Judgments
LegalFirms.in Judgments · legalfirms.in/judgments/the-state-of-rajasthan-vs-childrens-garden-play-school-20260717/ · Printed 19 Nov 2026
Civil

The State of Rajasthan vs Childrens Garden Play School

Add to a compilation

Keep judgments in folders, mark the paragraphs you rely on, and print a compilation with an index. It comes with the Research and Advocate Pro judgment plans and with a campus licence. Sign in · See the plans

Court
Rajasthan High Court
Date
17 July 2026
Case No.
SAW 1280/2025
Result
Dismissed
Bench
Arun Monga, Maneesh Sharma
Cite this judgment
Citation
Link for your website or blog
Cite the court's own record or the law report in court filings.

The court's order

The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.

11. Both, the application for condonation of delay as well as main appeal are dismissed.

Full Judgment Text

Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs, CC BY 4.0). The court's own copy is the authoritative text.

[2026:RJ-JP:27356-DB] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 1280/2025 URN: SAW / 2740U / 2025 1. The State Of Rajasthan, Through Secretary Of School Education, Govt. Of Rajasthan, Secretariat, Jaipur. 2. Director, Elementary Education, Bikaner, Rajasthan. 3. Director, Secondary Education, Bikaner, Rajasthan. 4. District Education Officer, (Primary Education/ Secondary Education), Govt. Of Rajasthan, Shiksha Sankul, Jaipur. ----Appellants Versus 1. Childrens Garden Play School, Opp. Geejgarh House, Keshav Nagar, Hawa Sadak, Civil Lines, Jaipur-302006, Through Its Administrator And Authorized Signatory Dr. Shreya Chatterji, Aged 43 About Years, W/o Dr. S. Chatterji. 2. Dr. Shreya Chatterji, W/o Dr. S. Chatterji, Aged About 43 Years, Authorized Signatory Of Childrens Garden Play School, Opp. Geejgarh House, Keshav Nagar, Hawa Sadak, Civil Lines, Jaipur-302006. 3. Union Of India, Through Ministry Of Human Resource Development, Shastri Bhawan, Dr. Rajendra Prasad Road, New Delhi. ----Respondents For Appellant(s) : None present For Respondent(s) : None present HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MONGA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANEESH SHARMA Order (Oral) 17/07/2026 Per: Arun Monga, J. 1. Applicants seek condonation of delay of 714 days in filing the present appeal against the order and judgment dated 18.07.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11317/2023, vide which the learned Single Judge in light of the [2026:RJ-JP:27356-DB] (2 of 5) [SAW-1280/2025] judgement dated 18.07.2023 passed by the Court in S.B. Civil Writ No. 8567/2023 disposed of the writ petition. 2. For ready reference paras No. 2 and 3 of the application are as below: “2. That the matter was examined by the State Level Standing Committee with the other similar matters and The officer in charge was appointed to file the special appeal in the matter, by the order dated 16.11.2023. Thereafter the officer in charge contacted the counsel of the department to file the special appeal. The counsel asked for the record of the single bench writ petition. The writ petition was decided without filing of the reply and the record was not available in the office of the officer in charge. An application was filed in the high court on 09.01.2024 for the record. Simultaneously, the officer in charge also tried to collect the record from the directorate vide letters dated 09.02.24, 27.03.24 and 29.04.24. After collection of record of writ petition, the officer in charge again contacted the changed additional advocate general and wrote letter dated 10.06.2024 to file the special appeal. But again there was change in departments of Government Counsel. So, officer in charge again contacted new Additional Advocate General office and wrote a letter dated 21.08.2024 for filing of special appeal and as per instructions provided copies of relevant documents after examining the complete record by the office Additional Advocate General, it was found there is sanction for filling of the appeal was not available therefore, a letter dated 24.06.2025 sent by the Officer In- charge to the Directorate in this regard, then a latter dated 08.07.2025 was received from the Directorate to file the Appeal, therefore, that in pursuance of latter dated 08.07.2025 issued by the directorate, officer in charge, again contacted the office concerned counsel to prepare the appeal and after that the present special appeal has been prepared and filed before this Hon'ble Court. 3. That there is certain delay in filing the special appeal, for which the appellants sincerely tender their regrets and it is humbly submitted that the delay in filing the special appeal is not at all intentional and deliberate but due to the aforesaid reasons, which are bonafide in nature being procedural, as such looking to the facts and circumstances of the case and involvement of pertinent question of law in the appeal, the delay in filing the special deserves to be condoned.” 3. The explanation given in the application for seeking condonation is totally mechanical and there seems to be no application of mind. No specific details or day to day explanation have been given as to why the matter remained pending, other than administrative lethargy coupled with red tapism. 4. It is a settled position in law that delay confers crystallized rights in favour of a litigant by virtue of law of limitation. Delay and latches since result in freezing of the vested rights in a party, which seeks enforcement of the same, the said right cannot betaken away unless there is a sufficient cause shown by the party seeking condonation of delay (3 of 5) [2026:RJ-JP:27356-DB] 5. [SAW-1280/2025] Qua the law applicable on condonation of delay, reference may be had to Apex Court judgment in Ramlal and others Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd.1 Relevant extract of the same is reproduced hereinbelow:“7. In construing Section 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of decree holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge and this legal right which has accrued to the decree holder by lapse of time should not be light heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in trial behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice.” 6. Reference may also be had to another Apex Court judgment in Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v. State of Gujarat 2, wherein it is observed thus: “.....it is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal, but when it allows limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal, but that the limitations has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. In the present case, there was no such cause, and the High Court erred in condoning the delay.” 7. In Government of Maharashtra (Water Resource Department) Vs. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Private Limited3, Hon’ble the Supreme Court once again held as under: “59. Likewise, merely because the Government is involved, a different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down. This was felicitously stated in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India)Ltd.70 "Postmaster General"], as follows: (SCC pp. 573-74. paras27-29). 27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with AIR 1962 (SC) 361 AIR 1981 (SC) 733 2021 SCC OnLine SC 233 [2026:RJ-JP:27356-DB] (4 of 5) [SAW-1280/2025] competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances. the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government. 29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.” 8. In another recent Apex Court judgment in Shivamma(dead) by Lrs Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors. 4, it is observed thus:“ x-x-x-x-x 261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude. 262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law. 263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969 [2026:RJ-JP:27356-DB] (5 of 5) [SAW-1280/2025] is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. 264. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law.” 9. Aforesaid position in law dissuades us to grant any judicial latitude to the appellant/State. 10. In the premise, since the appeal is not maintainable on the ground of delay, no ground to hear the main appeal on merits is made out. 11. Both, the application for condonation of delay as well as main appeal are dismissed. 12. All pending application(s) also stand disposed of. (MANEESH SHARMA),J 19/RACHNA (ARUN MONGA),J

This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.

Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong? Request a review

All Rajasthan HC judgments →
LegalFirms.in Directory
Find an advocate for this matter
Dealing with a similar case? Find an advocate who handles this kind of matter on LegalFirms.in.
Find an advocate →