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Page No.# 1/12
GAHC010262052025
2026:GAU-AS:11513-DB
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WA/165/2026
THE STATE OF ASSAM AND ANR.
REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY AND COMMISSIONER TO THE
GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM, HIGHER EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, DISPUR,
GUWAHATI - 781006
2: THE DIRECTOR OF HIGHER EDUCATION
ASSAM
KAHILIPARA
GUWAHATI - 781019
VERSUS
BANESWAR BEZBARUAH AND 3 ORS.
S/O - LATE PRANESWAR BEZBARUAH, R/O - VILLAGE BELBARI, P.O BARKHAPALA, DISTRICT - BARPETA, ASSAM, PIN-781-307.
2:UNIVERSITY GRANTS COMMISSION
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY
BAHADUR SHAH
ZAFAR MARG
NEW DELHI
PIN - 110-002.
3:GOVERNING BODY OF MADHYA KAMRUP COLLEGE
SUBHA REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT
P.O - CHENGA
DISTRICT - BARPETA
ASSAM
PIN -781- 305
4:THE PRINCIPAL CUM SECRETARY
MADHYA KAMRUP COLLEGE
SUBHA
P.O - CHENGA
Page No.# 2/12
DISTRICT - BARPETA
ASSAM
PIN - 781-30
BEFORE
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE MICHAEL ZOTHANKHUMA
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE ARUN DEV CHOUDHURY
For the Appellants
: Mr. K. Gogoi, Standing Counsel,
Higher Education Department,
For the Respondent(s)
: Mr. P. Mahanta, counsel for respondent No.1
Dr. P. Agarwal, SC, UGC
Date on which Judgment is
Reserved
:
10.08.2026
:
14.08.2026
:
NA.
:
Yes.
Date of pronouncement of
Judgment
Whether the pronouncement
is of the operative part of the
Judgment
Whether the full Judgment has
been pronounced
JUDGMENT & ORDER (CAV)
(A.D.Choudhury, J)
1.
Heard Mr. K. Gogoi, learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the appellants. Also heard Mr. P. Mahanta, learned counsel for the
respondent/writ petitioner No. 1, and Dr. P. Agarwal, learned Standing
counsel, University Grants Commission (UGC), for the respondent No. 2.
2.
This intra-court appeal is directed against the Judgment
and Order (Oral) dated 23.10.2025, passed by the learned Single Judge in
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WP(C) No. 3820/2023, whereby the writ petition preferred by the
respondent No.1/ writ petitioner was allowed and the appellants were
directed to extend the benefit of UGC Scale of Pay to the writ petitioner
from the date of his appointment, i.e., 08.07.1994.
3.
The relevant facts may first be noticed.
4.
The respondent No. 1 had applied for the post of Lecturer
in Political Science at Madhya Kamrup College pursuant to an
advertisement dated 23.12.1992. His service was subsequently approved
by the competent authority in the Higher Education Department vide
order dated 08.07.1994. His appointment order dated 08.07.1994,
contained, inter alia, the following two conditions.
(i)
That the incumbent would be entitled to
incremental benefit in UGC Scale of Pay of Rs. 2200-4400 per
month only after obtaining M.Phil or Ph.D within 8 years,
failing which his service would not be continued, and,
(ii)
That the incumbent would not be eligible for
Senior Scale/ Selection Grade Scale of Pay till he fulfills the
conditions laid down in the UGC scheme.
5.
The respondent No.1 did not challenge the aforesaid
conditions at the relevant time. He subsequently earned an M.Phil in
2008. Thereafter, the authorities granted him the UGC Scale of Pay with
effect from 01.04.2008 under an order dated 03.12.2011.
6.
The respondent No. 1 thereafter made a representation
only on 08.01.2019 claiming UGC Scale of Pay from the date of his
appointment. Though the authorities granted certain benefits by way of
notional fixation/pay protection, they did not grant the UGC scale from
08.07.1994.
7.
In 2023, the respondent No. 1 approached this Court by
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filing the aforesaid writ petition, assailing, firstly, the very condition of his
appointment order, as well as seeking the grant of the UGC Scale of Pay
with effect from 08.07.1994, i.e., his initial date of appointment.
8.
The learned Single Judge, under the judgment impugned,
allowed the writ petition, holding that the minimum UGC qualification for
appointment as a Lecturer in Deficit Grants-in-Aid college as on
08.07.1994 was 55% marks in Master's Degree and the respondent No.1
possessed the said qualification. The learned Single Judge consequently
held that the two conditions incorporated in the appointment order were
illegal and arbitrary.
9.
Mr. K Gogoi, the learned counsel for the appellants, argues
that the learned Single Judge has not correctly appreciated the distinction
between the qualification required for appointment and the condition
governing the entitlement to benefit in the UGC Scale of Pay.
10.
It is argued that the case of the State is not that M.Phil was
the minimum qualification prescribed by the UGC for appointment as a
Lecturer in 1994 but that the UGC norms governing appointment were
required to be fulfilled and that while approving the appointment of the
respondent No.1, the competent authority imposed a condition that the
benefit of increments in UGC scale would accrue upon the incumbent on
acquisition of M.Phil or Ph.D.
11.
The learned counsel further submits that the respondent No.
1 had not even acquired the eligibility test qualification prescribed under
the UGC Notification applicable to the relevant period. Nevertheless, his
appointment was approved by the competent authority subject to the
aforesaid conditions. The respondent No. 1 accepted the appointment and
the conditions attached thereto and, upon subsequently acquiring an
M.Phil, was granted UGC scale of pay with effect from 01.04.2008.
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12.
Per contra, Mr. Mahanta, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent No. 1, argues that an M.Phil was not a prescribed qualification
for appointment under the UGC regulations applicable at the relevant time
and, therefore, the two conditions incorporated in the appointment order
were illegal and arbitrary.
13.
It is also submitted that the respondent No. 1 possessed
55% marks in the Master's Degree and was therefore entitled to the UGC
scale from the date of his appointment. Reliance has been placed upon
the judgments of the Supreme Court in Kalyani Mathivanan Vs. K. V.
Jeyaraj & Ors., reported in AIR 2015 SC 1875 and P. J. Dharmaraj
Vs. Church of South India& Ors. reported in 2024 INSC 938.
14.
We have considered the submissions advanced by the
learned counsel for the parties and have perused the materials available
on record.
15.
The relevant UGC Notification prescribing qualifications for
Lecturer is the Notification dated 19.09.1991, which prescribed the
qualification for appointment as Lecturer, a good academic record with at
least 55% marks at the Master's degree level, and, in addition, required
the candidate to have cleared the eligibility test conducted by the
UGC/CSIR or a similar test accredited by the UGC. Such a requirement is
also specifically noticed in the impugned judgment under appeal.
16.
The additional affidavit filed by the Higher Education
Department also reproduced the said qualification. Thus, the UGC
qualification framework relied upon by respondent No. 1 did not consist
merely of having 55% marks in Master's Degree; it also required clearing
the eligibility test. It is significant that respondent No.1 has not acquired
the said eligibility test qualification.
17.
The UGC itself had taken the stand before the learned Single
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Judge that the eligibility criteria prescribed by the Notification dated
19.09.1991 were mandatory.
18.
We do not, however, consider it necessary, at this stage, to
hold that the appointment of the respondent No.1 itself was invalid on
account of non-fulfillment of the eligibility test requirement at the time of
his appointment or thereafter at any point of time during his service
career.
The relevance of this fact is in considering that whether the respondent
No. 1’s contention, because he possessed 55% marks in the Master's
Degree, he acquired an unconditional right to the UGC scale from the date
of appointment.
19.
In our considered view, the argument that UGC did not
prescribe M.Phil as a qualification for appointment and, therefore, the
conditions in the appointment order requiring acquisition of M.Phil/Ph.D.
were beyond the permissible framework of such prescription, overlooks
the distinction between the qualification for appointment and the
conditions governing the accrual of a financial benefit under the UGC
scale. Further the respondent No.1 did not clear the eligibility test for
lecturers conducted by the UGC, CSIR or similar test accredited by the
UGC in terms of the UGC notification dated 19.09.1991 on 08.07.1994.
20.
The Condition No. (i) incorporated in the appointment order
did not state that the respondent No. 1 was ineligible to be appointed as a
Lecturer merely because he did not possess an M.Phil. The condition
provided that he would get an incremental benefit in the UGC scale only
after obtaining an M.Phil or PhD within the stipulated period. Similarly, the
Condition No. (ii) is linked to the Senior Scale Selection Grade to the
fulfillment of the conditions laid down in the UGC scheme.
Thus, the conditions were directed toward the accrual of financial benefit
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under the UGC scale, not merely to initial eligibility for appointment.
21.
In the present case, respondent No. 1 accepted the
appointment order subject to the conditions incorporated therein. He did
not challenge those conditions at the relevant time, continued in service
under the terms of such appointment, and subsequently acquired an
M.Phil. Thereafter, the authorities granted him the UGC scale of pay with
effect from 01.04.2008, in terms of the very condition incorporated in the
appointment order. In such circumstances, the respondent No.1 cannot
now succeed merely by contending that the condition was arbitrary
because an M.Phil was not an essential qualification for initial
appointment.
22.
The real issue before us, therefore, is whether the condition
linking the accrual of incremental benefit in the UGC scale to the
acquisition of M.Phil/Ph.D. was wholly foreign to, or inconsistent with, the
governing UGC framework and was thereby arbitrary.
23.
On the material available before us, we find no such basis.
24.
It is not in dispute that under the communication dated
02.11.1982, the Director of Public Instruction, Assam, addressed to the
Principal/Secretary of all Aided College, specifically referred to the
conditions imposed by the UGC and approved by the State Government
that where a person was selected under good academic record but was
not an M.Phil degree holder, he/she would have to obtain M.Phil or a
recognised degree beyond Master level within eight years, failing which,
future increments would not be earned until such qualification was
obtained or equivalent published work was produced.
25.
We are not required, in the present appeal, to determine
whether the communication dated 02.11.1982, by itself, constituted the
source of power for the particular condition incorporated in the
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appointment letter of respondent No. 1. Its significance lies elsewhere. It
demonstrates that a condition requiring acquisition of an M.Phil or an
equivalent qualification within a stipulated period, earning the scale of
pay, was not an innovation devised by the appointing authority in the
individual case of the respondent No.1. The said communication dated
02.11.1982 expressly records that such condition had been imposed by
UGC and approved by the State Government.
26.
The respondent No.1, therefore, cannot succeed merely by
contending that M.Phil was not the minimum qualification prescribed for
initial appointment. That circumstance, by itself, does not render illegal a
condition regulating subsequent accrual of scale of pay/increments or
other financial benefits under the UGC scale.
27.
The learned Single Judge, in our view, therefore, erred in
proceeding on the basis that once the respondent had obtained 55%
marks in the Master's degree, the condition requiring an M.Phil/Ph.D. for
earning an incremental benefit in the UGC scale necessarily became illegal
and arbitrary.
28.
There is yet another aspect which reinforces the conclusion
that possession of 55% marks in the Master’s Degree could not, by itself,
confer an unconditional right to the UGC scale of pay from the date of
appointment.
29.
The UGC notification dated 19.09.1991 prescribed, in
addition to a Master’s degree qualification, clearance of the National
Eligibility Test. The respondent No.1 admittedly did not possess such a
qualification.
We are conscious that his appointment had been approved by the
competent authority, and we are not holding that his appointment was
invalid on that account.
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The point is only that the respondent cannot selectively rely upon one
component of the UGC qualification framework, namely, the 55%
requirement, to contend that he acquires an unconditional right to every
financial benefit under the UGC scale.
The State had approved his appointment subject to certain conditions.
However, respondent No. 1 cannot selectively rely on one part of the UGC
qualification framework to claim the benefit of the UGC scale, while
disregarding the other requirement within the same framework. The fact
that the respondent possessed 55% marks, therefore, cannot by itself
establish that he had an unconditional right to the UGC scale from
08.07.1994.
30.
The learned Single Judge has also relied on the fact that two
similar incumbents, namely Sri Bhairab Chandra Das and Sri Kailash Das,
who were also appointed as lecturers in the same college, were not
subjected to the same conditions, and has held that the respondent was
treated differently.
31.
There cannot be any dispute with the proposition that
similarly situated employees should ordinarily be treated alike.
However, the mere fact that a similar condition was not imposed upon
another employee cannot, by itself, establish that the condition imposed
upon the respondent No.1 was arbitrary.
Before the principle of equality is invoked, it must be established that the
condition relied upon was similarly extended in all material particulars and
that the benefit allegedly extended to them was itself legally valid.
In the present case, the condition imposed upon the respondent had a
rational nexus with the scale of pay/accrual of incremental benefit in the
UGC scale and was linked to the acquisition of a recognized higher
qualification. The contemporaneous material noticed hereinabove also
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demonstrates that such a condition was not foreign to the UGC pay
framework.
32.
The principle of equality cannot, in any event, be invoked to
compel the state to disregard a condition which, for the reasons stated
above, cannot be regarded as arbitrary or legally unsustainable, merely
for the reason that another employee may not have been subjected to the
same condition.
Article 14 does not operate in isolation from the governing rules and the
terms upon which the respective appointments were made.
33.
Learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon Kalyani
Mathivanan (supra). There can be no dispute with the proposition that
UGC regulations, where applicable, have binding effect upon the
institution to which they apply. The said proposition, however, does not
answer the controversy before us. It is not a question before us whether
the state can disregard a binding UGC prescription; rather, it is whether
the condition incorporated in the appointment order is inconsistent with
the governing UGC framework.
Kalyani Mathivanan (supra) does not lay down that a condition
regulating accrual of benefit accepted at the time of appointment and
acted upon thereafter, becomes invalid, merely because the condition is
not itself prescribed as a minimum qualification for initial appointment,
more particularly, when the respondent himself did not acquire all the
prescribed qualifications under such regulation.
34.
The decision in P.J. Dharmaraj (supra), in our opinion,
does not advance the case of respondent No. 1 any further.
In that case, the Supreme Court was dealing with the applicability of the
subsequent amendment to the UGC/AICTE regulation within the
institutions' governing framework. The decision does not hold that an
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express condition governing an employee's entitlement to a financial
benefit, accepted at the time of appointment and subsequently acted
upon, must be ignored merely because the condition is not reproduced
verbatim in the UGC Regulations.
35.
We may also note the conduct of respondent No. 1.
He accepted the appointment in 1994, subject to the conditions
incorporated therein. He continued in service under those conditions,
subsequently acquired an M.Phil, and accepted the UGC scale of pay with
effect from 01.04.2008 when the authorities treated the condition as
fulfilled. It was only in 2019, after a considerable lapse of time, that he
sought to reopen the terms of his appointment and claimed the benefit
retrospectively from the date of initial appointment.
We do not consider it necessary to dispose of the appeal solely on the
ground of delay and laches. Nevertheless, the aforesaid conduct is a
relevant circumstance in considering whether the condition, which was
accepted and acted upon for years, can now be challenged as arbitrary.
36.
The learned Single Judge has also relied upon the
communication (U/O) No. G(B) UGC 28/2002/9 dated 18-11-2002 to
conclude that the minimum UGC qualification in 1994 was 55% marks in a
Master's degree only.
In our view, the aforesaid communication, being a note addressed to the
Personal Secretary to the Minister of Education, cannot by itself be
treated as a source or incorporation of the UGC regulatory framework
applicable in 1994.
More importantly, one cannot ignore the contemporaneous departmental
communications noted hereinabove, including the UGC notification dated
19.09.1991 and the communication dated 02.11.1982, but they have to
be considered while determining the nature of the condition imposed in
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the appointment order of the respondent No.1.
37.
For the discussion made and reasons recorded hereinabove,
we are of the considered view that the learned Single Judge erred in
treating possession of 55% marks in the Master's degree as sufficient, by
itself, to confer upon the respondent No.1 an unconditional right to UGC
scale of pay from 08.07.1994.
The learned Single Judge further erred in treating the conditions requiring
an M.Phil./Ph.D. to earn the benefits as illegal and arbitrary merely
because an M.Phil. was not the minimum qualification for initial
appointment.
We repeat, the contemporaneous material shows that an M.Phil or an
equivalent higher qualification for earning the benefits in question was a
condition recognized within the UGC pay framework and approved by the
State Government. The respondent No. 1 accepted that condition, acted
under it, and was subsequently granted the UGC scale of pay with effect
from 01.04.2008 upon acquiring an M.Phil.
38.
For the reasons aforesaid, we are unable to sustain the
judgment and order (oral) dated 23.10.2025 passed in WP(C) 3820/2023.
Accordingly, the same is interfered with by allowing the present appeal.
Consequently, the Writ Petition filed by respondent No.1 stands dismissed.
39.
There shall be no order as to costs.
JUDGE
Nmani/Smita
Comparing Assistant
JUDGE
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