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[2026:RJ-JP:27356-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 1280/2025
URN: SAW / 2740U / 2025
1.
The State Of Rajasthan, Through Secretary Of School
Education, Govt. Of Rajasthan, Secretariat, Jaipur.
2.
Director, Elementary Education, Bikaner, Rajasthan.
3.
Director, Secondary Education, Bikaner, Rajasthan.
4.
District Education Officer, (Primary Education/ Secondary
Education), Govt. Of Rajasthan, Shiksha Sankul, Jaipur.
----Appellants
Versus
1.
Childrens Garden Play School, Opp. Geejgarh House,
Keshav Nagar, Hawa Sadak, Civil Lines, Jaipur-302006,
Through Its Administrator And Authorized Signatory Dr.
Shreya Chatterji, Aged 43 About Years, W/o Dr. S.
Chatterji.
2.
Dr. Shreya Chatterji, W/o Dr. S. Chatterji, Aged About 43
Years, Authorized Signatory Of Childrens Garden Play
School, Opp. Geejgarh House, Keshav Nagar, Hawa
Sadak, Civil Lines, Jaipur-302006.
3.
Union Of India, Through Ministry Of Human Resource
Development, Shastri Bhawan, Dr. Rajendra Prasad Road,
New Delhi.
----Respondents
For Appellant(s)
:
None present
For Respondent(s)
:
None present
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MONGA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANEESH SHARMA
Order (Oral)
17/07/2026
Per: Arun Monga, J.
1.
Applicants seek condonation of delay of 714 days in filing the
present appeal against the order and judgment dated 18.07.2023
passed by the learned Single Judge in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.
11317/2023, vide which the learned Single Judge in light of the
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judgement dated 18.07.2023 passed by the Court in S.B. Civil Writ No.
8567/2023 disposed of the writ petition.
2.
For ready reference paras No. 2 and 3 of the application are as
below:
“2. That the matter was examined by the State Level Standing Committee with the
other similar matters and The officer in charge was appointed to file the special
appeal in the matter, by the order dated 16.11.2023. Thereafter the officer in charge
contacted the counsel of the department to file the special appeal. The counsel asked
for the record of the single bench writ petition. The writ petition was decided without
filing of the reply and the record was not available in the office of the officer in
charge. An application was filed in the high court on 09.01.2024 for the record.
Simultaneously, the officer in charge also tried to collect the record from the
directorate vide letters dated 09.02.24, 27.03.24 and 29.04.24. After collection of
record of writ petition, the officer in charge again contacted the changed additional
advocate general and wrote letter dated 10.06.2024 to file the special appeal. But
again there was change in departments of Government Counsel. So, officer in charge
again contacted new Additional Advocate General office and wrote a letter dated
21.08.2024 for filing of special appeal and as per instructions provided copies of
relevant documents after examining the complete record by the office Additional
Advocate General, it was found there is sanction for filling of the appeal was not
available therefore, a letter dated 24.06.2025 sent by the Officer In- charge to the
Directorate in this regard, then a latter dated 08.07.2025 was received from the
Directorate to file the Appeal, therefore, that in pursuance of latter dated 08.07.2025
issued by the directorate, officer in charge, again contacted the office concerned
counsel to prepare the appeal and after that the present special appeal has been
prepared and filed before this Hon'ble Court.
3. That there is certain delay in filing the special appeal, for which the appellants
sincerely tender their regrets and it is humbly submitted that the delay in filing the
special appeal is not at all intentional and deliberate but due to the aforesaid
reasons, which are bonafide in nature being procedural, as such looking to the facts
and circumstances of the case and involvement of pertinent question of law in the
appeal, the delay in filing the special deserves to be condoned.”
3.
The explanation given in the application for seeking condonation is
totally mechanical and there seems to be no application of mind. No
specific details or day to day explanation have been given as to why the
matter remained pending, other than administrative lethargy coupled
with red tapism.
4.
It is a settled position in law that delay confers crystallized rights
in favour of a litigant by virtue of law of limitation. Delay and latches
since result in freezing of the vested rights in a party, which seeks
enforcement of the same, the said right cannot betaken away unless
there is a sufficient cause shown by the party seeking condonation of
delay
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5.
[SAW-1280/2025]
Qua the law applicable on condonation of delay, reference may be
had to Apex Court judgment in Ramlal and others Vs. Rewa
Coalfields
Ltd.1
Relevant
extract
of
the
same
is
reproduced
hereinbelow:“7. In construing Section 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important
considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of
limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of
decree holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other
words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree
holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree
as beyond challenge and this legal right which has accrued to the decree
holder by lapse of time should not be light heartedly disturbed. The other
consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing
delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit
the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in
order that judicial power and discretion in trial behalf should be exercised to
advance substantial justice.”
6.
Reference may also be had to another Apex Court judgment in
Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v. State of Gujarat 2, wherein it is observed
thus:
“.....it is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for
filing an appeal, but when it allows limitation to expire and pleads sufficient
cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that
because of some event or circumstance arising before limitation expired it was
not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising
after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be
events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may
further delay the filing of the appeal, but that the limitations has been allowed
to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within
the period of limitation. In the present case, there was no such cause, and the
High Court erred in condoning the delay.”
7.
In
Government
of
Maharashtra
(Water
Resource
Department) Vs. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors
Private Limited3, Hon’ble the Supreme Court once again held as
under:
“59. Likewise, merely because the Government is involved, a different yardstick
for condonation of delay cannot be laid down. This was felicitously stated in
Postmaster General v. Living Media (India)Ltd.70 "Postmaster General"], as
follows: (SCC pp. 573-74. paras27-29).
27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware
or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period
of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave
petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate
period of limitation when the Department was possessed with
AIR 1962 (SC) 361
AIR 1981 (SC) 733
2021 SCC OnLine SC 233
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competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of
plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why
the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the
Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of
condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or
deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to
be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in
the facts and circumstances. the Department cannot take advantage of
various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal
machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several
notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being
used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds
everybody, including the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government
bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have
reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was
bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that
the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable
degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government
departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they
perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of
delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit
for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the
same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.”
8. In another recent Apex Court judgment in Shivamma(dead)
by Lrs Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors. 4, it is observed
thus:“
x-x-x-x-x
261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court
deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it
appropriate to make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and laxity
can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want to
convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be
condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient
cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted
with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid
to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the
constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State
agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations
due to its own lackadaisical attitude.
262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous
attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra
cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority. They
should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional
courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant.
Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the
fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are
at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice,
not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by
doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals
under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to
questions of law.
263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis
to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969
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[SAW-1280/2025]
is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an
enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such
litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a
party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the
condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for
another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts
of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent from
pillar to post to seek justice. 264. No litigant should be permitted to be so
lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the
process of law.”
9.
Aforesaid position in law dissuades us to grant any judicial
latitude to the appellant/State.
10.
In the premise, since the appeal is not maintainable on the
ground of delay, no ground to hear the main appeal on merits is
made out.
11.
Both, the application for condonation of delay as well as
main appeal are dismissed.
12.
All pending application(s) also stand disposed of.
(MANEESH SHARMA),J
19/RACHNA
(ARUN MONGA),J
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