment of arrears relating to 16 years,
and that too with interest. It ought to have restricted the relief
relating to arrears to only three years before the date of writ
petition, or from the date of demand to the date of writ
petition, whichever was lesser. It ought not to have granted
interest on arrears in such circumstances.”
[26]
Relying on the decisions of the Apex Court reported in (2003) 6
SCC 1 (Kapila Hingorani vs. State of Bihar) and (2005) 2 SCC 262 (Kapila
Hingorani vs. State of Bihar) counsel further contends that the appellants
cannot deny parity in the matter of pay and allowances to the officers and
employees of TJML. According to Mr. Roy Barman, learned counsel, the learned
Single Judge has correctly held in the judgment impugned that rejection of the
intervention application of the respondents by the Apex Court would not non suit
their claim because the intervention was not permitted at the stage of Special
Leave to Appeal for the reason that they were not parties to the proceedings
before the Division Bench of the High Court, that does not disentitle them to seek
appropriate remedy from the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Counsel has further contended that the appellants have on principle agreed to
grant revised scale of pay in terms of the recommendations of the 4 th Pay
Commission for which they have also issued a notification on 05.07.1999.
Pursuant to the direction of the Court, the benefit has been extended to the
officers of TJML w.e.f. 01.01.1996. The workers of TJML having been similarly
situated cannot be denied the parity. Counsel, therefore, urges the Court to
uphold the judgment of the learned Single Judge by dismissing the appeals.
[27]
Considered the submissions made by the learned counsel
representing the parties. Perused the entire record. In WA No.74 of 2003, the
Division Bench relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Kapila Hingorani vs.
State of Bihar reported in (2003) 6 SCC 1 and (2005) 2 SCC 262 in which
WA No.72 of 2018
WA No.73 of 2018
WA No.74 of 2018
Page - 26 of 29
the Apex Court held that the State owned corporations/PSUs/statutory bodies
being State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the State
Government having deep and pervasive control over such bodies has an additional
duty to protect the Constitutional rights of their employees.
[28]
With regard to the plea of the State that TJML being a sick unit,
the State was not in a position to provide its employees the benefit of revision of
pay, the Division Bench held that in respect of other 32 PSUs in the State, pay
revision in terms of the recommendations of the 4th Pay Commission was made
effective from 01.01.1996. In their case, they were even asked to furnish proposal
to the State Government for fund for meeting the additional financial liability
arising out of the implementation of the 4th Pay Commission recommendations.
Such discriminatory treatment in respect of TJML was not accepted by the Division
Bench. The Division Bench viewed that it cannot be said to be a case of
reasonable classification warranting non interference of this Court exercising
power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This apart,
it was also observed by the Division Bench that the plea of the State in their
original counter affidavit prior to the amendment of the writ petition was
completely different. In the original counter affidavits submitted by them in the
writ petition it was never pleaded by the State that because of the economic
condition of the TJML its officers and employees were not entitled to claim pay
parity/revision of pay at par with other PSUs. It was contended by the State that
TJML from its very inception maintained different pay structure and in fact when
the 3rd Pay Commission was constituted, the Managing Director of TJML requested
the Government to exclude TJML from the purview of the said Pay Commission
but such decision of the Managing Director was not backed by any decision and/or
WA No.72 of 2018
WA No.73 of 2018
WA No.74 of 2018
Page - 27 of 29
a resolution of the Board of Directors of TJML. The Division Bench held that
admittedly TJML was very much within the purview of the 2nd Pay Commission and
since its inception, all along followed the pay structures of the State Government
employees.
[29]
As stated, the Hon’ble Apex Court maintained the judgment of the
Division Bench in Civil Appeal No(s).10411 of 2016 arising out of SLP(C) No.20837
of 2011 but the relief was confined only to the members of Tripura Jute Mills
Officers’ Association as it was the said association who had agitated the matter
before the High Court. After the said judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court, the
workers’ union instituted WP(C) No.510 of 2017 and WP(C) No.525 of 2017 in
which the learned Single Judge by the judgment impugned held that the objection
raised by the State that after their intervention application filed by the workers’
union was rejected by the Hon’ble Apex Court, they could not prefer any writ
petition was without substance for the reason that the Apex Court did not permit
the intervention at the stage of Special Leave to Appeal because they were not
parties to the proceedings before the Division Bench, but that would not debar the
workers’ union in filing their separate petition and rejection of their intervention
application by the Hon’ble Apex Court would not non suit their claim, which they
have raised in the present writ petition. We cannot, but agree with the said
observation of the learned Single Judge.
[30]
With regard to the objection of the State on the ground of delay
and laches of the petitioners in approaching the Court, the observation of the
learned Single Judge is reproduced hereunder:
“21……………….The submission is without substance for the
reason that the grievance agitated was pending in this Court
for a sufficient long time and once the Division Bench of this
Court on principles has arrived to a conclusion that the action
WA No.72 of 2018
WA No.73 of 2018
WA No.74 of 2018
Page - 28 of 29
of the respondents was in violation of Article 14 of the
Constitution
and
the
defence
in
segregating
the
officers/workers of the TJML from other 32 Public Sector
Undertakings/Govt.
undertakings/Statutory
bodies
etc.
amounts to discrimination which is violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution and once held that the entitlement of the officers
who approached for their revision of pay w.e.f. 01.01.1996,
there is no reason for the Govt. to take any different stand
against the workers of the Tripura Jute Mills Ltd. who are
indeed employees of the TJML and it was expected from the
Govt. to come forward after lost the battle on principle to
extend the benefits to the workers who are also the employees
of the Tripura Jute Mills Ltd. and at least the delay and laches
may not come in way of the petitioners, more so, when no third
party right has accrued or defeated in the interregnum period
and that will not defeat the rights of the petitioners in claiming
the relief of fixation of pay scales w.e.f. 01.01.1996 as decided
by the Division Bench of this Court under its judgment dt. 8th
April,2011 of which a detailed reference has been made by me.”
[31]
In the given facts and circumstances of the case, we do not find
any reason to disagree with the said findings of the learned Single Judge. There
cannot be any doubt that the members of the workers’ union of TJML
(respondents herein) were not treated equally with the similarly situated workers
of other public sector undertakings/Government undertakings/statutory bodies etc.
in the State in revising their pay scale in terms of the recommendations of the 4th
Pay Commission. The recommendations of the 4th Pay Commission have been
made effective from 01.04.1999 in the case of the private respondents whereas
the benefit of such pay revision is given to the employees of other PSUs w.e.f.
01.01.1996 and such discrimination has been made without any rational basis. As
such, the learned Single Judge has committed no error in directing the State to
revise the pay scales of the members of the workers’ union including other
employees of TJML at par with their counterparts in other 32 PSUs w.e.f.
01.01.1996 along with other allowances such as HRA, CAS, CA and DA etc.
WA No.72 of 2018
WA No.73 of 2018
WA No.74 of 2018
Page - 29 of 29
[32]
In the additional affidavit submitted on behalf of the State
appellants on 15.03.2022, it has been stated that the pay of the employees of
TJML has already been notionally revised as applicable to the corresponding posts
in other PSUs in terms of ROP Rules, 2009 raising their pay and allowances. In the
reply submitted on behalf of the respondent workers’ union, it has been stated
that even though benefit has been given from 2009 and that too notionally, the
members of the workers’ union have been deprived of the benefits from
01.01.1996 to 01.01.2009.
[33]
In view of the above, while dismissing the appeals, we direct the
State appellants to provide the benefit of the revised pay scales and allowances to
the private respondents i.e. the members of the workers’ union and other
employees of TJML and also to respondent Dr. Parimal Kanti Chakraborty w.e.f.
01.01.1996 in terms of the judgment impugned of the learned Single Judge after
adjustments of the dues already paid to them within a period of 6 (six) months
from today.
[34]
In terms of the above, the writ appeals stand disposed of.
Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
(S.G. CHATTOPADHYAY), J
Rudradeep
WA No.72 of 2018
WA No.73 of 2018
WA No.74 of 2018
(INDRAJIT MAHANTY), CJ
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review