Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
[ 3494 ]
HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD
TUESDAY, THE THIRD DAY OF FEBRUARY
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN
AND
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY
WRIT APPEAL NOs: 1723 1741 0F 2018 & 10 0F 2019
W.A.No.1723 OF 2018
Writ Appeal under clause '15 of the Letters Patent against order daled 29-12-2017 in
WP.No. 21914 of 2008 on the file of the High Court
Between:
1. The State of Telangana, Rep. by its Secretary, Dept. of Revenue (UC-ll),
Secretariat Buildings, Hyderabad.
2. The Commissioner of Urban Land Ceilings, Office of the Chief Commissioner
of land Administration, Government of Telangana, Hyderabad.
3. The Special Officer and Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceilings,
Hyderabad (now present District Collector, Ranga Reddy District).
4. The District Collector, Ranga Reddy District, Lakdikapul, Hyderabad.
...APPELLANTS
AND
Mr.Narsing Prasad Shroff, (Died per LR)
Sint. L. Sujatha Reddy, Wo L. Sudhakar Reddy, R/o. 6-3-1176, Begumpet,
Hyderabad
3. The State of Telangana. Rep. by its Secretary, Department of Tourism and
Culture, Secretaraat Buildings, Hyderabad.
4. The Director, Department of Tourism, State of Telangana, Hyderabad..
5 Sanjay Shroff, S/o Late Narsingh Prasad Shroff R/o lnterpid Online Retail (p)
Ltd,No.20,Ward No93/7B,Bth Main,6th Cross,Vasanthnagar, Bangalore 560052.
Respondent No.S is brought on record as Lr of deceased respondent
No.i as per Court Order dated '14.03.2023 Vide lA No. 1 of 2O22 in WA
No.1723 of 20'18.
...RESPONDENTS
lA NO:2 OF 2018
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in
the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to
suspend lhe operation of the judgment in WP No 21914 of 2008, dt.29.12.2017,
pending disposal of the Writ Appeal
Counsel for the Appellants : GP FOR ASSIGNMENT
counser for the Respondent No'1&5
'
:#:.ttH:r:rlb:il8'^iilf"',
Counsel for the Respondent No.2 :
Counsel for the Respondent No.3&4 : GP FOR TOURSIM
W.A.NO: 1741 OF 2O1A
Writ Appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent Against the Order
dated.29.12.2017 in W.P No 19512 ol 2008 on the file of the High Court.
Between:
1. The State of Telangana, Rep. by its Secretary, Dept. of Revenue(UC-ll),
Secretariat Buildings, Hyderabad.
2. The Commissioner of Urban Land Ceilings, Office of the Chief Commissioner
of land Administration, Government of Telangana, Hyderabad.
3. The Special Offlcer and Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceilings,
Hyderabad (now present District Collector (ULC), Ranga Reddy District).
4. The District Collector, Ranga Reddy District. Lakdikapul, Hyderabad.
...APPELLANTS
AND
Smt L. Sulatha Reddy, W/o. L Sudhakar Reddy, Aged about 68 years,
House Wife. R/o. 6-3-1176, B.S.Makhta, Begumpet, Hyderabad
Mr.Narsing Prasad Shroff, S/o.Late Bhuramull Shroff, Aged about 75 years,
Rlo 211/14, Bright Street, PS Karaya, Kolkata - 700 019
The State of Telangana, Rep. by its Secretary, Department of Tourism and
Culture, Secretariat Buildings, Hyderabad.
The Director, Department of Tourism, State of Telangana, Hyderabad.
...RESPONDENTS
lA NO: 2 OF 2018
Petition under Sectron 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in
the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to
suspend the operation of the judgement in WP.No.19512 Of 2008, dL.29.122017,
pending disposal of the Writ Appeal.
Counsel for the Appellants : GP FOR ASSIGNMENT
Counsel for the Respondent No.1 :
--
counser for the Respondent No'2
t-1"';:tHi3.1';.ilii3;ffi"rl
'
Counsel for the Respondent No.3&4 : GP FOR TOURSIM
W.A.No.10 OF 2019
Writ Appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the order dated
29-12-2017 in writ petition No. 15224 of 20'1 1 on the file of the High Court.
Between:
1. The State of Telangana, Rep. by its Secretary, Dept. of Revenue(UC-ll),
Secretariat Buildingsl Hyderabad
2. The Commissioner of Urban Land Ceilings, Office of the Chief Commissioner
of land Administration, Government of Telangana, Hyderabad.
3. The Special Officer and Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceilings,
Hyderabad (now present District Collector (ULC), Ranga Reddy District
4. The District Collector, Ranga Reddy District, Lakdikapul, Hyderabad
..APPELLANTS
AND
Smt. L. Sujatha Reddy. Wo L Sudhakar Reddy, Aged about 71 years,
House wife, R/o. 6-3-1176. B.S.Nilakhta, Begumpet, Hyderabad
Mohd.Fakruddin, S/o.lVlohd. Kareemuddin, aged about 72 yearc, OccAgriculture, R/o.H.No.8-112, Narsingi Village, Rajendranagar [t/andal,
R. R, District
3. Mohd.Ghousuddin, S/o.Mohd Bhurhamiddin, Aged about 50 years, OccAgriculture, R/o.H.No.1-38, Narsingi Village, Rajendranagar [Vlandal, Ranga.
Reddy District
4. tVlohd.Moinuddin, S/o.Mohd. Nizamuddiri, Aged about 63 years, OccRetd,Govt.Servant, R/o.H No 12-2-41813120, Vishwas Nagar Colony,
Gudimalkapur, Mehdipatnam, Hyderabad
5, Mohd.Hafeezuddin, S/o.lvlohd. Muneeruddin, Aged about 39 years, OccAgriculture, R/p.H.No.'1 8-8-684137, Edi Bazar, Aulia Bagh, Hyderabad
6. I\r1ohd. Faheemuddirr, S/o. Mohd.Ameenuddin, Aged about 43 years, H.No.'176, Narsingi Village, Rajendranagar Mandal Ranga Reddy District
7. The State of Telangana, Rep. by its Secretary, Department of Tourism and
Culture, Secretariat BUildings. Hyderabad.
B. The Director, Department of Tourism, State of Telangana, Hyderabad
...RESPONDENTS
lA NO: 2 OF 2019
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in
the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to
suspend the operation of the orders in W.P.No. 15224 o'f 2011, dated :29-12-2017 ,
pending disposal of writ appeal.
Counsel for the Appellants : GP FOR ASSIGNMENT
Counsel for the Respondent No.1to6 :
Counsel for the Respondent No.7&8 : GP FOR TOURSIM
The Court made the following: COMMON JUDGMENT
--
I{lGH COURT FOIt'l'Htt S'l'A'l'll OF TFILANGANA
A'I' IIYDEIIABAI)
TH E I{ONO U IL,\I}LE SII.I .I USTICF] K. I,AKSH M AN
ANI)
THE HONOURAI}LE SRI JUSTICE VAKITI Ii.AMAKRISHNA REDDY
WRIT APPEAL Nos. 1723 l7{l ol'20lll antl l0 of 2019
D;\'fE: 03.02.2026
Writ Appcal No. 1723 of 2018
Behyeen:
The State ofTelangana Rep. bf its Secretarv,
Department of Revenue (UC II),
Secretariat Buildings, Hyderabad and othcrs ... Appellants
r\ ncl
Narsing Prasad Shroff ar.rd others
Respondents
Writ Appeal No.l74l of 2018
Betu een:
The State ofTelangana Rep. by its Secretary,
Department of Revenue (UC - II),
Secretariat Buildings, I-{yderabad and othL'rs ... Appellants
And
Smt. L. Sujatha Reddy and
others
... l{espondents
Writ Aprreal No.l0 r.rf 2019
Betrveen:
The State of Tclar.rgana l{ep. by its Secletary,
Depaftment of Ilevenue (lJC tl),
Secretariat Iluildings, Hyderabad and othcrs
... Appcllants
A ncl
Smt. L. Sujatha Reddy and others
... Respondents
KL,J&VRKR,J
wA 1723, l74l of2018 and lOol2019
CoN{N,I ON,' TiDGM I.-NT (Per llorttttrt-ahlc ,\ri .lrrstice Vt*iti RannArishtn Reddy\
These three intra courl appeals arise out of a common order
datcd l9.ll.l0 l7 passed by the leamed Sinele Judgc in W.P. Nos
l2 and 21914 ol 2008 and 15224 ol 2011. Since the issues
involved in all these appeals are substantially common, they rvere
hearcl together and are bcing disposed of by this comrnon judgrnent.
2.
The appellants (State) assail the order of the leamed Single
Judgc rvhereby the impugned proceedings initiated under the Urban
I-anc1 (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, I976 ("the Act") were set aside on
the ground that mandatory statutory notices, particularly under
Sections 8(3) and l0(5 ) of the Act, were nol served on the declarant or
the pcrson irr posscssion.
I.
BRIITF FACTUAL BACKGROUNI)
i.
The material lacts. shorn of unnecessary detail. are tliat the
lancls in disprrte are situated in Survey Nos. 157 and I 58 of Narsingi
Village, Raiendra Nagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District (for short "the
Subiect Lands"). The sub.lect lands are recorded as agricultural lands,
a lact which is not seriously disputed. The respondents / writ
petitioners clairn ownership and possession on the strength of a
KL.J&VRKR,J
wA -1723, t741of2018 and tooJ20t9
registered Sale Deed and an Agrcement ol Sale dated 24.0i.1983,
supported by continuor-rs revenue entries (Pahanics) evidencing their'
possesslorl.
4. The particulars ol the writ petitions instituted by the
respondents and the corlesponding writ appeals prel-erred by the State
are as lollorvs:
S.No. W.P.No.
li.
lrs5[/]008 lfi41t2ot8
J
1123120t8
10/10 r9
l:.
5.
W.A.No.
219t4/2008
15224120lr
|
The case of the appellar.rts is that the sub.iect lands constitute
"vacant land" within the nreaning of Section 2(q) o1'thc Act, that they
were held in excess of the ceiling lirnit, and that upon completion of
proceedings under the Act against the original declarants, the lands
stood vested in the Goverrrrnent by operation ol'Section 10(3)
6.
Before the lcarned Single Judge, the controversy clystallizcd
around the following questions:
(i)
Whether actual possession ol tlie subject land was taken
in accordance with Sections 10(5) or 1 0(6) ol the Act?
KL, J ai l,?KR, J
U't\ _1723, I74I of 2018 and IO ol2019
(ii)
Whethel tlre mandatory requirerrent of Section 8 ol the
Act was cornpiied with and
(iii; Whether the petitioners were in possession of the land as
on thc relevant cut-off date.
7.
'[he lcarned Single Judge, upon an exhaustive exarnination of
thc statutor! tiamework and binding judicial precedents, held that the
proceedings under Section 8 ol the Act wet'e vitiated due to nonserr icc ol'thc nrandatorv notice under Section 8(3). In the absence of
such service. the consequential order under Section 8(4) was declared
illcga l.
8.
[t rias lirthcr held tliat there was a clear lailure olapplication of
rriind on tlrc part ol the competent authority in declaring the land as
sur|lr.rs. inasrnuch as r.ro consideration was given to the crucial issue
ri hcthcr thc land 1'ell u ithin the deflnition of "r"rrban lar-rd" or "vacant
lancl" under Sectiorrs 2(o) and 2(q) of the Act. The report ol the
I-.nqtriry Olllcer datcd 31.07.1979, which categorically recorded that
thc land ir as aqricultulal in nature and reflected as such in the revenue
records. rias ignored n,ithout assigning reasons, contrary to Section
2(oXB) of'the Acr.
KL J & VRKR, J
WA t723, 1741 of2018 a .1 1o oJ2019
The learned Single Judge further tbund that the State f'ailed to
cstablish larvtul and actual plil,sical possession of the land under
Se'ction l0 ol the Act. There \\,as no proof of service ol noticcs under
Sections l0(5) or l0(6). The allegcd taking over of possession on
28.08.1995 was found to be merely symbolic. The panchanarna dated
25.08. 1995 did not disclosc the precise extent
or ide'ntifiable
boundaries of the land altegedly taken over. On the other hand. the
revcnue records consistently rcf1ected the writ petitioner i.c., Smt.
Su.jatha Ileddy, as pattadar ancl persor.r in possession tlour 1983-84 to
t00l -2002.
10. In the absence of valid notice and proof' ol actual physical
possession, the leanred Single Judge conclr.rded that the alleged taking
o',,er of'possession was invalid in thc eye of law, and accordingly
allo*,ed the writ petitions.
I l.
Aggrieved by the said order', the State has prelerrcd ihe present
writ appeals, contending that the learned Single Judge errcd ir.r lau,and
on lacts in interfering with proceedings which, according to the
appellants, had attained fi n a litl'.
KL, J & \'I?KR. .J
tVA _1723, l74I oJ20l8 and 10of2019
12. We havc- heard the learned Goverrunent Pleader for Assignment
appearing firr the appc llants-State, Mr. V. Ramesh, the learted Senior
Cor,rnscl representing Mr. D.S.V.G. Nagaraju, appearing for the
respondents / rvrit petitioners. and the leamed Standing Counsel
appearing lor'l-or.rrisrn. We have also carefully perused the pleadings,
the rnaterial placed on record, and the leasoning and conclusions
recorded br thc learrrc<l Singlc Judge in the impugned order.
II
SUBNIISSIONS OF THE PARTIES:
a)
Sulttrtissiotrs on hahtlf o/ the Appellonts (State):
l:i.
Lcarlcd Govcrrrrncnt Pleader for Assignment, appearing for the
appellants Statc. contcnded that the respondents / writ petitioners lack
loc'tt,t stanclito maintain thc writ petitiorrs. as they are neither absolute
o\\ncrs nor pcrsons cntitlcd in law to question proceedings initiated
undcr tlre Act. lt u'as Lrrged that once the lands stood vested in the
Govcmment pursuant to 1'rroceedings under Section I 0(3 ) of the Act,
no right, title ol intcrcst survived in favour of the respondents.
14. It was lurlhcr contcnded that possession of the subject lands
u'as tal<cn orcr b1 thc authorities on 28.08.1995, and therelore, the
respondents \\iere ne\/er in posselsio-n so as to claim any benefit under
-t
KL, J & VRKR..'
WA 1723, l74l of2Ale otd tOoI20t9
the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) I{epeal Act, 1999(fbr short
"llcpeal Act"). According to the appellants, the alleged possession of
[he respondents is neither lawlll nor supported by any entbrceable
li-qht
15. Learned Govemment Pleader submitted that the respondenls'
claim to title and possession had already been adjudicated and had
attained finatity in earlier proceedings, particularly in W.P. Nos
24i98 and 25156 ol 1995, and in the absence ofany challenge to the
saitl j udgments befbrc the I Ionourable Supreme Cour1, the findings
therein operate as res judicura, precluding re-agitation of the issue ol
possession or entitlement to regularization under any Govemment
Orclers
16. It w,as also urged that the subject lands rvere allotted to thu'
'l'ourism [)cpartment fbr the purposc of establishrncnt ol an Artists"
Village, ancl that the lespondents' claim rlrns contrary to larger public
interest. Mere entries in the revenr:e rccords, it was contended, do not
conf-er title or lawful possession, nor can they defeat concludeci
proceedings under the Act
KL,J&VRKR.J
wA -1723. 1741 of2018 and to ol20I9
17. l-earned Governlncnt Plcader further submitted that reliance
placed b1' the respondents olr an Agreemcnt of Sale does not corrf'er
any enlbrccablc light. title or intercst in immovable property unless
such richt is declared or rccognized by a competent civil couft. In the
absence ol such ad.iudication. the rvrit petitions were asserted to be not
maintainable and rrotivated bv
a t-).
attempt to usulp valuable
Govemnrent Iand
18. R.cliarrcc w'as placed on lhe decision of the Honourable
Suprerne Coum in lllahulakshni lt,lotors Limitedd. v. MRO & othersl
to corrtcnd that individr-ral claims cannot override public interest and
those persons rvithout a subsistirrg legal right cannot invoke rvrit
jurisdiction to def'cat statutory acquisitions.
b)
Subnrissions on hcltulf of the R cspott I e rtts/Writ Petitioners
19. l)ar L'ot?tt'tt. lcalncd Scnior CoLrnsel appearing for the
respondents/writ pctitioners subrnitted that the initiation of
proccedings under the Act itsell was without jurisdiction, as the
subject lancls are agricultural in natr-rre, continuously used as such, and
'loozlttysccla
KL,J&I'RKR.J
tvA -r723. 174t of2olaand tooI2Ol9
therefbre expressly excluded lrom the purview of the Act by virtue of
Sections 2(o) and 2(q).
20. lt w,as contcndecl that the subjcct lands rvere never included in
an),notillcd Master Plan, lie outside the municipal limits, and i'all only
u,ithir.r the peripheral limits of the urban agglomeration" ln the absence
ol stalutory inclusion in a Master Plan, the lands cor-rld not have bcen
treated as urban or vacant lands, rendering the ploceedings void ab
inilio
21. Learncd counsel lirrther subrnitted that the respondents, having
entered into possession under an Agreement of Sale, being reflected as
possessors in thc revenue records, and having been in actual,
continLrous possession and enjoyment ol'the lands, scluarely tall rvithin
the exprcssion "persons concemed" under Section 8(3) olthc Act and
iverc thcretbre entitled to mandatory notice and an oppofiunity of
hearing.
22. [t rvas ernphatically urged that non-service ol notices under
Sections 8(3) and l0(5) strikes at the root of the proceedings. lssuance
and service ol'such notices is mandatory and constitutes an integral
I
KL,JEVRKR,J
wA - 1723, 1741 of 20t8 and to of2019
lacet of thc principles of'natural .justice. Proceedings undertaken in
violation thereol'are r oicl ar-rd unenfbrccable.
23. Lastly. it was contL'nded that. in an1' cverrt, by operation of the
Repeal Act, all procccdings stood abatcd, inasrnuch as no larvlul or
actual physical posscssion ot' the sub.icct land was taken by the
competent authority prior to the rcpeal. lt was submitted that the
requirement of taking possession in accordance with Sections 10(5)
and 10(6) of thc Act is nrandatorl , arrcl that mere notional or paper
vestinr: undcr Scction l0(31 clocs not dir est the landholder or the
person in possessior-r ol actual possession. In the absence of
cornpliance s,ith thc statLltorv procedure, the proceedings initiated
urrder the principal Act cannot surlivc alicr rcpeal and stand
extinguished b1' operation of lau. I{eliarrcc r.r,as placed on a consistent
line ol following decisiorrs to subnrit that unless actual, physical
possession is taken strictl-v in accordance sith Sections 10(5) and
l0(6) prior to repeal. the yrroccedings cannot survive:
l. State of |Jttar Pracleslt r,. Hari Rtutt),
2. Vinayak Kashinath Shilkar v. Collector and Competent
Authoriqt3,
(20 t3 ) a scc :80
t' (2012)
a scc I tg
-11
KL- J 6r VRKR. J
wA ,1723, 174 I ol2018 aad lO ol2Ol9
3. The Commissionet' of Land Reforms & another V. Libra
Electrical Meters (P) Limitedr,
4. G. Krishnanoorthy and others v. Government of Tamilnadus,
5. The Stare t{'Tumil Naclu and another Vs S.L. Chitale & others6,
6. T.V. .lrttortl r'. .S/nlc' o/.Tanil h'adu & others.:,
7. Benjamin il[ohuntt,r,. State oJ.Orissa and anothers,
8. Pratima Paul cl others v. The Competent Authority ancl otherse,
9. G.V. Mohun & othars v. State of Andhru Pradesht(',
l0.Mongalsen v. State of LJttar Pradeshtt ,
ll.Governmettt oJ'Tamil Nadu v. Mecca Prime Tanneryt2,
l2.Gajanun Kaml),a Pcrtil t,. Aclditional Colleclort3,
13.Competent uuthctrin' t,. Barangore Jute Factory & otherstl,
14.Raghbir Singh Sehrutat v. State of Haryanat5,
15.Union of Inttiu v. Ibrahi, tlddin ancl anothert6,
I 6. Comm iss ioner o/' Lctnd Reforms v. M. VenkataramantT
17.The Goventment oJ'Tamil Nadu v. l. Richardsonts
lS.llnion oJ tnclia ancl Others V. Vasavi Cooper:atire Housing
Sr,tcieq, Limitetl uncl ol herste
IIt. POI\ t-S I.()rr Dr._rt,.lrlil\.\TIoN:
24. Upon consideration ol the pleadings, the rival submissions,
and the material placed on record, the following issues arise for
cletclnrinatiorr:
n
1997 SCC Online tuad lir)-l
t N4adras High Cou{: w.l' No. .17.10 ol200l dccided on 07.08.2009
o2oo2(l)crc 18
''/
20 t9 scc oniine sc 1.]86
t ntn t982 oRtssn:16
' ntn tqgo caLCUttn ts>
'o APHC: w.P. No.gl98 ol'2007 decided on 08.10.2010
" 20 rz 13; sce.Lr: -s ra
't 2o l2 4) SCC 718
't 2ol4 l2) scc 523
'' loo5 ri) scc 477
't (20 l2 I S('C 792
'u (20t2) 8
r?
scc 148
20l4 scc onLinc Mad 450-i
(i) Lw :zg
zot+
't
'' 1zot,t; z scc z6e
'12KI..J&ITRKR,J
Lt'A 1723. 174t oJ20I8 and lO of2019
(
i)
Whether the respondents/,'r'rit petitioners have /oczs
standi Lo assail tl"re proceedings initiated under the Urban
Land (Cciling and Regulation) Act. 1976?
(ii)
Whether the subject lands constitute "vacant land" within
the meaning of-Sectiorrs 2(o)and 2(q) olthe Act?
(iii) Whether non-service ol rrotice under Section 8(3) of
the Act vitiates the proceedings?
(iu) Whether possession of the subject lands was tawfully
taken in cornpliance with Sections l0(5) and l0(6) of the Act?
(v) Whether the proceedings stood abated by operation of the
lJrban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act. 1999?
(ui) Whether the order ol the learncd Single Judge
warrants interlerence in appellate jurisdiction?
I\"
ANALYSIS,.\NDFINDINGS:
Issrre (i): Locus Standiof the Respontlcnts / Writ Petitioners
25. The llrst contention urged on behall'ol-the appellants is that the
respondents/rvrit petitioners lack locus startdi to question the
proceedings initiatecl undcr the Act, as thel,arc not absolute orvners of
the sub.iect lands. Accor ding to the appeliants, once the lands were
declared surplus and vcsted in the Government,, no right, title or
KL,J&VRKR,J
t[.i 1723, 1741 ol2018 and lAof2019
interest survived in lavoul ol the respondents so as to enable them to
invoke writ j urisdiction.
26. Per contra, it is thc case of the respondents that they are in
lawlul and settled possession ot' the subject lands, either under
registered sale deeds or under an agreemcnt ol sale coupled with long-
standing possession rctlected in the revenue records. It is subrnitted
that they are persons dircctly allected by the impugned proceedings
and lace imrninent thleat ol dispossession, thereby entitling them to
maintain the writ petitior r\.
27. The issue ol /oc'rrs stttruli in proceedings under the Act cannot
be cxamined in a narrori or peclantic mlurner.
-l'hc
scheme of lhe Act,
particularly Section 8(i) rcad riith [{ule 5 ol'the Urban Land (Ceiling
and Regulation) ltules. makes it clcar that notice is required not only
to be served on the declarant but also on all persons who have, or are
likely to have, an,v claim to. or intcrcst in. the orvnersliip or possession
of the land. The statutor) recognition ol'such persons itself indicates
that the light to question procccdir-rgs is not confined only to absolute
title holders.
-14KL,JAVRKR.J
wA 172.), t741 of2018 and 10 of20t9
28. [t is rvell settled that a person in lawful, recognized or settled
possession, r.r'hose rights are
tikely to be adversely alfected by
statutor), proceedings. has sulllcient standing to seek judicial review.
The writ jurisdiction under Afticle 226 of the Constitution is available
to any person rvho demonstrates a real and substantial grievance
arising frorr.r an action rvhich is alleged to be illegal. arbitrary or
rvithout j urisdiction
29. -l-he contention ol' the appellants tl-rat vesting under Section
l0(3) ol'the Act automatically extinguishes all rights olthc landholder
or Derson in possession cannot be accepted. The law is now settled
that vcsting undcr Seclion l0(3) is or.rly a de .lure vesting ol title and
does not, by itself', anrount to de facto possession. Actual physical
posscssion can be taken only in the manner prescribcd r-rndcr Scctions
l0(-5
) and l0(6) oi the Act. In the abserrce ol larvlul taking ol
posscssion, the landholder or the person in possession cannot be
divested of their right to question the procccdings.
30. In the present case, the respondents asseft continuous
possession of the subject lands for several decades, supported by
revenue records. They further iit.g",nu, the authorities sought to deal
KL,J&VRKR,J
wA -1723, l74l ol2018 and 10 of 2019
with the lands by treating them as surplus and proposing allotrnent to
another Deparlment, thereb-v- posing a direct and immediate threat to
their possession. Such persons cannot be characterized as strangers or
third parlies to the procecdings.
31. The objection based on res jrulicuta is equally nrisconceived.
The question ol' locus sl.rr./i must be examined with re l'erence to the
legality of the impugned proceedings and the nature of the right
asserted. Where proceedings arc allegcd to be i,itiated by non-
compliance with mandatory statutor) rcquirclrents and violation of
principles of natural justice, the plca of linatity cannot be invoked to
shut out judicial scrutinv
32. This Court, thcretbrc, has no hcsiLation in holding that the
respondents / writ petitioners, being persons in possession and directly
alf,ected by the inipugned proceedings. possess the requisite /oczls
standi Lo mainlain the writ petitions ancl to challenge the validity ol
the proceedings initiated under the Act.
t
-76KI, J&\'RKR J
WA 1723, 174t oI20t8 and l0 oI2At9
Issue (ii): Whcthcr the subject lands constitute "vacant Iand"
w ithin thc nrcaning of Sections 2(o) and 2(q) of the Act
13. Issuc (ii) strikes at thc very jurisdiction of the compctent
auth()rit) to initiatc proceedings r-rnder thc lJrban Land (Cciling and
Rcgulation) Act, 1976. The applicability of the Act itsell depends
upon whether the sub.ject lands fall within the statutory definitions ol
"urban Iand'' and consequently "vacant land" under Sections 2(o) and
2(q) olthe Act.
34. At this stage. it is apposite to extract the relevant statutory
provisions. Scction 2(o) oltlie Act deflnes "urban land" as lbllorvs:
Section: 2(o) "urbun land" means,
(i)
ary land rituated u'ithin the litnits o/'an urban agglotnerutitttt
und re-ferred to cts such in lhe masler plon: or
(ii)
itl d case u,here lhere is no master plan, or where llte rustar
plan does not re./cr to any land as urban lttnd, any land v,ithin the
lintits o/'un urban agglomerotion dnd silualed in any orea includcd
rithin thc ktcol limit-s o/ u ntunicipalitl,(b1 rhatever nama t'olletl1. u
tnlified urea commiltee , a lown afco commitlee, a cil1, and tov n
tommittet'. a sntttll-tovtt utntmillce. u canlonment botu'tl or u
lrunchavat. but doa.s nol include ant'stch land v,hich is muir
lbr the purn ose o/ usricuhure
Section 2(q) defines "vacant land" thus:
"
2(q) 'wcant land' means land, not being land mainly used .for the
purpose ofagriculture, in an urban agglomeralion.... "
KL.J&I'RKR,J
l{A 1723. 1741 of 201A and lo ol2019
A conjoint reading of the above provisions leaves no manner of
doubt that lar.rd mainly used lor agricultural purposes is expressly
excluded from the detlnitions o1'both "urban lar-rd" and "vacant land".
36. The consistent case ol the respondents is that thc subject lands
situated in Survey Nos. 157 and 158 ol Narsingi Village, Rajendra
Nagar Mandal, Ranga l{eddy District,
it
fc
agricultural lands,
continuously used tbr agricultural purposes and recorcled as such in
the revenue records. This assertior-r stands corroborated by the E,nquiry
Officer's repofi dated 31.07.1979. which catcgorically recorded the
lands as agricultural, and by the ceftitlcate dated 13.03.1983 issued by
the otfice ol the Special Ofllcer cerrilying that thc lands u'ere situated
olrtside the municipal lirnits, within the peripheral lirnits ol the urban
agglomeration, and were not urban lands so long as thc-y continr.red to
be used for agriculture.
37. It is not the casc of the appellants that thc sub,iect lands rvere
ever converted fbr non-agricu ltu ra I use or that they ceased to be
agricultural prior to initiation of procecding.s undcr the Act. No
rnaterial whatsoever has been placed on record to establish that the
,18,
KL.J&VRKR.J
wA -1723, 1741 ol2018 an t to of 2019
lands ri,ere put to anl use other than agriculture so as to attract the
statutory defi nition ol "vacant land".
38. 1'he legal position in this regard is no longer res integra. -[he
Honourable Supreure Court, while interpreting Sections 2(o) and 2(q)
of the Act, has consistently held that agricultural land stands excluded
frorl the purview olthe Act, and that the character and use of the land
are determinative. In State of Gujarat v. Manoltarsinh.ji
Pradyutnans itthj i Jadeja2i, the Honourable Supreme Courl observed
that land mainlv used fbr agriculture, even if situated within an urban
agglorncration, does not fatl within the definition of vacant land undcr
the Act. The Apex Court held thus:
''
11. l.lndar the ,4ct. 1976 while de.fining 'vacant land'. the
saitl definition specilically excludes a 'land' used for the purpose of
'ugriculture 'l'ht lc.finition of 'Urban Land' again makes thc
position cleor lhal any land situated within the urban agglonteration
ref<'rred to as such in lhe Master Plan would exclude any such land
rhich is nruinlS' usecl .[or the purpose of 'agricullure'. "
39. I he principle tlrat the actual and dominant use ol thc land is
decisivc for deterurinirrg its character under the Urban Land (Ceiling
and Regulation) Act has evolved consistently through judicial
to:o ti (2) scc
3oo
'19KL,J&'t'RKR,J
WA 172i. t74l of2Ata end lAof2019
pronouncements. ln Libra Electrical Meters (P1 l,imited's case
(supra), the Madras High Courl held that land can bc tleated
as
"vacant land" only when it is established that it is nrainiy used fbr a
purpose other than agriculture and that rrere location rvithin an urban
agglomeration or potential fbr urban use does not altcr its statutorl,
character. This position was reiterated in S.L. Chitctle s case (supra),
wherein it was emphasized that land recorded and used as aglicultr-rral
cannot be brought within the sweep ol the Act mele lv because it lies
within urban or peripheral limits, unless there is clear evidence of
conversion to non-agricultural use. The Honourable Supreme C]ourr. in
T.V. Antony s case (supra), subsequerrtly afllnned ancl authoritatively
crystallized this principle by holding that, so long as land continues to
be mainly used for agricultural purposes and is not divcrtcd to a non-
agricultural use, it stands excluded from thc detlnition of "r"rrban land"
under Sectior-r 2(o) and cannot be treated as "\,acant iand" under thc
Act
40. An additional and equalll, determinativc jurisdictional
requirement under the Act is the inclusion ol tl-re land irr a notifled or
statutory Master Plan. The definition ol "urban land" under Section
2(o) predicates either an express ref'erence to such land in a Master
,20KL.J&'||RKR,J
wA -172s, 1741 ol2018 and lO of 2019
Plan or, in the ahsence thcreol, its location within municipal liniits. In
the abscnce ol' cithcr conditiorr, the competent authority lacks
jurisdiction to proceed undcr the Act.
.
1-his position has been consistently recognized in Pratima Paul
and Otltcrs (supt'rt), a Division Bench ol the Calcutta High Court held
that agricultural lands rvhich are recorded as such in the revenue
recolds and arc in Iact uscd lol agricultural purposes do not lose their'
statutory charactcr mercly because of their location, unless they are
shorvn to be included in a rrotifred Master Plan. The Courl emphasized
that \laster I)lln incltrsiorr is r-rot a procedural formality but a
loundational -i urisd ictional lact.
12. lrr the prcserlt ciise. the material on record unequivocallv
establishcs that thc sub.jcct lands were not covered by any notified or
statutory Mastcr P lan. I n the absence ol such statutory inclusion, thc
ver')' assulnption ol j urisdiction by the competent authority stands
vitiated. When rcacl in conjunction u,ith the established agricultural
use ol the land, the initiation of proceedings under the Act is rendered
wholly unsustainable in lau,
-21
Lt'A
KL.,I & VRKR. J
-1723, I74 t ol 2018 and l0 of 2019
43. tn the light of thc forcgoing discussion, this Court concurs rvith
the conclusion leached by the learned Single Judge that the cornpetent
authority proceeded on an el'roneous premise and failed to advcft to
the statutory exclusions and jurisdictionaI r'equirenrents cnrbodicd in
Sections 2(o) and 2(q) ol the Act. Such failure to consider
loundational jurisdictional facts amounts to non-application ol rnind
ancl vitiates the proccedings at their inception.
41. l'his Court accordingly holds that thc subject lands. bcir.rg
agricultural lands, not shown to be included in any notified Master
Plan, do not constitute "urban land" or "vacant [and" rvithin the'
nreaning ol Sections 2(o) and 2(q) ol the Act. Consequentll', the
initiation and continuation of proceedings undcr the Act in respcct of
tlre subject lands are without jurisdiction and unsustainablc in lart
lssue (iii): Whethcr non-service of notice under Scction 8(3)
vitintcs thc proceedings
45. Issue (iii) concerns cornpliance u,ith thc marldatot'y proccdural
sateguards plescribed under the Act prior to dctermination ol surplus
land. Section 8(3) of the Act obligates the competent authority to
scrve the' drafi sratement on the declarant and allbrd an opporlunity to
file objections before passing final ordels under Scction 8(4)" 'Ihis
1''
KL,J&I'I?KR,J
WA 1723, t74t oI2018and IooJ2019
statutorv rcquirenlcnt is anrplified and operationalised by Rule 5 of the
Urban I.and (Ceiling and Rcgulation) Rules. 1976.
46. At this juncture. it is neccssary to extract Rule 5(1) and Rule
5(2)(a) olthe Rulcs, whicli read as fbllows:
'' Rule
5 Particular.s to ha contained in draft slatement as regards
vacanl lands and monner ofservice of the same:
(l)
Eter.v draft stdtcnrcnt prepared under sub-section (l) q.f
Section 8 shall cotltoin tfu l)orticulurs specificd in Form Ill.
(2)(u) The druli .rtarent'nt sltoll bc sert,ed, together with the notice
reJbrred to in.\ub-sectiotl (3) of Section 8, on-
(,
(ii)
tha holder of tht vocant land; and
all olhar persotrs. .to.far as may be known, who have, or are
likely to have, an1' cluim lo. or interes! in, the ownership or
po.s.scssion or hoth. ol the vacant lond, b1, sending the same hy
registered post addressed lo lhe person concerned-
(,
in tha ca.se ol' tlr holder of the tacant land, to his address
as giycn in Ihe \letemei lilad under Section 6: ond
(ii)
in thc tu.se of otlt'r pcrsons, lo thcir la.tt known addresses."
. A plain rcading of' IlLrle 5 rnakes it abundantly clear that thc
otrligation to servc the drali statentcnt and notice under Section 8(3) is
rrot confined to the declarant alone. but expressly extends to all
persons who have. or are likely to have, any claim to or interest in the
o\rynership or possession ol the land. The rule thus embodies the
plinciple ol attdi alteram l)drtetn and statutorily recognises the rights
-23
KL,J&VRKR,J
wA 1723, l74 t of 20 Ia a^d 1o of 2019
of persons in possession or having an interest in the land to parlicipate
in the adjudicatoD, process.
48. Cornpliance rvith Rulc 5 is. therefore, not a merc procedural
lbrrnalitl,, but a mandatorl, ru1- trur, designed to ensure that no
person is divested ol rights or possession without notice and ait
opportr"rnity of being heard. Any determinatior.r of surplus land made
in violation of this rccluire mcnt stands vitiated in lar.v.
49. In the present case, the learned Single Judge has recorded a
clear tincling that no rnaterial was produced by the authorities to
cstablish service of noticc undel Sectior-r 8(3) either on the dccltrrant or
on the rcspondents, who rvere admittedly in possession and whose
rrarles stood ref'lected in the revenue records.'fhe alleged reliance on
an untlaccable rvritten staternent dated. 28.07.1983. said to have been
tilecl b1 thc declarant was rightly rejected in the absence oi- anr
conlemporrne'or:s record.
50. Thc legal position is well settlcd that t-ailr-rre to sclvc notice
under Section 8(3) ol the Act, read with Rule 5 ol'the Rules, vitiates
the entire proceedings. Where the statute mandatcs service ol'notice
-24
KL,J&VRKR,J
wA
-1723, 1741 of20l8 and lOof20l9
on persons concerne(l. corrlpliance is not a rnatter of discretion but a
corrditiorr pre'ccclent to thc assunlption oljurisdiction. Non-service of
such noticc strikes at the ver1, root of the proceedings. In
G. Kri.shnantoot thr's crr.sr, (su;rra). it has been categorically hetd by
the Madras High Courr that detcrrnination of surplus land without
issuing notice to persons in possession is irnpermissible in law and
renders thc proceedings void. Thc Court ernphasized that persons
whose possession or intelest is likely to be affected cannot be
excluded fi'orn the statutory process, and any adjudication undertaken
behind their back is a nullitv
51. -fhe []onourable Supre me ('ouft repeatedly emphasised that
statutory presclipLions governing notice and hearing cannot be diluted
on considerations ol expcdiency. Whcre thc statute itself incorporates
the principlcs ol natural .ir-rsticc. conrpliance therewith is rnandatory,
and all) action tal<en iu violation thcreol is rcndered non est
52. Irr vierv of the express languagc of Rule 5(2)(a), the
respondents. beir-rg persons in possession and having a dernonstrable
interest in the land, were entitled to service of notice and an
opportunity of filing objections. Thc failure of the competent authority
-25KL,J&'y?KR,J
WA 1723, l74l of2018 and Io of2019
to do so rcnders the proceedings under Section 8(4) illcgal and
unsustainable.
53. '[his Court, theletble, holds that non-service ol notice under
Section 8(3)olthc Act, read with Rule 5(l)and 5(2)(a) olthe Rules,
vitiates the entire proceedings, and the learned Single Judge rvas
justitied in setting aside the sarnc on this ground.
Issue (iv): Il4tclher possession of the subject lsuds wos low./irlllt
taken itr contpliance x:ilh Scctions l0(5) ond l0(6) of
the Act
54. Issue (iv) conccrns the State's assertion that possession of the
subject lands was taken prior to the coming into force ol the Urban
Land (Cieiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999. 'l'he legality o[ such
asscrliou nrust bc tcsted strictly on thc anvil of Sections l0(5) and
l0(6) ol the Ulban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, I976, which
exclusively govern '.he manner in ri,hich physical possession may be
assurred bv tl-re State .
55. Section l0(5) mandates that where vacant land is vested in the
State under Scction l0(3), the competent authority shall, by notice in
writing, require the person in possession to sulrender or deliver
26K1..J&VRKR.J
wA _ 172-r, 1741 of 20 18 and 10 ol2019
possession \\'ithin the stipulated period. Section l0(6) permits forcible
dispossessiorr on11,upon lhilure to conrply u,ith such notice.
56. The statutory schcrne thus rnakes a clear and conscious
distinction betu'cerr r estirrg of land under Section l0(3) and taking of
actual physical possession. Vesting under Section l0(3) is not selfexecutory so far as possession is concemed and does not, by itself,
divest the landholdel or the person in possession ol physical control
over the lancl
57. The law on the r.nanner in which possession may be taken under
the Act, starrds authoritativell, settled by the l-lonourable Suprerne
Court irr lluri Ram't cuse (supra7, rvherein it rvas held that vesting
under Section l0(3) results only in de.jure vesting, and that de facto
possession can be talten only by strict compliance with Sections l0(5)
and l0(6). l'he issuance and sen'ice ol- notice uncler Section l0(5) was
held to he mandatorv
58. The Ilonourable Suprerne Courl lurther explained that Section
l0(5) conternplates peaceful dispossession pursuant to notice. whereas
Section l0(6) conternplates forcible dispossession, which can be
-27KL,J&VRKR.J
WA 1723, 1741of20t8and to oI2019
resorted to only upon t-ailure to comply with the notice issued under
Section l0(5). Any deviation lrom this statutory sequence renders the
act ol dispossession legalll, inrpennissiblc. -['he Honourable Court
I-re lcl as
under:
''30. Vacont land, it may be noted, is nol aclually acquired
but deemed to have been acquiretl, in lhat deeming things to be what
they are not. Acquisition, tlrcre.fbre, does not lake possession unless
there is an indicati<tn to the L'ontrort. lt is trite law lhat in construing a
deeming provision, il is ntces.sury lo bear in mintl the legi,slutive
purpose. The purpose oJ tha lct is to impose ceiling on vacant land,
for the acquisition of lcnd in ercess of the ceiling limit thereby to
regulate conslruction on such lunds. lo prevenl concenlration of urban
lunds in hands of .feu' p(tsons. so as lo bring about equitable
distribution. For uchieving that object, various procedures hove to be
Jbllowed for acquisition and vesting. I4hen u,e look at those words in
the above setting and the provisions to follou' such as sub-seclions (5)
and (6) o/Section 10, the v'ords acquired' and 'vested' have dilferent
tneaning (lnd content. []ttdcr Stttion l0(3), what is vested i.s dejure
possession nol de larcto, Jbr nutre raasons lhon one because we are
lesting the expression on o stalulory hypothesis and such a hypothesis
can be carried only 16 11ru t\tenl necessary lo {tchiete the legislative
Voluntory Surrendrr
3I
. The 'vesting' in sub-section (3) of Section 10. in our view,
means vesling of lille absolutely ancl not possession though nolhing
slands in the v,ay oJ'a persttn voluntarily surrendering or delivering
possession. The courl in Maharai Singh v. Stale of UP and
Others (1977) I SCC 155. u'hile inrerpreting Section 117(1)of U.P.
*'....-
KL.J&VRKR.J
wA t723, 174 t ol2018 a^d to of2019
Zamindari Abolition and Land Re.form Act, 1950 held that 'vesting' is
a u'ord ral slipper.t, inlporl and has mary nrcaning and lha contexl
controls tlte lefl atul the purpose und schene project thc porticultu'
rcmantic shade or nuonce o/ nrconing. The court in Rajendra Kumar t.
Kalyan (dcad) by L.rs. (2000) ll SOC 99 held as.[ollou,s:
"tVe dofind some conlentious substance in the conlcxlual
"vesting" certoin. "To lest,
facts, sirce wsting shall hat'e to be a
generally,neans to give a property in." (Per llrelt, L.J. C'overdale
v. Churlton. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 5th edn. l/ol. VI.)
l,esting in.favour qf the unhorn person and in the contexlualfocts
on lhe ha:;is of a subsequent adoption qfter about 50 years t,ithout
ony authorizotion connol however but be lermed to bc a
conlingent etent. 'l'o "vesl'. connol be lermed to be an execulor
devise. Bc il rtotcd hou,ct'cr, lhal "t'csted" does not ncccssuril.r'
and alv,a1,s meun "rest in possession but includes "r'csl in
interest" as well. "
32. We are of the tieu, that so far as the present case is
concerned, the word "resling" lakes in eler)) interest in the property
including de jure pos.session and. nol de.facto but il is aluavs open to
o person to voluntarily surrender and deliver 7t<t.tsession,
Lmder Seclion l0(3) of the Act.
33. Before we eytninc suh-seclion (5) ond sub-sL'cliot (6) oJ'
,\ection 10, let us cxamine tht meaning ef sub-section (4) ofScction
l0 of the A(t. \,hich .\avs tlrut during the period comntent'ing on the
date o/ puhlication uncler .vLlt-section (l), ending with the day
tpecified in tlte decloration nade under sult-seclion (3). no person
shull lrans-fcr lt1,wa.v of salc. nnrtgage. gifl or otheru,ise. un-r excess
vacant land. specificd in the noti,fication arul any such trun.s.f'ar made
in contr(lvenlion of lhe Ac't .rhall be deemed to be null and yoid.
Further, it also sttys that no person shall alter or catlse b be altered
the use of such excess vacanl land. Therefore, from thc dote of
ltublicalion of the notification under sub- section (t) and ending with
the date speci"fied in the decloration made in sub-section (3), there is
-29 -
KL,J&VRKR,J
vA 1723, 1741 oJ2a18 and IOoI20l9
no question of disturbing the possession of u person. the pttssession,
therefore, continues to be with the holder of the land.
Peaceful clispossess io n
3l- Sub-secthn (5) o.l Section lU,.lbr the Jirst time, speaks of
"possession" which says u'hcrc any land is vested in the State
Government under sub-seclion (3) of Section 10, lhe competenl
uulhorily may, by notice in u,riling,, order uny person, who may be in
possession of it to surreruler or trans.fer possession to the State
Government or to any other person, dulS, attthor'zed by the State
Government.
35. lf de facto possession has alrcadl, pctssed on to the State
Government by the tu,o cleenting provisions under sub-section (3) to
Section 10. there is no necessity oJ using the erpression "where any
land is vested" under sub- sectiott (5) to Seclion 10. Surrendering or
transler of possession under sub-se.'tfut't (3) to Section l0 can be
voluntary so thdt the person may gel the compensation os provided
under Section ll of the Act eurl1,. Once there i.s no voluntary
surrender or delivery oJ posses.sion, necasscrrily the Slole Government
has to issue notice in writing uruler sub-sct'tiort (5) to Scction l0 to
surrender or deliver possession. Sub.rcction (51 oJ Section l0
visualizes o situalion of surrcndering and delivering pctssession,
peacefully v,hile sub-section ((t1 o/ Sectiorr l0 contamplate-s a situalion
o./ fo r c eJil tl i sp osselsirrrr.
Fo rceful tl is poss e ss i o n
36. The Act providcs Jbr force/ul dispossession but only when
a person reJuses or.fails to comply with un order under sub-seclion (5)
of Section 10. Sub-section ((t) to SLc'tion l0 again speaks oJ'
"possession" which says. if any person reJuses or fails to comply with
the order made under sub- seclion (5), the compelenl aulhorily may
take possession of the vacant land to bc given lo lhe Stale Government
-30
K/-, .-/ & YRKR, J
tvA 1723, I74 I oJ 2A l8 atld l O of 2019
and for that purpose. -force - as may be necessary - can be used. Sub-
section (6). lhere.fore, contemplates o silutttion ofa person refusing or
/uil.s to crtttplt' v,,ith the order tutdersuh-.teclion (5). in lhe ercnt of
v hith tht Lompetetll ntlhtsrily may teke 1tos-tassion by use o.[ force.
Forciblt rlisposscs.siott ol the land, thereJbre, is being resorted only in
u situalion wltich.falls under sub-section (6) and not under sub-seclion
(5) to Section 10. Sub-.sections (5) and (6), therefore, take care of botlt
lhe situations, i.e. toking possession by giving notice lhat is " peace.ful
disposses.rion" antl on .failure to surrender or give delivery oI
possession under Section l0(5), than "forcefr,il dispossession" under
sub-.section (6) ofSection 10.
J1. Requirentent of giving nolice under sub-sections (5) arul
(6) qfSection l0 is mandatory. Though the word 'may' has been used
lherein, the u'ord ma-y' in both the sub-sections has lo be understood
crs "shall" because o court charged with the task qf enforcing the
.\tdtltte needs to det:ide the consequences thol lhe legislature intended
to.follou,.from failure to implement the requirement. Effect of noni.tsue of notice under .sub-section (5) or sub-saction (6) ofSection I I i.;
lhat it might result the land holder being dispossessed without notice.
tln'raforc. rhe v'ord may' has tn he reutl u: 'shall
.
59. 'fhis principle has been consistently reiterated and reinlbrced in
subscquent decisions includir-rg M/s. A.P. Electrical Ecluiltnent
Corporalion's case (.tupra) and Mangalsen's case (supra), wherein
tlie Honourable Supreme Court held that possession claimed by the
State rvithout issuance and service ol notice under Section l0(5)
cannot be recognised as lawful possession. The Court deprecated
-31,
KL, J &, VRKR, J
t'" A
_1723. 174 I of 2018 and 10 of 20I9
reliance on intemal records, possession meulos or panchanamas
prepared without statutol'y compliance, characterising such possession
as illusory or paper possession.
60. The Honourable Supreme Court in M/s. A P Electrical
Equipment Corportttion's c'ase (supra) lurthcr held that the procedure
under Sections I 0(5 ) and I 0(6 ) is not an e mpty lbrmality but a
substantive safeguard, and unless disposscssion is efhcted strictly in
the manner known to [aw. the State cannot clairn the benefit olvesting
SO AS
to defeat the operation of the ltepcal Act. l he Llonor-rrable
Supreme Courl made the following pertinent obscrvations:
"21. Sub-secrions (5) and (6) rf Sectbn l0 oJ rhe Act, 1976
respectively which are relevant.fbr lhe purpose o/ leciding the present
Appeals read as under:
" 10. Acquisition of vucunl larul in exccss o/ ceilinp
limit-
(5) Where any vacant land is vested in the SIdl( (iorernment under
sub-sectktn (3). the contpetent mihorit)' nn),'. by noricc in wrilinu,
orcler any person u,ho nury he in possessiotr ol il lo su"rencler or
deliver possession thereol'to the Slale Oovernmtnt or to any parson
duly authorized by the State Govarnment in this behoff v,ithin thirry
days of the service ol notice-
(6) IJ any person reJiscs or fails to comply with un ortlar made undar
sub section (5), the competenl anlhori0' ntay lake possassion of the
vacant land or cause it lo bc giwn tu lhe conccrntd Slule (iot'ernmettl
or lo any person duly authorised by such State Go"-crnmenl in this
behalf and may for thal purpose use such.force us nruy be necessory'
.
KL, .I & VRKR. ,)
tuA 1723, 1/4t of20t8anct 1aof2019
22. On a plain reading of the aforesaid provisions, it is
un)urtnl lhal tlrc .\l(.ttule contentplales giving an opportunit-\/ to thc
lundhrtllt'r or an.\' per.\ot1 in possession ol escess racanr land lo
.;urrender or delivcr posscssiolt thereof ut lhe State Governmenl und
/or lhis purpose prorides.for gh'ing notice in v,riting, ordering such
pcrsotl t() surrendcr or deliver possession qf such lund. lt is only u,hcn
put'\ttltrlt to .\uch notice, such person refuses orfails lo comply with dn
onler under sub-.scction (5) within a period of thirty days of the
strricc of notice, thut the compelcnl aulhoriry is required to take oter
possessiorr of llte racant land and for thal purpose may use force,
if
ne(c\stu'r There/'ore. the provisions of sub-section (6) are to be
resorted to onLy v,hcrt there is re-fusal or non-compliance of an order
unler suh-.sectit)n (5) o.f Section l0 of the Act, 1976 u'ithin tha
ltrcstrihetl pcriod.
)3. In Srure o.f Muharashn'a t'. B.E. Billinnria, (2003) 7 S(:C
-;-]6. thi.\ (.'(,ttt-t
i tl : L'ontext ol the Act, 1976 held that rhc said Act
lrcitt,g un .'x|)rol)riot()r!- lcgislation shoukl he construed strictly.
)1.'l lti; ( ourt itt thc tasc oJ llhavnagar University v. Polilanu Sugar
.llill /P) Ltd.. (2001) 2 SCC I I l, in the context of the Cuiarat Tou,n
l'lututirt.q ar I'rhan Devclopment Acr, 1976 held thus:
''l lrc .slututory inlerdict of use and eniownent of the proDerlv
nut.\t l)(' \triclly ton.struacl. lt is x'ell selll(,d lhal when a stat lor\:
ittrtlntrin i.\ )ttlut L,Ll to do o llting in a porliculut ntanne r. llrc snnt
nlu.\t l)c &)ne in tlrut nrunner a' not at all. The state ond ollrcr
tu lk)t'iti(,\ vl lt uctirry under the suid Act ure only treolure of st.ttulc
.llu,r
rntlst ttti v illtitt tlte o ur corners thereo
( [i r n p h u.r i.s .t upp I i L: tt
)
25.7'hus. applying the principle of strict construction as
axplained in the uforesaid ru,o deci.rions, the aulhorities are required
-3 3,
KI,.J&VRKR,J
tvA -1723, t74t of2018 and lOof20t9
lo act strictly in accordance v'ith lhe slatutory provisions. Thus, when
sub-section (5) of Section l0 mandates giving notice ofan order under
the said sub-section to lhe person in possession, the some is requiretl
to be complied rvirh in its true letter and spirit. Considering the noture
o.[ rights involved, mere i.ssuance of notice rithout sen,ite thereol,
cannot be suid to be due compliance x'ith lhe provisions oJ the stdute.
Besides, the provisions of subsection (6) ofSection ]0 cun he resorted
to only if the person fails to usmply with an order under sub-section
(5) thereof v,irhin u period q/ thirry days of sarvice of n<ttice. tlence.
possession cannot be taken ovcr under Section l0(61 of the Act, 1976
unless a period of thirty days from the date of service of notice has
elapsed. In absence of sertice oJ notice undcr sub-.sectktn (5) of
Section 10, there will be no sturting point for culculating the period oJ'
thirty days. In other u,ords. time v'ill not slurt running, hence the
question of tdking over possession under sub-saction (6.1 o/ Section l0
ofthe Act, 1976 will not arise at all. ln lhis view oJ the matter, in the
clse on hand, it was not open to the respondent aulhorities to rasort to
the provisions ofsub-section (61 qfSection 10 o.l the Act. 1976 without
lirst strictly cotnplying tvith lhe provisions of sub-sectiotr (5) thereof.
Hence, such dction being in controvention 4'the stotutory provisiotts
cannot be sustained and deserves to be struck down.
Validin' of Transactions - Rclevancc to Possession Procecdings
61. It is in the above sl.atutor)' and jurisprudcntial backdrop that the
contention of the appellants regarding the alleged invalidity of the sale
decds and agreernents of sale relied upon by thc respondcrtts / writ
petitioners is required to bl: examined. Proceedings under the Urban
Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 197 6 are not proceedings for
-34KL,J&VRKR,J
WA 1723, l741of 2018 nnd IOof20l9
adjudication ol title, and the competent authority is not vested with
.iurisdiction to pronounce upon the validity of private convcyances.
62. For the f urposes ol- conrpliance rvitli Sections 8(3), I0(5) and
I 0(6
) of thc Act. thc dcte lminative consideration is not the ultimate
validity ol thc transaction. but whether thc person concerned is in
possession or has a clainr or interest in the land. Even where the State
dispLrtes the validitl, ol a private ffansaction, such dispute cannot
.iustifl' denial of statutory notice nor legitimise dispossession
othcrrvisc than in accordance with law. Questions relating to titlc can
bc adjudicated onh, by a cornpetent civil court and cannot be
collateralll, lrresurnerl against thc resporrdents in proceedings under the
Act
63. It is a scttlcd principle that even a person in settled possession
r.r'ithout perlectccl title cannot be dispossessed except by authority ol
law. Where the statute itsell tnandates notice and prescribes a specific
procedurc tbr taking possession, the State cannot circurnvent such
salesuarcls by' qucstioning the validity of underlying transactions. Any
such atternpl rvould aurount to deprivation of possession rvithout due
process.
-35KL,J&VRKR,J
wA 1723, 1741 of 2014 a^d tool20)g
64. 1-urning to the facts of the present case, the appellants asserl
that posscssion was taken on 28.08.1995. l{owever. the record
discloses that no notice under Section l0(5) was ever sen,ed eithcr on
the dcclarant ol on the respondents. who rvere adrnittedly
possession.
-l'herc
i It
is also no material to show tl-rat proceedings r"rnder
Section l0(6) were initiated or that fbrcible dispossession
\\'as
lau tully eflected
65. 'fhe panchanarrra dated 25.08.1995 relied upon by the appellants
neithcr specifies the precise extent nor identities the boundaries olthe
iand allegedly taken possession of, nor does it evidence actual
physical dispossession. In the absence ol statutory cornpliance, it can
only be characterised as evidencing paper possession
66. On thc contrary, the revenue recerds consistently reflect the
rcsporrdents as pcrsons in possessior-r everr subsequent to the alle'gecl
date- ol taking possession. These contemporaneous public records
str.t)ngl), support the rcspondents'
la* tully taken by the State.
CASC
that possess ion \\,2IS IlCYC r
-3 6-
KL.J&IIRKR.J
wA 1723. 1741 oJ20t8 ond 1o oI20t9
.
This C'ourt accortlingll holds that the appellants have f'ailed to
establish lau'lul taliing of possession ol the subject lands in
accordancc rvitlr Sr'ctions l0(5) and l0(6) of the Act. The possession
clainred by thc State is nrercly syrnbolic and is non-est in law.
Issue (v): Whethcr thc proccedings stood abated by
opcration of thc Urban Land (Ceiling and
Rcgulation) ltepcal Act, 1999
68. [ssue (r ) conccrns the el'l'ect of the Repeal Act on the
proceedines initiated against the subject lands. The determinative
question is ri,hether thc Statc had taken lawful and actual physical
posscssion ol'thc lancls lrrior to the commencement of the Repeal Act.
69. Section 3 ol- thc Repeal Act provides that all proceedings
relating to anl. ordel rnaclc or purported to be made under the principal
Act shall stand abated. crccpt in cases whele possession of the surplus
land has bcerr tal<crr ovcr bv the State Government ol any person duly
authoriscd b"v it. 'l'he savinq clause thus rtrakes it abundantly clear that
onlv thosc cascs u herc- actual possession had been lawfully taken
prior to repeal s u rv ivc.
70. T'he legal position governing-the scope and effect of Section 3
of the Repeal Act is'on,*,ell settled. The Honourable Supreme Court
KL,J&VRKR,J
WA 1723. 1741 of 20t8 an.l lOof20l9
ln
Hari Ram's cese (supra) held that for the purpose of saving
procccdings tl'om abaterl]ent, possession contemplated uncler Section i
o1' the Repeal Act must be actual, physical possession, taken in
accordance rvith law, and that mere vesting under Section l0(3) or
prcparation of inte|nal reco|ds does not sufllce.
71. This principle has been consistently reiterated in Vinayak
Kasltinath Shilkar's case (supra), Gajanan Kanlya Patil's case
(sul)ru) urtcl L'ipincltarulru l,'odilul Bavishi Il
Stete (t'Gujarat:t,
whcrein it has been held that unless the State establishes lawful
disyrossession in compliance with Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act
prior to rcpeal, the proceedings autornatically abate.
'72. ln l4is. A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporatictn's case (supra),
thc Honourablc Supreme Court, after examining thc interplay betrvccn
the principal Act and thc Repeal Act, reiterated that papcl possession
or syrnbolic posscssion cannot be treated as possession in the eve of
Iarv tbr the purpose of invoking the saving clallse under Section 3 ol
thc Repeal Act. l'he Court held at paragraph Nos.20 and 40 as under:
'' (20 to) a scc 5: t
KL,J&VRKR.J
WA 1723, l74I ol20l8and tooJ20l9
"20, Thus. h.t virtue of llte provisions of Section 3 of the
Repeal ,lct. 1999. i/ po.tsession of racant land has been laken otar on
hchul.f oI the State (iovernntcnt hefore thc cominq into.force of the
Rcpeal .1t'r. 1999. tfu rr:1teul ol tht' Principal ,,1c1 v,ould nol olfect the
vsling ol .suth ldtll utklcr srb-sL'ttiort (3) ofSution l0 of AcL 1976.
llence. tht' i.ysut a.s lrt v,hethcr uclLd Stossession oJ land declared
excess under the
.|tt has hcan kften or'('r or nol assumes grea!
significarce ofter the coming into force of the Repeal Act, 1999
inasntuch as if possesskn has nol lteen taken over. the proceedings
v:ould ohate wtder Section 1 of the Rcpeol AcL 1999 and the
ov,nership of the land, if va.sted in the ,ftate Government under
Section l0(3) of the .1tr. l9;6 vould be rcquired to be restored to lhe
original land-holdar suhiect to rcpaymcnt o.f any smount that has
hcen ytkl by'the ,\lult,Oovetnnte nt *,ith reslvcl to such land. "
''10.'tltc t,llbtt of Repeul ,lct, 1999 is further clear. lf the
londou ner remain.s irt Pb,sical possession, then irrespective of his
land being declurerl surplus uruL/or entry being made in.favour of the
Sltue in retetrue re ttnds. he u ill not hc tlirested of his rights. Even if
contpetxetion is retci', cd llrut ul.ut u'ill not dis-entille him to claim
the hetrcfit i.[ contrynsatiott is re.limdetl. provided he is in actual
physicul ltossessiott. l'aymenl of cotnpcnsution hos no co-relation
v'ilh the tuking o/ rtt'trnl ph.ttitttl ltt.r.se.ssiott us u'ith lhe vesting land
LUmpcnsdtit)n bt'conrt.s prt.vrhlt' t ltich cun ha paid wilhout toking
acl ual l)h-\'.\ icul lro.r.r('JJio/r.
73. In thc present case. as alrcady held while dealing with Issue
(iv). the al)l)ellants har,e f-ailed to estahlish that possession of the
subiect lands r.vas taken in accordarrce wirh Sections l0(5) and 10(6)
of the Act. No notice under Section l0(5) was serued, no lawful
-39
KL,J&VKKR,J
t|A 1723, 174t of20lsand looJ2019
proceedings under Section l0(6) were undertaken, and the so-called
possession clain.red by thc State is unsupported by any Iegally
sustainable uraterial
14. ln the absence ol lawlul and actual phl,sical possession haviug
bccn taken prior to the cornurenceurent oi the Repeal Act, the
inevitable conscqucncc is that all proceedings initiated under the
principal Act stood abated by operation of Section 3 ol the Repeal
Act. The State, thercfbre. cannot assert any subsisting right over the
subject lands on thc basis ol tl.re repealed legislation.
15. l'his Court accordingly holds that the proceedings under the
Urban [.and (CeilinS. anci I{cgLrlation) Act. 1976, in respect of tl.rc
subject lands. stood abated on the corring into lorce of tlie Repeal Act,
and no lurlher action colrld have been larvf ully taken thereunder.
lssue (r i): Whether thc ortlcr ol'thc learned Single Judgc
\r 2lrr:rnts intcrfcrence in appcllatc jurisdiction
16. lssue (vi) r'elates to thc scope ol interttrence by this Court in
intra-court appellate.jurisdiction with the order passed by the lcarned
Single Judge. It is *,ell settlcd that an appellate courl would interfere
KL,J&VRKR,J
rrt4 1723, t741 ol20l8 ond 10 of2019
only where thc findings recorded are shorl,tt to bc perverse, contrary to
law, or based on mis-appre ciation o1'tnaterial on record.
. In thc prcsent case. the learncd Single Judge undeftook a
detailed and nreticr-rlous exanrination ol' thc statutory pror isions
governing the Act. the IJrban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Rules,
and the binding prccedents of the IIonourable Supreme Court. The
conclusions arrived at b1, the learned Singlc Judge are firmly founded
on the statutory scherne and the settled legal position.
78. The learned Singlc Judgc con'ectly held that the subject lands
are agricultuml in nature. cxclLrdcd lrorn the purvierv ol the Act under
Sections 2(o) and 2(q). and that the cornpetcnt aLrthority lacked
jurisdiction to treat thc samc as vacant land. This hnding is supltofted
by conternporaneous revcnue rccorcls. thc' cntluiry report. and the
absence of ir-rclusion ol tlrc lands in arry notificd i!{aster Plan
79. The Irnding that thc proccedings stood \itiated on account of
non-service of nrandatory noticc undcr Sectiorr 8(3), read with Rule
5( l) and 5(2)(a) of the Rules, is fully in consonance with the sratutory
-41,,
KL.J&VRKR,J
WA
-1723, 1741 of2018 and lOoJ2019
mandate and the principlcs ol natural justice. No material has been
produced by the appellants to dislodge this finding.
80. The leamed Single Judgc lirrther recorded a correct finding that
lawtul and actual physical possession ot'the lands was never taken by
the State in accordance rvith Sections l0(5) and l0(6) ol the Act. This
finding is squarely suppolted by the consistent line of decisions of the
Honourable Suprenre Court, including t[ari Ram's case (supra), Mh.
A.P. Electric'al Equipnertt Corporution's ca.se (supro), and the other
authorities referred to hercinbc fbre.
81. Once it is hcld that llo-sscssion was not lawfltly taken, the
conclusion that the procceciings stood abated by operation of the
Repeal Act necessarily' fbllolr s.
'['he lcarned Single Judge, therefore,
committed no error in larr irr setting aside the proceedings initiated
under the principal Act.
82. The appellants have lailc-d to derronstrate any perversity.
illegality, or jurisdictional crror in the reasoning or conclusiot-ts
recorded by the learned Singlc Judge. The contentions advanced in
KL. J & VRKR, J
l|A 172.1. l741ol20lAaad lO of 20l9
appeal merely seek a re-appreciation ol lacts and settled legal
principles. u'hich is irnpermissiblc in appcllate jurisdiction.
83. This ('our-t is. therelore. of the considered vicrr, that the order of
the leamed Single Judge does not sul'ler fl'onr any irrfirmity warranting
interGrencc. The rvrit appeals are de',,oid ol'merit
\,'I. CONCLUSIONS:
84. On a holistic considelation ol' thc statutory liameu'ork ol the
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) ,Act. 197(r. the Rulcs frarred
thcreunder, the Urban Larrd (Ceiling and Rcgulation) Repeal Act,
1999, and the binding precedents governing the t-reld, this Court
records the following conclusions.
85. Thc subject lands are agricultural in character, continuously
recorded and used ers sucl-r, and are llot sllo\vlt to havc been included in
any notified Master Plan. In view ol the express cxclusion containcd
in Sections 2(o) and 2(q) ol the Act, they do nor lall within the
deflnition of either "urban land" or "vacant land". 'l'he initiation of
proceedings under the Act in respect thereol was, therefore, without
jurisdiction.
KL,J&\RKR.J
IVA 1723, 1741 ot 20l8 and lO,tt20l9
86. The respondents/writ petitioners, being pelsons in possession
and having a demonstrable clairn or int..rcst in the subject lands. tall
within the ambit of "persons concerned" under Section 8(3) read with
Rute 5( i ) and 5(2)(a) ol the Rules. l he admitted fhilure to serve
mandatory notice upon thent stril<cs al the root of the proceedings and
renders Ihe deterrnination unsustainable-
87. The Vesting Contenrplated undcl Section 10(3) ol the Act is
only de jure and does not by itscll result in divestment of physical
possession. Lawful assurltption o1'ph1'sical possession can be eflected
only upon strict compliance rvith Sections l0(5) and 10(6). In the
absence of service of notice Lrnder Scctior.r l0(5) and lawful
dispossession in thc nranner knou'n to larv. lhe possession claimed by
the State is merely symbolic or papcr posscssior.r. rrhich is non-est
88. The challenge raised by, thc appeiiarrts to the validity of the sale
deeds or agreemcnts ot' salc leliecl Lrlron b1' thc respondents
IS
misconceived. Procecdings under tl're Act are not proccedings fbr
adjudication of title, and disputed questions relating to the validity of
-44KL,J&VRKR,J
WA 1723, 1741 ol 20l8 dnd 1O of2019
pri\,ate transactions cannot be invoked to deny statutory notice or to
bypass r-naridatory proccdural saleguards.
89. In thc abscnce of lawful arrd actual physical posscssion of the
subject lands w.rs taken prior to the coming into l'orce of the Repeal
Act, all the proceedings initiated under the principal Act stood abated
by operation of Section 3 thereof. No right, title or intcrcst can
theleafter bc clainred by the state orr the basis ol' sr.rch abated
procecdings.
90. The learncd Single Judge, upon a correct appreciation of
statutory scherle and the binding precedents governirrg the treld,
rightly intcrl'ered with proceedings which were vitiated by lack of
iurisdiction and non-compliance with rnandatory statLrtory
requirerlents. l'his Court finds no error, j r.rrisdictiona I or others'ise
u,arranting intell-erence in intra-court appellate jurisdiction.
VII. RIrSt l.'l'
91. In vicri ol the conclusions lecorded hereinabove. and lbr the
reasons statcd. all the Writ Appeals fail and are accordingly disrnissed.
-45KL,J&\'RKR.J
wA 1723, 1741 of2018 and 10 ol2019
9L The common order dated 29.12.2017 passed by the learned
Single Judge in W.P. Nos. 195 12 and 21914 of 2008 and 15221 of
201 I is hereby affirmcd.
93. It is held and declared that the proccedings initiated under the
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 in lespect o1- the
subject lands are without j urisdiction, vitiated fbr non-compliance
with n-randatory statutor) requirements, and stood abated by operation
ol'the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999.
9+. There shall be no order as to costs.
As a sequel, all pending rriscellaneous applications. if any, in
thesc appeals, shall stand closed.
SD/-A.V.S. PRASAD
DEPUTY REGIS
//TRUE COPY//
I
ECTION OFFICER
SHIVIAN
One Fair Copy to the Hon'ble Sri Justice
(For His Lordship's Kind Perusal
&
One Fair Copy to the Hon'ble Sri Justice VAKITI RAIVIAKRISHNA REDDY
(For His LordshiP's Kind Perusal)
To,
1. Two CCs to GP FOR ASSIGMENT, High Court for the State of Telangana at
Hyderabad. [OUT]
2. One CC to SRI D.S V G NAGARAJU, Advocate lOPUCl
3. Two CCs to GP FOR TOURISM, High Court for the State of Telangana at
Hyderabad. [OUTI
4. 1'1 LR.Copies
The Under Secretary, Union of lndia, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company
Affairs, New Delhi.
The Secretary, Advocates' Association Library, High Court Buildings,
Hyderabad
Two CD Copies.
BSK
BS
HIGH COURT
DATED:0310212026
t HES
ID
li
t
COMMON ORDER
WA.Nos.1 723, 17 41 of 2018
& 10 0F 2019
DISMISSING THE WRIT APPEALS
WITHOUT COSTS
q
f
.:..\.
C /'. ':.
"^d\
) o2n
F)
t,+-)//
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review